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FOREWORD 
 
Samantha von Ende* 
 
“In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute.” 
- Justice Thurgood Marshall1 
 
The Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality started as an idea in the 
mind of young law students. Ideas can be quite powerful. The Journal has since 
grown into an interdisciplinary academic forum for scholars, practitioners, policy 
makers, and students with the goals of providing an outlet for scholarly discourse 
and contributing to society’s understanding of legal and policy issues concerning 
social equality.  
By drawing on leading scholars from a variety of disciplines and practice 
backgrounds, the Journal seeks to transform the lens through which issues of social 
equality and equity are viewed by identifying new issues and offering new 
theoretical and pedagogical approaches. It also seeks to serve as a model for social 
equality in its composition, functioning, and community engagement. The 
importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach to issues of social equality is 
grounded in the understanding that identities and experiences are situated within 
socially constructed systems and organized around characteristics such as race, 
gender, class, sexuality, ability, and others. These identity systems interact, 
mutually shape, and reinforce each other. Consequently, they cannot be studied in 
isolation. 
Although our journal is still in its early adolescence, it has continued to 
flourish this year under the leadership of Editor-in-Chief Melissa Logan and with 
tremendous institutional support provided by the law school administration, and, 
principally, our new and former faculty advisors, Professors Luis Fuentes-Rohwer 
and Deborah Widiss. We owe a significant debt of gratitude to each. 
Starting an academic publication is never an easy feat, but it may be easier 
than sustaining it through its initial years. Doing so involves a continuous process 
of adaptation, collaboration, and cooperation, and a great deal of patience, 
forethought, and judgment. Undertaking such an endeavor takes a significant 
investment of time and emotional resources—but it proves worthwhile. How we 
spend our days, of course, as Annie Dillard reflected, is how we spend our lives. 
How better to do so then, than in the dedicated pursuit and promotion of elaborate 
                                                        
* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D./Ph.D. (expected 2020). I extend my deepest thanks to 
the three most recent Editors-in-Chief of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality--Alyson 
Schwartz (Volume III), Nick Parker (Volume IV), and Melissa Logan (Volume V)--for their friendship, 
professionalism, and dedication to this Journal. I am indebted both to Katie Cullum and to Richard von 
Ende, without whose editing and support this piece would not have been produced. This Foreword is 
adapted from remarks given on April 7, 2016 at IJLSE’s Spring 2016 Symposium, Toward Justice: 
Turning Points in Social Movements Past and Future. All opinions and errors are my own. 
1  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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and honest inquiry? How better than by building an institution steadfastly 
committed to the uniquely human pursuits of greater knowledge and greater 
justice? This work cannot be accomplished in any given year, nor by any particular 
board of editors, but rather is by its nature an unending and evolving process. 
That’s fine. Land Institute Founder Wes Jackson once pointed out, “if your life’s 
work can be accomplished in your lifetime, you’re not thinking big enough.”2 
So, working as a member of this journal has been meaningful, but it has also 
been fun. When confronted with a problem that our bylaws do not address, we often 
joke that we should resort to journal common law tradition, and try to ring up 
former EIC, Alyson Schwartz. It is incredible she still takes our calls. We joke that 
we should add comments to bylaw revisions, from the “advisory committee for the 
2016 amendments.” So, yes, we flip through the bluebook a lot. But we make the 
best time of it. 
Levity aside, though, academic publications are incredibly important. And 
this journal’s existence is important for three specific reasons. First, it provides 
space for meaningful, supported, and dynamic discourse. Second, it does the critical 
work of informing the public and generating an educated citizenry, an attribute of 
society that Thomas Jefferson emphasized as the cornerstone of our democracy. 
Third, the space for discourse provides an opportunity to offer solutions to injustice, 
and, more fundamentally, to identify and frame those issues. John Dewey put it 
best when he simply stated, “A problem well put is half solved.”3 
Law is a remarkable human construction, but is by necessity inherently 
conservative, reflective of social evolution but never itself revolutionary. It 
entrenches values and processes in order to ensure stability and the mechanisms for 
self-government. Existing understandings of these entrenched values can be 
characteristically difficult to change. Progress can be slow, engagement low, and 
distrust high. It can become all too easy to succumb to the frustration, to throw our 
hands up at the absurdity and network of obstacles and decide: not me, not today. 
But if not us, who? And if not now, when?4 
We are at once fortunate and burdened to live in such interesting times of 
upheaval and social transformation. We live in an age of unprecedented 
development and access to information, but our lives, perspectives, and work 
remain as divided as ever. We construct echo chambers in technological and social 
spaces and yell past each other from value sets that are incomprehensible to those 
on the receiving end of our often-legitimate rants and pleadings. Overspecialization, 
institutionalized oppression, and emerging illiberal tendencies pose legitimate 
threats to our public discourse. 
Yet, public universities remain as one of the last commons—preserving a 
commitment to civil and reasoned discourse. Remarkably, these institutions, and in 
                                                        
2  Wes Jackson Transcript, THE PROMISED LAND, http://www.thepromisedland.org/wes-jackson-transcript 
(last visited March 7, 2017).  
3  JAMES CAMPBELL, UNDERSTANDING JOHN DEWEY: NATURE AND COOPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE 48 (1995). 
4  Here I am referencing the famous quotation from Hillel the Elder, “If I am not for me, who will be for 
me? And when I am for myself alone, what am I? And if not now, then when?” MISHNA, Pirkei Avot 1:14, 
http://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.1.14?lang=en.  
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particular their student organizations and publications, stood at the forefront of 
revolutionary social movements throughout the 20th century and continue to do so 
today. At present, a contentious issue emerging on campuses and in discursive 
spaces asks who bears the burden of education in movements to identify and rectify 
oppression. I certainly do not have the answer to that question, but I can 
propose one answer. It is our job. 
It is our job because the privilege of editorial boards to both represent and 
amplify the voices of others carries with it an immense responsibility: to do so fairly, 
accurately, swiftly, and with due regard for the pressing issues of the day. Likewise, 
the unique characteristics of universities, the empowerment of lawyers, and the 
secured position of academics imposes upon all of us an ethical imperative to 
publicly grapple with these issues, to admit the limitations of our knowledge and 
perspectives, to acknowledge the tense coexistence of multiple fundamental 
principles, and to embrace the uncertainty by committing to continuously reassess 
our values, the forms they take in society, and the impacts they have on the lived 
experiences of others. Our law counsels against the alternative, instructing, as 
Susan Sontag wrote, that “silence is inescapably a form of speech.”5 
That, I submit, is one sure way toward justice. The facilitation of 
conversations about social issues and social movements is integral to this journal’s 
dual missions of transforming the lens through which issues of social equality are 
viewed and contributing to society’s understanding of the legal and policy issues 
concerning social equality. This work is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
the envisioned and interdependent ends of social equality and an informed public. 
For, as Paulo Freire said, “we make the road by walking.”6 History is replete with 
examples of instances wherein the writing of scholars, politicians, reformers, and 
activists catalyzed major social transformations, identifying opportunities for 
and propelling turning points in justice movements. We can only ever move 
forward, but we can look backward and around for guideposts that signal the paths 
and the forks. 
So, that is why I think we are here, why it is important that we are, and why 
we are honored to have the scholars featured in this volume on board with our 
endeavor. We are thrilled once again to hand over the torch to the incoming board of 
editors, a diverse group of qualified individuals who have committed to continuing 
this important labor. The hard work of informing, verifying, and advancing is never 
done. This we know but it does not dissuade us. As the Mishna advised, it is not 
upon any of us to finish the work, but neither are we free to ignore it.7 
                                                        
5  SUSAN SONTAG, A SUSAN SONTAG READER 187 (1983). 
6  MYLES HORTON & PAULO FREIRE, WE MAKE THE ROAD BY WALKING: CONVERSATIONS ON EDUCATION AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1990). 
7  Here I am referencing a saying attributed to Rabbi Tarfon, “"It is not incumbent upon you to complete 
the work, but neither are you at liberty to desist from it.” MISHNA, Pirkei Avot 2:21, 
http://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.2.16?lang=en.  
 
      
 
Inefficient Inequality 
Shi-Ling Hsu 
ABSTRACT 
For the past several decades, much American lawmaking has been animated by a concern for 
economic efficiency. At the same time, broad concerns over wealth and income inequality have roiled 
American politics, and still loom over lawmakers. It can be reasonably argued that a tension exists 
between efficiency and equality, but that argument has had too much purchase over the past few decades 
of lawmaking. What has been overlooked is that inequality itself can be allocatively inefficient when it 
gives rise to collectively inefficient behavior. Worse still, some lawmaking only masquerades as being 
efficiency-promoting; upon closer inspection, some of this supposedly efficiency-driven legislation is only 
naked rent-seeking, enriching a small minority at the expense of social welfare. In pursuit of efficiency, 
injudicious lawmaking has created inefficient laws and institutions. 
This Article lays out several ways in which inequality can be allocatively inefficient. This Article 
also lays out a simple normative principle, focusing on broad economic effects, by which efficiency 
rationales for lawmaking might be more rigorously considered. Importantly, while it is lawmaking and 
not economic policymaking that is the focus of this article, it is essential that lawmaking be adequately 
informed by serious economic analysis, and not the intellectually casual, ideologically-driven economics 
that has opened the door to rent-seeking over the past several decades. The resulting lawmaking creates 
inequality but does not even produce the promised efficiencies. Better lawmaking must be informed by 
better economics. After all, if inequality is objectionable because it is inefficient, then measures to reduce 
inequality should themselves be efficient. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of economic inequality in the United States has already roiled 
presidential politics, and still retains the potential to reshape, if not realign, both the 
Republican and Democratic parties. The temptation is to think of inequality as an 
economic problem with economic solutions. There is just enough truth in such a view 
to mask a more fundamental source: legal rules and institutions. After all, an 
economy is defined by the legal rules and institutions that allocate resources and 
govern transacting.  
At the same time, American lawmaking has unmistakably taken on more of an 
emphasis on economic efficiency as a normative principle. Over the past fifty years or 
so, economic considerations have played an increasing role in lawmaking, helping to 
                                                 
   D’Alemberte Professor and Associate Dean of Environmental Programs, Florida State University College 
of Law. The author thanks and acknowledges the help and comments of Richard McAdams, Lee Fennell, 
June Carbone, Steve R. Johnson, workshop participants at Emory University School of Law, Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law, and at the Florida State University College of Law, and participants 
at the 2015 Midwestern Law and Economics Association meeting. The author would also like to thank 
Mary McCormick, Kat Klepfer, and the always outstanding library staff at the Florida State University 
College of Law for their assistance. Of course, the remaining shortcomings are the sole responsibility of 
the author. 
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establish the new field of Law and Economics.1 It is difficult to overstate the influence 
of Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law,2 the first (of nine and counting) edition 
published in 1973,3 and Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox,4 both of which succeeded in 
dramatically reshaping the way that legal scholars and judges think about law. In 
Reiter v. Sonotone,5 the Court, citing Bork,6 brushed aside nearly seven decades of 
antitrust jurisprudence and policy that was oriented around the preservation of 
competition7 and substituted Bork’s prescribed economic efficiency orientation.8 
Judge Posner’s textbook, in the meantime, is commonly thought to be one of the most 
influential works of the twentieth century, by one of the most influential scholars of 
his time.9 
The influence on law and economics scholars such as Judges Posner and Bork 
is perhaps most obvious in written judicial opinions, in which the reasoning is 
expected to be explicit, at least more so than any foray into legislative history. The 
influence of economic considerations on legislators is thus less obvious but just as 
profound. Major legislative initiatives in welfare reform,10 tax reform,11 financial 
                                                 
1 For a brief survey of the influence of economics on law and policymaking, see NICHOLAS MERCURO & 
STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM AND BEYOND 4–5 (2d ed. 
2006). 
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014). 
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973). 
4 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 61 (1978).  
5 442 U.S. 330 (1979).  
6 Id. at 343 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)). 
7   See Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2255 (2013); see also Eleanor 
M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2013) (“The operational goal … is to let business 
be free of antitrust unless its acts will decrease aggregate consumer surplus…. But this is not the goal of 
antitrust unless the concept of ‘goal’ reads ninety years out of antitrust history.”). 
8  BORK, supra note 4, at 90 (“Consumer welfare is the greatest when society’s economic resources are 
allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints permit. 
Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for the wealth of the nation.”). 
9 MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 1, at 102. 
10 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, PUB. L No. 104-93, 110 STAT. 
2105 (1996) (ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, commonly referred to as 
“welfare,” and substituted a package of programs to limit the amount of time that needy people can 
receive federal aid and provide job training benefits). For a review, see Jerry Watts & Nan Marie Astone, 
The End of Work and the End of Welfare, 26 CONTEMP. SOC. 409 (1997). The legislation was highly 
controversial (and has again become so recently), and was driven in part by an efficiency rationale: that 
aid dulled incentives to work. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative 
Federalism of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 128–30 (1996). 
11   See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Introduction, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 1, 6 (Joel Slemrod 
ed., 1996); Robert K. Triest, The Efficiency Cost of Increased Progressivity, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 137, 138–39 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1996). 
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institution regulation,12 as well as deregulation of electric utilities,13 railroads,14 
airlines,15 and even environmental law,16 have been justified as enhancing economic 
efficiency. At seemingly every turn, any legislative or regulatory proposal is touted 
as one that makes the American economy more efficient. To be sure, some of the 
economic claims made by lawmakers who lack even the most basic economic training 
lack credibility.17 But that has hardly stopped lawmakers from invoking economic 
efficiency, whether they know what it is or not.  
Unfortunately, whether lawmakers are complicit or genuinely duped by rent-
seeking industries,18 the result of efficiency-driven lawmaking is often inefficiency. If 
lawmakers do not have the tools or the training to strictly apply an efficiency 
standard espoused by economists,19 they have often used proxies, such as jobs, 
competitiveness, and cost-reduction for economic efficiency. But if these proxies are 
not a sleight of hand, they are an opening for rent-seeking. Jobs-counting is a 
numerical game, but it conveys no information about the value of jobs; job creation 
can be offered as justification for a subsidy to a dying industry. Helping domestic 
industries compete suggests greater domestic economic efficiency but fails to account 
for whether the domestic industry enjoys a comparative advantage over foreign 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., infra Part III.A. 
13 Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded Costs in Utility Deregulation, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 169 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
14  See, e.g., Jerry Ellig, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. REG. ECON. 143, 144–46 (2002). 
15 Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 321 (1988) (“The last ten years 
have fully vindicated our expectations that deregulation would bring lower fares, a structure of fares on 
average in closer conformity with the structure of costs . . . and great improvements in efficiency . . . .”). 
16 See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOL. L.W. 303, 337–42 
(2004). 
17 To take just one example of the abysmal economic ignorance in certain quarters of the U.S. Congress, 
such as Florida Congressman Ted Yoho, a large animal veterinarian, and Arizona Congressman David 
Schweikert, a real estate developer, who led calls to reject an increase in the U.S. debt ceiling on the 
grounds of fiscal thrift, but which would have triggered an unprecedented default with globally 
catastrophic consequences. See, e.g., Carmel Lobello, 3 Crazy Arguments From Debt Ceiling Deniers, THE 
WEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://theweek.com/articles/458997/3-crazy-arguments-from-debt-ceiling-deniers. 
For a scholarly discussion of the implications of a default, see, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover 
Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014).  
18 Rent-seeking is the practice of seeking privately favorable government policy with negative social value. 
See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN 
PUBLIC CHOICE 43 (2002). 
19 POSNER, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
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competitors.20 Reducing production costs seems like it must be efficient, except when 
it does so by allowing an industry to externalize its costs.21  
I hasten to emphasize that all of this Article is not a condemnation of economic 
efficiency as a public policy criteria. This Article is an effort to provide equal time for 
an under-appreciated counterweight to the prevailing views on efficiency and the law: 
that inequality itself is a source of inefficiency. Wealth or income inequality, if severe 
enough, gives rise to behavior which may be individually rational but collectively 
inefficient. This Article sets out several pathways in which this might be the case. 
This Article is also an exposition of how an ill-informed invocation of economic 
efficiency can lead to bad lawmaking—unjust by any reasonable definition but, more 
prominently and ironically, inefficient lawmaking. The upshot of this exposition is 
that economics must play a more prominent role in lawmaking, not less. What is 
needed is a more exacting scrutiny of economic claims made in support of lawmaking 
initiatives invoking economic efficiency as one of its goals. 
I emphasize that this Article does not argue that inequality is per se inefficient. 
Juxtaposed against the arguments raised in this Article are a countervailing set of 
arguments that inequality is not only something to be tolerated but even a necessary 
ingredient for prosperity.22 Circumstance and history dictate which arguments are 
more applicable, both sets of arguments playing a crucial role in ordering well-
functioning societies but in different places and at different times. That said, I do 
argue that the debate over economic efficiency inequality has lost its balance, and 
that the suite of efficiency-maximizing, inequality-tolerating arguments have come 
to dominate public law and policymaking, and have become unhinged from sound 
economic theory. Part I of this Article describes the sometimes fraught relationship 
the economics profession has had with inequality. Part II sets out how, as a result of 
this ambivalence, a set of arguments for de-emphasizing or even ignoring inequality 
has held too much sway over public lawmaking and economic policymaking. Part III 
sets forth several reasons why inequality may be allocatively inefficient. In so doing, 
Part III draws upon economic research that examines the linkages between 
inequality and economic growth as a proxy for allocative efficiency. Part IV of this 
Article argues that the key to reducing inequality lies not in redistribution for its own 
sake but on policies that focus on economic growth. That is not to say that 
redistributions cannot spur economic growth; every law or policy affects a 
                                                 
20 An “absolute advantage” is the greater technological ability of one country over another to produce some 
good. Of more relevance for international trade purposes, a “comparative advantage” is the greater 
economic ability of one country, given its factors of production, to produce some good. In other words, a 
country at an absolute disadvantage but a comparative advantage enjoys lower factors of production that 
can compensate for its lesser technological ability to produce the good. See, e.g., Shelby D. Hunt & Robert 
M. Morgan, The Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition, 59 J. MARKETING 1, 5 n.8 (1995). 
21 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF L. REV. 
1, 3 (1985).  
22 See infra text accompanying note 46. 
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redistribution to some degree. Effective legal responses to inequality, however, should 
be informed by sound economic analysis. 
I. ECONOMISTS ON INEQUALITY  
In attention to enabling rent-seeking, ignorance of basic economic principles 
has prevented lawmakers from appreciating the efficiency problems raised by 
inequality. It has not helped that most economists have, until recently, stayed out of 
the inequality discussion.23 Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist, 
Robert Lucas, once opined in an essay, even while acknowledging that the world had 
become “a world of staggering and unprecedented income inequality,” that economists 
should nevertheless avoid trying to reverse inequality.24 Lucas warned that “[o]f the 
tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my 
opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” 25 On the subject 
of inequality per se, there would appear to be little for economists to say anyway. 
Without a principled way of aggregating individual preferences into a social welfare 
function that can serve as a maximand,26 there is no obvious economic reason for 
choosing one distributional state of affairs over another.27  
Several prominent economists have ventured into the normative thickets of 
inequality work.28 These scholars include Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz;29 Sir Tony 
Atkinson, the author of perhaps the most prominent and long-standing body of work 
on inequality and poverty;30 and Thomas Piketty, the author of the sensationally 
                                                 
23 ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 14–15 (2015); Anthony B. Atkinson & Francois 
Bourguignon, Introduction: Income Distribution and Economics 1, 2–4, in HANDBOOK OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION (Anthony Atkinson & Francois Bourguignon eds., 2000).  
24 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., The Industrial Revolution, Past and Future, 2003 Annual Report Essay, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2004), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-
region/the-industrial-revolution-past-and-future. 
25 Id. 
26 Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLIT. ECON. 328, 328–30 (1950).  
27  But see Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2006). 
28 See, e.g., ATKINSON & BOURGUIGNON, supra note 233; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & FRANCOIS BOURGUIGNON, 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, VOLUMES 2A–2B (2014) (which included prominent economists such 
as Amartya K. Sen, Agnar Sandmo, Daron Acemoglu, and Thomas Piketty.). 
29 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM (2015); 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013). 
30 See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 23; Atkinson & Bourguignon, supra note 23; ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, 
ECONOMIC AND INEQUALITY (1975); ANTHONY BARNES ATKINSON AND ALLAN JAMES HARRISON, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL WEALTH IN BRITAIN (1978). A very long list of Atkinson’s work can be found at 
http://www.tony-atkinson.com/.  
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successful book Capital in the Twenty-First Century.31 Piketty’s Capital has forced 
inequality into public intellectual debate but has been broadly criticized,32 and most 
economists and economics-oriented legal scholars have still simply shrugged, “so 
what?”33 
So what, indeed? As many have pointed out, the lives of so many people in the 
world have improved vastly over the past several decades, even as inequality has 
increased,34 so really, is there anything wrong with inequality per se? From a 
perspective that focuses on overall wealth rather than its distribution, it might seem 
a bit petty to begrudge the fact that while the poor are better off, the rich are so much 
                                                 
31 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 2014) (originally published as Le capital au XXI siècle (2013)). Piketty’s book itself represents the 
culmination of two decades of work by himself and a group of economists focusing on economic inequality. 
See generally, Facundo Alvarado, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, & Emmanuel Saez, The Top 1 
Percent in International and Historical Perspective, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013); Phillipe Aghion, Abhiji 
Banerjee, & Thomas Piketty, Dualism and Macroeconomic Volatility, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1359 (1999); A.B. 
ATKINSON & T. PIKETTY, TOP INCOMES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2010); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 
A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation, 81 ECONOMETRICA 1851 (2013); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/ 
SaezZucman2014.pdf. 
 32 See, Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Piketty on Inequality, IGM FORUM (Oct. 14, 2014, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_5v7Rxbk8Z3k3F2t. 
See also infra notes 204–06. 
 33 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, 113 U. MICH. L. REV. 833, 836 (2015) (“Is 
there a problem? If r > g were embedded in a larger pattern in which g was relatively impressive—or 
even perhaps where g increased with the inequality—then for many observers there would be no problem 
to solve.”); N. Gregory Mankiw, Yes, r > g. So What? 105 AM. ECON. REV. 43 (2015); Richard Epstein, The 
Piketty Fallacy, REALCLEARPOLITICS (May 6, 2014), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl 
es/2014/05/06/the_piketty_fallacy_122547.html (“One of the most striking defects of the Piketty analysis 
is its flawed understanding of the relationship between social wealth and income inequality. . . . [A]s an 
economic matter, the increase of the wealth of some without a decline of wealth in others counts as a 
Pareto improvement, which is in general to be welcomed, even if it increases overall levels of inequality.”); 
Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Thomas Piketty is Wrong: America Will Never Look Like a Jane Austen 
Novel, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 31, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118925/ pikettys-capital-
theory-misunderstands-inherited-wealth-today (“The real danger is not inequality per se but bad policy 
that suppresses growth and thus the accumulation of wealth . . . .); Kenneth Rogoff, Where is the 
Inequality Problem?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 8, 2014), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/kenneth-rogoff-says-that-thomas-piketty-is-right-about-rich-countries--but-
wrong-about-the-world.  
 34 See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, THE GREAT ESCAPE: HEALTH, WEALTH, AND THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY 1 (2013) 
(“Life is better now than at almost any time in history. More people are richer and fewer people live in 
dire poverty. Lives are longer and parents no longer routinely watch a quarter of their children die.”); 
Lucas, supra note 24 (“of the vast increase in the well-being of hundreds of millions of people that has 
occurred in the 200-year course of the industrial revolution to date, virtually none of it can be attributed 
to the direct redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The potential for improving the lives of poor 
people by finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently 
limitless potential of increasing production.”); Rogoff, supra note 33. 
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better off. A policy preference for allocative efficiency would seem to have at least 
played a large part in decades of global economic growth. 
But the so-what response clearly does not sit well,35 even among the “One 
Percent”—the top percentile of wage-earners or wealth-holders.36 Even if it could be 
said that the poor are better off in absolute terms in an unequal society, there is a 
nagging, growing unease that inequality does matter, and not just in a visceral sense 
of unfairness. Rather, the broad concern is that excessive inequality produces a 
society that in its totality is less well-off in some sense.37 In other words, inequality 
might not only be unfair but inefficient as well. So to those who shrug “so what?” 
there is a retort: a blind devotion to allocative efficiency as a norm at the expense of 
distributional concerns may generate laws and policies that are, ironically, 
allocatively inefficient.38  
The reticence of the economic profession is exasperating because it is clearly 
within the economic mainstream to study the effects of inequality on indices such as 
economic growth,39 crime,40 and educational outcomes.41 What is missing is the short 
leap from a descriptive and empirical account of these linkages to the normative claim 
made in this Article: inequality, if extreme enough, can lead to outcomes that are 
societally undesirable and allocatively inefficient. 
                                                 
 35 See Public Opinion on Income Inequality, 11 AEI POLIT. REP. 1, 1–7 (May 2015), 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Political-Report-May-2015.pdf; Pew Research Ctr., 
Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich Countries About Future (Oct. 9, 
2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economies-much-more-optimistic 
-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/.  
 36 See, e.g., Warren Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html; Bill Gates, Why 
Inequality Matters, GATESNOTES: THE BLOG OF BILL GATES (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.gatesnotes.com/ 
  Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review. 
37 The thesis of this Article includes, but is not limited to, the claim that inequality can be inefficient from 
a purely neoclassical economic view. But this Article also makes the claim that inequality can make a 
society worse off in a way that is not captured by neoclassical economic models. For example, subjective 
well-being is increasingly considered a valid measure of societal welfare. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Rafael 
Di Tella, & Robert MacCulloch, Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?, 88 
J. PUBL. ECON. 2009, 2011 (2004); MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2012) (setting 
out a theoretical framework for comparing distributions in a social welfare function).  
38 Another article, and important precursor to this one, that has surveyed the literature is Paul L. Caron & 
James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic 
Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2012). The current article seeks to further disaggregate the mechanisms 
by which inequality may be allocatively inefficient, and to add to the list compiled by Caron and Repetti. 
39 See infra Part III.A. 
40 See infra Part III.C. 
41 See infra Parts III.A., III.B. 
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II. COMPETING NARRATIVES 
To a great extent, differences in opinion over inequality stem from different 
ideologies. The ideologies derive from opposing economic theories, but with empirical 
evidence somewhat spotty, political partisans have been left to fill in the blanks with 
their own ideological, often specious interpretations of theory and evidence. 
Seemingly academic economic debates thus matter because economic theory has come 
to play an enormously influential role in public law and policymaking, which has in 
turn played a central role in alleviating or exacerbating inequality. 42 Tax policy alone 
allocates trillions of dollars among Americans.  
One set of competing narratives draws upon fairly simple microeconomic 
notions. Every undergraduate student in Economics learns of the law of declining 
marginal utility of money: the more money someone has, the less each additional 
increment of money adds to that person’s happiness or utility.43 The first one hundred 
dollars a person has will be spent on absolute essentials, such as food and shelter, 
while subsequent one hundred increments are spent on things that are less and less 
important. The familiar graph of the declining marginal utility of money is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
 
The implication of this truism is a very general proposition that all other things 
being equal, a more equal distribution of money will place more people on a steeper 
part of the utility curve, achieving a higher level of utility for a greater number of 
people, as opposed to concentrating the money in one individual. Money means more 
to poor people than it does for rich people. 
There are equally simple, equally powerful competing narratives, however. For 
one thing, people have different preferences for wealth and trade wealth off 
differently against other tangible and intangible goods, such as material goods or 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN THEORY AND POLICY: A REALISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET 
ORIENTED CAPITALIST ECONOMY 9–14 (2015); Alan S. Blinder, The Case Against the Case Against 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy, (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 100, 2004), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/100blinder.pdf.  
43 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffrey, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 71, 
76–77 (1994). 
2016] Inefficient Inequality 9 
 
 
 
leisure time,44 so that not everyone has the same declining marginal utility of money. 
Another counterargument is that it is important to preserve incentives for hard work. 
Some inequality exists because individuals are rewarded for productive effort and 
individuals differ in their ability and willingness to produce, so unequal allocations 
are to some extent just a natural outcome in a world where productive effort is 
rewarded.45 Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets propounded a theory that inequality was 
a necessary incident of economic growth. Market factor prices would cause unequal 
factor prices to converge and equilibrate at a higher level of wealth.46 By Kuznets’ 
account, inequality is ultimately self-correcting and nothing to worry about.47  
Another pair of competing narratives draws from macroeconomic theory. John 
Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money48 ranks as one 
of the most influential writings of all time, having been vindicated (rightly or 
wrongly) by expansionary fiscal policy that pulled the world out of the Great 
Depression.49 A core tenet of Keynesian economic theory is that in recessionary times, 
when spending is low, government spending can take the place of private spending, 
which would boost aggregate demand for goods, spur employment, and boost 
economic activity.50 Keynesian economics has implications for inequality because 
government spending is likely to have the greatest effect on the poor. Because poor 
individuals generally have a higher marginal propensity to consume (i.e. spend), 
money in the hands of poor people have a greater stimulative economic effect than if 
it were in the hands of rich people.51  
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Richard Layard, Guy Mayraz & Stephen Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUBL. 
ECON. 1846, 1846 (2008) (“[I]t is crucial to know how fast the marginal utility of income declines as income 
increases. . . . A natural way to do this is to weight each person’s changes in income by his or her marginal 
utility of income.”).  
45 See, e.g., Gustavo A. Marrero & Juan G. Rodriguez, Inequality of Opportunity and Growth, 104 J. DEV. 
ECON. 107, 107–08 (2013); Martin Ravallion, Inequality When Effort Matters (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 21394, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21394.pdf. 
46 Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1955). 
47 Id. 
48 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).  
49 President Roosevelt was not apparently convinced of Keynes’ theory, nor was his New Deal inspired by 
Keynes. However, the military spending that was necessitated by World War II was, in fact, the kind of 
stimulus that Keynes advocated. ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929-1941 
329 (1993). 
50 KEYNES, supra note 48, at 348–52; Alan S. Blinder, Keynesian Economics, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECON. (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html.  
51 Christopher Carroll, Jiri Slacalek, Kiichi Tokuoka & Matthew N. White, The Distribution of Wealth and 
the Marginal Propensity to Consume 1 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/ 
cstwMPC.pdf. Moreover, spent money becomes income to the seller, who in turn spends some of that 
same money on her own needs, and so on, resulting in the same money being counted as income several 
times, or creating a multiplier effect of money, an empirically-derived factor that is used to evaluate the 
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But government spending is not free. One of several responses to Keynesian 
was “supply side economics,” which posits that long-term economic growth is affected 
not only by demand but also supply.52 Governments running huge, unsustainable 
deficits are likely to crowd out private investment and retard future growth.53 Supply 
side economics would argue for government policies to promote the formation of 
capital to produce goods that people supposedly demand.54 After all, money not spent 
is invested, which is also a predicate for production and consequent economic 
productivity.55  
A sensible synthesis of these two sets of competing narratives would 
acknowledge that none are universal; some situations call for redistribution and some 
call for government austerity, but government fiscal policy must be dictated by 
circumstance, not ideology. No self-respecting, modern Keynesian economist would 
deny that supply is irrelevant, a topic not even covered by Keynes.56 By the same 
token, during the depths of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, what has come to be 
known as simply the Financial Crisis, even prominent supply-side theorists 
advocated for strong fiscal action to stimulate aggregate demand.57 
Unfortunately, a sensible synthesis has not prevailed upon government fiscal 
policy. It has not even been true supply-side economics that has driven fiscal policy. 
Fiscal policy has been driven by a wayward faction of self-described supply-siders, 
ones that make much more aggressive and speculative claims than credible supply-
side economists. Prominent among them is Arthur Laffer, who famously propounded 
on a cocktail napkin his “Laffer Curve,” a putative relationship between tax rates and 
                                                 
effectiveness of fiscal policy. WALLACE C. PETERSON & PAUL S. ESTENSON, INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 172–76 (7th ed. 1992). 
52 Martin Feldstein, Supply Side Economics: Old Truths and New Claims, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 26, 26 (1986). 
53 See Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced-
Economy Episodes Since 1800, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2012). This paper has been controversial, as a 
graduate student found an error in Reinhart et al.’s spreadsheet, which affected some of quantitative 
claims made in the paper. Reinhart and Rogoff argue that the errors did not change their conclusions. 
Peter Coy, FAQ: Reinhart, Rogoff, and the Excel Error That Changed History, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-18/faq-reinhart-rogoff-and-the-excel-error-that-
changed-history.  
54 Feldstein, supra note 5252, at 26. 
55 Income is commonly defined by the accounting identity Y ≡ C + I + G  showing that for a closed economy 
without exports or imports, income is the sum of consumption, investment, and government 
expenditures. See, e.g., PETERSON & ESTENSON supra note 50, at 82. That is, by definition, money not 
spent is invested (excepting government expenditures). Investment in capital is a fundamental 
ingredient to economic growth. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 69–70 (1956). 
56 Blinder, supra note 50. 
57 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Stimulus Plan We Need Now, WASH. POST, (Oct. 30, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/29/AR2008102903198.html.  
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revenues, and argued that tax cuts would actually increase tax revenues.58 At some 
level this is true. But at current levels of income taxation in the United States, this 
idea is fantasy. Martin Feldstein, President Reagan’s Chief Economic Advisor and an 
architect of major federal income tax cuts of 1981 and 1984, has called the Laffer 
Curve the “height of supply-side hyperbole”59 and Laffer himself “a supply-side 
extremist.”60 Neither Laffer nor his supporters have marshalled any empirical 
evidence that high, personal income taxes reduce labor supply.61 
And yet, Laffer and his ilk remain extremely influential on fiscal policy.62 Tax 
cuts introduced by President George W. Bush in 2001, the “Bush Tax Cuts,” have 
been justified on the grounds that they would boost growth by creating jobs,63 a claim 
                                                 
58 The Laffer Ctr., The Laffer Curve, LAFFER CTR. (2014), http://www.laffercenter.com/the-laffer-center-
2/the-laffer-curve/.  
59 Feldstein, supra note 52, at 27. Feldstein continued: “I have no doubt that the loose talk of the supply-
side extremists gave fundamentally good policies a bad name and led to quantitative mistakes that not 
only contributed to subsequent budget deficits, but also made it more difficult to modify policy when those 
deficits became apparent.” Id. at 27–28. 
60 Id. at 29.  
61 See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Robert E. Hall & Lawrence F. Katz, Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve 
from Six Decades of Tax Reform, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1999) (“As a testable 
hypothesis, however, the Laffer curve has not fared well. . . . More careful econometric analysis has not 
been any more supportive. An extensive literature in labor economics has shown that there is very little 
impact of changes in tax rates on labor supply for most people, particular for prime-age working men. 
This would seem to indicate that the central tenet of the Laffer curve is demonstrably false—marginal 
rates seem to have little impact on the amount that people work.”). It is true that more sophisticated 
theories have emerged that have the same implications as the Laffer Curve: Feldstein himself argues 
that high personal income tax rates do not discourage labor so much as they encourage the shifting of 
income into non-taxable forms. Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: 
A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551 (1995). This, however fares little better 
as an empirical matter than the original Laffer Curve. Austan Goolsbee, Robert E. Hall & Lawrence F. 
Katz, Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax Reform, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1999). 
62 Jim Tankersley, Arthur Laffer Has a Never-Ending Supply of Supply-side Plans for GOP, WASH. POST, 
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/arthur-laffer-has-a-neverending-
supply-of-supply-side-plans-for-gop/2015/04/09/04c61440-dec1-11e4-a1b8-2ed88bc190d2_story.html 
(“No one has influenced Republican candidates’ thinking on the economy for the past four decades as 
much as Laffer . . . .); Rana Foroohar, Growth is Still All About Supply Side for Republicans, TIME (Nov. 
11, 2015), http://time.com/4107809/republican-debate-economics/. 
63 House Speaker John Boehner claimed on the Today Show on May 10, 2011, that the Bush Tax Cuts 
created 8 million jobs. Louis Jacobson, John Boehner Says Bush Tax Cuts Created 8 Million Jobs Over 
10 Years, POLITIFACT.COM (May 11, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter 
/statements/2011/may/11/john-boehner/john-boehner-says-bush-tax-cuts-created-8-million-. GOP 
lawmakers still cling to this claim. The GOP continues to claim the Bush Tax Cuts have led to job 
creation, even recently, Jonathan Weisman, Economy Up, G.O.P. Wants a Little Credit, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 
10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/business/economy/economy-up-gop-wants-a-little-
credit.html (“‘There’s a positive story to tell since Republican took over the House, 9.6 million jobs 
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that lawmakers have clung to despite it having been debunked by even conservative 
analysts.64 Meanwhile, the Bush Tax Cuts have been highly regressive, boosting the 
incomes of the One Percent by 61.8% from 2002 to 2007, while boosting incomes of 
the bottom 99% by only 6.8%,65 and then only to be wiped out by losses from the 
Financial Crisis.66 Those continuing to advocate for tax cuts have argued that tax 
cuts are needed for “job creators,” who would use the extra money to employ 
workers.67 Skepticism and calls for tax equity that have risen up alongside Piketty’s 
book sales68 have been answered by catcalls of “class warfare.”69 
Even post-Financial Crisis, government fiscal policymakers seem to resist any 
Keynesian suggestions of infusing poor households with money. By any measure, the 
economic recovery following the Financial Crisis has been weak,70 and the evidence 
seems to point to depressed aggregate demand71 due to weak spending by the poor—
                                                 
created, the deficit cut in half, 98 percent of the Bush tax cuts locked in place.’” (quoting David Winston, 
a Republican pollster)). 
64 See, e.g., Rick Ungar, The Truth About the Bush Tax Cuts and Job Growth, FORBES (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/07/17/the-truth-about-the-bush-tax-cuts-and-job-growth/; 
David Boaz, One Bad and Eight Good Reasons to Cut Taxes, CATO INST. (Feb. 28, 2001), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/one-bad-eight-good-reasons-cut-taxes. This claim has also 
been debunked by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4570, 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POLICIES CONTRIBUTING TO FISCAL TIGHTENING IN 2013, at 2 (Nov. 2012) (stating 
that allowing the Bush Tax Cuts to expire for couples making more than $250,000 and single individuals 
making more than $200,000 would increase GDP by 1.25 percent).  
65 Emanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2012 
Preliminary Estimates) 6 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-
UStopincomes-2012.pdf); see also THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42131, CHANGES IN 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG TAX FILERS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006: THE ROLE OF LABOR INCOME, 
CAPITAL INCOME, AND TAX POLICY 4 (2011) (Table 1, showing large increases for high-income individuals 
and falling income for the bottom twenty percent). 
66 See infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
67 A 2011 proposal by Republicans in the House of Representatives was entitled “Plan for America’s Job 
Creators,” REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 112TH CONG., PLAN FOR AMERICA’S JOB CREATORS (2011), 
http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/jobs/theplan.pdf, and pledged to “help business owners 
create jobs without raising taxes.” Press Release, Office of Speaker of the House, Helping Americans Get 
Back to Work is Our Number One Priority (May 26, 2011), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-
boehner-highlights-plan-america%E2%80%99s-job-creators). See also Jeremy W. Peters, G.O.P. Hopefuls 
Now Aiming to Woo the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http:/.www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/us/ 
politics/gop-hopefuls-now-aiming-to-woo-the-middle-class.html.  
68 See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, High-income Americans Pay Most Income Taxes, But Enough to be ‘Fair’? PEW 
RES. CTR., FACTTANK (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/24/high-income-
americans-pay-most-income-taxes-but-enough-to-be-fair/.  
69 Gary Cameron, Senior Senate Republican Accuses Obama of ‘Class Warfare’, REUTERS 
   (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-taxes-hatch-idUSKBN0KT1KR20150120.  
70 See, e.g., BEN BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 109–10 (2013). 
71 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Consumers and the Economy, Part II: Household Debt and the Weak U.S. 
Recovery, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F., (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/ 
economic-letter/2011/january/consumers-economy-household-debt-weak-us-recovery/. 
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because they are still poor!72 This fact would call for a Keynesian injection of money,73 
but that notion has been completely supplanted by the rubbish that supply-side 
charlatans are peddling and conservative politicians are disseminating—that is, the 
idea that giving money and regulatory breaks to “job creators,” such as finance 
institutions, will produce economic growth.74  
As another example of faux economics driving law and policy, deregulation of 
the finance and banking industries had been justified on the grounds that 
liberalization was needed so that American banks and financial firms could compete 
in a global finance industry and continue to create wealth and jobs domestically.75 A 
series of deregulations of the banking and finance sector, at the very least, played an 
important part in creating the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.76 At 
the same time, deregulation had the effect of amplifying compensation in the finance 
industry.77 The top 0.1%—dominated by individuals in finance78—now hold 22% of 
the nation’s wealth, which is about the same level as it did in 1929.79 All this 
regressive mayhem occurred because the banking and finance industries were able 
                                                 
72 More precisely, actually, the Ninety-Five Percent. See Barry Z. Cynamon & Steven M. Fazzari, 
Inequality, the Great Recession, and Slow Recovery, (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 9, 
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205524.  
73 See, e.g., Alan Auerbach & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion, 1–27 in 
FISCAL POL’Y AFTER THE FIN. CRISIS (A. Alesina & F. Giavazzi eds., 2012); Olivier Blanchard & Daniel 
Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers, (IMF Working Paper No. 13/1, 2013) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf.  
74 See, e.g., THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOPS TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at 1 (2012) (“The plan advocated by House 
Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan that is embodied in the House Budget Resolution . . . the Path 
to Prosperity, also proposes to reduce income tax rates . . . . Advocates of lower tax rates argue that 
reduced rates would increase economic growth, increase saving and investment, and boost productivity.”); 
TRANSCRIPT: Fox News-Google GOP Debate, FOX NEWS (Sep. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com 
/politics/2011/09/22/fox-news-google-gop-2012-presidential-debate.html (“Americans want a leader who’s 
got a proven record of job creation. Number one, we get rid of Obamacare. Secondly, we pull back all of 
those regulations that are job-killing today, whether it’s Dodd-Frank or whether it’s the EPA.”) (quoting 
Texas Governor and Republican Presidential candidate Rick Perry)).  
75 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 973–75 (2009); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 73 (2014). 
76 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall 
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1328–40 (2013). 
77 See Thomas Philippon & Ariel Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–
2006, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1551, 1605 (2012). 
78 Benjamin B. Lockwood, Charles G. Nathanson & E. Glen Weyl, Taxation and the Allocation of Talent,124 
J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324424. 
79 Emaneul Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from 
Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 519 (2016).  
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to argue that less regulation would preserve their competitiveness and that their 
greater profits would mean more jobs.80  
It is clear that a wide variety of legislative and administrative actions that 
have led to increased inequality have been justified by something quite beyond what 
is credibly considered supply-side economics. Current levels of inequality have come 
about in large part because of the rhetorical power of an ideology of low taxes and 
economic deregulation, which has increased inequality and failed to deliver promised 
economic growth.81 But it has been an ideology that has clearly placed its stamp on 
economic law and policy, dragging the political spectrum so far to the right as to 
completely separate political ideology from economic reality. This Article seeks to 
restore economic reasoning to economic law and policy and strike a new balance 
between competing theoretical narratives concerning the need (or lack of need) to 
address economic inequality. 
III. HOW INEQUALITY CAN BE INEFFICIENT 
Inequality may be allocatively inefficient (and therefore produces suboptimal 
welfare states) in a variety of ways that are completely consistent with a strictly 
welfare maximization viewpoint. Welfare maximization, correctly done, thus requires 
that some attention be paid to distribution so as to avoid some inefficiencies and 
pathologies that arise out of inequality itself. This section sets forth several such ways 
in which inequality might generate inefficiency. 
This Article does not treat the related but separate problem of poverty. Poverty 
tends to be defined in absolute terms, such as an income level for a given number of 
dependent household members.82 This Article speaks to the need to address 
inequality, a relative state of affairs measuring differences among groups, not 
absolute levels of life quality. And again, this Article only seeks to present arguments 
                                                 
80 A central figure driving deregulation was former Senator Phil Gramm, co-sponsor of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, which removed regulatory barriers between retail banking and finance. Gramm has said of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which re-regulated some banking and finance activities, that it “has undermined a 
vital condition required to put money and America back to work — legal and regulatory certainty.” 
Michael J. de la Merced, Deregulator of Banks Set to Testify Before House, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/business/dealbook/deregulator-of-banks-set-to-defend-his-
actions.html.  
81 See, e.g., Hungerford, supra note 74, at 8–10 (“The statistical analysis . . . does not find that either top 
tax rate has a statistically significant association with the real GDP growth rate. . . . These results are 
generally consistent with previous research on tax cuts. Some studies find that a broad based tax rate 
reduction has a small to modest, positive effect on economic growth. Other studies have found that a 
broad based tax reduction, such as the Bush tax cuts, has no effect on economic growth. It would be 
reasonable to assume that a tax rate change limited to a small group of taxpayers at the top of the income 
distribution would have a negligible effect on economic growth.”). 
82 See How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/ 
income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measures.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2016). 
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that inequality can produce inefficient outcomes. I acknowledge that economic theory 
is replete with accounts of how inequality can be a natural and efficient aspect of an 
effective free market.  
 Inequality Suppresses Capital Investment 
Atkinson, Piketty, and a group of economists led a re-engagement with the 
economic implications of inequality in the 1990s after a period in which it was 
commonly accepted that income or wealth inequality was either irrelevant to 
economic growth or was a positive factor for economic growth.83 Three arguments 
were offered in support of the view that inequality was associated with economic 
growth: (1) that the rich had a higher marginal propensity to save and therefore 
invest,84 and that providing more wealth to the rich increased the supply of 
investment funds, spurring economic growth;85 (2) some growth-enhancing 
investments tended to be large and indivisible so that some concentration of wealth 
was necessary for those investments to be made; and (3) the presence of inequality 
provided incentives for individuals to increase their effort and also to innovate.86 
These arguments rested on pivotal assumptions—for example, that a growth economy 
is limited by investment funds, not skilled labor—which seem not to have been 
seriously challenged.87 Nor did economists seem to obsess much over the omission of 
other crucial growth determinants, such as education and infrastructure.88 However, 
in the 1990s, with the rise of the study of human capital (education and informal 
                                                 
83 See Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1615, 1615 (1999). 
84 A standard identity in macroeconomic theory is that savings, the difference between income and 
consumption, is necessarily investment. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 63 (1936). There is sometimes confusion whether this is an 
accounting identity (true by definition) or an assumption of equilibrium conditions. See, e.g., A. 
Asimakopulos, Finance, Saving and Investment in Keynes’ Economics: A Comment, 9 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 
405, 405 (1985). But almost any growth theory would posit that at least the vast majority of savings 
would be invested in some productive manner, contributing in some way to economic growth. 
85 Very generally, a simple growth posits production as a function of labor and capital. See, e.g., Robert M. 
Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 69–70 (1956). So unless 
production requires capital and labor in fixed proportions, increasing capital would increase production 
and therefore economic growth. 
86 Aghion et al., supra note 83, at 1620. 
87  Nicholas Stern, The Determinants of Growth, 101 ECON. J. 122, 124 (1991). But the interdependence of 
labor stock and capital stock was noted influentially by Solow’s seminal A Contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth. See Solow, supra note 85. 
88 Id. at 129. 
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learning)89 and the emergence of development economics, a renewed interest in 
growth theory took root.90 Recognition that growth could be modeled endogenously 
and could be strongly affected by government policy seemed to raise new research 
and modeling questions and force a re-examination of prevailing notions about 
inequality.91 As economists looked at the difference between developed countries and 
developing countries, they could not help but notice vast inequalities of wealth among 
the former and began to ask questions about whether inequality played some role in 
determining growth.92  
Growth theory has typically focused on production, and more particularly on 
the capital investment required for production.93 It was thus natural to wonder, at 
some point, if inequality might impede economic growth because it meant that large 
swaths of a population might be too poor to invest in potentially productive capital. 
Lenders in an unequal society face borrowers that have sufficient collateral (rich 
people) and those who don’t (poor people), and lenders would therefore loan at 
different interest rates.94 An unequal society misses a huge opportunity by making it 
harder for the poor to borrow and invest.95 This constraint might hinder ordinary 
productive investments, like opening a small business, but might be even more 
unfortunate (and more inefficient) if it discouraged, as economic scholars suspect it 
                                                 
89 See Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POLIT. ECON. 571 (1960); Theodore W. 
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1961); GARY S. BECKER, A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 30–54 (3d ed. 1993). 
90 See Ravi Kanbur & Nora Lustig, Why is Inequality Back on the Agenda? 1 (Cornell Univ. Dep’t of Agric., 
Res., and Managerial Econ., Working Paper No. 99-14, 1999), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2645 
b8f2cf81613e353d3dd0ef7abd0991ad9d49.pdf. 
91 Stern, supra note 87, at 122–23. 
92 See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600 
(1994); Atkinson & Bourguignon, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
93 Conventional economic theorizing and empirical analysis has tended to view capital as the limiting factor, 
since much of the under-developed world has so much inexpensive labor. See, e.g., Adrian Wood, Openness 
and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional 
Wisdom, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 33, 34 (1997) (“The belief that increased openness reduces wage 
inequality in developing countries rests on an apparently indisputable fact—that the supply of unskilled 
labor, relative to the supply of skilled labor, is larger in developing than in developed countries.”); Michael 
P. Todaro, A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment in Less Developed Countries, 59 AM. 
ECON. REV. 138, 138 (1969) (“[E]ven the most casual observer of these countries cannot help but be 
overwhelmed by the proportion of the urban labor force which is apparently untouched by the ‘modern’ 
economy.”). 
94 Thomas Piketty, The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit Rationing, 
64 REV. ECON. STUD. 173, 181–85 (1997). See also, Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and 
Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 35, 36 (1993); Abhijit V. Banerjee & Andrew F. Newman, 
Occupational Choice and the Process of Development, 101 J. POLIT. ECON. 274, 276 (1993). 
95 Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Distribution and Growth in Models of Imperfect Capital Markets, 36 
EUR. ECON. REV. 603, 603–04 (1992); Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth 
and Development, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 151 (1997); Banerjee & Newman, supra note 94, at 276 
(1993); Piketty, supra note 944, at 173–74 (1997); Galor & Zeira, supra note 94, at 36 (1993). 
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does, investment in education.96 Inequality thus has a dynastic effect in that poorly-
educated families have little capacity to invest in education and improve their lot.97 
This dynastic effect is exacerbated because poorer families are more likely to be 
larger; to augment income and pool risks of family misfortune (such as illness), poorer 
families are likely to have more children, in turn making it more difficult for those 
children to invest in education.98 Even without considering the cost of maintaining a 
safety net for unproductive individuals, the lack of productivity is an enormous 
opportunity cost for society.  
Some economists with Keynesian inclinations also wonder if inequality 
reduces capital investment from the demand side. It is true that economic growth 
might be stunted by insufficient production caused by lack of investment. But it might 
also be true that economic growth might be stunted by insufficient demand. A person 
with 3,000 times the personal wealth of an average individual does not consume 3,000 
times as much as the average individual.99 Wealth inequality implies that fewer 
consumers can afford to purchase goods, which would suppress demand for goods and 
services, which would in turn suppress capital investment.100 Why invest in 
producing goods if there aren’t enough consumers out there with sufficient wealth to 
buy them? Moreover, an inefficiently small consumer base creates second-order 
inefficiencies: a smaller domestic goods market reduces product diversity and 
                                                 
96 W. Henry Chiu, Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance, 108 ECON. 
J. 44, 44–45 (1998); Galor & Zeira, supra note 94, at 36; José De Gregorio, Borrowing Constraints, Human 
Capital Accumulation, and Growth, 37 J. MONETARY ECON. 49, 50 (1996); Amparo Castelló & Rafael 
Doménech, Human Capital Inequality and Economic Growth: Some New Evidence, 112 ECON. J. C187, 
C187–89 (2002).  
97 Oded Galor & Hyoungsoo Zang, Fertility, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth: Theory and Cross-
Country Evidence, 9 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 197, 198–99 (1997); see Momi Dahan & Daniel Tsiddon, 
Demographic Transition, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth, 3 J. ECON. GROWTH 29, 29–30 
(1998). 
98 Cf. Nancy Birdsall & Juan Luis Londoño, Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment of the World Bank’s 
Approach to Poverty Reduction, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 32, 36 (1997); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New 
Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 273 (1998); See also Castelló 
& Doménech, supra, note 96, at C187–89; Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: 
What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 177–82 (1996). But see, Stephen Knowles, Inequality and 
Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data, 41 J. DEV. 
STUD. 135, 154 (2005); Christophe Ehrhart, The Effects of Inequality on Growth: a Survey of the 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 27–39 (Soc. for the Stud. of Econ. Ineq. Working Paper No. 
ECINEQ WP 2009-107, 2009). 
99 For a study showing that income inequality leads to consumption inequality, see Mark Aguiar & Mark 
Bils, Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequality?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2725 (2015). 
100 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Income Distribution, Market Size, and 
Industrialization, 104 Q.J. ECON. 537, 538–39 (1989); Anandi Mani, Income Distribution and the Demand 
Constraint, 6 J. ECON. GROWTH 107, 108 (2001); Josef Zweimüller, Inequality, Redistribution, and 
Economic Growth, 27 EMPIRICA 1, 13–15 (2000). 
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competition in goods provision,101 and it consequently dampens the incentives to 
innovate and in turn dampens the economic growth that comes along with 
innovation.102  
It should not be surprising that inequality creates economic losses by 
suppressing consumption as well as production. If severe enough, inequality 
disenfranchises large parts of a population. To the extent that countries with high 
levels of inequality are leaving substantial groups of people behind, they are not just 
ill-serving those groups; they are ill-serving their entire populace by failing to 
capitalize on human resources. 
 Loss of Positive Human Capital Externalities 
Like other forms of capital, human capital—formal education or informal 
learning—is a factor of production and a key driver for economic growth.103 But 
human capital confers benefits that other forms of capital do not. Human capital 
helps drive the adoption of new technologies, as higher-skilled workers with richer 
human capital generate better ideas and are more able to adapt to changes in 
technology.104 Better still, human capital can produce knowledge spillovers as 
interactions among skilled individuals generate mutually beneficial enhancements to 
human capital.105 This is especially true if one examines the stock of human capital 
in a specific locality, where interactions are likely to take place, such that one 
explicitly considers the returns of education to a local economy.106 
The empirical evidence strongly suggests that inequality is negatively 
correlated with investment in human capital and thereby dampens economic 
                                                 
101 Josef Falkinger & Josef Zweimüller, The Impact of Income Inequality on Product Diversity and Economic 
Growth, 48 METROECONOMICA 211, 213 (1997). 
102 Reto Foellmi & Josef Zweimüller, Income Distribution and Demand-Induced Innovations, 73 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 941, 941–42 (2006). 
103 N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer & David N. Weil, A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, 
107 Q.J. ECON. 407, 408 (1992). 
104 Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. S71, S99 (1990); Andrew D. Foster 
& Mark R. Rosenzweig, Technical Change and Human-Capital Returns and Investments: Evidence from 
the Green Revolution, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 931, 951 (1996). 
105 See, e.g., Romer, supra note 104; Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, 
Technological Diffusion and Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 69, 75 (1966); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On 
the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 5–8 (1988); James J. Heckman, 
Policies to Foster Human Capital, 54 RES. ECON. 3, 7 (2000).  
106 JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 3 (1970); James E. Rauch, Productivity Gains from Geographic 
Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence from the Cities. 34 J. URBAN ECON. 380, 380 (1993); Enrico 
Moretti, Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence from Longitudinal and Repeated 
Cross-Sectional Data, 121 J. Econ. 175, 208–09 (2004); Enrico Moretti & Per Thulin, Local Multipliers 
and Human Capital in the United States and Sweden, 22 IND. & CORP. CHANGE, 339, 356–67 (2013). 
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growth.107 Economists have long intuited the importance of education to economic 
growth.108 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, in their book The Race Between 
Education and Technology,109 argue that the economic dominance of the United 
States for the latter half of the twentieth century was largely due to its broad public 
schooling system, which created an educated workforce able to adapt to technological 
changes and increase productivity.110 Young women,111 as well as young African 
Americans,112 benefited broadly and greatly. But more importantly for our purposes, 
the dissipation of inequalities in education did not place white males at a relative 
disadvantage; rather, the breadth of education in the American populace lifted up an 
entire populace, creating economic growth in excess of what could have been achieved 
without compulsory schooling.113 And by contrast, Goldin and Katz argue, the 
American failure to maintain that educational advantage after 1970 largely explains 
the country’s economic underperformance over this same period.114 In the United 
States, inequality that stratifies schooling into one system for haves and another for 
have nots is not only unjust but grossly inefficient.115  
 Inequality and Crime 
Crime has long been studied as a sociological problem.116 Nobel Laureate Gary 
Becker modeled crime as a purely economic problem, opening up a new and entirely 
                                                 
107 Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. 
ECON. 259, 272–74 (1998); Perotti, supra note 98, at 152–54; Castelló & Doménech, supra note 96, at 
C187–89; Moretti, supra note 106; Moretti and Thulin, supra note 106; Rauch, supra note 106. But see 
Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, How Large are Human-Capital Externalities? Evidence from 
Compulsory Schooling Laws, 15 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. MACROECONOMICS ANN. 2000 9, 12–13 
(2000), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11054.pdf. 
108 See, e.g., Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, supra note 89; Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 
supra note 89. 
109 CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY (2008). 
110 Id. at 29. 
111 Id. at 78 (Table 2.5 showing higher returns for education for women in college and business school, but 
not high school). 
112 GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 109, at 21–23. 
113 Id. at 29. 
114 Id. at 320–23. 
115 Roland Bénabou, Heterogeneity, Stratification, and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of Community 
Structure and School Finance, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 584, 603 (1996). 
116 See, e.g., Stuart Lottier, Distribution of Criminal Offenses in Sectional Regions, 29 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1938); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN 
AREAS (1942). A strand of literature actually focused on the U.S. South on the theory that Southern 
culture had more violent roots than that of other regions. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON C. BREARLEY, HOMICIDE 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1932); Sheldon Hackney, Southern Violence, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 906 (1969); 
Raymond D. Gastil, Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence, 36 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 412 (1971); 
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different literature, one that tended to view criminals, law enforcement agents, and 
potential victims all as rational actors, in stark contrast to sociological models of 
culture and norms.117 Again, this Article does not address the effects of poverty on 
efficiency, and so does not address the effects of poverty on crime. If poverty is the 
result of a lack of legal economic opportunities, then illegal opportunities become an 
increasingly rational alternative even in the face of potential sanctions. Inequality, 
by contrast, is not concerned with the situation of the potential criminal herself but 
her position relative to others. A potential criminal may not even be particularly poor 
but may be moved to crime by her relative position to others.  
Inequality may cause crime by breeding resentment, but for our purposes, it is 
more relevant that inequality can make crime, even violent crime, a rational course 
of action. Consider two individuals of equal age, size, and strength, but one is 
wealthier than the other. The wealthier individual, with more opportunities for 
wealth acquisition, would have more to lose from a violent encounter. The opportunity 
costs of violence are higher for the wealthier individual, and the poorer individual 
can exploit that asymmetry and threaten violence. In fact, the wealthier individual 
may even be larger, stronger, and quicker, and have an absolute advantage over the 
poorer one; but the poorer individual who has less to lose may still have a comparative 
advantage in violence.118 
Extrapolating from this two-person example, it is not hard to imagine that 
inequality creates a dangerous situation because of the asymmetry of opportunity 
costs. In societies with vast inequalities, some individuals will have very small 
opportunity costs of crime, perhaps even violent crime, with the result that they will 
enjoy a comparative advantage in violence. The rich can of course purchase some 
security with their vast wealth, obtaining an absolute advantage in violence, but that 
will not be enough to prevent those with little left to lose from initiating violence.119 
Even if the poor lose more in a violent clash, in the context of what can be gained and 
lost by violence, a clash will be more costly to the rich than the poor, which is exactly 
what the rich fear. 
Empirical validation of this phenomenon does face some data challenges. For 
one thing, crime underreporting is not only commonplace in all jurisdictions but 
                                                 
Colin Loftin & Robert H. Hill, Regional Subculture and Homicide: an Examination of the Gastil-Hackney 
Thesis, 39 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 714 (1974). 
117 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach, 76 J. POLIT. ECON. 169–72 (1968). 
118 See, e.g., Hunt & Morgan, supra note 20. 
119 An illustration of the difference between an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in violence 
is provided in Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-
White Relations, 37 J. LAW & ECON. 39 (1994), and in D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of 
Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1986). Professor Johnsen 
argues that property rights among aboriginal groups of the Pacific Northwest emerged which provided a 
substantial amount of customary sharing, in part to avoid the wealth imbalances that would give rise to 
a comparative advantage in violence.  
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varied in its extent, making cross-sectional analyses difficult.120 For another, there is 
the question of what geographic unit of measurement is relevant: is it inequality 
within a country, state, county, city, or neighborhood?121 For yet another, 
measurement of inequality can be challenging. Measuring inequality by income elides 
the difficulty that individuals commonly have different incomes at different points in 
life that do not accurately represent lifetime earning potential.122 For example, 
graduate students may have low incomes but high future earnings potential and may 
consume more than the average low-income individual.123 Most researchers have 
simply tried their best to address data problems and disclose shortcomings.124 
But while data issues merit an asterisk, it is accurate to assert that a positive 
link exists between inequality and crime, violent and non-violent. At the end of the 
day, most studies have found a statistically significant relationship between 
inequality and crime.125 This relationship, where it is found, is usually 
distinguishable from the effect of poverty on crime.126 For our purposes, it seems 
sufficient to say that the link between inequality and crime serves as another 
economic justification for reducing inequality. 
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 Inequality and Political Instability 
There is enough of Karl Marx in Thomas Piketty for him to drop some dark 
hints of a grand clash between classes if wealth gaps continue to expand.127 Just a 
remote threat of violence or social unrest is enough to send investors fleeing for safer 
shores and thereby reducing economic growth.128 Worse still, the threat of social 
unrest raises borrowing costs for the government, further reducing the resources 
available in that country for public spending.129 Relatedly, the threat of violence or 
social unrest may induce executive action that infringes upon private property rights, 
again sending investors fleeing.130 A strand of political economy research thus 
examines the effects of inequality on political stability and consequently on economic 
growth.  
Using cross-country and time-series analyses, researchers have found that 
robust and statistically significant relationships exist between inequality and 
political instability131 and between political instability and economic growth over 
time.132 Political instability is operationalized by measuring the frequency of large 
political demonstrations and political assassinations, the number of fatalities 
stemming from incidents of mass violence, the number of serious attempts to 
overthrow a sitting government, and the frequency of actual changes in 
government.133 High levels of inequality have even been shown to be correlated with 
higher levels of terrorist activity.134 
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The existence of legal rights and a strong foundation in the rule of law have 
always been recognized as essential to economic prosperity and growth.135 But 
perhaps even more important is the existence of economic rights and opportunities to 
strive. What this research seems to highlight is the importance of the latter as a 
complement to the former.  
 The Erosion of Social Capital 
Since the publication of Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone,136 the study and 
measurement of “social capital” has occupied a prominent place in social science 
research, even among economists.137 Social capital is most commonly thought of as 
the variety of interpersonal and intra-organizational bonds that are formed for 
purposes of cooperation.138 Putnam defines social capital as “features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit.”139  
Putnam’s normative focus, and that of most sociologists, has been civic or 
community well-being. Putnam’s thesis was that social capital enhances political and 
civic life without consciously having these outcomes as objectives.140 Membership in 
bowling leagues, churches, and a variety of groups apparently made people better 
citizens without their knowing it.141 Conversely, a breakdown in social capital brings 
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on a variety of social ills, including poorer health,142 lower educational levels,143 and 
increased violent crime.144  
But in addition to social benefits, social capital confers important economic 
benefits. Significant efficiencies can be realized by cooperation within a social group 
or community that has built up a reservoir of trust.145 A well-known example is found 
in the Jewish diamond merchant business in New York City.146 In order to obtain a 
second opinion on the value of diamonds, merchants will entrust competing 
merchants with bags of diamonds with enormous value—tens or hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Amazingly, stealing in this community is virtually non-existent 
because the social capital resident in this community is even more valuable; stealing 
or substitution would result in ostracism.147 But note the economic significance: the 
ability to obtain a reliable second opinion on diamonds worth thousands and tens of 
thousands of dollars is a huge benefit. Moreover, being able to do so without having 
to resort to formal enforcement mechanisms148 is a cost savings. Of course, it is 
possible for social capital to be marshalled for unproductive, even immoral purposes, 
such as organized crime or the Ku Klux Klan,149 or for rent-seeking;150 but this is also 
true of physical or human capital. The economic perspective is analogous to Putnam’s 
argument: social capital enhances economic productivity without consciously having 
economic productivity as its goal.151  
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Inequality imposes costs because it erodes trust and social capital.152 Trust and 
social capital are unfortunately likely to be low when parties are from different racial 
or ethnic groups.153 Economic inequality creates a similar sociological distance so that 
the greater the inequality, the lesser the trust.154 A Pew survey conducted in 2014 
asked respondents about their views on whether government should help the poor 
and whether they thought the poor “have it easy.”155 The results are reproduced in 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2 
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The stark differences in attitude between the richest and the poorest are 
striking. It is shocking that more than half of people in the two richest quintiles 
actually believe that “poor people today have it easy,” when the average 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefit (food stamp benefit) is about 
$125 per month, or a little over $4 per day.156 In the United States, there is quite 
apparently a great sociological distance between rich and poor when it comes to how 
comfortably the poor live. 
Lower levels of trust and social capital are unfortunately costly. Clearly, one 
implication of the Pew study is that greater inequality has the ironic effect of 
discouraging giving from rich to poor.157 But it is not just that rich people are less 
charitable in their giving habits to help the poor, but that people of all income levels 
are less willing to contribute to civic engagement of all sorts.158 A general erosion of 
trust and social capital affects people’s view of policy and causes people to withdraw 
from social transacting. Cross-sectional studies show that the erosion of social capital 
caused by inequality causes a policy to disfavor public spending on all kinds of 
government programs and services,159 but most notably and most unfortunately, 
public education.160 The quality of government services is poorer in states where there 
is less reported trust.161  
For our purposes, it is most useful to consider how inequality erodes social 
capital and impinges on economic growth. Extrapolating from case studies, like that 
of the Jewish diamond merchant industry, up to a macro level, it is natural to 
hypothesize that economies with more social capital, and concomitantly more trust, 
were more economically productive.162 It is not difficult to imagine why: commercial 
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transactions are the stuff of economic growth, and as Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow 
once said, “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust.”163 Trust can displace the need for costly formal enforcement mechanisms, and 
the smaller the transaction costs, the more transactions.164 More trust requires less 
litigation, fewer defensive expenditures, and more innovation because of the more 
trustworthy environment.165 More trust leads to more accumulation of capital, 
especially human capital,166 which is perhaps the most critical growth 
determinant.167 
Note that this thesis has two stages: (1) that inequality erodes social capital 
and (2) loss of social capital reduces economic growth. Empirically validating this 
thesis thus requires establishing linkages for both stages. There are two approaches 
to empirical research in this area: (1) cross-sectional studies and (2) laboratory 
experiments. While data limitations and definitional questions warrant some 
caution, the totality of the research offers reasonably robust support for the thesis 
that inequality reduces social capital, which consequently reduces economic growth. 
Both cross-sectional studies and experiments offer support for the first stage 
of the thesis that inequality erodes social capital. There is the long-standing problem 
of how exactly to operationalize social capital: is it associational activity, such as 
belonging to clubs and civic organizations, or is it simply trust, as reported in general 
attitudinal surveys? Researchers examine both possibilities, mostly reporting both 
that inequality reduces associational activity168 (although ethnic heterogeneity plays 
an unfortunately stronger role)169 and reduces reported levels of trust.170 
Experimentally, as well, researchers have used inequality as a treatment effect and 
found that subjects placed in situations of inequality were less willing to contribute 
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to public good provisions, indicating a lower level of trust.171 Most troubling, 
inequality caused “richer” subjects to undercontribute, confounding a previously 
prevalent expectation that the rich contribute more so as to achieve a more equal 
allocation.172 
Validating the second stage—that erosion of social capital reduces economic 
growth—can only be accomplished with cross-sectional analysis, as no experiment 
can realistically model economic growth in a lab (though some researchers 
experimentally ask subjects to contribute to a public good that will lead to a higher 
future payoff, thus simulating economic growth).173 On this score, as well, more 
researchers have found a link than not. Working from well-established economic 
growth models,174 cross-sectional studies attempt to control for other growth 
determinants (most notably education) and then attempt to find a statistical 
relationship with some measure of social capital—most commonly associational 
activity or trust—and economic growth.175 A variety of reasons could exist for social 
capital being a determinant of growth. Some researchers have identified a specific 
pathway: social capital as a stimulant of innovative activity by facilitating productive 
collaborations and by instilling some faith and trust in institutions through 
associational activity.176 
On the whole, researchers have linked the loss of social capital to losses in 
economic growth. In retrospect, this thesis should have been obvious. Widening 
wealth gaps reduce the commonalities of experience between rich and poor, 
increasing alienation. Under such circumstances, it would be natural to expect less 
trust, less generosity, more suspicion, and a generally less collaborative and 
productive society. Similarity within a population in wealth, education, and 
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employment, help to create some assurance that certain social norms are shared and 
that transactions are likely to be undertaken with these social norms serving at least 
as a coordinating principle. All of this is frittered away with increasing inequality. 
 Inequality Increases Incentives for Rent-Seeking 
Why do nations fail? That is the very big question asked by Daron Acemoglu 
and James Robinson in their book of the same title.177 In their book, Acemoglu and 
Robinson document the economic and political histories of a variety of countries and 
societies, and show how the rise of exploitive, economically “extractive” institutions 
simultaneously thwart economic growth and enrich a small elite group (or even an 
individual).178 The book does not offer a fundamental explanation of why the 
extractive institutions arise in the first place, nor does it truly define “extractive 
institution.” The reader is asked to recognize an extractive institution when she sees 
it. Slavery,179 monopoly,180 and suppression of free speech181 are examples.  
It is true that extractive institutions produce unequal societies. But a critical 
lesson from Why Nations Fail has to do with the self-perpetuation of inequalities 
brought on by extractive institutions. As it turns out, once “inclusive” institutions—
ones that foster economic growth, acting as the opposite of extractive institutions—
are ruined and replaced by extractive institutions, they are extremely hard to 
reconstruct. Once extractive institutions have succeeded in enriching the few and 
imposing misery on the many, the quest for power becomes all-important and rent-
seeking becomes a default option. As opposed to creating a “virtuous circle” 
constructed from inclusive institutions and the rule of law, a “vicious circle” of 
poverty, misery, and concentration of wealth and power becomes entrenched.182 With 
so much at stake and with an inevitable weakening of the rule of law, rent-seeking 
becomes an indispensable option.  
The frightening upshot of Why Nations Fail is that it is dangerously easy for a 
country to slip down the greasy slope of rent-seeking down to the black hole of 
autocracy. The story, as told by Acemoglu and Robinson, of how so many nations 
failed in the past is the story of how some critical level of inequality raised the stakes 
for government policy, and ushered in a new political equilibrium that was predicated 
on the naked pursuit of power. Even after an autocratic, kleptocratic government is 
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toppled, the inequality remains, and the incentives for rent-seeking and disincentives 
for the rule of law remain. While rent-seeking is costly and harmful, the real danger 
may be that it creates inequalities that are extremely difficult to reverse.  
 Inequality Reduces Subjective Well-Being 
Economists concede that indices such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are 
very crude approximations for social welfare.183 The most compelling case for 
continued reliance on measures such as GDP for social welfare and on income and 
wealth for individual welfare seems to be that we can measure it.184 Those arguments 
have been influential as far as they go, but a growing unease about some critical 
shortcomings have intensified doubts about the accuracy of these metrics.185  
Rising concerns about inequality have cast a particularly dark cloud over 
traditional, aggregate economic indices, fueling skepticism. United States GDP rose 
from 1999 through 2008 (up to the Financial Crisis), even while most Americans 
experienced a decline in real income.186 Over the past forty years, mean household 
income in real dollars has risen by thirty-three percent while real median household 
income has been stagnant, rising only twelve percent.187 Over the same period, the 
share of income by the top one percent has risen from below ten percent to over twenty 
percent.188 By breaking down aggregate measures of statistics like income, 
economists such as Piketty and Saez have helped to erode the misplaced faith in 
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aggregate indices, giving a data-driven voice to those straining against the misplaced 
satisfaction in seeing gains in aggregate statistics. Inequality is in large part driving 
re-examination of faith in GDP and economically-based welfare analysis. 
At the same time, notable advances in alternative measurements have 
reinvigorated calls to at least include some alternative measurements to go alongside 
the traditional economic indices as supplemental indicators.189 Happiness, or 
subjective well-being (SWB), has emerged as a serious alternative to traditional 
economic indices. Happiness, or SWB indices, are constructed using self-reported 
data, typically collected through very broad surveys,190 such as the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System administered by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention191 or the General Social Survey administered by the National Opinion 
Research Center.192  
Indices constructed from SWB data suffer from some of the same problems as 
economic indicators. Are measures of individual SWB additive, cardinal, or 
interpersonally comparable?193 How does one actually construct a social measure 
from individual responses?194 Is happiness all that matters? Maybe “meaningfulness” 
is more important to people than pure hedonic happiness or anything measured by 
reported measures of SWB.195 But even if alternatives are imperfect, rising concerns 
with inequality seem to provide an especially strong case for diversifying away from 
indicators such as GDP. GDP captures none of what is compelling about inequality: 
the mere volume of economic transactions says nothing about the parties to 
transactions, and what is troubling about inequality is the fact that many are being 
left out. In light of such glaring omissions, even an imperfect measure of the 
discontent brought on by inequality is likely to provide some information.  
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utilitarianism and its problems. For example, if maximum experienced happiness (or utility) is the goal, 
is success measured by assessing the average or the total amount of happiness?”). 
195 See MIKE W. MARTIN, HAPPINESS AND THE GOOD LIFE 183 (2012) (“The pursuit of any of those values, 
including moral values, contributed to happiness by sustaining a (subjective) sense of meaning . . . .”). 
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SWB research using data on a national level generally finds that over time, 
increases in income (which might be measured by GDP) have failed to generate 
increases in SWB.196 Getting at the discontent caused by inequality requires that 
data be analyzed using the individual as the unit of analysis: Are individual people 
more likely to report unhappiness if they live in a situation of greater income or 
wealth inequality? SWB research suggests a negative correlation between SWB and 
inequality.197  
In thinking about why inequality might lead to unhappiness, one strong 
hypothesis rooted in a long line of psychological research is that individual happiness 
depends significantly on an individual’s comparison with local peers. Thus, if one 
lives in a city with large inequalities, then one might be more envious if one is poor, 
or one might be more suspicious if one is rich.198 Or, inequality might give rise to a 
perception of lack of fairness and a lack of trust.199 Overall, while the results are not 
unambiguous, the predominance of the research shows a negative link between SWB 
and income inequality.200 Having more money makes most people happier,201 as does 
marriage.202 Involuntary unemployment makes almost everyone very unhappy.203 
But all other things being equal, living in a situation with inequality makes an 
individual less likely to be happy than otherwise. 
This line of research comports well with intuitions about inequality and 
general happiness. In a sense, the propensity of inequality to generate unhappiness 
ties together all of the subsections preceding this one. Each of the subsections in this 
part describe how a divergence in wealth or income creates some social or economic 
problem. Individually, these deviations from some innate expectation might be 
unnoticeable. But inequality has become not only noticeable, it has become a source 
                                                 
196 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the USA, 88 J. PUBL. 
ECON. 1359, 1366 (2004); Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some 
Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MOSES 
ABRAMOWITZ 89–125 (P. David & M. Reder eds., 1974). 
197 See infra notes 198–99. 
198 See Michael R. Hagerty, Social Comparisons of Income in One’s Community: Evidence From National 
Surveys of Income and Happiness, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 764, 767 tbl.2 (2000). 
199 See Shigehiro Oishi, Selin Kesebir & Ed Diener, Income Inequality and Happiness, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1095, 
1098 tbl.1 (2011). 
200 Only income inequality is investigated. Because of the difficulties of measuring wealth, researchers have 
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Nations, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 851, 859 tbl.4 (1995); Hagerty, supra note 198; Oishi et al., 
supra note 199. But see Maarten C. Berg & Ruut Veenhoven, Income Inequality and Happiness in 119 
Nations, in SOCIAL POLICY AND HAPPINESS IN EUROPE (B. Greve, ed. 2010). 
201 Diener et al., supra note 200, at 859 tbl.4.    
202 Alesina et al., supra note 200, at 2032 tbl.3. 
203 Id. 
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of widespread concern. It is as if the accumulation of these small deviations have 
suddenly welled up and been brought into public consciousness.  
IV.  TOWARDS REVERSING INEQUALITY: THE ROLE OF LAW, AND OF ECONOMICS 
A second objective of this Article is to press the case for reversing inequality, 
but to do it in a way that is consistent with economic growth. If inequality is 
objectionable in part because it is allocatively inefficient, then measures to cure 
inequality should not themselves be inefficient. Piketty’s thesis that inequality is 
increasing because the returns to private capital exceed the rate of economic growth—
expressed in his now-famous relation r > g—has been criticized for its universality,204 
its relevance,205 and its underlying data, faultily handled by Piketty (according to his 
critics).206 But the relation usefully reframes inequality as at least partly a problem 
of economic growth, which meets no disagreements from any economist. If inequality 
increases because r > g,207 then at least one answer is to find ways to increase 
economic growth.  
However, not all measures to stimulate economic growth are created equal. 
Enough harm has been wrought by, borrowing from Martin Feldstein’s words, 
“supply side extremists.”208 Economic growth policies have to be grounded in sound 
economics, not the snake oil economics that has insinuated itself into partisan politics 
and lawmaking. Unfortunately, snake oil economics often presents itself as a formula 
for job creation and economic growth. How can one tell the difference? 
There is no magic spell that can distinguish between sound economics and 
snake oil economics, much less a way of holding legislatures accountable for economic 
belief systems that border on astrology. But it is possible to do some informal sorting 
of laws and policies that purport to contribute to economic growth but seem to produce 
outsized rents to particular industries or groups. The most useful way to attack 
inequality is to focus on specific laws and policies that seem to contribute much more 
to private returns to capital (r) than they do to economic growth (g). In other words, 
laws or policies in which ∆r >> ∆g should be carefully scrutinized and re-evaluated 
for its impacts on economic growth. First, when it can be said of a law or policy that 
∆r >> ∆g, there is a heightened possibility that it contributes to economic inequality, 
                                                 
204 See, e.g., Per Krusell & Anthony A. Smith, Jr., Is Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ Fundamental?,     
J. POL. ECON. 725, 726 (2015). 
205 N. Gregory Mankiw, Yes, r > g. So What?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 43 (2015).  
206 Martin Feldstein, Piketty’s Numbers Don’t Add Up, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 7:31 PM), 
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since it is bringing about or exacerbating Piketty’s r > g condition. Second, when there 
is a connection between a law or policy and a spectacularly high return on private 
capital, there is the distinct possibility that the law or policy in question is wealth-
reducing, naked rent-seeking.209 In fact, the larger the returns to private capital, the 
more it is worth spending to obtain those rents. Few and far between are those 
economic laws and policies that miraculously create spectacular wealth in one sector 
or group that also redounds to the benefit of the larger polity. A third and related 
point is that when a law or policy dramatically and suddenly boosts returns to private 
capital in one sector or industry, it is potentially inducing a misallocation of 
resources, especially investment capital. As Eric Posner and Glen Weyl have argued, 
the finance sector has been shockingly well-paid, five times that of all academic 
research, a subset of which—medical research—has produced the equivalent of $3.2 
trillion of benefit every year since 1970.210 It is a fair bet that the finance sector has 
not produced $16 trillion annually in wealth over that time period. 
Granted, saying of a law or policy that ∆r >> ∆g is necessarily an informal 
observation, as there is never a counterfactual against which to measure economic 
growth or returns to private capital. Could we ever say such a thing? The answer is, 
in fact, yes: judgments about rent-seeking are made quite frequently and routinely, 
without necessarily resorting to empirical analysis.211 
To canvass the law and find all instances in which ∆r >> 0 and Δg is either 
negative or very small is a task beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, in keeping 
with the general theme of this Article—that inequality in extreme forms can be 
allocatively inefficient—I discuss two cases to outline a growth-increasing approach 
to reducing inequality. First, I discuss one case in which Δr >> 0 and Δg < 0, the 
deregulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The systemic risk of catastrophic 
loss created by unregulated trading of derivatives is a boon to traders and a clear case 
of government failure. As such, the re-regulation of OTC derivatives is exactly the 
kind of growth-improving measure that should be implemented to reduce inequality. 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., David R. Henderson, Rent Seeking, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentSeeking.html(“It has been known for centuries that people lobby 
the government for privileges. Tullock’s insight was that expenditures on lobbying for privileges are 
costly and that these expenditures, therefore, dissipate some of the gains to the beneficiaries and cause 
inefficiency . . . . Although such an expenditure [on lobbying] is rational from the narrow viewpoint of the 
firm that spends it, it represents a use of real resources to get a transfer from others and is therefore a 
pure loss to the economy as a whole.”). 
210 See Posner & Weyl, supra note 33 (citing Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Value of Health and 
Longevity, 114 J. POL. ECON. 871, 872 (2006)). Financial workers, meanwhile, contributing quite less than 
that, were paid five times that amount. Id. (citing Benjamin B. Lockwood, Charles G. Nathanson & E. 
Glen Weyl, Taxation and the Allocation of Talent, J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2016)). 
211 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 5 (2005) (“The problem here is one of definition. 
Should we regard the competitive research, competitive sales effort, and so on, as equivalent to rent 
seeking?”). 
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Second, I discuss a case in which Δr < 0 but it is likely that Δg < 0: an increase in the 
minimum wage. The economic analysis of minimum wage increases is surprisingly 
deep, but still inconclusive.212 But even if we were to accept that a minimum wage 
hike reduces inequality, it is potentially counterproductive in that it may impinge 
upon economic growth.213 Such a legal response might just be inadvisably blunt, given 
the plethora of alternative measures to raise economic growth more broadly. 
 The Re-Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Banking and finance, previously separate industries, have undergone 
deregulatory changes through a series of legislative and administrative moves over 
two decades.214 The total effect of all of the moves has been spectacularly lucrative 
for the banking and finance sector as a whole, even if there have been individual 
casualties. Never mind the most notorious instances of banditry, such as Lehman 
Brothers CEO Richard Fuld’s $480 million payout for navigating Lehman into the 
largest bankruptcy in history (while seeking a government bailout);215 the banking 
and finance sector as a whole has done extremely well throughout the Financial Crisis 
and the recovery since. Thomas Philippon and Ariel Reshef estimate that the 
educational wage premium for those in the finance industry, vis-à-vis other 
industries, adjusting for skill intensity and job complexity, to be 250 percent that of 
comparable professions.216 Banking and finance have been, and have become even 
more so, extraordinarily over-compensated sectors.217 The private returns to capital 
have been spectacular. And while the Financial Crisis obviously visited enormous 
losses upon the finance industry, the recovery has been uneven, to say the least. The 
One Percent lost so much, just because they held so much of the lost wealth—thirty 
percent218—but those on the lower rungs of the wealth ladder lost a larger portion of 
their wealth and had a much smaller household buffer (if they had one at all) to 
absorb losses.219 Perhaps most stunning, ninety-five percent of total income gains in 
                                                 
212 See infra notes 268–72 and accompanying text. 
213 See infra notes 273–73 and accompanying text. 
214 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
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the United States from 2009 to 2012 accrued to the top one percent of income 
earners.220  
And what of the effects of deregulation and consolidation for economic growth? 
Without a counterfactual, it is impossible to say, but even before the Financial Crisis 
laid bare the sharp contrast between compensation in the finance industry and its 
contribution to economic prosperity, studies suggested that the finance industry 
imposes shockingly large negative externalities.221 Certainly, in the wake of the 
Financial Crisis, in which $15 to $30 trillion of wealth was lost,222 no serious 
contention is made that the package of banking and finance deregulations over the 
past two decades have been positive for economic growth. Given the staggering wealth 
lost, if the contested assertions223 that the package of banking and finance 
deregulations caused the Financial Crisis are even partially correct, it would be 
implausible to argue that deregulation of the sector was economically beneficial. 
One reason this crisis was particularly brutal on the less wealthy is because it 
produced a widespread withdrawal of credit. The Financial Crisis was an old-
fashioned bank run,224 only on a new “securitized banking” system made possible by 
the combination of deregulations undertaken in the decades prior.225 Credit 
                                                 
Recession, 650 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 104 tbl.1 (2013). Moreover, so much of this loss 
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220 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (updated with 
2012 Preliminary Estimates) at 6 tbl.1 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://currydemocrats 
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221 See, e.g., Kenneth R. French, The Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN. 1537, 1538 (2008). 
222 See, e.g., Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell & Harvey Rosenblum, How Bad Was It? The Costs and 
Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis, 20 FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS STAFF PAPER 3 tbl.1 (July 
2013), http://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf. The authors’ $15–30 trillion 
estimate actually does not account for the costs of trauma and the opportunity costs of extraordinary 
government support offered in reviving economic activity. 
223 A majority (six out of ten) of the Congressionally-commissioned body charged with analyzing the causes 
of the crisis, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, found that banking and finance deregulation was 
a substantial cause of the Financial Crisis. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REP. OF THE NAT’L 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvii–xxviii (2011), 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173617/http://www.fcic.gov/about. The four 
dissenting members of the Commission pointedly disagreed with the parts of the report that emphasized 
deregulation, and propounded their own view that global capital flows bore significant blame for the 
crisis. Id. at 417–19. 
224 See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008, 97 
J. FIN. ECON. 319, 319–20 (2010). 
225 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 
425 (2012). Conservative scholars have laid the blame on government intervention in the form of Fannie 
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homeownership and supporting the risky mortgage-backed securities. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The 
Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong 12, (Nat’l Bureau 
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disappeared for a wide swath of businesses, causing many to fail or contract and to 
lay off workers, which compounded itself as the newly unemployed (and even those 
hanging onto their jobs) dramatically cut back on spending.226 In 2008 and 2009, 
nearly nine million Americans lost jobs—eight hundred thousand in the single month 
of January 2009.227 The job losses were wide and deep enough to deposit nine million 
Americans into poverty from 2007 to 2010.228 
This catastrophic credit crisis, with its regressive effects on employment, can 
be traced in large part to the deregulation of OTC derivatives,229 the product of a 
decades-long lobbying effort.230 In 1989, the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) was headed up by Wendy Gramm, the wife of Senator Phil 
Gramm, a central architect of banking and finance deregulation. The banking and 
finance industries sought and secured from Gramm’s Commission a safe harbor for 
one type of derivative, a “swap transaction,” used by banks to hedge risk from interest 
rates.231 Other liberalizations followed. The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 
authorized the CFTC to exempt some derivatives in addition to swaps and also pre-
empted any state laws purporting to regulate OTC derivatives.232 After a series of 
spectacular derivative-driven failures, including the bankruptcy of Orange County’s 
pension fund and a $4 billion bailout of the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
                                                 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14361, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14631 .pdf. But even 
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Management, talk of reigning in derivative trading resurfaced.233 CFTC Chair 
Brooksley Born sought to re-regulate OTC derivatives trading, but was shouted down 
by a “stampede” of lobbyists, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin.234 The culmination of this deregulatory effort was 
passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,235 which completed 
deregulation of speculative financial products, including credit default swaps.236  
Following the CFMA, trade in derivatives increased more than sixfold, from 
$94 trillion in the first half of 2000237 to almost $600 trillion during the second half 
of 2007.238 The result can be (and was, in the case of the Financial Crisis) the 
development of a derivatives market much larger than the value of the underlying 
collateral asset itself. Speculation using OTC derivatives ran rampant because 
unregulated derivatives were so much easier to obtain for hedging than actually 
purchasing a countervailing position.239 Critically, OTC derivatives could be issued 
on the same event multiple times,240 allowing a $1.3 trillion market on subprime 
mortgages to wipe out $11 trillion of wealth.241 
It is not hard to understand why banking and finance companies lobbied so 
hard for so long to deregulate the trading of OTC derivatives. The zero-sum 
gambling242 introduced by derivatives is not zero-sum for banks at all. Derivatives 
are a subsidy. Trading in derivatives increases risk, but much of the downside risk is 
insured in case of default.243 Also, for finance firms trading on behalf of clients, OTC 
derivatives are lucrative business: reporting of OTC-derived income is not mandated, 
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but Goldman Sachs estimated that from 2006 to 2009, twenty-five percent to thirty-
five percent of its revenues were generated from derivatives trading.244 Goldman 
Sachs net revenue for 2007 was about $46 billion dollars,245 so twenty-five percent to 
thirty-five percent of that is a lot of money. 
Worst of all, the nature of the risk created by speculation using OTC 
derivatives was systemic.246 Even the fractious Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
agreed that among those speculators that failed, there was “appallingly bad risk 
management.”247 While some of those guilty of speculating recklessly were, in some 
sense, punished (such as Lehman Brothers), the breadth of the risk created enveloped 
nearly the entire American economy. Credit drying up for speculators was also credit 
drying up for the vast majority of American businesses that depended on credit for 
cash flow to conduct their business and employ workers. So the risk happened to be 
much more widespread than that assumed (unwittingly) by wealthy managers taking 
risks on behalf of their wealthy clientele.248 The breadth of that risk, affecting all 
debtors, is an externality.249  
Finally, risk itself is a source of wealth inequality. The wealthier can better 
afford to take risks, and over the long run, a portfolio with more risk generates higher 
returns. Enabling risk-taking is the law’s way of inflating the returns to capital—
Piketty’s r. Seen in that light, all of the deregulations sought and obtained by the 
financial industry appeared desirable to wealthy investors. Risk is good for those that 
can afford to take it, and OTC derivatives create risk. 
The Financial Crisis was horrifying enough to result in passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd Frank”)250 which, 
among other things, required banks to transfer their derivatives holdings to non-bank 
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affiliates.251 It is not as if Dodd-Frank re-regulated OTC derivatives, as Lynn Stout 
has called for.252 But by forcing federally-insured banks to transfer derivatives to non-
banks, Dodd-Frank at least took the American taxpayer off the hook for speculating 
losses. Even this was too much for the finance industry, which used the occasion of a 
threatened government shutdown to insert a provision amending section 716 of Dodd-
Frank,253 putting the American taxpayer back on the hook and allowing, once again, 
federally insured banks to trade in OTC derivatives. 
Some of the risk associated with OTC derivatives has been alleviated by the 
mandate under Dodd-Frank for a “swaps clearinghouse,” so that most non-commodity 
swaps must be carried out through a “derivatives clearing organization that is 
registered under this Act.”254 The idea is that the regulated clearinghouses can—and 
are required to—better ascertain the robustness of the proffered collateral than the 
likes of AIG.255 However, as Mark Roe and others have argued, clearinghouses do not 
actually reduce the kinds of systemic risk that befell markets during the Financial 
Crisis and do not actually alleviate the risk;256 there is no reason to believe that the 
“derivatives clearing organizations” will have the incentives or the tools to spot poorly 
priced assets any better than the failed institutions.257 At the end of the day, with 
section 716 effectively repealed, trading in OTC derivatives is still legalized gambling 
with the downside risk implicitly assumed by the American taxpayer, and the fruits 
of such risk-taking accruing to those that have the means to take it. 
Obviously, if Congress is willing to do Wall Street’s bidding to amend section 
716 of the Dodd-Frank Act—which was not even a regulation of derivatives—then a 
push to re-regulate OTC derivatives would face considerable political headwinds in 
the near-term. The purpose of this Article, however, is to re-engage efficiency 
arguments for reducing inequality and to identify opportunities to reduce inequality 
in a manner that is consistent with economic growth, laying the groundwork for a 
longer-term initiative. Along those lines, the idea of re-regulating OTC derivatives, 
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which serve no purpose other than to further enrich wealthy financiers at a huge net 
cost to the economy and to the non-wealthy, is low-hanging fruit. 
 An Increase in the Minimum Wage  
With the rise in concern over inequality, one obvious solution is to raise the 
minimum wage, automatically raising the income of some of the lowest-wage workers. 
The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour, which is where it has been 
since 2009.258 Some cities in which protest over inequality has been noisiest—Seattle, 
Los Angeles, Washington, and Chicago—have passed minimum wage laws, with 
Seattle and Los Angeles mandating a minimum wage of fifteen dollars per hour, and 
Washington and Chicago lower amounts.259 Voters in San Francisco and Oakland 
have approved similar measures, and proposals are underway in New York and San 
Diego.260 The minimum wage hike idea is simple and has been gaining popularity in 
recent years, as concerns of inequality intensify.261  
Apart from a handful of scholars that have grappled with the nuances of a 
minimum wage increase,262 the debate over minimum wage hikes has been driven by 
two competing, simplistic, and ideological ways of thinking about the minimum wage: 
(1) that inequality can be reduced by lifting up poor wage workers by blunt legal 
force263 and (2) that raising the minimum wage increases labor costs and causes 
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262 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 
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employers to reduce the number of jobs available.264 Both of these ideological 
assertions contain just enough truth to be plausible. But the economic truth is, as it 
always inconveniently seems to be, dependent on unknowable specifics. On the one 
hand, it is not clear that a minimum wage hike would help those that one would 
consider “needy.” The minimum wage work force is small to begin with—3.8 million 
in 2011, representing only 5.2% of all hourly-wage workers.265 Of those, half are under 
the age of twenty-five, indicating that the lower end of the pay scale is crowded by 
younger workers, as we might expect, but not necessarily the most needy.266 It is true 
that significant increases in the minimum wage would boost the wages of not only 
those working at or below the minimum wage, but also those making slightly more; 
among those might be people that are targeted for relief: the working poor that are 
struggling to stay above the poverty level, including those with dependent children.267 
But low-wage employment situations are so heterogeneous that it is difficult to say 
definitively who would benefit from a minimum wage hike. The effect of a minimum 
wage hike on poverty remains uncertain.268 
On the other hand, the opposition to a minimum wage hike is based on unclear 
empirical support as well. In a seminal and still-controversial 1994 article, David 
Card and Alan Krueger studied the effect of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey, 
comparing employment dynamics in New Jersey with that of neighboring 
Pennsylvania.269 Card and Krueger failed to find the predicted contraction of 
employment in New Jersey,270 confounding what had been strong conventional 
economic theory at the time.271 Moreover, Card and Krueger found a small positive 
effect on employment in New Jersey, which they attributed to lower turnover and 
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  INST., Public Policy Brief (Dec. 1999), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/hili57a.pdf.  
268 See, e.g., Joseph J. Sabia & Richard V. Burkhauser, Minimum Wages and Poverty: Will a $9.50 Federal 
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savings in retraining new employees and to possible monopsonist behavior by 
employers.272  
Many critiques and a few affirmations of this landmark study followed,273 but 
over time, most economists seem to have accepted that a minimum wage hike might 
reduce employment but that the effects are small.274 It is also more widely accepted 
among economists that a minimum wage hike would have only modest effects on 
inequality, only helping some of those at the lowest income levels.275 
A 2013 survey of top American economists at Harvard, Stanford, MIT, 
Berkeley, Yale, Stanford, and Chicago was mixed in terms of their support for a 
raising of the federal minimum wage to nine dollars per hour.276 When asked whether 
they agreed with the statement “[r]aising the federal minimum wage to nine dollars 
per hour would make it noticeably harder for low-skilled workers to find 
employment,” thirty-four percent agreed, thirty-two percent disagreed, and twenty-
four percent were uncertain. Some of the world’s top labor economists, such as David 
Cutler of Harvard and Austan Goolsbee of Chicago (once President Obama’s Chief 
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Economic Advisor) replied “[u]ncertain.”277 Proposals at the state level, even in liberal 
states, have been greeted with unease, even by those who advocate for greater 
economic equality.278 In light of the prevalence of fifteen dollars-per-hour proposals, 
however, the same economists were surveyed about the minimum wage hike up to 
that higher amount; that seemed to garner some more negative reactions, with more 
expressing the belief that unemployment would increase and aggregate output would 
contract.279 
 So it turns out that in addition to providing top-notch political theater, 
minimum wage hikes make for lively and animated academic debate as well. But at 
the end of the day, even economists who support a minimum wage seem 
unenthusiastic. Neither Stiglitz nor Piketty have had much to say recently about a 
minimum wage hike.280 In Inequality: What is to be Done?, Atkinson compiled a list 
of fifteen proposals for reducing inequality; a “statutory minimum wage set at a living 
wage” is one,281 but he devotes little text to this proposal and expresses doubt: 
Does the Minimum Income Standard provide a foundation for defining a low-pay 
standards? Doubts must arise. If we examine the details of the wage requirement 
derived from the Minimum Income Standard, we see that it varies across family types. 
. . . The minimum wage cannot do all the work on its own.”282 
The verdict on a minimum wage increase as a legal tool to address inequality seems 
to be that it is blunt and probably not very effective. A Congressional Budget Office 
study found that raising the federal minimum wage to $9 would lift 300,000 out of 
poverty but would cost 100,000 jobs, with larger figures for a hike to $10.10.283 These 
numbers are not trivial, nor are they worth the inordinate attention and political 
posturing surrounding this idea. The problem with a minimum wage hike is that, 
while it may reduce the returns to private capital, there is some risk that it would 
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also reduce economic growth. In Piketty’s parlance, it does no good to implement a 
policy for which Δr < 0 if it also imposes Δg < 0. If the problem of inequality is that it 
is inefficient, then the answer cannot be to impose more inefficiencies, however 
modest they may be. 
CONCLUSION 
Distributional issues have efficiency implications. To be sure, the relationship 
between distribution and efficiency is complicated, but it is no longer tenable to take 
Robert Lucas’ position that economics should never concern itself with inequality. At 
certain levels of inequality and under certain circumstances, an increase in inequality 
in either wealth or income will reduce social welfare. That reduction may or may not 
be measurable by traditional economic metrics, but it is widely accepted that welfare 
changes can occur without being reflected in such metrics.  
Not only should economists concern themselves with inequality, but the 
cautionary tale stemming from the bogus supply-side economics still taking up 
residence on Capitol Hill and the equally speculative claims about the benefits of a 
minimum wage hike is that economists also have a crucial role to play in setting legal 
policy that implicates inequality. If Piketty is just heuristically correct—that r > g 
characterizes the dynamics of inequality, then much work is to be done, and sound 
economic analysis must be a crucial component of any legal policymaking that 
implicates inequality. Given the multitude and complexity of factors that affect 
returns to private capital and that affect economic growth, there is no quick and easy 
way to undo decades of inequality-producing law and policy. The r > g formula 
suggests structural changes are required. 
Some care must be taken to find ways to narrow the gap between r and g. There 
are certainly ways to reduce returns to private capital, but many of them would run 
against the grain of a legal system that instinctively protects legal expectations.284 
The most egregious enrichments of wealth should eventually be susceptible of 
reform—compensation in the banking and finance industry, the re-regulation of OTC 
derivatives, and an increase in the estate tax285—but others might be undertaken 
more gingerly. The complexity is that measures promoted as growth enhancing are 
rarely so.  
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The harder, but surer path to reducing inequality is to focus on laws and 
policies which more broadly and clearly stimulate economic growth and which 
redound to the benefit of the non-wealthy. There are certain fundamental widely 
accepted drivers to economic growth—quality education accessible to the entire 
populace,286 a physical and electronic infrastructure that is sufficient to support 
trade,287 a reasonable investment environment free of confiscatory regulation or 
policy,288 and the minimization of environmental and health hazards that threaten 
human development.289 As between knocking down r or boosting g, it is most 
constructive to find ways to increase g, the rate of economic growth, with an emphasis 
on how to ensure that the non-wealthy participate meaningfully in economic growth 
and receive the benefits of doing so. So, for example, focusing on broadly accessible 
education as a “force of convergence” in Piketty’s parlance is one way to address both 
economic growth and reducing inequality.290 That educational reform has proven to 
be so vexing, speaks to the magnitude of the challenge, not its desirability, as no 
economist disputes the importance of education in fostering economic growth.291 
Reducing inequality is likely to require a long, sustained effort. In large part, 
current levels of inequality have come about because of rent-seeking, enabled by 
specious claims of economic benefits generated by some pet industry. There are no 
magic bullets. If reducing inequality were simple, the world would be nearly free of 
it. 
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Campus Racial Unrest and the Diversity Bargain 
 
Steven W. Bender* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Coinciding with the Supreme Court’s consideration of a significant challenge 
to affirmative action,1 campus racial unrest across the United States during the 
2015–16 academic year drew national attention. Encompassing elite institutions 
such as Yale, Harvard, and Princeton and sometimes aligning with broader 
movements for racial justice such as Black Lives Matter, protests over hostile racial 
climates on campus challenged the status quo of unwelcoming environments for 
students of color.2 I moderated the Society of American Law Teachers’ annual Cover 
Workshop, held in early 2016 at Fordham University School of Law. This workshop 
engaged these racial protests as entry points for improving race relations on 
campus. 3  Racial activism on campus, of course, is not a new development, as 
campus protest reaches back throughout the 1900s as it coincided and connected 
with broader racial unrest confronting entrenched segregation and discrimination.4 
While achieving some short-term victories, 5  the current wave of campus 
protests also prompted backlash and even threats of violence from some White 
students, as well as media attacks, such as Fox News’ labeling of university 
protestors as anarchists. 6  This backlash exposes the sinister and sobering 
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1  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).   
2  Alia Wong & Adrienne Green, Campus Politics: A Cheat Sheet,  THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/04/campus-protest-roundup/417570/ (detailing some 
of the high-profile protests including the most newsworthy outcome when University of Missouri 
President Tim Wolfe resigned in response to a strike of the university’s football team and mass student 
demonstrations protesting his response to racial incidents on campus). 
3  2016 SALT Cover Workshop, Race Matters: Creative Entry Points for Impacting Race Relations on 
Campus. Panelists included a Yale law student and other presenters who addressed the role of 
oppressive symbols, contextualized the current struggles within a history of racialized oppression, and 
connected the protests to Black Lives Matter and other movements. SALT Cover Workshop, Jan. 9, 
2016, Fordham Law School, SOC’Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, https://www.saltlaw.org/events/salt-cover-
workshop/ (last accessed Sept. 13, 2016). 
4  See Stefan M. Bradley, Black Activism on Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/07/education/edlife/Black-HIstory-Activism-on-Campus-
Timeline.html (supplying a timeline of significant Black activism on campus since 1900). 
5  See Wong & Green, supra note 2 (detailing the aftermath of high-profile protests). 
6  Olivia Kittel, Fox News: Where Protests Against Racial Discrimination Are Anarchy but Armed Protests 
Against Federal Law Are “Patriotic,” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 12, 2015, 3:02 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2015/11/12/fox-news-where-protests-against-racial-discrimi/206819 
(comparing negative characterizations on Fox News of racial justice protestors with its praise for White 
rancher protesters in Nevada: “Only on Fox News are armed militia members protesting federal law 
‘patriotic,’ while university students and faculty speaking out against racism are labeled as 
anarchists.”); See also Wong & Green, supra note 2 (reporting threats of murder and violence in the 
aftermath of racial protests at the University of Missouri). 
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foundations of racism on college campuses that connect to the seeming permanence 
of racism embedded in U.S. institutions and law. In this Article, I suggest that 
despite the window dressing of diversity that claims to open the campus doors to 
racial minorities, society fears an educated and activist minority population that 
sets out to change the status quo of systemic racism. As I posit, activist minority 
students, whether in law or other disciplines, have violated their covenant of 
admission and tolerance on the college campus. 7  So long as activist minority 
students are subservient students who stick to the classroom, honor campus 
legacies, and, once educated in mainstream Anglo-centric curriculum, enter the job 
market well-dressed and with cultivated accents intending to support the university 
financially in producing the next crop of graduates, university officials will talk the 
talk of diversity and its fruits. But should the students, as angry products of 
working-class families of color, learn the nature of their oppression and its sources 
and aim to change that world, starting with their own campus, they violate their 
tacit bargain, long enforced by a variety of policies and strategies detailed below. 
I. DIVERSITY’S BARGAIN 
Colleges now routinely celebrate and trumpet their commitment to diversity.8 
Corporate America also champions the virtues of a diverse workforce and, 
concomitantly, a diverse and educated supply chain of student bodies. Best 
evidencing this support, more than sixty major companies signed an amicus brief in 
the University of Michigan affirmative action litigation before the Supreme Court in 
the early 2000s.9 But the implementation of affirmative action admission policies 
and, more broadly, the tolerance of racial minorities on campus, whether or not 
admitted through affirmative action, are constrained by the terms of the diversity 
bargain of assimilation and complicity. To honor this bargain requires minority 
students to accept that the numbers of their diverse classmates will be few and 
                                                        
7  See also Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness as Property 
and Racial Performance as Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 7, 25 (2015) (describing 
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brief supporting affirmative action joined by 65 companies such as Coca-Cola and Microsoft). The 
Supreme Court ultimately recognized the constitutional underpinning of affirmative action programs 
sourced in the compelling justification of diversity. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(finding law school had compelling government interest in attaining a diverse student body). Ironically, 
the corporatization of universities in recent decades does not suggest a breakthrough for racial justice, 
as corporations also value docility of their diverse workforce. 
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diluted even more by their respective majors, that most of their professors will not 
look like them and that their required and elective curriculum will not engage their 
own histories of oppression or their cultures of expression. Students must be willing 
to kiss the ring of slaveholders and segregationists when surrounded by buildings 
named for racial oppressors and by statues and other symbols honoring these 
leaders.10 Once minority students graduate, they must return the favor of their 
admission and tolerance of their presence on campus by tamping down impending 
racial insurrections and feeding the system that sends back donations to their alma 
mater to support another generation of docile students, who they commit to mentor 
to the same positions of grandeur and comfort. 
The university is not the only venue where racial docility is prized—the 
workplace equally values submission. 11  Poor and working-class Mexicans, for 
example, were long praised for their perceived subservience to the master’s orders.12 
One writer lauded the shift to a Mexican labor force in the early-1900s United 
States as inviting “a great reservoir of the cheapest and most docile labor.”13 He 
went on to describe the Mexican “peon” as “a poverty-stricken, ignorant, primitive 
creature, with strong muscles and with just enough brains to obey orders and 
produce profits under competent [Anglo] direction.”14 My point is that the university 
is no haven from the societal expectation of racial docility. Whether in the 
workplace, on campus, or on the streets, society expects minorities to know their 
place and be thankful for whatever scraps of the American dream are tossed their 
way.15 
Racial protests on campus in the last year shook the historic foundations of 
racism and assimilation, breaching the covenant of tolerance of minorities on 
campus by other students, university administration, and society in general. 
Evident in the demands articulated in many of the recent protests are common 
themes of developing a curriculum that better speaks to the students, recruiting 
minority faculty, and admitting a critical mass of minority students.16 Imagine what 
                                                        
10  See generally CRAIG STEVENS WILDER, EBONY AND IVORY: RACE, SLAVERY, AND THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF 
AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES (2013) (describing how universities used slave labor). 
11  One of the tensions of affirmative action has been this duality of insisting on docility of recipients, 
while at the same time critiquing their supposed laziness. This critique is explained as one of the 
strategies deployed to keep minority entrants (whether or not admitted through affirmative action 
programs) in their place by communicating they are ill-deserving of the opportunity and best avoid 
causing any trouble. See infra notes 28–30 discussion and accompanying text. 
12  LOTHROP STODDARD, RE-FORGING AMERICA: THE STORY OF OUR NATIONHOOD 214 (1927). 
13  Id. 
14  Id. See STEVEN W. BENDER, ONE NIGHT IN AMERICA: ROBERT KENNEDY, CÉSAR CHÁVEZ, AND THE DREAM OF 
DIGNITY (2008) (detailing the decades-long activism of César Chávez to bring decent working conditions 
to field workers). 
15  We also expect them, as immigrants, to leave the country when their labor is no longer needed. See 
Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the United States: Invitation and Exile, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: 
A CRITICAL READER 77 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) (addressing our history of inviting 
Mexican labor, particularly under the wartime Bracero Program, and then forcibly ousting Mexicans 
during economic downturns). 
16  See Wong & Green, supra note 2 (reporting students at 60 schools have submitted racial demands to 
their schools; also describing the demands of Claremont McKenna College minority students seeking 
greater faculty diversity and multicultural services funding, and the reaction of the since resigned dean 
of students who pledged to support these students who didn’t fit “our  . . . mold,” prompting a campus-
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university administrators and wealthy donors must think about the prospect of a 
faculty member of color teaching students of color about their oppression, with those 
students graduating and causing even more trouble for the status quo.17 These 
leaders no doubt anticipated the risk of an uprising by minority students at some 
point but relied on a variety of structures and pressures to temper any revolution. 
The Article’s next section briefly surveys those repressive strategies. 
 
II. ENFORCING DIVERSITY’S BARGAIN 
Current calls for meaningful curriculum, such as the demand in the fall of 
2015 by petitioners at the University of Cincinnati for curriculum focusing on 
“racial awareness,”18 expose how current university courses serve the interests of 
assimilation into the prevailing norms of racial subordination. Reinforcing the 
settled expectations of White students and faculty, the existing college curriculum, 
and even whole academic disciplines, reifies white supremacy despite the 
diversification of the student body.19 Graduate programs inculcate the same culture 
of assimilation and suppression. Law schools, for example, failed to change their 
curriculum when affirmative action brought substantial numbers of Latino/as, 
Blacks, and Asian students to the classroom in the late 1960s.20 Instead, it was 
those law students who needed to adapt to the existing curriculum and its reliance 
on the classic cases. This reliance is akin to an undergraduate literature course 
teaching the same classics. In turn, as law school graduates, the minority students 
educated in the traditional classroom for the most part become lawyers with careers 
indistinguishable from White lawyers—handling the work-a-day representation of 
small business, procuring divorces, and writing wills for individuals—while 
reinforcing the existing social order.21 
To ensure minorities are not adequately educated in their oppressions 
requires complicity not just of the university and its graduate programs, but of K–
                                                                                                                                                                                  
wide protest to her characterization of minority students as outside the model of Claremont students). 
Other campus demands addressed violence against minority, particularly Black, students. E.g., Matt 
Coker, UC Irvine Black Student Union Demands End to Campus Police Department, OCWEEKLY (Jan. 
28, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.ocweekly.com/news/uc-irvine-black-student-union-demands-end-to-
campus-police-department-6927075. 
17  See generally Richard Delgado, Transcendence: Conservative Wealth and Intergenerational Succession, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 42 (2011) (discussing the competitive threat affirmative action poses to plutocratic, 
wealth-based succession). 
18  See Wong & Green, supra note 2. 
19   David Shih, Campus Protests and Whiteness as Property, BLOGGER (Jan. 25, 2016, 8:20 AM), 
http://professorshih.blogspot.com/2016/01/campus-protests-and-whiteness-as.html (explaining the 
relationship between the racist status quo and college curriculum). 
20 Richard Delgado, Delgado’s Darkroom: Critical Reflections on Land Titles and Latino Legal Education, 
45 N.M. L. REV. 275, 292–93 (2014); see also Steven W. Bender, From Sandoval to Subprime: Excluding 
Latinos from Property Ownership and Property Casebooks, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND 
TRANSFORMATIVE LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 111 (Society of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate 
Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011) (discussing that at the same time law school property casebooks expand 
their subject base to include intellectual property and other materials, they ignore the Latino/a 
property experience of exclusion and loss). 
21  Delgado, supra note 20, at 293–94. 
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12 education as well. This complicity was one of the reasons (along with the rousing 
academic success of program participants) that Arizona legislators were threatened 
by the Tucson high school Ethnic Studies curriculum, which relied on critical race 
theory and race texts.22 With few such exceptions, K–12 curriculum has long stayed 
true to the classics, deploying watered-down versions of racial history or simply 
ignoring oppressions altogether. 23  Even in predominantly minority districts, 
students must adapt to the curriculum rather than the reverse. Occasionally 
students see through the façade of a curriculum that aims not to startle, anger, or 
engage them, as did Chicano high school students in East Los Angeles in 1968 who 
walked out of their classrooms voicing demands for bilingual education and teachers 
more aware of the community’s pressing social and economic problems.24 
Given the role of White curriculum in protecting the status quo, it is not 
surprising that school officials and White faculty will argue for its preservation. 
Among the weapons used to attack any calls to racialize and diversify college 
curriculum is to dismiss those proposed courses and, more broadly, Ethnic Studies 
degrees, as marginal and lacking intellectual rigor.25 Some faculty will also attack 
the scholarly work of teachers of color in similarly dismissive tones.26 
In the same way that racial justice curriculum is marginalized, assimilation 
and whiteness norms are enforced by reminding minority college students that they 
are guests in the master’s house, in some cases only present by the grace of 
affirmative action programs that are voluntary and not constitutionally compelled. 
Reminding minority students of their subordinate status and the bargain they 
struck can take several forms; for some of these strategies, university officials are 
the catalyst, while for others they are at least complicit.27 As an example, symbols 
                                                        
22  See generally Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book Traffickers 
(Librotraficantes), and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513 (2013) (discussing lawsuits filed 
after ethnic education book bans); Jean Stefancic, Reflections on Reform Litigation: Strategic 
Intervention in Arizona’s Ethnic Studies Ban, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1181 (2014) (discussing the 
resultant ban on Mexican American studies and the lawsuit challenging the ban). 
23  See Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
297 (2009) (supplying a history of Latino lynchings, particularly of Mexican Americans in the 
Southwest, that few schoolchildren learn); Emma Brown, Texas Officials: Schools Should Teach that 
Slavery was “Side Issue” to Civil War, WASH. POST (July 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/150-years-later-schools-are-still-a-battlefield-for-
interpreting-civil-war/2015/07/05/e8fbd57e-2001-11e5-bf41-c23f5d3face1_story.html (discussing the 
manipulation of history with Texas public schoolchildren learning states’ rights rather than slavery as 
primarily causing the Civil War). 
24  BENDER, supra note 14, at 70, 198 (detailing demands that connected to the broader Chicano Movement 
and included more Mexican teachers and renaming the present schools from historic figures such as 
Garfield, Roosevelt, and Lincoln to names better establishing community identity); see also IAN F. 
HANEY-LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 22–27 (2003) (discussing the 
aftermath of the walkouts when trumped up criminal charges were brought against the strike 
organizers). 
25  See Shih, supra note 19 (suggesting that the faculty in the academy making these attacks are the 
biggest beneficiaries of “a curriculum that reifies whiteness as logical, cultured, or professional.”). 
26  See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years 
Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992). 
27  Consider a more overt strategy to deter protest proposed and ultimately withdrawn by a Missouri 
legislator who introduced legislation to revoke scholarships of student athletes who support or 
participate in a strike. Rodger Sherman, Everything About that Missouri Bill to Ban College Athletes 
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reflected in campus statues, building names, seals, and other settings remind 
students of the White origins and influences at the school that still define the 
institution. Often these symbols are those of the wealthy who built their fortunes on 
the backs of slaves.28 
So-called “microaggressions” work in concert with symbols to ensure minority 
students understand their subordinate position as barely tolerated outsiders. The 
term describes a host of incidents that comprise a hostile racial climate on many 
campuses, including hate speech and hostility toward minorities. For example, 
portraits of African American law professors at Harvard were defaced with black 
tape.29 
Both scholars and White students will help quell any campus revolt by 
attacking the credentials of minority students as unworthy for admission and 
graduation at the particular school. Presumably their targets will think twice about 
speaking out, as their voices have been marginalized. Although university officials 
might reject or not join in these appeals to reduce minority admissions, these 
officials nonetheless benefit from this demeaning backlash, which helps diminish 
any pressure to admit more students of color, hire more faculty of color to teach 
them, or to change the curriculum. Examples of student attacks on affirmative 
action include a Harvard Crimson piece suggesting employers would justifiably 
regard all minority candidates with skepticism if their alma mater used affirmative 
action and arguing it would be better for society to refuse admission to race-based 
affirmative action students: “Helping those with primarily low academic 
qualifications into primarily academic institutions makes as much sense as helping 
the visually impaired become pilots.”30 Some scholars have added their voice to 
disparage Black and Latino/a applicants. For example, a University of Texas law 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
from Protesting was Stupid, SB NATION (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/2015/12/16/10214874/missouri-bill-athletes-protest-rick-brattin (discussing 
proposal made in response to the Missouri football team’s protest of university administration’s 
handling of racial discrimination complaints). 
28  Recent campus activism has targeted these symbols of oppression, such as Harvard law school’s seal 
with the family crest of a “wealthy and ruthless slaveholder,” Wong & Green, supra note 2, and Yale’s 
Calhoun College, a residential housing complex named after a notorious slavery advocate and Yale 
graduate. Backlash from the Harvard protest, in which the law school’s seal was covered with black 
tape, resulted in a defacement of portraits of Harvard’s Black law professor portraits with similar tape. 
Symbols of racial oppression are far reaching, as in the case of school mascots mocking Native 
American culture, whether through commodification of Native American images, perpetuating 
derogatory stereotypes, or by glorifying oppressors. See id. (discussing Amherst College protest calling 
for changing unofficial college mascot who allegedly gave Native Americans smallpox-infected blankets). 
29  See Wong & Green, supra note 2 (discussing that the U.S. Education Department’s Office for Civil 
Rights received more than 1,000 complaints of campus racial harassment during a seven-year period). 
See generally SOC’Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, SALT Condemns Harvard Law School Hate Crime and 
Racially Hostile Environments Across the Country, SOC’Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS (Nov. 24, 2015), 
https://www.saltlaw.org/salt-condemns-harvard-law-school-hate-crime-and-racially-hostile-learning-
environments-across-the-country/; see generally Tanzina Vega, Students See Many Slights as Racial 
“Microagressions,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/us/as-diversity-
increases-slights-get-subtler-but-still-sting.html. 
30  Sarah R. Siskind, Affirmative Dissatisfaction: Affirmative Action Does More Harm Than Good, HARV. 
CRIMSON (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.thecrimson.com/column/the-snollygoster/article/2012/11/2/Siskind-
affirmative-action/. 
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professor, Lino Graglia, remarked on the formation of an anti-affirmative action 
student group: 
 
Blacks and Mexican-Americans are not academically competitive with whites in 
selective institutions. It is the result primarily of cultural effects. They have a culture 
that seems not to encourage achievement. Failure is not looked upon with disgrace.31 
 
Apparently, many students agree with this cultural assessment that connects 
to longstanding stereotypes of laziness and unintelligence.  A study released in 2016 
found White students in elite colleges lumped their Latino/a and Black peers 
together, believing they “need to work harder to move up.”32 
Other academic critics of affirmative action take a deceptively more 
compassionate, tough-love approach, arguing that race-based affirmative action 
admittees are in over their heads and to their own detriment—they would be more 
successful attending a lesser ranked school. Written by a UCLA law professor and a 
Brookings Institution fellow, the book Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts 
Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won’t Admit It,33 argues Black 
and Latino/a students are not competitive at the more selective schools they attend. 
Becoming bitter and overmatched, their personal struggles transform into collective, 
racialized campaigns. Pointing to the despair of these student “victims” of 
affirmative action, one of the authors argued in a separate piece that the resultant 
dissatisfaction explains “the over-the-top demands now roiling our campuses for 
still more racial admissions preferences; more preferentially hired, underqualified 
professors; more grievance-focused courses and university bureaucrats; more 
university-sponsored racial enclaves; and more apologies for ‘white privilege.’”34 
Presumably racial minorities, if already enrolled, should blame themselves and 
accept their dissatisfaction on campus without protest, or better yet, they should 
have applied to some lesser-ranked institution more of their speed, reserving the 
elite institutions for White entrants. This argument for the exclusion of racial 
minorities resonates with those who would deny angry minority students the right 
to protest racial injustices on campus and in broader society. In this way, the college 
                                                        
31  Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 97 (2000). 
32  Natalie Gross, Do White College Students Believe Stereotypes About Minorities? ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/white-college-students-buy-in-to-
stereotypes-of-minority-peers/426813/ (finding in contrast that White students at elite schools felt 
Asian American classmates were “cold but competent.”). 
33  RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S 
INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012). 
34  Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Little Understood Engine of Campus Unrest: Racial Admissions Preferences, AM. 
SPECTATOR (Nov. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://spectator.org/64739_little-understood-engine-campus-
unrest-racial-admissions-preferences/. Other scholars offer different explanations for the racial unrest 
on campus, connecting to the racist roots of most U.S. universities. See Kalpana Jain, Unsurprised by 
Missouri – Scholars on the Roots of Racial Unrest on Campus, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 12, 2015, 9:08 
PM), http://theconversation.com/unsurprised-by-missouri-scholars-on-the-roots-of-racial-unrest-on-
campus-50636 (quoting argument of Emory University historian Leslie Harris that the roots of today’s 
racial unrest connect to the roots of universities in the slave trade: “[C]olleges and universities 
historically have supported hierarchies of race and other forms of difference from their founding in the 
colonial era through the civil rights struggles of the late-20th century.”). 
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campus continues as a venue where the right to exclude, as a common nucleus of 
both property and whiteness, controls.35 
Yet another strategy to police compliance with the diversity bargain is to 
ensure that minority students act individually and not collectively in ways that can 
more readily connect to larger community and societal campaigns.36 In the austerity 
age of tight university budgets,37 campus officials routinely fend off requests to 
adequately fund minority groups, characterized disparagingly above as “university-
sponsored racial enclaves.”38  Students also think twice about membership in racial 
identity-based organizations when they see how often those affiliations are attacked, 
as when California gubernatorial candidate Cruz Bustamante was vilified for his 
involvement with the Chicano student empowerment group, MEChA, while a 
student at Fresno State.39  For minority students, then, the campus is a venue for 
rugged individualism, rather than a place for bonding with the few others on 
campus who come from their background. 
 
III. FACULTY OF COLOR’S COMPLICITY IN DIVERSITY’S BARGAIN 
Demands for improving the campus racial environment tend to be directed at 
university administration, but too often professors are complicit in the hostile 
climate. Richard Delgado remarked on the shift in aspiration of many law students 
of color from rebellious lawyering to conventional careers: “We did little to dissuade 
them; some of us might even have quietly cheered the prospect of minorities tracing 
conventional career paths, mirroring, perhaps, our own.” 40  Could the White 
curriculum most of us teach be serving the same function as campus symbols of 
slaveholders and segregationists to enforce the diversity bargain? Do law professors 
of color, and university professors generally, encounter similar pressures that 
students face to be docile and thereby honor the “classics” in their teaching and 
writing?41 
                                                        
35  See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714, 1789 (1993) (suggesting that 
affirmative action programs might dismantle the right to exclude applicants through identity by 
challenging the property interest of whiteness, thus breaking the link between White identity and 
property). 
36  A historical example is the 1968 East Los Angeles school walkouts that connected to the Chicano 
Movement, see supra note 24 discussion, and current examples are those fusing campus racial activism 
to the Black Lives Matter movement.  
37  Austerity can also be deployed to resist demands for new teachers of color and for new curriculum that 
requires new instructors to teach it. Even those faculty of color hired in response to student pressure 
are vulnerable to being the last hired, first fired if revenues dip. 
38  Taylor, supra note 34. 
39  See Steven Bender, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas & Keith Aoki, Race and the California Recall: A Top Ten 
List of Ironies, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 11, 12 (2005) (noting even respected mainstream media 
questioned Bustamante’s fitness for office given his involvement with the student group, and that 
conservative media likened the organization to terrorist groups). As a long-time faculty advisor to the 
University of Oregon MEChA organization, I was routinely forced to defend an organization that cared 
little for excluding others, and most about diverse students surviving in an often hostile climate of 
higher education. 
40  Delgado, supra note 20, at 293. 
41  A current example of an activist professor, and the backlash that resulted, is University of Missouri’s 
Melissa Click, an assistant professor of communication. Indefinitely suspended after she tried to 
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Evident in the current tumult of student activism is the idea that professors 
can and should do more to actively promote an inclusive campus environment. 
Professors collectively wield considerable power in their academic freedom to shape 
the content of the courses they teach, in their role in the hiring process, and in 
promoting a favorable campus climate. The suggestions that follow connect to the 
most articulated demands of current campus racial activists in promoting courses 
and course content that relate to the struggles for racial justice, as well as critical 
masses of students of color and professors of color who teach them.42 
Law professors rarely take racial risks. Among those who did is Michael 
Olivas, who for years managed the Hispanic National Bar Association’s annual list, 
The Dirty Dozen, of law schools in areas with large Latino/a populations that 
nonetheless failed to hire a single Latino/a faculty member. Prompting backlash 
from deans, the list may have generated several Latino/a hires,43 but years after the 
list ceased publication, many law schools still lack any Latino/a tenure-track faculty, 
and just a handful are managed by Latino/a deans.44 Rather than shaming law 
schools, efforts such as the joint annual LatCrit/SALT junior faculty development 
workshop45 aim to mentor prospective and newly hired diverse faculty members in 
the academy. Although the reward system for law professors within their home 
institutions fails to fully appreciate the considerable time spent in mentoring junior 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
remove a student journalist from documenting a racial protest, Republican lawmakers wanted more 
and called for her discharge. Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, A Suspension for Melissa Click, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/melissa-click-suspended-
mizzou/432564/. The school responded by firing her in early 2016. Outcry accompanied her hiring as a 
lecturer by Gonzaga University in mid-2016. 
42  Racial demands often include additional funding for campus diversity initiatives and organizations, as 
well as funding embedded in demands for additional minority students accomplished through need-
based scholarships, and new faculty positions to immediately bring in faculty of color rather than 
through attrition over time of existing faculty. The suggestions below emphasize non-revenue 
dependent approaches, mindful that revenue-raising is often outside of individual faculty control and in 
the hands of law school (or other department heads) and main campus administration. See, e.g., 
Reclaim Harvard Law Demands, RECLAIM HARVARD LAW SCH. (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://reclaimharvardlaw.wordpress.com/demands/ (demanding, among other things, that the school: 
“Reform the existing mandatory legal curriculum at Harvard Law School, through meaningful student 
input and transparency, to ensure the integration of marginalized narratives and a serious study into 
the implications of racism, white supremacy, and imperialism in creating and perpetuating legal 
analysis and thought.”). 
43  Marie McCullough, A Hispanic Plea for Law Teachers, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 7, 1993), 
http://articles.philly.com/1993-05-07/business/25963705_1_hispanic-students-law-schools-olivas (noting 
10 of the 22 schools that once appeared on the list hired Latino/a law professors by 1993). 
44  See Jennifer L. Rosato, 48 Cal. W. L. Rev. 445 (2012) (Latina dean situates herself as one of hour U.S. 
Latino/a law school deans at the time); see also Ediberto Roman, Whites Only  . . . Perhaps More Than 
Just at the Oscars, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Feb. 4, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
ediberto-roman/whites-onlyperhaps-more-t_b_9114768.html. Across campus things are little better. See 
Ben Myers, Where Are the Minority Professors?, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 14, 2016), 
http://chronicle.com/interactives/where-are-the-minority-professors (finding that of more than 400,000 
U.S. professors, three-quarters were White, five out of one hundred were Black, and even fewer were 
Latino/a, and the more elite schools were even less diverse). 
45  See generally LatCrit/SALT Junior Faculty Development Workshop, LATINO & LATINA CRITICAL LEGAL 
THEORY, INC., http://www.latcrit.org/content/teaching_resources/junior-faculty-development-workshop-
fdw/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
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faculty, I am proud to have earned recognition for my mentoring by receiving the 
AALS Minority Groups Section C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr. award.46 
Faculty can have the most impact in the curriculum they teach. Law 
professors can elect to teach law’s active role in creating and sustaining systemic 
racial injustice.47 They can write critical histories that link identity to unequal 
justice. These critical histories, when local or regional, are best written by those 
minority professors from local venues who gain a special credibility by their 
willingness to breach their own diversity bargain of hiring and tolerance by 
exposing the injustice rooted in their own institutions and states to both students in 
their classrooms and a scholarly audience.48 
Faculty of color, both writing and teaching about subjects that engage 
students of color, can serve as a welcoming mat for those prospective students who 
feel that university curriculum does not respect their backgrounds or honor their 
struggles. As the author of texts used in college classes outside of law school, I aim 
to reach beyond college into high schools and earlier education to inform students 
that exposing and challenging systemic injustice is a shared goal, and that the 
educational assembly line can be recalibrated from the current bargain of tolerance 
and assimilation to a new environment of respect and honor. 
Students of color49 protesting racial injustice on their own campus and in 
broader society are taking a risk by breaching their diversity covenant. Faculty 
members too must be willing to support and contribute to the campaign to improve 
the racial climate on campus. In so doing, we help build a better world for others 
instead of a comfortable haven for the fortunate academics of color who successfully 
navigated diversity’s bargain. 
                                                        
46  See Professor Steven Bender Recognized for Teaching and Service, SEATTLE U. SCH. L. (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://law.seattleu.edu/newsroom/2014-news/professor-steven-bender-receives-ferguson-award-for-
teaching-and-service (describing the AALS Minority Groups Section C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr. award as an 
annual award recognizing law professors who provide support and mentoring to students, colleagues, 
and aspiring educators). 
47  As a current example of teachers connecting systemic injustice to their classroom, see Symposium, 
Ferguson and its Impacts on Legal Education, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261–413 (Nov. 2015). I am part of a 
team of legal scholars developing a coursebook that includes and situates law among the instruments of 
systemic injustice. SOCIAL IMPACT ADVOCACY: POWER, IDENTITY, AND SYSTEMS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 
(forthcoming 2017). 
48  E.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado’s Historic Embrace—And 
Denial—Of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703 (1999) (written while its 
author was an endowed chair holder at the University of Colorado law school); Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic, California’s Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision 
Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000) (Richard Delgado taught previously at 
UCLA law school). These critical histories serve another goal of laying the foundation for an affirmative 
action program sourced in repair or reparation for past discrimination at the institution and in the 
region.  
49  In focusing on students of color, I do not mean to marginalize the experience and role of other initiators 
and supporters of campus protests, particularly those within the LGBT community who may be of any 
race and who often face a similar “don’t ask, don’t tell” expectation of campus silence and subordination. 
 Gerrymandering Revisited—Searching for a Standard 
 
Theodore R. Boehm* 
 
I. DISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL 
 
History is replete with examples of legislative districts created to assure the 
election or defeat of specific candidates or to preserve the domination of a majority 
party. By the time John Kennedy sought the Presidency in 1960, perpetuation of 
incumbent interests had taken the form of inaction as well as affirmative jiggering of 
district lines. Many states had not redistricted for decades despite massive shifts in 
concentrations of population, generally from small towns and rural areas to cities and 
their suburbs. In the most egregious example of malapportionment, Dallas’ 
Congressional district cast five times the votes of smallest Texas district.1 The 1960 
election in Indiana was conducted using maps that had been created in 1921. Only 
half as many people voted in the largely rural Ninth District as did in Marion County, 
which included the pre-UniGov city of Indianapolis and was a single congressional 
district.2 
Until the 1960s, the federal courts had heeded Justice Frankfurter’s caution 
against venturing into the “political thicket” and declared these practices, however 
objectionable, beyond judicial scrutiny.3 But in 1962 the Supreme Court opened the 
courthouse door to constitutional challenges to congressional districts.4 A nationwide 
frenzy of districting litigation ensued. Within two years, Wesberry v. Sanders5 
imposed rough equivalence of district population in congressional races, and Reynolds 
v. Sims6 did the same for elections of both houses of state legislatures. 
Equal population requirements proved to impose no restraint on the ability of 
legislators to keep a heavy thumb on the scale in their own elections. Manipulation 
of legislative districts for the benefit of a favored party or individual candidate is 
nothing new. But modern technology has substantially facilitated a temporary 
majority’s ability to perpetuate its dominance of a legislative body. This art has now 
advanced to the point that the legislators in dozens of states can join the North 
Carolina state senator who famously observed in 1998: “We are in the business of 
rigging elections.”7 
 
 
* Partner, Hoover Hull Turner LLP, Indianapolis, IN. Mr. Boehm is a former Justice of the Indiana 
Supreme Court and was the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Davis v. Bandemer, discussed infra. 
1 Benjamin J. Gunthrie, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, Statistics of the Presidential and 
Congressional Election of November 8, 1960 44 (1961), http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electioninfo 
/1960election.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
5 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
6 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
7 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting a North Carolina state 
senator). 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren considered the redistricting cases the most 
important of his time leading the Supreme Court because the effects of reshaped 
federal and state legislatures reverberated across every aspect of American life.8 We 
are potentially on the cusp of an equally significant ruling that gerrymanders violate 
the Federal Constitution. 
II. GERRYMANDERS: A PROBLEM WITH MANY DIMENSIONS 
 
There are many reasons to adjust district lines to achieve some electoral result. 
For purposes of this discussion, a gerrymander is an attempt to assure a political 
party’s domination of a legislative chamber by creating as many districts as possible 
that are likely or certainly safe for the party. This means creating a majority of 
districts at least fifty-five percent favorable to the party and concentrating or 
“packing” the opposition’s voters into a minority of districts.9 
 
Voter confusion. Complaints about gerrymandering, including those from some 
courts, take a variety of forms. Early attacks, including the Boston Globe’s, which 
coined the term “Gerry-mander” in 1812, focus on “traditional” districting principles 
that essentially turn on the appearance of the district on the map.10 Even today, 
Justice John Paul Stevens advocates a federal constitutional amendment to constrain 
mapmakers by requiring districts to be compact and contiguous and to justify any 
deviation by adherence to existing political boundaries, such as county and municipal 
borders.11 There is merit in requiring district lines to follow boundaries that define 
units of municipal government. Districts that follow no pattern and have irregular 
shapes conforming to no widely understood demarcations are confusing and make it 
difficult for voters to identify their representative. But with today’s very sophisticated 
software and the ability to manipulate precinct level voting data, the constraints of 
compactness, contiguity, and adherence to other boundaries are not sufficient to 
prevent an effective gerrymander. And voter confusion is only one of the many 
reasons why gerrymanders are undesirable. 
Conflict of interest. A more fundamental problem with a gerrymander is that 
it is a law passed by vote of the majority party and opposed by the minority members. 
Virtually all of the approving legislators have a blatant conflict of interest. Of course, 
many laws are voted upon by legislators with some self-interest at stake, and 
legislators are generally free to vote for legislation that may benefit them 
individually—for example, by favoring an industry in which they have an interest. 
Particularly in states with part-time legislatures, this practice is considered the 
necessary cost of a democratic form of government. In the case of most legislation, the 
judgment of disinterested legislators is considered a sufficient restraint on abuse of 
 
 
8 Ed Cray, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 437 (1997). 
9 See infra note 35. 
10 See Christopher Klein, ‘A New Species of Monster’, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe. 
com/ideas/2011/09/10/new-species-monster/TRpFHqNSEeLV2OGlUi1HyI/ story.html. 
11 See JOHN  PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND  WHY WE SHOULD  CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 
HARDCOVER (2014). 
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principle. But a gerrymander is qualitatively different from most other legislation. 
The majority-party legislators who support a gerrymander are precisely the favored 
few the law benefits. By perpetuating their majority party domination, it assures 
many of the majority a shot at a committee chair, and gives most of them a friendly 
district for reelection. In that respect, those few citizens, and only they, are the direct 
beneficiaries of the law they are imposing on all others. 
 
Unrepresentative legislative bodies. A third obvious issue raised by a 
gerrymander is it unfairly skews election results as between the parties. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly found no constitutional right to proportional 
representation—that is, elected representatives need not be in proportion to the votes 
cast for their respective candidates across the state.12 But a map that purposely packs 
voters of one party into a minority of districts is as pernicious in effect as patently 
unlawful practices such as intimidation of minority party voters at the polls or 
creating districts of substantially unequal population. In that sense a gerrymander 
is unfair to the minority party. But apart from any unfairness to a political group, a 
gerrymander produces a legislature that is not representative of the general voter 
population. Successful candidates in primary elections are predominantly those who 
appeal to their party’s most enthusiastic supporters who tend to positions many 
regard as extreme. The general election in most districts of a gerrymandered map 
merely ratifies the election of the winners of the majority party primary, resulting in 
a legislature that underrepresents the views of moderates and centrists. 
 
Polarized legislative bodies. Fourth, a gerrymander produces a legislature 
composed of mostly safe districts for one party or the other. In those districts the 
primary election becomes the only significant event, and the successful candidate is 
one who runs to the center of his party’s voters. The result is a legislature with few 
centrists and with few who need to appeal to a broad range of constituents. Many 
argue that this in turn contributes to polarization and gridlock.13 Regardless of the 
validity of that charge, at a minimum the legislature does not reflect the attitudes of 
the electorate as a whole by, in effect, underrepresenting the vast political center. 
 
Disenfranchised Independents and minority party adherents. Fifth, 
gerrymanders in many states, including Indiana, effectively disenfranchise 
Independents and third party candidates in most districts. By creating large numbers 
of districts as nearly impregnable fortresses of one of the two major parties, a 
gerrymander reduces the general election to a pro forma ratification of the primary. 
The result is that Independents and third party adherents in those safe districts have 
no meaningful role in the selection of the legislature. The extent of that consequence 
may depend on state laws and to some extent the voting practices of the state. Some 
 
 
12 See e.g. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; see also ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET. AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA (2004). 
13 For a discussion of this debate, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of 
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011); But see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. 
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009). 
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states have “open” primaries and experience significant crossover voting in the 
primary elections. Others, including Indiana, have some deterrent to adherents of a 
different party, or even genuinely undecided voters, participating in a party’s primary 
election.14 Even if there is no consequence to voting other than as permitted by 
statute, a voter’s choice of party in the primary is a matter of public record, and that 
alone undoubtedly deters many who do not want to appear to affiliate with a party 
that is not of their choice. The constitutional right of free association includes the 
right not to associate, and those who do not wish to identify themselves as Republican 
or Democrat have a right to do that. 
Voter alienation. Sixth, gerrymanders discourage all voters from participation 
in the election. The extent to which gerrymanders contribute to voter apathy and 
distrust of government is for others to analyze. But the contribution of gerrymanders 
to the health of the body politic can’t be positive. Because the result in the general 
election is preordained by each district’s majority party primary, supporters of the 
district’s minority party have less incentive to bother to vote, and less interest in the 
strengths and weaknesses of the candidates. Gerrymanders produce a number of 
uncontested legislative races across the state. Reduced voter turnout is less felt in 
presidential years but nonetheless significant. To compound this problem, the 
spectacle of legislators choosing their voters rather than voters choosing their 
representatives only fosters cynical disrespect for the process. 
In sum, a gerrymander produces a number of destructive and anti-democratic 
consequences, but it serves only the private interests of the dominant political party 
and, more specifically, its legislators. 
III. GERRYMANDERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
In a few states voters have taken these problems in their own hands and 
wrested the process from the legislature’s grasp, enacting a bipartisan approach to 
districting by direct voter initiative. But in the many states without voter initiatives 
and in those whose state constitution expressly vests districting power in the 
legislature, there is little evidence that the state legislatures will adopt any 
meaningful reform of state legislative districts. And because the state legislatures 
draw the Congressional maps, without reform of the state process, we can expect 
minimal progress in Congressional districting.15 When control of the General 
Assembly was divided, the two parties confirmed skepticism of legislative relief as to 
Indiana’s state maps. The majority in each house drew a map to its liking for itself 
 
 
14 In Indiana, any voter in the precinct may challenge an attempt to vote in a party’s primary. IND. CODE 
ANN. § 3-10-1-6 (LexisNexis 2011) provides that a voter is “eligible” to vote in the primary if the voter 
voted in the last general for a majority of the party’s candidates, or did not vote in the last general, but 
intends to vote for a majority of that party’s candidates in the upcoming general election. How this works 
in practice is not clear, and may vary across the state. In fact it seems clear that in some recent elections 
there was some crossover voting without any consequence to the voters who crossed party lines. 
15 Indiana has a form of bipartisan districting for congressional elections if the legislature fails to agree on 
congressional districts. This was put in place in 1988 when the two major parties each controlled one 
house of the state legislature and a deadlock in passage of a congressional map was foreseeable. It has 
never been used. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2011). 
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and approved the other house’s self-drawn plan. The result was a decade-long 
bipartisan gerrymander favoring Democrats in the House and Republicans in the 
Senate. 
As explained in Part II, federal constitutional precedent offers some hope of 
judicial cabining of gerrymanders. And state legislatures create both their own and 
congressional maps, but they more directly labor under a conflict of interest in 
drawing their own districts. The odds seem good that reform of state legislatures will 
lead to fair congressional districting. All of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that 
a federal constitutional challenge to gerrymandering of state legislatures offers the 
most likely prospect of assuring that we have functioning state and federal legislative 
branches that are broadly representative of the electorate and not only the zealous 
adherents of the two major parties. 
Redistricting cases are heard by three-judge courts and appeals go directly to 
the Supreme Court. Beginning in the 1980s and recurring sporadically since, 
challenges to the constitutionality of gerrymandering have been raised, but as of this 
writing none have been ultimately successful.16 Few would dispute the importance 
of the questions whether a court can strike down a legislative map that meets the 
population equality test and does not violate the Voting Rights Act, as well as what 
a successful plaintiff must show to achieve that result. Some likely critical issues, 
notably partisan intent to disadvantage a voting group, are essentially factual, so a 
successful trial court ruling will be a leg up; but the courts have yet to establish an 
attainable legal standard a plaintiff must meet. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that 
any attempt to analyze the prospects of a successful challenge must start and end 
with the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
Davis v. Bandemer (1986)17 The first pure gerrymandering case to reach the 
Supreme Court came from Indiana. In Davis v. Bandemer, the three-judge trial court, 
by 2-1 decision, had agreed with the plaintiffs that the redistricting plan enacted after 
the 1980 census violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The plaintiffs were Democratic voters from several parts of the state who 
claimed that the map was a law that was intended to, and did, disadvantage an 
identifiable  group,  in  this  case  Democrats,  and  was  justified  by  no  legitimate 
governmental interest. Plaintiffs presented this claim as grounded in established 
Equal  Protection  doctrine,  including  principles  that  “the  state  must  govern 
impartially”18 and legislative classifications must be “rational” (that is, must “serve 
important governmental purposes”).19  They bolstered their claim with language from 
several Supreme Court cases affirming that laws having “a real and appreciable 
impact  on  the  exercise  of  the  franchise”  must  “serve  important  governmental 
objectives.” 20 Plaintiffs also argued that the law was intentionally designed to injure 
 
 
16 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 831, 839–49 (2015). 
17 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
18 N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). 
19 Id. 
20 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
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supporters of a political party, which is a group of citizens entitled to be free from 
discriminatory legislation.21 
The defendants responded that the issue was not justiciable because there 
were no judicially manageable standards, redistricting was inherently a political 
issue, and the Equal Protection Clause conferred no group right on political parties 
or their supporters. Because at that time the nationwide effect of curtailing 
gerrymandering would have benefited Republicans more than Democrats, an unusual 
array of amici curiae appeared. Briefs supporting the plaintiffs were filed by the 
ACLU, Common Cause, and The Republican National Committee. The California 
State Assembly, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and 
the California Democratic Congressional Delegation supported the defendants. 
The Supreme Court reversed by a seven-two vote with no majority opinion. A 
four-justice plurality (White, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun) held the 
plaintiff’s claims justiciable. The plurality quoted at length from Baker v. Carr, which 
opened the door to challenges to unequal populations and limited nonjusticiable 
“political questions” to six areas described collectively as those “essentially a function 
of separation of powers.”22 Among these are matters lacking “judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards.”23 The plurality agreed that there was no “arithmetic 
presumption” to identify a constitutional violation, but rejected the claim that this 
established a lack of judicially manageable standards.24 The plurality noted that 
when Baker held challenges to unequal population justiciable, the “one-person-one- 
vote”25 rule had not yet been devised. 
Turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the plurality noted that in 
multimember districting cases the Court had “repeatedly stated that districting that 
would ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political 
elements of the voting population’ would raise a constitutional question.”26 The 
plurality agreed with the district court that plaintiffs were required to prove both 
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group. The plurality readily accepted the district court’s 
finding of intentional discrimination. The maps had been designed in secret with the 
aid of computer consultants and were moved through the legislative process through 
 
 
 
21 E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 327, 363 (1976). 
22  Davis, 478 U.S.at 121 ("It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the 
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more 
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface 
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”) (quoting 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
23 Id. at 217. 
24 Id. at 110. 
25 Id. at 150. 
26 Id. at 119 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)) (emphasis removed). 
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“vehicle” bills which had no content. The maps were first revealed to the minority 
members or the public in the last days of the legislative session. The final approval 
was by unanimous Republican majorities in both houses of the Indiana General 
Assembly over the dissenting votes of all Democratic members. 
Despite the partisan motivation, the plurality found the proof of lasting effect 
insufficient.27 The plurality would require proof “that the challenged legislative plan 
has had or will have effects that are sufficiently serious to require intervention by the 
federal courts in state reapportionment decisions.”28 The trial of the case was held in 
1984 before the election of that year.29 The only evidence of the effect of the maps was 
the 1982 election, in which Democratic candidates received 51.9% of the votes cast 
for the Indiana House but elected only 43 of 100 Representatives.30 The plurality held 
that one election was not sufficient to establish a lasting injury. 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and future Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, would reverse for lack of justiciability.31 Justice O’Connor also found no 
right of a political group to assert a constitutional claim.32 In her view, the racial 
discrimination cases were not applicable precedent because court intervention to 
address racial discrimination was justified by the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
Justice O’Connor supported her conclusions with two factual assertions that 
time has proved questionable. First, gerrymandering has not proven to be “self- 
limiting,” as she suggested based on an academic study published in 1984.34 To the 
contrary, it has metastasized. To use the Indiana example again, the 1981 map 
challenged in Bandemer created fifty-six House districts that were considered by its 
sponsoring legislators to be “safe” for Republicans, and the election results bore out 
their confidence.35 The 2011 Indiana gerrymander produced at most five competitive 
Senate districts and perhaps ten competitive House districts in the Indiana state 
maps. Thirty-seven Indiana House races were uncontested in the 2014 general 
election. Congressional districts across the nation show the same trend. Few studies 
conclude that more than 35 of the 435 districts today are competitive. 
Second, Justice O’Connor found no proof “that political gerrymandering is an 
evil that cannot be checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves.”36 As 
already noted, in a few states, including Justice O’Connor’s Arizona, a voter initiative 
has been invoked by “the people” to address gerrymandering. But in a large majority 
 
 
 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 134. 
29 Id. at 163. 
30 Id. at 181–182. 
31 Id. at 144. 
32 Id. at 144–61. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 152. 
35        The district court found a district “competitive” if neither major party had more than 55% of the votes for 
the two major party candidates. This standard of measuring “safe” and “competitive” districts was 
accepted by the district court and endorsed by experts for both sides. As will be elaborated below, it has 
stood the test of time. If one party has 55% of the vote, the other party must increase its 45% by 10% of 
the two-party total, or 11.1% of its votes. History has shown this occurs rarely, hence a district with one 
party whose candidate received 55% or greater in the district is considered “safe” for that party. Id. 
36 Id. at 152. 
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of states a voter initiative is not available, and, as described in Part I, temporary 
legislative majorities across the nation have typically sought to solidify a stranglehold 
on the maps. 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented.37 They would accept 
Justice Fortas’ definition of gerrymandering as “deliberate and arbitrary distortion 
of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes” and 
would affirm the district court’s judgment.38 They pointed out that some district lines 
may be distorted to achieve a partisan advantage, but the effect is statewide. The 
dissent would look to several factors in evaluating whether there was deliberate 
manipulation of districts without legitimate justification. These factors include 
whether the legislative process itself exhibited partisan motivation (which the 
plurality also found), disregard of traditional political boundaries, irregular shaped 
districts, and the absence of any considerations beyond partisan advantage. 
 
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) Following the redistricting to adjust for the 2000 
census, plaintiffs tried again, this time in Pennsylvania. Vieth v. Jubelirer39 was 
appealed to the Supreme Court after the three-judge court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
political gerrymandering claim. Again, the Supreme Court produced no majority 
opinion. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Thomas, argued that the Bandemer holding of justiciability should be revisited and 
overruled. The plurality first noted that Article 1, §4 of the Constitution allows 
Congress to “make or alter” Congressional districts as drawn by states; and in 1842, 
Congress had acted to require single member districts of “contiguous territory”40; and 
in 1872, Congress had imposed a requirement of equal population.41 Since 1911, only 
the single member district requirement survives. 
The plurality then turned to the language from Baker v. Carr to describe 
nonjusticiable “political questions” and quoted verbatim in Bandemer. The plurality 
labeled them “six independent tests” of nonjusticiability and focused on the second: 
“a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,” which imposes the 
requirement that, unlike legislatures, courts are to impose law only if “principled, 
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”42 The plurality noted that although 
lower courts had entertained claims of unconstitutional gerrymandering, none had 
granted relief, and no plaintiff had satisfied the Bandemer plurality’s standard.43 The 
Vieth plurality described the Bandemer standard in various ways, both as to 
individual districts and as to the state as a whole. But the plurality did not describe 
it, as it might fairly be summarized, as a requirement of a showing of a lasting 
impairment of voting strength. Rather, the plurality attacks the Bandemer approach 
 
 
 
37 Id. at 161. 
38 Id. at 164. 
39 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. 
40 5 Stat. 491 (1842). 
41 12 Stat 572 (1872). 
42 Vieth, 541 U.S.at 277–78. 
43 Id. at 279–80. 
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as confused because the plurality saw no clear way to identify the predominant 
purpose as between the likely ever-present partisan considerations and other 
considerations such as compactness, adherence to political boundaries, etc.44 But this 
is a fact question, as later cases will hold, and the evidence in virtually every 
gerrymandering case demonstrates to any objective observer that the predominant 
motivation for the maps as a whole was preservation of the dominant party’s majority 
status. Indeed, all six Justices of the Bandemer court who addressed the question 
found it obvious. 
The Vieth plaintiffs argued for a standard that would require proof of (1) 
systematic “cracking and packing” the minority and (2) inability of the minority to 
attain a majority of the seats even if it obtained a majority of the votes.45 The 
plurality viewed this as a claim that groups have a right to proportional 
representation, a right that several precedents have rejected.46 The plurality 
understood the plaintiffs’ measure of the minority party’s vote to be based  on 
statewide races and responded that this measure was unworkable because candidates 
of both major parties had won statewide races. The plurality also accepted the view 
that “there is no statewide vote” for districted legislative offices, citing two relatively 
dated academic sources.47 Finally, the plurality noted that “natural” packing occurs 
from the fact that some groups, notably Democrats in cities, are more densely 
clustered, and therefore a neutrally drawn map would be biased against them. 
Justice Stevens agreed that statewide claims are nonjusticiable, but individual 
district claims were cognizable by analogy to racial gerrymanders, which had been 
held unconstitutional.48 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found the Bandemer standard too 
demanding and would later find some gerrymanders unconstitutional, but he would 
limit the plaintiffs to district-specific claims. Souter would allow a claim based on a 
burden-shifting process patterned on those used in employment and housing 
discrimination cases. If a plaintiff’s district were manipulated to the disadvantage of 
the plaintiff’s group, the defendants would be required to justify the district by 
objectives other than naked partisan advantage. 
Justice Breyer dissented, viewing the partisan gerrymandering as “unjustified 
entrenchment,” and he set out several scenarios that he considered sufficient to 
support a claim. As might be expected, all of this came down to Justice Kennedy, 
whose views on this matter will likely be dispositive, absent a change in the Court. 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the plaintiffs had not set out a 
“manageable and workable standard” to evaluate political gerrymanders, but he was 
not willing to conclude that none could be found. He therefore formed a majority to 
 
 
 
44 Id. at 284. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 268. 
47        Id. at 289 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in 
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1985); see also PETER SCHUCK, 
Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
AND THE COURTS 240, 241 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
48 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993). 
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affirm dismissal of the Vieth complaint, but left for future resolution whether a 
majority of the Court could find a manageable standard. Interestingly, Justice 
Kennedy introduced the concept that the First Amendment, whose right of 
association protects the formation of political parties, also protects “representational 
rights.” And he suggested that if a gerrymander “had the purpose and effect of 
imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may 
offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal 
Protection Clause.”49 In his view, the  ultimate constitutional issue is whether 
political considerations “burden representational rights,”50 and a manageable 
standard requires a means to “measure the effect of the apportionment . . . to conclude 
that the State did impose a burden.”51 
 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)52  dealt with the 
Texas legislature’s redrawing of Congressional districts in mid-decade to override a 
plan devised by a court after the initial apportionment was found to violate the 
population requirement. The plaintiffs alleged both Voting Rights Act violations and 
unconstitutional political gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-justice 
majority, putting to rest the tenuous claim advanced by a few courts53 that Vieth had 
held gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Describing his own deciding vote, Justice 
Kennedy stated: “The Vieth plurality would have held such challenges nonjusticiable 
political questions, but a majority declined to do so.”54 In a portion of his opinion, 
writing for himself, Justice Kennedy succinctly described a  successful partisan 
gerrymandering claim as one that imposes “a burden, as measured by a reliable 
standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”55 
A majority found the new legislative plan violated the Voting Rights Act by 
splitting a Latino majority district. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both 
addressing redistricting cases for the first time, affirmed dismissal of the 
gerrymandering claim for failure to offer a reliable standard but expressed no opinion 
on justiciability. Justices Scalia and Thomas adhered to their view that the 
gerrymandering claim was nonjusticiable. 
Some observers took LULAC as indicating the Court’s receptivity to revisiting 
Vieth and Bandemer,56 but until recently, few plaintiffs have taken up the 
challenge.57 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315. 
50 Id. at 269. 
51 Id. at 315. 
52 See League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
53 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 855 (Ct. 
App. 2005); see Benisek v. Mack, 11 F.Supp.3d 516, 524–25 (D. Md. 2014). 
54 Perry, 548 U.S. at 400. 
55 Id. at 404. 
56 Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan 
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007). 
57 Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 at 832. 
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IV. TEA LEAVES IN SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 
 
The Supreme Court has not entertained a direct constitutional challenge to a 
gerrymander since LULAC. But the Court has addressed several cases on the 
periphery of that issue that may offer insight into the Justices’ current thinking. 
By the time Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission58 reached the Court in 2015, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor had 
replaced Justices Souter and Stevens. All indications are that this had no effect on 
the 4-4 division that gave Justice Kennedy the deciding vote in Veith and LULAC. 
Arizona, like California and some other western states, allows voters to enact 
laws by popular vote, and Arizona voters had used that process to transfer the 
districting function from the state legislature to a bipartisan commission. The 
Arizona Legislature sued to preserve its districting prerogative, claiming that the 
Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution required that districts be drawn by the 
state legislature. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor 
and Kagan, held that if a state chooses to vest legislative power in the people as a 
whole, it does not violate the Elections Clause.59 Ginsburg’s opinion for this five- 
justice majority quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Veith: “‘Partisan 
gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized ‘are incompatible with democratic 
principles.’”60 She summarized the state of play on partisan gerrymandering: “The 
plurality [in Veith] held the matter nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy found no 
standard workable in that case, but “left open the possibility that a suitable standard 
might be identified in later litigation.”61 Like LULAC, this language, not necessary 
to resolve the Elections Clause issue, can be read as an open invitation to reopen the 
search for a suitable standard. 
Finally, shortly after the death of Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer writing for a 
unanimous Court, decided Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.62 In that case, Arizona legislators and their allies renewed their attempt 
to regain the keys to the legislative fortress, this time contending that the bipartisan 
commission had drawn its map to favor Democrats, and therefore the population 
variations in the state legislative maps, though within tolerances acceptable if 
justified by legitimate redistricting principles, were based on illegitimate 
considerations and were unconstitutional. 
The Court unanimously rejected the factual premise that the commission had 
been motivated by partisan considerations, accepting the district court’s factual 
finding that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was the reason for the 
commission’s accepting population deviations within the ten percent tolerance 
allowed by precedent. The unanimous opinion concluded by “assuming, without 
 
 
 
 
58 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652 (2015). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2658 (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 316). 
61 Id. (citing Veith, 541 U.S. at 281, 317). 
62 993 F.Supp.2d 1042 (D.Ariz. 2014). 
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deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor,” plaintiffs failed to 
show it. 
 
V. SEARCHING FOR STANDARDS 
 
Gerrymanderers typically do their work as soon as a new census is available 
and create hypothetical models based on past elections. Essentially the same 
techniques adopted by the Indiana Republican majority and its highly paid 
consultants in 1981 are in use today, though refined and improved by vastly greater 
computing power and the ease with which graphic displays of districts can be easily 
manipulated to test a tweak here or there to a given district. Repeated use and 
refinement of this technique at considerable expense demonstrates it is believed 
reliable and effective. The results in most states are maps with all the attendant 
problems identified in Part I. The need for judicial intervention cannot be overstated. 
Voter initiatives are not available in most states, and the legislative branch, 
inherently locked in a conflict of interest of monumental proportions, has shown itself 
incapable of reform in almost every state. 
A majority of the current Court is now on board with Justice Kennedy’s 
summary of the situation: gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but no manageable 
standard to measure the burden on representative rights has yet been shown. 
Gerrymandering is thus now in the same place districts of unequal populations were 
after Baker and before Wesberry and Reynolds. Plaintiffs are now launching a new 
round of constitutional challenges attempting to establish such a standard, and some 
may reach the Supreme Court in the next term. 
 
The Efficiency Gap as a Measureable Standard. Whitford v. Nichol63 was tried 
in May 2016, and is before the three-judge court for decision as of this writing. The 
court had previously denied defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint and for 
summary judgment, carefully reserving for trial whether the plaintiffs’ proof would 
be sufficient to establish a claim. The Whitford plaintiffs alleged an unconstitutional 
gerrymander of the Wisconsin state House and Senate.64 They proceeded on the 
assumption that such a claim required proof of partisan motivation and a 
measurable, material, and lasting effect on the voting power of the minority party. 
Partisan motivation relied in part on evidence developed in a prior case which 
had attacked the same maps based on population deviations of less than one 
percent.65 The plaintiffs there contended that even these usually permissible 
deviations were unconstitutional because the map was drawn with partisan intent. 
The three-judge court in that prior case described the denials of partisan intent from 
the legislative staffers involved, some of whom also testified in Whitford, as “almost 
laughable,”66 but dismissed the complaint because the population deviations were de 
minimis. 
 
 
63 No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47048 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 7, 2016). 
64 Id. at 918. 
65 Baldus v. Members of the Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Wis. 2012). 
66 Id. at 851. 
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The Whitford plaintiffs presented evidence of the legislative process similar to 
that found sufficient by six justices in Bandemer—secrecy in developing the maps, 
rushed legislative process driven by party-line voting, outside consultants testing 
various maps for partisan bias based on prior election returns, and statements of the 
drafters or their consultants.67 They offered the “efficiency gap” proposed by 
Stephanopoulos and McGee68 as a measure of partisan effect to meet a manageable 
legal standard. The efficiency gap measures the difference in the number of “wasted 
votes” for candidates of the two major parties. Wasted votes are votes cast for a losing 
candidate, plus all votes for a winner above the number required to win the district. 
The efficiency gap is the difference between the statewide totals of wasted votes for 
the two parties expressed as a percentage (positive or negative) of the total votes for 
the two parties’ candidates for the legislative body. Here is a simple example of the 
efficiency gap in a hypothetical election of a nine-district legislative body with 900 
voters, 450 of each party. Its map looks like this, with the most recent party votes in 
each district: 
 
55-45 Red 55-45 Red 55-45 Red 
60-40 Blue 60-40 Blue 60-40 Blue 
55-45 Red 55-45 Red 55-45 Red 
 
In this example six districts would be considered “safe” for Red and three “safe” 
for Blue. The efficiency gap is 16.7%, calculated as follows (for simplicity ignoring the 
one vote more than 50%, which is immaterial in the real world where districts contain 
thousands of voters):69 
3 40 60 120 180 120 9 3x40=120 3x10=30 
 Total votes: 450 450 Total wasted votes: 150 300 
         
Efficiency Gap= (300-150)/900=150/900= +16.67% in favor of Red   
    -16.67% disadvantage to Blue   
         
         
         
 
 
67 Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918; Davis, 478 U.S. at 109. 
68 Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 16 (The article was widely circulated among academics and 
advocates concerned with redistricting issues for some time before its publication). 
69 See id. at 18 (In the real world, districts are not exactly equal in number of votes cast, so adding the 
wasted votes by district is tedious. A simpler and quicker method of calculating the efficiency gap in a 
two party race is ½ of a party’s seat advantage minus 2 times its vote advantage, with both advantages 
expressed as percentages. In this hypothetical Red captured 6/9 or 66.7% of the seats, which is 33.3% 
more than Blue’s 33.3%. The two parties each received 450 votes, so Red’s vote advantage is 0%. The 
efficiency gap is ½ of 33.3% or 16.7%). 
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In simple terms, the efficiency gap is an index of the relative legislative muscle 
the two parties get from each vote and how much the districting dilutes the vote of 
one party. It measures the presence in a map of the goal that a gerrymanderer sets 
out to accomplish: “pack” as many of the opposing party’s voters as possible into 
districts that the opponents will win anyway, and “crack” the opponent’s votes in 
competitive districts down to levels that assure success for the gerrymanderer. 
The efficiency gap thus supplies the “measurable” component of a manageable 
standard of unconstitutional gerrymandering, analogous to the equal population 
requirements of Wesberry and Reynolds. It also is relevant, but not sufficient, to 
establish partisan motivation. 
 
Proof of a material and lasting burden. The challenge raised by the Bandemer 
plurality and by the Court’s later demands for a manageable standard is to establish 
that the maps will create a lasting and material impairment of the minority party’s 
representational rights. These requirements boil down to showing how much of an 
efficiency gap revealed by the first actual election under a new map (or  by a 
hypothetical election using the new districts measured by the voting history from past 
election) is sufficient to demonstrate a probable, lasting material impairment of 
representational rights. 
To establish reliability and durability, the Whitford plaintiffs did not rely 
solely on common sense or the fact that the defendants spent over $200,000 to 
generate their maps.70 Plaintiffs offered two basic means of testing the durability of 
an efficiency gap of a given magnitude. One expert testified that he had analyzed a 
large number of elections and found that a map exhibiting an efficiency gap of seven 
percent or more in the most recent election would continue the dominant party as the 
majority in the legislative chamber throughout a decade in 95% of the cases. The 
plaintiffs argue that this finding and other statistical showings establish to a high 
degree of probability that the degree of Republican bias in the Wisconsin map will 
enable it to retain majority control throughout the decade, thus establishing a 
material and lasting impairment of the minority party voters’ representational 
rights. 
Mopping up. There are a number of subsidiary issues that are often debated 
and cloud the issue. It is true that in some areas, notably cities with large minority 
populations, Democrats tend to be clustered more densely than Republicans.71 The 
degree to which that is truer of Democrats (in cities) than Republicans (in suburbs) 
is hotly debated. Very likely, however, any “natural” bias rarely exceeds low single 
digits, and never approaches the thirteen percent efficiency gap that the Whitford 
plaintiffs allege. Similarly, there is some skirmishing over how to account for the 
efficiency gap in uncontested districts, which are numerous in some heavily 
gerrymandered states. Some hypothetical vote for the nonexistent opponent of an 
 
 
 
 
70 Whitford, 151 F.Supp.3d at 918. 
71 Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral 
Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 239–69 (2013). 
2016] Gerrymandering Revisited 73 
 
 
 
unopposed winner needs to be constructed.72 It is up to the political scientists to work 
this out with reasonably reliable statistical analyses. There will be multiple 
reasonable means of resolving these nuances, but the differences among them are 
unlikely to affect the ultimate conclusion that representational rights are indeed 
impaired by large efficiency gaps. 
 
VI. INDEPENDENTS AND MINORITY PARTIES 
 
Finally, plaintiffs have typically asserted claims asserting denial of rights to 
political parties or their supporters, and alleged that the effect of a gerrymander is 
statewide. Viewed as a denial of the ability to reach majority of a chamber in the state 
legislature, it seems correct that all supporters of the excluded party are wrongly 
denied representation of their views, and the effect is statewide. 
A qualitatively different complaint is available to Independents and third- 
party supporters. In a competitive district, they can choose between the two major 
party candidates, and often affect the outcome. In a gerrymandered map, however, 
up to ninety percent of the districts are virtually certain to elect the prevailing 
candidate in the party dominating that district.73 As a result, at least in states with 
closed primaries, Independents are effectively disenfranchised, having no say in 
whom the parties nominate, and being handed the winner of the district majority. As 
a result, in some districts Republicans and Independents are shut out, and in others 
Democrats and Independents are excluded from a meaningful vote. Some of this 
phenomenon occurs in any districting plan, but it is not unconstitutional because it 
is not the product of “illegitimate” districting considerations. The Supreme Court has 
assumed, without deciding, that partisan districting is “illegitimate” for purposes 
justifying population deviations. If so, it seems equally illegitimate in drawing district 
lines. Such an approach would create different, district-specific claims by different 
groups of people in different parts of the state. 
In this connection, the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Common Cause 
Indiana v. Individual Members of the Indiana Election Commission74 is interesting. 
The court unanimously affirmed the Chief Judge of the Southern District in holding 
unconstitutional Marion County Indiana’s system for electing its thirty-six Superior 
 
 
72 It would seem that a hypothetical vote for the minority party that did not field a candidate could be 
reasonably constructed by first determining the ratio of the total votes for the minority’s least well known 
statewide candidate (examples are auditor, treasurer, secretary of state) in all legislative districts which 
were contested between the two parties to the total votes for that party’s legislative candidates in those 
districts, then attributing that percentage of the statewide candidate’s vote in the legislative district to 
create a hypothetical anonymous minority candidate vote. This would require precinct level data on the 
statewide candidate’s race to construct his/her hypothetical district vote. If that is not available, it may 
be necessary to use presidential races adjusted for relative volume between them and state legislative 
races. I understand statisticians may favor more sophisticated techniques, and leave that issue for the 
courts to resolve. 
73 In 2014, thirty-seven of the one hundred Indiana House seats were unopposed. The prevailing candidate 
in ninety-four of hundred districts received more than fifty-five percent of the votes cast for a major party 
candidate. Election Results, INDIANA ELECTION DIVISION, 
http://www.in.gov/apps/sos/election/general/general2014?page=office&countyID=- 
1&officeID=10&districtID=-1&candidate= (last updated March 11, 2015, 10:01 AM). 
74 800 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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Court judges.75 The system was instituted in 1975 to assure partisan balance of the 
trial bench in Indianapolis and only slightly tweaked since.76 Its most recent 
incarnation called for each of the two major parties to nominate only half of the 
number of judges whose seats were up for election in any year. Absent a write-in or 
third party candidate, all primary winners were assured election in the general 
election. In the forty years of this plan, only an occasional write-in or third party 
candidate popped up, and none came anywhere near success. 
The Seventh Circuit grounded its decision expressly in a violation of First 
Amendment representational rights, holding that restricting the parties to 
nominating only half the seats burdened the voting rights of the party adherents, and 
also finding troublesome the disparity between the voting rights conferred on primary 
voters and others.77 The scheme invalidated in Common Cause was a de jure denial 
of voting rights to some, while a gerrymander can accomplish the same thing de facto. 
It remains to be seen whether this approach will supplement or even displace the 
conventional attack on gerrymanders as deprivations of minority party rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Id. at 928. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
 Drawing the Line for Democratic Choice: 
How the Petition Clause Can Restore a Citizen’s Right to Participate in 
Commission-Driven Redistricting 
 
Mateo Forero* 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue that commission-driven redistricting (and the “apolitical” process 
enshrined therein) frustrates a citizen’s right to meaningfully participate in electoral design. 
This right is fundamental, and has long been safeguarded by the First Amendment’s 
assertion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Accordingly, I propose that courts use 
the Petition Clause as a constitutional remedy against rules that abridge substantive public 
input in commission-driven redistricting. To illustrate this claim, I analyze how one 
commonly adopted commission rule—the ex parte contacts prohibition—limits democratic 
choice.  Then, I examine how a court might deploy the First Amendment to repair the harm 
inflicted by the rule. 
INTRODUCTION   
 
 What does Bullwinkle have in common with a broken-winged pterodactyl? 
According to the courts, both resemble congressional districts that were oddly drawn 
to achieve suspicious electoral outcomes.1 Gerrymanders, as they are more commonly 
known, have long been the stuff of political intrigue. In large part, this is because 
state legislatures—the entities which usually produce them—are political by nature.2 
                                            
*  Associate, Balch & Bingham LLP. J.D., University of Alabama School of Law (May 2016); B.A., George 
Washington University: Elliott School of International Affairs (May 2013). Thank you to Professor Bryan 
Fair for his invaluable guidance in making this Article a reality. Thank you also to Alyssa Backlund, 
Ashley Batiste, Nic Campbell, Chase Chesser, Tyler Connor, Lyndsie Curry, Kathryn Davis, Gillian 
Richard, Stephanie Smith, Roenika Wiggins, and Aaron Smith for their editing suggestions and timely 
advice. I dedicate this research to my grandfathers, whose professional example has always been my 
inspiration. 
1  Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the Bullwinkle shape of New York’s 
12th congressional district was unconstitutional because it diluted the effect of Latino votes); Fletcher v. 
Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 902 n.5 (describing Maryland’s 3rd congressional district as “reminiscent 
of a broken-winged pterodactyl, lying prostrate across the center of the State”). 
2  See Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, Redistricting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 649, 651 (Jan E. Leighley ed., 2010) (noting that in most 
jurisdictions, redistricting “defaults to the legislature and the governor. For these states, redistricting is 
no different than passing state law. The state legislators pass new maps and rely on the governor to sign 
them into law”); WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS 
AND THE STATES 22 (10th ed. 2001) (“By and large, what the legislature brings to lawmaking is the power 
to represent the people and the authority to make social; what it can leave is its distinctive imprint on 
the policies recommended by others. Neither in what it brings to the process of making law nor in what 
it leaves in public policy is its power trifling”). 
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Indeed, the specter of partisan bias in redistricting is exactly what makes 
gerrymandering suspicious.3 But the close link between partisanship and electoral 
design is not a random one. Notably, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution provides 
that the “times, places and manner of holding elections for . . . Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof . . . .”4 Thus, it is by design that 
our Founding Fathers placed the task of drawing electoral maps in the hands of those 
closest to the people. Theirs was an institutional choice rooted in the vision of a 
pluralist and federalist republic.5 
 That choice, however, was seriously undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
one of its recent decisions. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, the Court held that a state may draw congressional 
districts through a freestanding agency—even though the text of Article I, Section 4 
assigns that duty to its legislature.6 The Court reached this conclusion by 
interpreting “legislature” to mean “legislative power,” which includes prescription by 
direct democracy.7 Therefore, the Court found that an Arizona initiative assigning 
redistricting authority to an independent commission was a permissible exercise of 
the state’s “legislative power.”8 Rationalizing its decision, the Court stressed that 
                                            
3  Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601–09 (2002) 
(arguing that partisan gerrymanders harm democratic accountability, individual rights, and group-based 
interests); and see Grofman & Brunell, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that “it is common journalistic wisdom 
that redistricting is an important cause of the extreme ideological polarization between the two parties 
found in the U.S. House of Representatives and in many state legislatures”). 
4  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Although “legislature” has been interpreted broadly in 
Elections Clause jurisprudence, this is not without caveats. See Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, 
541 U.S. 1093, 1095 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be 
consistent with Article I, Section 4, there must be some limit on the State’s ability to define lawmaking 
by excluding the legislature itself in favor of the courts” (emphasis added)). 
5  James Madison, widely recognized as the philosopher of the Constitution, noted that “the House of 
Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the 
influence of that class of men whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the 
state legislatures.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 287–88 (James Madison). Following Madison’s cue, 
Professor Franita Tolson has argued that partisan gerrymandering is federalism-reinforcing “because: 1) 
the states’ redistricting power links officials in separate spheres of government; and 2) this link, when 
combined with the loyalty commanded by the political party structure, allows the state to send an 
ideologically cohesive House delegation to Congress to influence federal policy.” Franita Tolson, Partisan 
Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 889 (2010). 
6  135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2015) [hereinafter Arizona Legislature]. 
7  Id. at 2666–68. The Court’s interpretation was based on three cases that had previously given the 
Elections Clause its “functional” gloss. See also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); 
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). However, as the dissenters 
pointed out, those cases never stood for the proposition that the identity of a legislature changes clause-
by-clause in the Constitution. Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2682-83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
8  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2676. The initiative, known as Proposition 106, was introduced in 
response to decades of fruitless redistricting litigation. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A 
Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1830–31 (2011) (providing a brief description of the 
controversies). Proposition 106 went on the ballot in the year 2000, and ultimately won by a margin of 
56.1% to 43-9%. BETSEY BAYLESS, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2000), 
http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/105092/content/2000%20annual_report.pdf.  The vote broke along 
party lines, with groups like Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and the Democratic Party as 
its major proponents. Cain, supra note 8, at 1831. Based on that reality, the Court’s characterization of 
Proposition 106 as a choice of the unified “people of Arizona” is strained at best. 
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removing legislatures from the line-drawing process curbs partisan entrenchment in 
state government.9 On that point, the Court noted that commissions like Arizona’s 
“have succeeded to a great degree in limiting the conflict of interest implicit in 
legislative control over redistricting.”10 
 The reasoning in Arizona Legislature, however, is problematic because it 
gainsays the Framers’ preference for a participatory (i.e., political) redistricting 
process. This preference was grounded on the fact that legislatures have long been 
considered adept at transforming disparate viewpoints into social consensus.11 Thus, 
it makes sense that Article I, Section 4 was written to give those institutions—instead 
of unelected bodies—the weighty task of electoral design. But Arizona Legislature 
imperiled that choice by allowing states to bypass the Constitution in the name of 
“nonpartisan” redistricting.12 Effectively, the Court invited states to vest redistricting 
power in commissions that are not accountable to the public, even though the costs 
to democracy are precipitous.13 In Arizona, for example, the state traded away a 
majoritarian consensus model for a system at risk of bureaucratic gridlock.14 This 
action hurt the citizens of Arizona the most, since they lost their ability to lobby 
candidly and directly for competing electoral maps, and they are now shut out by 
                                            
9  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (reasoning that commission-driven redistricting, as adopted by 
Arizona, is “in full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental 
power”). What the Court failed to see, however, was that the compromise of our federal Constitution 
changed that “font” of power in order to serve superordinating structural interests (e.g., federalism, 
pluralism). See Tolson, supra note 5, at 898. In other words, the Elections Clause was the Framers’ 
method of protecting the people from their own hyper-majoritarian vices. 
10  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2676. 
11  James Madison famously observed that legislatures “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations . . . .” Within that model, he argued, “the public voice, pronounced by the 
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people 
themselves, convened for the purpose.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 76, 77 (James Madison). Over time, 
political scientists have confirmed the wisdom of Madison’s pluralist perspective. See, e.g., ROBERT A. 
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 223-56 (2d ed. 2005) (describing 
pluralism as an ordering theory of political science); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE 
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22–66 (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (arguing that “interest group 
liberalism” captures the essence of modern legislative power).  
12  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658 (framing the question before it as primarily “concern[ing] an 
endeavor by Arizona voters to address the problem of partisan gerrymandering”). The dissent amply 
criticized this rationale, asserting that: “The majority today shows greater concern about redistricting 
practices than about the meaning of the Constitution. I recognize the difficulties that arise from trying 
to fashion judicial relief for partisan gerrymandering. But our inability to find a manageable standard in 
that area is no excuse to abandon a standard of meaningful interpretation in this area. This Court has 
stressed repeatedly that a law’s virtues as a policy innovation cannot redeem its inconsistency with the 
Constitution. ‘Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.’” Id. at 2690 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
13  Id. at 2659. 
14  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1833 (“[B]ecause redistricting is a technical exercise, [Arizona’s] commissioners 
necessarily rely upon staff with geographic information system (GIS) skills (i.e., the ability to actually 
draw the lines), those with statistics training to do the Voting Right Act section 2 analysis, and legal 
counsel specializing in voting rights law. This sets up principal-agent problems based on asymmetries of 
information. In theory, the technical staff could steer commission decisions in a given direction by 
skewing the advice and options it gives to the commissioners”). 
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procedural rules “shielding” the commission from outside influence.15 The result has 
been a staggering loss of public access to an important field of policymaking. 
 Concerned by that outcome, I aim to explore how public access to redistricting 
can be restored in states that use (or are planning to adopt) the commission model. 
In this Article, I argue that commission-driven redistricting (and the “apolitical” 
process enshrined therein) frustrates a citizen’s right to meaningfully participate in 
electoral design.16 This right is fundamental, and it has long been safeguarded by the 
First Amendment’s assertion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the 
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”17 
Accordingly, I propose that courts use the Petition Clause as a constitutional remedy 
against rules that abridge substantive public input in commission-driven 
redistricting.18 To illustrate this claim, I will analyze how one commonly adopted 
commission rule—the ex parte contacts prohibition—limits democratic choice.19 Then, 
I will examine how a court might deploy the First Amendment to repair the harm 
inflicted by the rule. 
 This Article proceeds in two substantive Parts. In Part II, I explore 
redistricting commissions from the institutional perspective. I first discuss the 
history of partisan gerrymandering and redistricting reform and then use that 
backdrop to analyze the comparative dynamics of independent commissions. Within 
that context, I survey and critique the ex parte contacts prohibition common to all 
independent commissions. My assessment reveals that—when compared to the 
legislative method—this rule limits public access to the redistricting process and 
                                            
15  The inability to interact one-on-one with redistricting commissioners inflicts a serious individual harm 
on the people of Arizona. Absent procedural barriers, political “relationships . . . develop from extensive 
informal contacts between lobbyists and government decision-makers. Both parties to the exchange of 
information . . . benefit from this closeness. For their part, government decision-makers obtain valuable 
information that helps them make decisions. As for lobbyists, closeness allows them access to the people 
who make the decisions that affect them and their clients.” ANTHONY J. NOWNES, INTEREST GROUPS IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS: PRESSURE AND POWER 121 (2d ed. 2013). 
16  My thesis focuses on a narrow issue: whether procedural barriers in the redistricting context abridge 
democratic-choice interests safeguarded by the First Amendment. But the same type of argument could 
be made about procedural barriers in any other area of public policy. This broader confluence of 
administrative law and First Amendment jurisprudence raises interesting questions, and merits more 
research than what is currently available. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian 
Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 423–27 (2015). 
17  U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Framers believed that, by securing this right, “the people may . . . publicly 
address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the 
whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will.” See Proceedings in the House of 
Representatives, June 8, 1789, in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in 
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, 
AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 110 (2012). 
18  This argument relies on Professor Ronald Krotoszynski’s hypothesis that the Petition Clause carries an 
expansive right of access to the government. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 17, at 170. In his seminal work 
on the subject, Professor Krotoszynski posits that “petitioners have a right to have their petitions be 
received and heard by the government,” and that “this right to be heard must [also] include a right of 
proximity to the government officials to whom a petition is addressed.” KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 17, at 
170. 
19  For an overview of the ex parte contacts rule in federal practice, see Sidney A. Shapiro, Two Cheers for 
HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 853 (2002). 
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dilutes the effect of citizen petitions on electoral design. Using that conclusion as a 
descriptive frame, I then proceed to make my normative First Amendment argument. 
 In Part III, I explore how the harm inflicted by the ex parte contacts rule 
implicates the First Amendment. I do this by measuring the values historically 
protected by the Petition Clause against the rule’s dilutive effect on those interests. 
Concluding that petitioning rights are materially infringed, I then contend that 
courts should subject the ex parte contacts rule to strict-scrutiny balancing. 
Borrowing from an analogous line of cases recognizing a right of access to court 
proceedings, I argue that this balancing reveals a constitutional infirmity. Therefore, 
I conclude that courts should invalidate the commission-specific rule as an invalid 
restraint on redistricting petitions. 
I. REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS & DEMOCRATIC CHOICE 
 
 Animating this Article is the acknowledgment that redistricting is, by nature, 
a political endeavor. This Part gives depth to that proposition by: (1) tracing a 
narrative between voting rights litigation and commission-driven redistricting and 
(2) exploring the institutional problems created by the commission model. The 
discussion proceeds in three sections. First, I examine the events that prompted 
commission-based reforms—namely, the failed attempt by courts to police partisan 
gerrymandering. Then, I survey how those reforms have played out in the states and 
consider why the independent commissions adopted in six jurisdictions are 
constitutionally significant. Finally, I delve into one of the procedural rules that 
makes commission-driven redistricting problematic, and I analyze why mechanisms 
of its kind violate principles of pluralism. This last section will provide a staging point 
for the First Amendment claim I make in Part III. 
A. Jilted at the Bench: A Brief History of Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
 
 History teaches us that commission-driven redistricting was born from a 
wrinkle in American jurisprudence. For over a century after the Constitutional 
Convention, courts respected the vesting of redistricting power in the legislative 
branch of each state.20 Justice Frankfurter forcefully articulated this position, writing 
in Colegrove v. Green that “courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy 
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion 
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”21 That remedy, however, 
                                            
20  For a historical overview of the voting rights debate prior to the 20th century, see Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost 
of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1023, 
1036-50 (2009); and Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1647-60 (1993). 
21  328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). In Colegrove, a group of voters sought to enjoin an Illinois 
congressional election. Id. at 550. The Illinois district map had not been modified since 1901, and the 
voters argued that it entrenched population inequalities. Id. at 551. The Court, however, rejected the 
plea for judicial intervention—reasoning that only the states and Congress could provide a remedy. Id. 
at 552-53. 
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became quite elusive in the mid-twentieth century, as racial entrenchment and major 
shifts in demography distorted the political process.22 It became clear by the 1960s 
that state legislatures were using their redistricting power for invidious ends, and in 
Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court finally intervened.23 The Baker Court held that 
challenges to electoral design were justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
concluded that courts had a duty to protect equality in voting rights.24 Thus, despite 
Justice Frankfurter’s criticism that the Court was spewing “empty rhetoric, sounding 
a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope,”25 the Court 
confidently entered the political thicket. Not surprisingly, that adventure soon 
presented the Court with insurmountable challenges. 
 In a line of cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Court elaborated its 
“one person, one vote” rule, which required states to draw districts with equal 
populations.26 The Court later clarified that this equipopulation principle applied 
rigidly to congressional districts27—even though a group of dissenters warned that 
“legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial 
groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they 
adhere to population equality.”28 In a scathing critique of the decision in Wells v. 
Rockefeller, Justice Harlan objected that “the Court’s exclusive concentration upon 
arithmetic blinds it to the realities of the political process.”29 And similarly, in 
Karcher v. Daggett, Justice Powell noted that an “uncompromising emphasis on 
numerical equality” actually “encourages and legitimates even the most outrageous 
partisan gerrymanders.”30 These reproaches laid bare that the Court was lost in the 
political thicket: setting rules against quantitative vote dilution, while exacerbating 
                                            
22  See Michael P. McDonald, American Voter Turnout in Historical Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 125, 132–35 (discussing how low rates of voter turnout 
were a result of Jim Crow policies in the South). 
23  369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962) (concluding that a 1901 Tennessee districting law violated equal protection). 
However, the writing was on the wall two years before Baker was decided. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960), the Court had ruled that an Alabama municipal gerrymander violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
24  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan established the familiar six-factor test for 
determining “political questions.” Id. Upon applying those factors, he concluded that malapportionment 
claims could be addressed by the Court. Id. at 226. 
25  Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
26  377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that a state must “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, 
in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable”). In fact, the Reynolds 
rule was a derivative of two other cases decided that same Term. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376–
78 (1963) (invalidating Georgia’s county-unit primary system, which used a vote-weighing mechanism 
similar to the federal electoral college); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that 
population disparities between Georgia’s congressional districts violated Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution). 
27  See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (invalidating Missouri’s congressional map); Wells 
v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546–47 (1969) (invalidating New York’s congressional map). 
28  Wells, 394 U.S. at 555 (White, J., dissenting). 
29  Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). His scathing dissent mocked the “magic formula” of “one man-one 
vote” as unworkable and ineffective at preventing partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 549–50. 
30  462 U.S. 725, 785 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell’s critique arose from the Court’s decision 
to invalidate a New Jersey congressional plan that diluted Republican votes in Newark. Id. at 726. 
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problems in qualitative vote manipulation.31 However, because none of the Court’s 
cases through the 1970s presented the precise issue for decision, the problem of 
partisan gerrymandering remained largely unpoliced. 
 This reality forced the Court in Davis v. Bandemer to consider whether 
equipopulous districts drawn with a partisan motive were unconstitutional.32 In a 
six-to-three decision, the Bandemer Court held that such partisan gerrymanders 
were in fact justiciable.33 However, the majority disagreed on the standard to be 
applied—with Justice White proposing one test and Justice Powell offering the 
alternative.34 Justice White’s approach focused on two elements: the “consistent 
degradation” of voter influence and the “continued frustration” of the majority’s 
electoral will.35 Meanwhile, Justice Powell’s approach hinged on three factors: the 
shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political boundaries; any 
legislative history bearing upon partisan motivation; and evidence of a dilutive 
distribution of voters by party affiliation.36 Criticizing both tests as disingenuous, the 
dissent argued that partisan gerrymanders were simply nonjusticiable. Leading that 
view, Justice O’Connor predicted that courts would be unable to follow the tests set 
forth by the splintered majority.37 She asserted that the judiciary was unfit to make 
policy determinations about partisanship, and accordingly, that it should stay out.38 
 This lack of guidance from the Court made Bandemer claims impossible to 
prove, and decades of litigation failed to settle the matter.39 Unsurprisingly, by the 
                                            
31  See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 791–94 (2004) (describing in 
detail how the Court’s voting-rights jurisprudence evolved from 1965 to 1985). 
32  478 U.S. 109 (1986). In the earlier case of Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court had 
upheld a Connecticut redistricting plan against partisan gerrymandering claims. The Gaffney Court, 
however, failed to address the justiciability of the challenge. See id. at 737. Thus, in an important way, 
Bandemer was an attempt to correct the error. 
33  Id. at 123. Justice White, writing for a majority on justiciability, explained that qualitative vote 
manipulation was not a political question. Id. at 126. He reasoned that the Baker factors counseled in 
favor of judicial intervention—especially since the Court had succeeded in finding a “judicially 
manageable standard” in the ambit of quantitative dilution claims (i.e., one person-one vote). Id. at 126–
27. 
34  The six-vote majority agreed that partisan gerrymandering required proof of “both intentional 
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” 
Id. at 127. See also id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, they divided 
on how to measure the requisite discriminatory effect. See Berman, supra note 30, at 796. 
35  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132–33. 
36  Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
37  Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (predicting that the proposed tests would devolve into “a requirement 
of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group”). 
38  Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This argument is buttressed by the fact that “nothing in our 
constitutional text or history supports the judgment that states act unconstitutionally by creating voting 
mechanisms and district lines that produce wholly disproportional representation.” Berman, supra note 
30, at 820. 
39  See, e.g., Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 773–74 (4th Cir. 2003); Smith 
v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 1998); La Porte Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs of Cty. of La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1994); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 
474–75 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2002); 
Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1172–74 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395–97 
(W.D.N.C. 1992), summarily aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); Ill. Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v. LaPaille, 
782 F. Supp. 1272, 1275–76 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 653 (N.D. 
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time Vieth v. Jubelirer was decided in 2004, a plurality of justices were convinced that 
partisan gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political question.40 Describing the 
proposed standards as “misguided when proposed,”41 and observing that they had 
produced “one long record of puzzlement and consternation,”42 the plurality voted to 
overrule Bandemer entirely.43 The plurality also rejected the four tests proposed by 
the Vieth dissenters—echoing Justice O’Connor’s admonition that it is “impossible to 
assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering,” difficult to establish whether a party 
has majority status, and “impossible to assure” that a party that does enjoy majority 
status “wins a majority of seats.”44 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, 
agreeing that the Bandemer test was inappropriate and noting that the approaches 
of the Vieth dissenters were questionable.45 However, he held out hope for a yet-to-
be-discovered method.46 As of 2016, the Court has not found that such a standard 
exists. 
 
B. Harnessing Politics to Fix Politics: The Rise of Commission-Driven 
Redistricting 
 
 In large part because of Vieth, commentators soured to the idea that courts 
could (and should) police partisan gerrymandering.47 Fueled by this frustration, 
policymakers began urging a more limited role for the judiciary in line-drawing 
controversies. The proposals for accomplishing this were varied, but importantly, all 
agreed that the political process should be “harnessed” to “fix” the conflict of interest 
                                            
Ill. 1991); Republican Party of Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 403–05 (W.D. Va. 1991); Kenai 
Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1366–69 (Alaska 1987); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 
A.2d 646, 664–65 (Md. 1993); McClure v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 766 N.E. 2d 847, 856–57 (Mass. 2002). 
40  541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Vieth, Democratic voters challenged a Pennsylvania 
redistricting plan that strongly favored the Republican Party. Id. at 272–74. The controversy arose after 
the state lost two congressional seats to reapportionment, and was forced to redistrict. Berman, supra 
note 30, at 798. The plan was designed to hand Republicans fourteen of the state’s nineteen congressional 
seats—even though both parties enjoyed nearly equal support among the Pennsylvania electorate. Id. 
The legislature accomplished this by “slashing through municipalities and neighborhoods, splitting 
counties . . . [and] producing oddly misshapen districts.” Brief for Appellants at 12–13, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580). 
41  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 283 (plurality opinion). 
42  Id. at 282 (plurality opinion). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 287–89 (plurality opinion). For a detailed description of the four tests suggested by the Vieth 
dissenters, see Berman, supra note 30, at 799–802. 
45  Id. at 306–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
46  Id. at 308–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested that analyzing partisan 
gerrymanders through the First Amendment might yield a “more relevant” analysis. Id. at 314 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“After all, these allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not burdening or 
penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their 
association with a political party, or their expression of political views.”). 
47  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1810–11 (“Some legal scholars and political scientists continue to urge the 
courts to intervene more deeply into partisan and incumbent gerrymandering issues, putting forward 
new refinements of formal redistricting criteria or fairness formulas for consideration. But others think 
this unwise and seek to lessen the current burden on the courts.”). 
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in legislature-driven redistricting.48 One commentator, for instance, proposed 
shaming politicians into drawing maps more “responsibly,”49 while others argued for 
accountability through the state referendum process.50 Most radically, however, a 
group of scholars suggested stripping elected officials of their redistricting duties 
entirely.51 It is in this milieu that commission-driven redistricting became an 
attractive policy mechanism. 
 Prompted by these proposals, states began establishing redistricting 
commissions with varying degrees of power.52 In a recent study of the existing models, 
Professor Bruce Cain describes commissions as being in one of four typologies: 
advisory, backup, political, or independent.53 I will briefly sketch each model here in 
order of least to most autonomous. 
First are advisory commissions, which can only recommend redistricting plans 
to the legislature and whose members are not insulated from partisan dynamics.54 
Eight states currently use the advisory commission model, and two of those 
jurisdictions serve as good illustrations of the categorical norm.55 In New York, for 
example, the legislature can adopt, amend, or ignore the commission’s proposal as it 
chooses.56 The commission itself consists of four legislators and two non-legislators 
who are appointed by party leaders in Albany.57 This formation stands in contrast to 
the Iowa commission whose five members cannot be in party positions, in elected 
office, or be related to members of the state legislature.58 On one hand, that quirk 
makes Iowa’s model more autonomous than New York’s; but the commission itself 
has little power. As in New York, the Iowa legislature may approve or reject the plans 
produced by the commission at will.59 
                                            
48  Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in RACE, 
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 86, 
86 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) (providing an overview of 
trends in the scholarly literature). 
49  Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 7 (2010). 
50  Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668 (2006). 
51  See, e.g., Gordon E. Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?, in 
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S 122, 149 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC 
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 380–84 (1968); Samuel Issacharoff, The 
Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 68 (1995); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, 
The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 849–50 (1997). 
52  See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2010) 
(cataloguing the reform trends emerging throughout the United States). 
53  Cain, supra note 8, at 1813. 
54  Id. at 1813–15. 
55  The eight states are Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. See Justin 
Levitt, All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt’s Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines, LOYOLA 
LAW SCHOOL, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
56  See N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(5) (Consol. 2014 & Supp. 2016) (“The primary function of the task force is to 
compile and analyze data, conduct research for and make reports and recommendations to the 
legislature, legislative commissions and other legislative task forces.”). 
57  See id. § 83-m(2) (describing the appointment process of the legislative task force members). 
58  IOWA CODE § 42.5(2) (2014 & Supp. 2016). 
59  See id. § 42.6(3) (explaining the duties of the commission). 
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Next are backup commissions, which can only exercise conditional (but 
independent) authority and whose members are not insulated from partisanship.60 
Eight states currently use backup commissions, albeit for different kinds of 
districts.61 However, in all of those jurisdictions, redistricting power is conferred only 
if a legislature fails to draw the lines.62 As Professor Cain notes, the mere existence 
of this trigger “can be consequential . . . . [because] knowing that stalemated 
redistricting negotiations would throw the matter to a backup commission can alter 
the legislative bargaining strategies in certain circumstances.”63 This phenomenon 
can be readily observed in states like Connecticut whose commission has a mandated 
bipartisan composition.64 When the partisan divide is close to fifty-fifty in the 
legislature, there may be more frequent recourse to the commission. But when the 
legislature is dominated by one party, the majority may wish to avoid a commission-
enacted plan. 
At a third level are political commissions, which possess initial line-drawing 
authority and are headed by panels that proportionally represent interests in the 
state.65 Seven jurisdictions use this model with variations on composition and scope 
of power.66 However, one feature common to all political commissions is their focus 
on balanced representation.67 Some states achieve this by allocating membership 
through statewide offices (e.g., the Governor or Attorney General), while others 
mandate bipartisan and multi-geographic officeholders.68 New Jersey’s institutional 
                                            
60  Cain, supra note 8, at 1815. 
61  Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas use a backup commission only for state 
districts. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MD. CONST. art. III, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OKLA. CONST. 
art. V, § 11A; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28 (explaining the composition or role of the 
backup commissions). Meanwhile, Indiana uses its backup only for congressional districts. But see IND. 
CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2012) (explaining the establishment of redistricting commissions for 
congressional districts). The only state to use its backup for state and congressional districts is 
Connecticut. See generally CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b) (explaining the role of the backup commission). 
62  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1815 (arguing that commissions’ initial lack of line-drawing power is “a serious 
deficiency”). 
63  Id. To illustrate this point, Professor Cain presents a hypothetical situation: if a backup commission has 
a different partisan composition than the legislature, the risk of losing authority over the matter will 
always “give the majority party leadership more leverage over individual majority party members (i.e., 
‘hold this up by insisting on your selfish demands and we lose control of the process to the other party’).” 
Id. 
64  See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b) (requiring that each party leader appoint two commissioners, and then 
agree on a ninth “citizen commissioner”). 
65  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1816 (explaining that political commissions are more independent than 
advisory or backup commissions). 
66  Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Missouri use political commissions for state redistricting. 
See ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7; OHIO CONST. art. XI, 
§ I; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(h). Meanwhile, the commissions in New Jersey and Hawaii draw both 
congressional and state lines. But see HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1. 
67  Cf. Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 
ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002) (observing that “the entire New Jersey experience—from negotiating the district 
configurations, to deliberating within the Commission, to defending the new plan in court—highlights 
the significance of unity among” state factions and communities of interest). 
68  Colorado’s model is noteworthy on this count. The state constitution requires that no more than four 
commissioners can live in the same congressional district. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. But see Cain, 
supra note 8, at 1816 n.29 (other states only require bipartisanship.). 
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framework is an example of the latter approach. There, the redistricting commission 
“consists of equally sized contingents of Democratic and Republican appointees 
chaired by a tiebreaking member selected by the commissioners themselves or the by 
the state supreme court if the commissioners cannot agree.”69 These commissioners 
must agree on New Jersey’s state and congressional districts, and they are supposed 
to do so in a manner that keeps elections competitive.70 As it were, Professor Cain 
believes the New Jersey model should be emulated in other states.71 
Finally, at the highest level of autonomy are independent commissions. As 
Professor Cain notes, independent commissions are the “culmination of a reform 
effort” aimed at completely eradicating the risks of partisan gerrymandering.72 He 
argues that these systems are in a league of their own because they: (1) are completely 
isolated from elected officials and (2) are able to put district lines in place without 
legislative approval.73 Because of their novelty and because of the Supreme Court’s 
stamp of approval in Arizona Legislature,74 independent commissions are likely to 
proliferate beyond the six states that currently use them (Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Montana, and Washington).75 Thus, studying the commissions that already 
exist can provide important insights about the landscape and future of redistricting 
reform. 
In that endeavor, Professor Cain’s analysis again sheds some light on the 
nuances. For example, he observes that Washington’s approach is the least 
independent because it gives “party leaders the power to appoint commissioners 
subject to certain restrictions,” and it grants the legislature a “limited ability to 
amend the commission’s recommended districts.”76 Meanwhile, he catalogues Alaska, 
Idaho, and Montana as intermediate states because they “do not give their 
legislatures any opportunity to amend the commission’s plans,” but they do “allow 
                                            
69  Cain, supra note 8, at 1817. 
70  Id. at 1838 (describing the “informal” bargaining process that occurs among New Jersey’s commissioners 
during redistricting). 
71  See id. at 1839–41 (arguing that New Jersey’s bargaining process should become a formalized procedure 
in other commission frameworks). 
72  Id. at 1817 (observing that the object of the independent commission model is to eliminate “legislators’ 
ability to choose the district lines they run in (sometimes simplistically characterized as elected officials 
choosing voters rather than voters choosing their representatives). The term for this problem—i.e., 
legislators drawing district lines that they ultimately have to run in—is legislative conflict of interest 
(LCOI)”). 
73  Id. These features sound similar to those which characterize political commissions. However, they are 
different in substance: the independent commission—at least in theory—operates entirely outside the 
sphere of horse-trading and tug-of-war prevalent in state capitals. 
74  See Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (“The people of Arizona turned to the initiative to curb the 
practice of gerrymandering and, thereby, to ensure that Members of Congress would have ‘a [sic] habitual 
recollection of their dependence on the people.’ In so acting, Arizona voters sought to restore ‘the core 
principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the voters should choose their representatives, not the 
other way around.’” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison)) and Berman, supra note 30, 
at 781)). 
75  See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8–10; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2, § 1(14); CAL. CONST. art. 21, § 2; IDAHO 
CONST. art. 3, § 2(a); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(1). 
76  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819; see also WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.100 
(2012). 
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legislative leaders to make . . . appointments subject to restrictions by elected 
officials, political party leaders, and lobbyists.”77 Finally, he classifies Arizona and 
California as the most independent systems because their commissions are wholly 
autonomous, and their nomination processes are increasingly merit-based.78 In 
Arizona, for example, the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments identifies 
potential candidates for office;79 in California, legislative leaders can only strike 
nominees from the candidate pools prepared by the State Auditor.80 
 In the aggregate, these reforms highlight a continued effort to eradicate 
legislative conflicts of interest from redistricting. However, that goal bears false 
promise. As Professor Cain aptly observes, “a core problem for U.S. redistricting 
reform is that the system of nonpartisan expertise is weaker (even, sadly, in electoral 
administration) than in the other Anglo-American democracies that also use single 
member district rules.”81 Thus, the idea that independent commissions can cure what 
Vieth could not is plainly unrealistic. 
Indeed, not only is the goal illusory, its implementation presents a threat to 
the pluralist mode of policymaking.82 By erecting institutional barriers between the 
redistricting and legislative processes, citizens in commission-driven states are 
placed at two degrees of separation from electoral design. That separation, in turn, is 
deepened by the reality that most commissions have to abide by the administrative 
code of their home states.83 This is because administrative codes are normally 
designed to mitigate outside pressures on rulemaking and adjudication.84 In practice, 
                                            
77  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819, and see ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; IDAHO CODE § 
72-1502 (2006). 
78  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819. 
79  See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8). 
80  See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(b)-(g) (West 2014); Cain, supra note 8, at 1824 
(noting that the desired effect of this policy was to create “a bipartisan panel of citizens, unconnected to 
incumbent legislators and relying on neutral criteria, [who] would create fair and competitive district 
boundaries without explicit instructions to do so and without using political data”). 
81  Cain, supra note 8, at 1820–21; see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 769, 780–86 (2013) (surveying non-American institutional models of election administration). 
82  To understand this point, consider the mechanics of redistricting reform. In adopting a commission 
model, a state hopes to impact a dependent variable (partisan-motivated redistricting) by tweaking a 
group of independent variables (e.g., institutions, personnel). When it makes those changes, however, the 
state also impacts other output coefficients tied to the same variables—namely responsiveness to public 
needs. The result is a redistricting process that takes in neither downstream (i.e., legislator) nor 
upstream (i.e., citizen) inputs. This creates an information gap that ends up being filled by intra-stream 
(i.e., bureaucratic) priorities. Cf. Nikolaos Zahariadis, Ambiguity and Multiple Streams, in THEORIES OF 
THE POL’Y PROCESS 25, 31 (Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible eds., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing how 
policy outputs are impacted by the confluence of input “streams”); Ellen M. Immergut, Institutional 
Constraints on Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUB. POL’Y 557, 565–68 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein 
& Robert E. Goodin eds., 2006) (discussing how governmental structure affects policy outputs). 
83  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election 
Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 117 (2010) (noting that “election administration remains mostly a matter of 
state law and local practice,” and that “authority is largely devolved . . . to thousands of local election 
officials at the state and local level”). 
84  See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: 
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (“The job of public 
administration is not limited to aggregating the preferences of interest groups when normative issues 
present themselves. Instead, as Brian Cook points out, public administration must be a ‘political 
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this means citizens of some jurisdictions have no way to directly and openly share 
their views with the officials that matter.85 It is precisely this mix of institutional and 
procedural isolation that raises grave concerns about the public’s ability to 
meaningfully participate in redistricting. 
C. Procedural Dysfunction: Independent Commissions and the Ex Parte 
Contacts Rule 
 
 To illustrate my point about the threat to pluralism from commission-based 
redistricting, it is useful to study how one procedural rule common to all independent 
commissions harms democratic choice. Take, for instance, the rule barring 
redistricting commissioners from engaging in ex parte contacts with citizens.86 
In California, the state legislature directs that “commission members and staff 
may not communicate with or receive communications about redistricting matters 
from anyone outside of a public hearing.”87 It further stipulates that “the commission 
shall establish and implement an open hearing process for public input and 
deliberation that shall be subject to public notice and promoted through a thorough 
outreach program.”88 Similarly, in Washington, the state legislature directs the 
commission to comply with the “Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW.”89 
And that law, in relevant part, provides that commissioners “may not communicate, 
directly or indirectly, regarding any issue in the proceeding, with any person not 
employed by the agency who has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the 
proceeding, without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.”90 
These commands are just examples, but they are representative of the ex parte 
contacts prohibition used by most states. Indeed, the rule is commonly adopted by 
                                            
institution’ that ‘helps to create, to express, and to realize a nation’s public purposes.’”) (citing BRIAN J. 
COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 16 (1996)). 
85  Of course, citizens may participate in other indirect or diminished ways (e.g., by attending public 
hearings held by the commission). But the mere absence of alternative avenues for substantive 
participation in redistricting is what creates an individual-rights problem. 
86  Although state administrative codes differ in their implementation of the ex parte contacts rule, they 
largely follow the federal example. Cf. Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings 
(Recommendation 77-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.77 (2001) (listing the advantages of restraining ex parte 
communications, including reducing the possibility of unfair influence over decision makers, and 
affording interested parties opportunity to respond to information relied upon in the decision-making 
process). 
87  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(3) (West 2014). The rule was passed as part of Proposition 11, which 
established the state’s independent redistricting commission by initiative. See Cain, supra note 8, at 
1823. 
88  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(7) (West 2014). This provision was meant to link the state’s ex parte contacts 
rule to California’s open-meeting laws. See Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking 
Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1048–51 (2015). 
89  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.080(1) (West 2014). This directive was enacted as part of a legislative 
package following the redistricting amendments to the state constitution. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(4) 
(“The legislature shall enact laws providing for the implementation of this section, to include . . . 
additional standards to govern the commission”). 
90  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.455(2) (West 2014); see also William R. Andersen, The 1988 Washington 
Administrative Procedure Act—An Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 811–813 (1989). 
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redistricting commissions because it is key to accomplishing a “bias free” line-drawing 
process.91 On its face, this objective seems defensible; however, use of the rule also 
constricts the ability of citizens to interact candidly and personally with their 
commissioners. In effect, the prohibition creates a catch-22: a “neutral” redistricting 
process has been created but only at the expense of the constituent-representative 
relationship. Intuitively, that outcome seems more harmful to representative 
democracy than having a less-than-perfect method for drawing electoral maps. 
To understand why, consider how constituents interact with officials in 
commission-based states. Because of the ex parte contacts rule, if an individual wishes 
to propose (or give feedback on) a redistricting plan, he may only do so in the sterile 
environment of a public hearing.92 As a practical matter, this requirement may force 
the citizen to dilute or modify his position out of fear of retaliation from other 
members of the public.93 Alternatively, the requirement may cause commissioners to 
be less receptive to constituent input than if they were listening in a more informal—
or even private—setting.94 In either scenario, the citizen suffers from an inability to 
impact the redistricting process at an organic and substantive level. From that 
institutional perspective, the ex parte contacts rule discourages participation in a field 
that should be most open to the people it affects—that is, the voters.95 Indeed, the 
                                            
91  See Ron Levy, Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena, 53 
MCGILL L.J. 1, 23–24 (2008) (observing that in a “recommendation designed to keep influential partisans 
from exercising power behind closed doors, Common Cause proposes the creation of new state 
readjustment commissions whose members would ‘be prohibited from all ex-parte communications’ with 
elected officials and lobbyists”). 
92  I call the public hearing a “sterile environment” because it turns out to be useless for deliberative 
policymaking. At least one study in public administration has documented this conclusion: “The most 
ineffective technique is the public hearing. Public hearings do not work. Low attendance at public 
hearings is often construed as public apathy or silent approval of the status quo. In actuality, low 
attendance is more likely to be related to the structure of public hearings. Administrators recognize that 
the structure of public hearings and public meetings prohibits meaningful exchange. As one 
administrator said, ‘The public hearing is not about communicating, it is about convincing.’ . . . An activist 
suggested that the public hearing was window dressing, ‘We have these hearings so they can check off 
on their list that they’ve had their citizen participation. . . . It’s participation out of the fear that they are 
going to look bad.’” Cheryl Simrell King et al., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public 
Participation in Public Administration, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317, 323 (1998). 
93  Cf. Carson Hilary Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 845 
(2010) (“Public participation has long been considered an essential element of effective governance, [and] 
resolution of broad social problems. . . . The values underlying First Amendment protections and 
pluralism demand that individuals and groups have the opportunity to make their voices heard, without 
the threat of retaliation by those equipped with greater financial or institutional power.”). 
94  See King et al., supra note 89, at 319 (“Many administrators are, at best, ambivalent about public 
involvement or, at worst, they find it problematic . . . . As a result, although [they] view close relationships 
with citizens as both necessary and desirable, most of them do not actively seek public involvement. If 
they do seek it, they do not use public input in making administrative decisions.”). 
95  At least one commentator has observed that partisan gerrymandering actually serves voter preference. 
See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to 
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 670–73 (2002) (arguing that legislature-
driven redistricting safeguards popular incumbents and ensures better governance). 
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rule ensures that redistricting will be conducted in isolation and with primarily 
bureaucratic priorities in mind.96 
 Compare that scenario to how an individual in a state with legislative 
redistricting participates in electoral design. Unlike the officials in commission-based 
states, legislators considering district maps are not bound by an ex parte contacts 
prohibition.97 Therefore, they are able to meet individually and privately with 
constituents about their redistricting concerns and priorities. Because each legislator 
is answerable to the citizens with whom she meets, she is more likely to take these 
critiques seriously.98 This practice, in turn, motivates legislators to advocate for their 
constituents and use their views as bargaining chips negotiating with each other.99 
Cognizant that their voice has weight in the legislative arena, individuals are more 
willing to share their unvarnished opinions about potential redistricting plans. At its 
core, this interaction is a positive outcome—since greater input in the process yields 
electoral maps that are more comprehensive and representative. 
 In a nutshell, the latter example represents pluralism at work. Contrary to the 
rationale in Arizona Legislature, this process was the one our Framers had in mind 
when they drafted Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.100 The fact that 
independent commissions with unworkable ex parte contact rules are 
countermanding that preference should be of deep constitutional concern. It is to that 
concern that I turn my attention next. 
  
                                            
96  See id. at 678 (“With nonpartisan expertise . . . often comes detachment from the policy goals of the 
political branches. For example, it is quite typical for nonpartisan experts to attempt to make district 
lines as coterminous with political subdivision boundaries as possible. Pursuing such a goal, however, 
often conflicts with attention to communities of interest that straddle such boundaries and with a state’s 
public policy goal of regionalism in uniting cities and suburbs”). 
97  In fact, the hallmark of the legislative process is that representatives can freely communicate with 
constituents. This information-sharing function is central for democratic accountability: if legislators fail 
to heed public demands, they will be met with retaliation at the ballot box. See STONE & BUTTICE, Voters 
in Context: The Politics of Citizen Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 555, 561. 
98  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1817 n.29 (“I can attest from my own experience as a redistricting consultant 
that legislators are often pressured by their constituents and supporters to shape district lines in 
particular ways and that legislators are often loath to ignore their demands for fear of the electoral or 
fundraising consequences”). 
99  See Persily, supra note 92, at 679 (“Legislative bargains in the redistricting process are not completely 
detached from others that occur throughout a legislative session. Through redistricting, legislatures not 
only make the tough value-laden decisions as to how communities should be represented, but they create 
service relationships between representatives and constituents that fit into larger . . . policy programs”). 
100  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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II. RESTORING PUBLIC ACCESS TO REDISTRICTING 
 
 In Part II, I showed how the ex parte contacts rule undermines pluralism in 
redistricting policy. In Part III, I contend that this harm to democratic choice also 
triggers a redressable constitutional violation.101 Specifically, I argue that the ex 
parte contacts rule—when used by redistricting commissions—runs afoul of the First 
Amendment right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”102 In 
making this claim, I contend that: (1) the Petition Clause safeguards a citizen’s right 
to influence electoral design and (2) that the ex parte contacts rule abridges that right 
by impeding and diluting meaningful participation in commission-driven 
redistricting. 
 This discussion proceeds in three sections. First, I define the scope of the 
Petition Clause coverage by examining its historical context. I then use that history 
to measure whether procedural barriers in redistricting trigger the Clause’s 
protection. Second, finding that the ex parte contacts rule materially inhibits First 
Amendment interests, I argue that courts should subject the provision to a strict 
scrutiny balancing test. Third, I forecast this balancing analysis by analogizing to a 
line of cases that enforce public access to court proceedings. Using that framework, I 
conclude that the ex parte contacts prohibition cannot survive strict scrutiny. On one 
hand, the rule inhibits a process that is historically and functionally reliant on 
democratic input; but on the other hand, a state’s interest in “neutral” redistricting 
is not compelling enough to justify the burden on citizen petitions. 
A. Constitutional Trigger: The Historically Recognized Right to Influence the 
Government 
 As is customary in First Amendment jurisprudence, I begin with an inquiry 
into what interests are safeguarded by the Petition Clause.103 Normally, this inquiry 
would be guided by the Supreme Court’s authoritative precedents. However, this is 
                                            
101  This thesis relies on Professor Krotoszynski’s contention that the Petition Clause codifies a justiciable 
and enforceable right of access to the government. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 170. 
102  U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is no answer to impaired advocacy that a citizen can still petition a commission 
through the formal administrative process. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 175 (“The availability of 
one means of petitioning the government should not imply the absence of other means of engaging in 
petitioning activity that would-be petitioners might prefer to use”). For one, participating in that process 
may not actually provide the type of access the citizen desires. See KEN GODWIN ET AL., LOBBYING AND 
POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS 40 (2013). Plus, the Supreme Court has 
warned against this precise argument. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (holding that “the 
Constitution’s protection is not limited to direct interference with fundamental rights,” and that 
procedural barriers can form “an impermissible, though indirect, infringement of . . . [those] rights”). 
103  See generally Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First 
Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1342–45 (2015) (describing the history and 
current state of the “trigger test” in First Amendment law).  
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impractical here, since the judiciary has long treated the Petition Clause as a dead 
letter.104 Instead, I resort to the academic literature for more concrete guidance. 
In his influential book on petitioning, Professor Ronald Krotoszynski suggests 
that “like the Free Speech Clause, the Petition Clause should be interpreted and 
applied dynamically or purposively—the federal courts should identify the core 
purpose, or purposes, of the Petition Clause and then use the clause to advance and 
secure them.”105 To that end, considering the Clause’s “historical origins and past 
meaning should be useful, perhaps even essential, to identifying and securing its 
proper place in contemporary constitutional law.”106 Following that instruction, I aim 
now to define the Petition Clause through its historical antecedents.107  
 Petitioning first became a significant political activity in the thirteenth century 
when it was codified in the Magna Carta as a right of the nobility enforceable against 
King John.108 By the reign of Edward III in the mid-1300s, petitioning was a common 
practice exercised by noblemen and knights.109 The Crown had a formalized structure 
for receiving petitions, and this structure consisted of in-person presentations by the 
landed elite on behalf of the English people.110 This model was followed by Parliament 
in the sixteenth century as its representative power grew.111 The House of Commons 
would receive grievances from the citizenry, and accordingly, the House petitioned 
the Crown for changes in the general law.112 As Parliament itself became the source 
of prescriptive power, citizen petitions were read and debated directly.113 And by the 
time of the English Revolution in 1688, petitioning was seen as a birthright of all 
                                            
104  As I describe in Part III.B, the Supreme Court has invoked the Petition Clause before. However, those 
precedents have been limited to the circumstances they control, and have failed to recognize the Clause’s 
independent force. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 157. 
105  Id. at 81. 
106  Id. at 82. 
107  Much of the historical analysis in this section draws from my previous research on the Petition Clause. 
See generally Mateo Forero, Distorting Access to Government: How Lobbying Disclosure Laws Breach a 
Core Value of the Petition Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. 327, 342–46 (2015). 
108  See Magna Carta 1215, 16 John c. 61, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 187, 187 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[I]f we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any of our servants shall 
have done wrong in any way toward any one . . . let [the] barons come to us . . . and let them ask that we 
cause that transgression to be corrected without delay.”). 
109  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 85 (citing Professor William Stubbs’ extensive research on the practices 
and traditions of the English Crown in the high medieval period). 
110  Id. at 85–86 (“Parliament itself generally petitioned the Crown to establish a [new] law; it did not purport 
to make laws in its own name. Only later, and not until after Charles I gave his consent to the Petition 
of Right in 1628, did Parliament consistently enact bills on its own authority . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
111  Id. at 86. 
112  See id. at 86–87 (citing WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 346–48 (2d ed. 
1892)) (documenting the work of the Committee of Grievances, which considered the vast array of 
petitions submitted to the House of Commons during the reigns of James I and Charles I). 
113  See ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 516–17 (1930) (discussing a 1669 enactment which made consideration of petitions an 
inherent governmental duty of the House of Commons). 
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citizens.114  It was enshrined in the English Bill of Rights and was frequently used as 
a method of redress for both private grievances and collective concerns.115 
 The idea that petitioning was a core democratic function was later exported to 
the American colonies, where it developed in unprecedented ways. Because North 
American settlements in the late seventeenth century were territorially disperse, 
direct petitioning by citizens became the most convenient method for legislators to 
keep a pulse on social needs.116 In many instances, individuals lobbied for regulations 
on local trades and professions, and community representatives stridently sought 
legislation on the sale of alcohol and lottery tickets.117 Colonial legislatures also 
considered petitions made by disenfranchised groups,118 and legislatures even 
accepted requests by lobbyists that advanced purely private interests.119  History tells 
us that the governor of New York was one of the first colonial officials to be subjected 
to this kind of organized petitioning by English merchants.120 But that example was 
not an isolated or anomalous political occurrence; in a concrete way, it shows that 
petitioning was alive across the American colonies. 
 Virginia, in particular, had a well-established petitioning culture, where 
powerful landed interests played the game of pressure politics.121 As early as the 
1710s, well-connected planters from the Chesapeake Bay lobbied Virginia authorities 
for “legislation . . . prohibiting the export of bulk tobacco from that colony, for 
regulation of the trade to prevent Scottish smuggling, for a long period of grace 
between the landing of tobacco and the paying of customs duties, and for the 
prevention of tobacco planting in England.”122 These lobbying tactics were also 
common in Pennsylvania, where religious groups wielded great influence. At the turn 
of the eighteenth century, Quaker lobbyists “worked for approval of a Pennsylvania 
act forbidding the importation of slaves, they supported the proprietorship as a form 
of government, they worked to keep the Three Lower Counties (now Delaware) part 
of Pennsylvania, [and] they backed the separation of New York and New Jersey . . . 
                                            
114  See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 87 (“This growth in the importance and frequency of petitioning 
corresponds to the clearer demarcation of Parliament’s legislative power.”). 
115  Id. at 86–87. 
116  See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
VIRGINIA 6 (1979) (underscoring that petitioning had been transplanted “literally during the first year of 
settlement at Jamestown, and by 1700 [it] had assumed an important role in the political process”). 
117  See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 209–10 (1943). 
118  In 1769, a group of freed, black men lobbied the Virginia legislature to exempt their wives from a poll 
tax. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to 
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2185 (1998) (noting that this campaign “was as incendiary an action 
as could be conceived in the slave South. All the more stunning, then, that the petition was not simply 
heard, but granted”). 
119  See id. at 2183 (studying the lobbying campaigns of two women in colonial Georgia on behalf of their 
families). 
120  See John D. Runcie, The Problem of Anglo-American Politics in Bellomont’s New York, 26 WM. & MARY 
Q. 191, 203 (1969) (highlighting the mercantile lobby’s influence on trade policy in colonial New York). 
121  See Alison G. Olson, The Virginia Merchants of London: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Interest-Group 
Politics, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 363, 368–70 (1989). 
122  Id. at 369. 
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.”123 The Quaker lobby was also active in New England, where it pressured the 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut assemblies for a variety of impost 
exemptions.124 These provisions were extended in 1737, after the governor of 
Massachusetts was “waited upon” by Quaker lobbyists from London.125 
 These examples demonstrate that factional pressures were an accepted 
political reality in America by the 1770s. In fact, dissenters to the English Crown 
used those exact tactics to spark the cause of independence.126 American 
revolutionaries drew from the tradition of petitioning to craft their own political 
message.127 Their “Olive Branch” Petition of 1775 was essentially a lobbying effort on 
behalf of American interests to secure political outcomes in Britain (namely that the 
colonies be given free trade incentives by repealing laws like the Stamp Act).128 When 
these exhortations fell on deaf ears, the colonists found just cause for self-
determination: their right to be heard by the sovereign was nothing more than a 
formality.129 It was a rude awakening for those American colonists who believed they 
still had access to the British ruling class, and the frustration of that belief made 
petitioning an item of constitutional reform.130 
 Soon after independence, nine of the thirteen states adopted constitutions with 
sweeping protections for petitioning.131 For example, the Vermont Constitution of 
1777 gave its citizens “a right . . . to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, 
by address, petition or remonstrance.”132 However, proposals for a more expansive 
federal right led to heated debate at the Constitutional Convention.133 Some delegates 
pushed for a right of the people to bind their representatives by “instruction,” but 
luminaries like James Madison disagreed.134 Madison believed that a right conferring 
                                            
123  Alison G. Olson, The Lobbying of London Quakers for Pennsylvania Friends, 117 PA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 131, 135 (1993). 
124  Kenneth L. Carroll, American Quakers and Their London Lobby, 70 QUAKER HIST. 22, 36 (1981). 
125  Id. at 38. 
126  See Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and 
Interpretation, at 57–66 (Aug. 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (on file 
with author) (cataloguing the petitions filed with Parliament seeking redress of colonial wrongs inflicted 
by George III). 
127  See Alice Tanner Boyer, The “Olive Branch” Petition, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 183, 185 (1953–1954) 
(describing the heated debates over independence that led to a last-ditch plea to the King for peaceable 
redress). 
128  See John Dickson & Thomas Jefferson, The Olive Branch Petition, reprinted in Boyer, supra note 123, at 
189 (requesting that “measures be taken for preventing the further destruction of the lives of your 
Majesty’s subjects; and that such Statutes as more immediately distress any of your Majesty’s colonies 
be repealed . . . .”). 
129  Richard Penn ultimately delivered the Olive Branch Petition to the court of George III. See Boyer, supra 
note 123, at 186. It is unclear if the King personally reviewed the petition, but whether by happenstance 
or deliberate inattention, the document was left unanswered. Id. 
130  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 108 (“To the colonists, the right to petition for redress of grievances (and 
the concomitant right to have one’s petition heard) was so fundamental that denial of the right was an 
act of tyranny and grounds for revolution.”). 
131  Mark, supra note 114, at 2199–203. 
132  VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XVIII (1777). 
133  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 109. 
134  Id. at 110. 
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only access to officials was consistent with the Anglo-American practice.135 Later, in 
Federalist No. 10, Madison noted that special interests “are sown in the nature of 
man,” and observed that democracy “involves the spirit of party and faction in the 
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”136 
 Records from the First Congress show that Madison’s predictions were correct: 
petitioning had become an effective method for obtaining policy outcomes in the 
nascent republic.137 Within months of opening its doors, Congress received petitions 
from veterans, tradesmen, printers, and surveyors.138 Notable examples included a 
group of Boston blacksmiths seeking wartime backpay, as well as Philadelphia 
newspapermen demanding patent legislation.139 These and many other petitioners 
used blunt in-person tactics to lobby (e.g., by seeking out legislators in their daily 
activities to secure political promises).140 A good example of this approach was the 
antislavery campaign mounted by a well-funded and highly organized group of 
Quakers.141 In a show of force, members of the New York Yearly Meeting “wrote 
supplemental briefs for the committee considering [antislavery petitions], accosted 
members outside the doors of Congress, visited them at their lodgings, and invited 
them for meals, all the while making themselves conspicuous in the House galleries, 
looming over the proceedings like the specters of a guilty national conscience.”142 
 The Quaker effort was so successful in stirring up debate that many 
representatives became suspicious of the initiative.143 The report of the ad hoc 
committee on abolition voiced this concern, noting sourly that “every principle of 
policy and concern for the dignity of the House, and the peace and tranquility of the 
United States, concur to show the propriety of dropping the subject, and letting it 
sleep where it is.”144 However, with its back against the wall, the committee 
suggested: (1) taxing the importation of slaves, (2) issuing guidelines for humane 
                                            
135  Madison was able to convince his colleagues to drop the more expansive proposal. Id. (citing congressional 
records which indicate that the proposals for a right of instruction “fell by the wayside”). 
136  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
137  For example, the first petition to arrive in the House of Representatives was a plea from the Baltimore 
business community seeking enactment of trade policies. See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners 
and Their Grievances: A View from the First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: 
PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 29 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon 
eds., 2012). 
138  Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early Congress, in THE 
HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
127, at 62. This account of the initial flood of lobbying is particularly revealing, and is worth a close read 
for the history student. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 63–64 (“One suspects a good deal of loitering around taverns was involved, because in some 
cases . . . there is little evidence of extensive or meaningful contact with members of Congress.”). 
141  See William C. diGiacomantonio, For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society: Antislavery and Pressure 
Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 169–97 (1995). 
142  Pasley, supra note 134, at 65. 
143  Id. at 66 (noting that the Quaker campaign was “unique in its openness, high degree of organization, and 
goal of effecting broad changes in government policy . . . .”). 
144  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1472 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 
111–12 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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treatment, and (3) banning the fitting of slave-trade vessels in American ports.145 
Although these policy recommendations were a far cry from banning slavery, they 
were still a victory for the Quaker lobbyists and their New York constituents. What 
is even more telling about this episode, however, is the fact that the committee’s 
complaints never engendered a backlash. As history indicates, this is because people 
of the day understood that direct and proximate petitioning was a fundamental right. 
 
B. Measuring the Harm: Procedural Barriers to Petitioning and the 
Analytical Quandary 
 
 These historical accounts are rich in and of themselves. But what do they tell 
us about the interests protected by the Petition Clause? And more to the point of this 
Article, how do procedural barriers in commission-driven redistricting intrude on 
those values? In his book, Professor Krotoszynski provides a sound answer to the first 
question: 
The history of the Petition Clause, including the history of its colonial and English 
antecedents, strongly suggests that the right to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances contemplates a right to do so in close proximity to the government officials 
to whom the petition is addressed. In other words, the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment properly construed and applied, should guarantee would-be petitioners a 
right, exclusive of their speech and assembly freedoms, to seek redress of their 
grievances within both sight and hearing of those capable of giving redress.146 
 
Seizing on that observation, Professor Krotoszynski suggests that “courts should 
start from a presumption that favors the ability of ordinary citizens to engage their 
elected representatives, government officers, and party leaders.”147 Therefore, he 
argues, any “regulations that would remove [petitioners] from the sight or hearing of 
government officials” should be deemed “invalid absent a substantial justification 
supported by the record.”148 
 Using that framework to address the “pluralism problem” sketched in Part 
II.C, I now posit that procedural restraints in commission-driven redistricting 
presumptively breach the protective sphere of the Petition Clause. The argument is 
based on the reality that the ex parte contacts rule, by design, prevents citizens from 
getting within earshot of their redistricting officers.149 In states with independent 
commissions, this prohibition presents an acute problem because individuals have no 
alternative avenues (short of filing a lawsuit) for directly participating in electoral 
                                            
145  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 112 (cataloguing the various policy proposals referred to the floor of the 
House of Representatives). Professor Krotoszynski characterizes this outcome as a political success, 
noting that “despite the vehement objections of Southern members of the House, the members considered, 
debated, and responded on the merits to the petitions seeking abolition of the slave trade.” Id. 
146  Id. at 154–155 (emphasis added). 
147  Id. at 168 (observing that this presumption best serves the concept of self-government highlighted in 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24–26 (1948)). 
148  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 156. 
149  See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
96  Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
design.150 In those systems, therefore, constituents can only interact with the 
mapmakers in the most formal and rehearsed of circumstances—a fact which 
sterilizes public input and prevents consensus building.151 As a conceptual matter, 
that outcome falls short of the advocacy-in-close-proximity value enshrined in the 
Petition Clause.152 And, since the ex parte contacts rule preserves that specific status 
quo, there is little doubt that the First Amendment is implicated. 
The remaining question, then, is how a court might apply Professor 
Krotoszynski’s presumption by way of existing doctrine. Regrettably, because the 
Supreme Court has relegated the Petition Clause to second-class status, there is no 
direct answer to that question.153 Even a cursory examination of the cases that have 
addressed petitioning reveals their limited utility here. 
 The Court first discussed the Petition Clause in 1867, almost a century after it 
was ratified as part of the Bill of Rights.154 At first, there were indications that the 
Clause might be given independent constitutional effect,155 but those aspirations 
were quickly extinguished. Instead, the Court began insisting that the right of 
petition could only be invoked if it was exercised in combination with other expressive 
freedoms.156 That approach led to the unfortunate fiction that deprivations of access 
to government could (and should) be decided on other First Amendment grounds.157 
Worse yet, this inattention to the Petition Clause’s history and purpose led the Court 
                                            
150  Sadly, this is not a hypothetical observation. Just one Term after the Arizona Legislature case was 
litigated, the Arizona redistricting commission returned to the Supreme Court to defend its plans against 
partisan gerrymandering claims. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Hard to Read on Arizona 
Redistricting Plan, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-
analysis-justices-hard-to-read-on-arizona-redistricting-plan/. As of this writing, the Court has not yet 
ruled on the appeal from the district court. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 
2d 1042 (D. Ariz. 2014). The Supreme Court ruled on the appeal from the district court on April 20, 2016. 
See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016). 
151  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
152  Cf. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: 
Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 624 (1999) (“The right to petition guarantees the right to speak 
to a particular body of persons, those comprising the government. This targeted speech serves values not 
achieved by general speech. It gives citizens a better chance at having their voices heard by the very public 
servants who are making the decisions in government. People do not have to wait or hope that their views 
will be channeled by the press or others to the government” (emphasis added)). 
153  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 156 (“The Supreme Court has, for almost all intents and purposes, 
simply subsumed and merged the Petition Clause into the rights of speech, assembly, and association”). 
154  Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) (noting that a citizen “has the right to come to the 
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business 
he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions”). 
155  See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“The very idea of a government, republican in 
form, implies a right of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to 
petition for a redress of grievances”). 
156  Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (“It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to 
freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable” 
(emphasis added)). 
157  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985) (“Although the right to petition and the right 
to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional 
analysis” (emphasis added)). 
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to render a grossly misinformed decision that struck a reeling blow to the right.158 
Since then, litigants have seldom dared to invoke the Petition Clause in its 
independent capacity.159 In fact, the only time they have successfully done so was in 
the antitrust context. However, for purposes of my analysis, even these precedents 
provide scant guidance. 
Arising from two Supreme Court cases, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine relies 
on the Petition Clause to grant absolute immunity from antitrust liability for lobbying 
activities that have anticompetitive effects.160  Particularly in Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Court seemed to grasp the 
urgency of letting constituents petition without fear of retaliation.161 In his majority 
opinion, Justice Black noted that democracy “depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government 
retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same 
time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would” 
create serious institutional problems.162 Relying on that principle, the Court 
concluded that it was permissible for a railroad company to wage a mass media 
campaign aimed at passing legislation harmful to its competitors.163 
That disposition, of course, is in line with our historical understanding of 
Petition Clause protections.164 However, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides 
little in the way of a doctrinal rubric for analyzing procedural barriers to the right of 
petition. It also does not help that Noerr dealt with indirect petitioning—which is 
                                            
158  In McDonald v. Smith, the Court held that the Petition Clause did not afford citizens immunity from 
libel suits for statements made in petitions. 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). It reasoned that the right of petition 
is “cut from the same cloth as the other [First Amendment] guarantees.” Id. at 482. Thus, “there is no 
sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the 
President than other First Amendment expressions.” Id. at 485. But see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 
158 (“What the [McDonald] Court failed to recognize was that through its history, the Petition Clause 
virtually demands special First Amendment status”); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous” Petitions for Redress of 
Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303, 343–45 (1989) (demonstrating 
that petitioning had always enjoyed broad immunity from suit, and that it was conceptually distinct from 
freedom of speech). 
159  Even in cases where petitioning rights are squarely abridged by lobbying regulation, litigants have opted 
against a pure Petition Clause theory. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting the petitioner’s brief for the position that “the disclosures mandated . . . will discourage and 
deter speech, petitioning, and expressive association”); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-5085); Forero, supra note 103, at 338–39. 
160  E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In recent years, litigants have sought to extend the holdings in these 
cases beyond the antitrust context. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED 
FOR SPEAKING OUT 8 (1996) (cataloguing different kinds of retaliation lawsuits that violate the right of 
petition). 
161  365 U.S. at 138 (“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we 
cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms”). 
162  Id. at 137–38. 
163  Id. at 145 (“In this particular instance, each group appears to have utilized all the political powers it 
could muster in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help it or injure the other . . . . 
[T]hat [deceptive effort], reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is 
concerned”). 
164  See supra notes 115, 117, 133 and accompanying text. 
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materially different from the type of proximate participation abridged by the ex parte 
contacts rule.165 Therefore, in order to extract a meaningful legal test for Petition 
Clause analysis, it is necessary to look elsewhere in the First Amendment for 
inspiration. This approach might seem academic, but it has actually been endorsed 
by the Supreme Court. In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri the Court noted that: 
 
[T]he rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground. This Court has 
said that the right to speak and the right to petition are ‘cognate rights’ . . . . Both 
speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in 
the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and 
concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to 
speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy . . 
. .166 
 
Accordingly, since the Speech and Petition Clauses are at least analogues, it seems 
prudent to use that branch of doctrine to inform the present constitutional analysis. 
As it turns out, one line of the Speech Clause cases furnishes an appropriate 
methodology for safeguarding a right of “proximate petitioning.” 
C. Applying the Test: Protecting Redistricting Petitions Through the Public 
Access Principle 
 
 In a series of decisions between 1980 and 1986, the Supreme Court announced 
that the First Amendment—through the Speech and Press Clauses—implies a right 
of public access to court proceedings.167 Relevant to this Article, those cases 
articulated a test that defines when a barrier to governmental access becomes 
constitutionally impermissible. 
 The foundation for this “public access” test was laid out in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, where the Court declared for the first time that citizens 
possess an enforceable right to observe criminal trials.168 In a plurality opinion 
                                            
165  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 161 (“Justice Black’s opinion does not link a mass media campaign—or 
other forms of indirect petitioning—to the traditional exercise of the right, which involved direct 
communication between a group of petitioners, on the one hand, and a legislator or an executive branch 
official, on the other. It is certainly true that this sort of indirect petitioning seems rather far removed 
from the historical paradigm of petitioning, which involved, quite literally, laying a petition at the foot of 
the throne”). 
166  No. 09-1476, slip. op. at 7 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In 
Guarnieri, the Court considered whether the Petition Clause protects public employees from retaliation 
by their supervisors for grievances lodged against them. Id. at 1. Ultimately, the Court held that §1983 
suits of this kind should be judged under the Speech Clause’s “public concern” test. Id. at 5. To reach that 
conclusion, the Court reaffirmed McDonald v. Smith’s flawed logic of commingled expressive rights. Id. 
at 8; see supra note 154 and accompanying text. However, as the passage I quoted above suggests, the 
Court did leave space for analogizing from Speech Clause precedent to create new doctrine specific to the 
Petition Clause. 
167  For an in-depth overview of these cases and their antecedents, see Edward J. Klaris, David A. Schulz et 
al., “If it Walks, Talks and Squawks . . . .” The First Amendment Right of Access to Administrative 
Adjudications: A Position Paper, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 21 (2005). 
168  448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980). 
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authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court traced the history of criminal trials from 
the Norman Conquest of England to Colonial America.169 Using that backdrop, the 
Court found that “throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared 
to observe.”170 Therefore, the presumption of openness “is no quirk of history; rather, 
it has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute” of due process.171 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan went beyond the historical record to underscore 
the “structural role” that the First Amendment plays “in securing . . . our republican 
system of self-government.”172 On this point, he noted that a First Amendment right 
of access supports “not only ‘the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide-open,’ but also the antecedent assumption that valuable 
public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be informed.”173 
 Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to the Richmond Newspapers holding.174 Led by Justice 
Brennan, the Court held that a statute requiring closed proceedings during the 
testimony of rape victims breached the First Amendment.175 In so concluding, the 
Court endorsed the theory that public access promotes the “free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”176 It reasoned that any abridgment of that interest should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. In other words, the government must prove that 
mandatory closure of a proceeding “is necessitated by a compelling governmental 
interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”177 Applying the standard, the 
Court found that the interest in shielding rape victims from press scrutiny—though 
strong—“does not justify a mandatory closure rule.”178 Nonetheless, the Court noted, 
“the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the [openness] 
interest.”179 
 Finally, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court extended strict 
scrutiny protection outside the criminal context.180 In the first phase of litigation, the 
                                            
169  Id. at 564–69 (citing MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343–45 (6th ed. 1820) 
and 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372–73). 
170  Id. at 564. 
171  Id. at 569. On that point, the Court also noted that “without the freedom to attend [criminal] trials, which 
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be 
eviscerated.” Id. at 580 (internal quotations omitted). 
172  Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
173  Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). In the same breath, Justice Brennan also cautioned that this 
rationale could produce “theoretically endless” justification for governmental access. Id. at 588. To 
mitigate this problem, he suggested that an assertion of the right must be weighed against its effect on 
the integrity of the proceeding. Id. at 589. 
174  457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
175  Id. at 610–11. 
176  Id. at 604–05. 
177  Id. at 606–07. 
178  Id. at 607–08. 
179  Id. The Court recalled that a “flexible” application of the compelling-interest rubric was justified—
especially since “the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized 
determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied.” Id. at 608 n.20. 
180  The case was actually litigated on two different occasions in front of the Supreme Court. See Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for the County of Riverside, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-
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Court held that its Richmond Newspapers holding applied to jury voir dire.181 And in 
the second phase, it held that the First Amendment also attached to preliminary 
hearings—even though they had no particularly strong analogue in history.182 To 
explain this decision, the Court read its cases as creating one single frame of analysis. 
Specifically, it prescribed that a court may extend the right of public access whenever 
“tradition” or “structural benefits” call for it.183 Thus, because openness in 
preliminary hearings was “structurally beneficial,” a lack of historical antecedents 
could not save the closure rule.184 
By combining the Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper holdings in this 
manner, the Press-Enterprise Court created a convenient test for the lower courts to 
apply.185 Following that test, a court considering when to keep a proceeding closed 
must examine: (1) whether public access to the proceeding has been traditionally 
granted and (2) whether “public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.”186 If both questions are answered 
in the affirmative, or if one answer carries a strong affirmative presumption, the 
court may not close the proceeding. Only a compelling interest could justify the 
closure—and even then, the government must show that the barrier it has erected is 
narrowly tailored to meet it.187 
 For purposes of the present Petition Clause analysis, the Press-Enterprise test 
seems useful. Conveniently, it answers the question of when a procedural restraint 
cannot block citizens from engaging (through observation or participation) in 
democratic functions. Indeed, applying the Press-Enterprise analysis to the ex parte 
                                            
Enterprise I]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 
II]. 
181  Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 507–09, and see Klaris, Schultz et al., supra note 163, at 34 (“Writing for 
the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger analyzed the structural benefits of open voir dire proceedings, 
reinforcing past findings that public proceedings enhance the basic fairness of the process, create an 
appearance of fairness that is essential to public confidence, and offer cathartic value”). 
182   Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10–11 (“Although grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed 
to the public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates 
have been open to the public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for treason, for example, 
with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as trial judge, the probable-cause hearing was held in the Hall of the 
House of Delegates in Virginia, the courtroom being too small to accommodate the crush of interested 
citizens” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Ky. 1806)). 
183  Id. at 9 (“Considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape 
the functioning of governmental processes. If the particular proceeding . . . passes these tests of 
experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches”). 
184  Id. at 15. 
185  Indeed, the test is so versatile that it has been applied to a vast array of contexts including civil and 
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 
23 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 
696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Symington, 209 B.R. 678, 692–94 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In re 
Vance, 176 B.R. 772, 778 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995); In re Astri Inv. Mgmt. & Sec. Corp., 88 B.R. 730, 741 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1988). 
186  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
187  See Klaris et al., supra note 163, at 36 (“The First Amendment right of access is a qualified, not absolute, 
right. The qualified right to attend a government proceeding may be overcome where there is a showing 
of a countervailing, transcendent interest requiring closure.”). 
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contacts rule reveals that substantive citizen participation in commission-driven 
redistricting would carry immense “structural benefits.” To understand why, consider 
one case that has used Press-Enterprise to hold administrative proceedings open. 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed a challenge to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
regulations, which forbade public access to “special interest” deportation hearings.188 
Finding that the administrative rule was in breach of the First Amendment, the court 
offered a ringing endorsement of openness as a check on government abuse.189 
Applying the Press-Enterprise test, the court concluded that public access to INS 
proceedings (1) ensured “fairly and properly” conducted hearings,190 (2) improved 
government performance and accuracy,191 (3) had a “cathartic” effect on the 
community,192 (4) gave a “perception of integrity and fairness,”193 and (5) promoted a 
more informed public.194 Because those structural benefits were so compelling, the 
requirement that openness be historically supported was analytically less 
important.195 The court, therefore, subjected the INS rule to strict scrutiny and found 
that the government’s interest in confidentiality was not narrowly tailored.196  
Aside from validating the Press-Enterprise test in the administrative 
context,197 the Sixth Circuit’s “structural benefit” explanations are revealing.  
Although the five rationales were found in the ambit of immigration hearings, a court 
could easily find that they apply with equal force in the redistricting context. 
                                            
188  See 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The case arose from the government’s “special interest” prosecution of 
a Muslim man in Detroit who had overstayed his tourist visa. Id. at 683–85. 
189  Id. at 683 (“The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a 
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a free press, protects 
the people’s right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation 
proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully 
belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation”). 
190  Id. at 703–04 (“In an area such as immigration, where the government has nearly unlimited authority, 
the press and the public serve as perhaps the only check on abusive government practices.”). 
191  Id. at 704 (“Congressional oversight hearings . . . can do little to correct past [mistakes]. In contrast, 
openness at the hearings can allow mistakes to be cured at once.” (quoting Soc’y of Prof’l. Journalists v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575–76 (D. Utah 1985)). 
192  Id. (“It is important for the public, particularly individuals who feel that they are being targeted by the 
Government as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, to know that even during these sensitive 
times the Government is adhering to immigration procedures and respecting individuals’ rights.” 
(quoting the district court below)). 
193  Id. (“The most stringent safeguards for a deportee ‘would be of limited worth if the public is not persuaded 
that the standards are being fairly enforced. Legitimacy rests in large part on public understanding.’” 
(quoting First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 486 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Adams, J., concurring)). 
194  Id. at 704–05 (“Public access to deportation proceedings helps inform the public of the affairs of the 
government. Direct knowledge of how their government is operating enhances the public’s ability to 
affirm or protest government’s efforts.”). 
195  Id. at 700 (The court rejected an argument that the tradition of openness in a hearing must date back to 
the time “when our organic laws were adopted.” Indeed, it observed, Press-Enterprise II had “relied on 
exclusively post-Bill of Rights history.”). 
196  Id. at 705–07. 
197  Accord Klaris et al., supra note 163, at 63 (“Due process obligations and a history of openness dating from 
the advent of the administrative state lead to the inexorable conclusion that the First Amendment’s 
presumptive right of access attaches to administrative adjudicatory proceedings.”). 
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Consider, for example, how each benefit would play out if commission-erected 
procedural barriers were struck down. First, allowing ex parte contacts with 
commissioners would foster “fair and proper” redistricting by ensuring that citizen 
feedback is incorporated into the electoral plan.198 Second, ex parte contacts with 
redistricting officials would improve “government performance” by increasing the 
upstream flow of policy information related to line drawing.199 Third, permitting ex 
parte contacts would be “cathartic” for citizens who might otherwise feel blocked out 
of the redistricting debate (especially in states like Arizona and California).200 Fourth, 
allowing ex parte contacts would foster “perceptions of integrity” by making unelected 
commissioners seem approachable.201 And fifth, the incidence of ex parte contacts 
would create a more “informed public” by permitting commissioners to answer 
constituent-specific questions about a redistricting plan.202 
Stepping back, the Detroit Free Press factors make clear that ex parte contacts 
are a necessary ingredient for “proximate petitioning.” This is an alarming conclusion 
given that virtually all redistricting commissions prohibit off-the-record 
communications. However, by invoking the Petition Clause to remove that procedural 
barrier, a court could reverse the harm to pluralism inflicted by the recent shift to 
commission-based redistricting.203 In Press-Enterprise parlance, re-democratizing 
electoral design would create significant “structural benefits.” Importantly, it would 
restore the Framers’ preference for a consensus model of redistricting, and it would 
countermand any negative consequences from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona 
Legislature.204 Because these functional benefits are specific and articulable, the 
“history” prong of Press-Enterprise becomes an ancillary (albeit equally well-
documented) consideration.205 Therefore, a court applying the test should be prepared 
to invalidate the ex parte contacts rule under strict scrutiny analysis.206 
CONCLUSION: BROADER IMPLICATIONS? 
 
 The foregoing discussions show that procedural hurdles in the redistricting 
process may raise grave constitutional problems. At the same time, my analysis of 
how the ex parte contacts rule abridges petitioning is merely illustrative. At one level 
of abstraction, the First Amendment framework I present may also be useful for 
                                            
198  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
199  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
200  See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
201  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
202  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
203  See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
204  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
205  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding that conclusion, there is little ground to 
argue that ex parte contacts have not traditionally been part of the redistricting process. To the contrary, 
it is their very incidence that fueled the redistricting reform movement. 
206  One unanswered question is whether a redistricting-specific government interest can save the ex parte 
contacts rule. That assessment is beyond the scope of this Article, but we can surmise that a compelling 
justification with strong factual support will be required. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—
The Roberts Court, The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012–13) 
(surveying the Court’s “new absolutist” approach to the First Amendment). 
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scrutinizing other rules that dilute access to commission-driven redistricting. At two 
levels of abstraction, my argument that procedural barriers abridge petitioning rights 
may be revealing in other policy areas outside of redistricting. And at three levels of 
abstraction, the idea that the Petition Clause provides an independent source of 
constitutional protection may be a boon to jurisprudence in the ambit of expressive 
freedom. Aside from those figurative conclusions, however, this Article seeks to make 
a more basic contribution. Fundamentally, presents one method by which courts can 
harness the Constitution to restore the Framers’ vision for a pluralist electoral 
system. In no unclear terms, this Article draws a line in the sand for democratic 
choice. 
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The Vote is Precious 
 
Melissa A. Logan* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This Note traces the history of the voter suppression in the United States, connecting 
present-day efforts to restrict access to the polls to harmful practices of the past. After 
demonstrating that the United States has never truly fulfilled the promise of the Fifteenth 
Amendment—that no citizen shall be denied the right to vote based on race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude—I argue that the federal government must take steps to 
protect voters from racial discrimination. I propose that Congress can use the power 
bestowed to it under the Elections Clause to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections 
in order to preempt any state’s attempt to suppress the vote. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 21, 2015, Congressman John Lewis visited Bloomington, 
Indiana, to discuss his graphic novel series, March,1 which tells his story of growing 
up in Troy, Alabama, becoming involved in the civil rights movement, and marching 
with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. His efforts with the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were pivotal in ensuring the full enfranchisement 
of Blacks in the American South.2 He is now a United States Representative for 
Georgia, and his involvement in civil rights campaigns continues to this day.3 During 
a question-and-answer session, Congressman Lewis was asked to explain the 
importance of voting to Blacks, broken by a system in which they no longer had faith. 
Congressman Lewis responded, “The vote is precious. It’s almost sacred in a 
democratic society such as ours. It’s the most powerful nonviolent tool or instrument 
that we have and we should use it. And I say to people, why did people try to keep us 
from voting? It must be important.”4 
                                                          
* Editor-in-Chief, Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, Volume 5; Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2016; Brown University B.A. 2011. I would like to thank Professor 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer for his inspiration and guidance, Samantha von Ende for her thoughtful 
comments, Mary Mancuso for her endless advice and support, and all the members of the Indiana 
Journal of Law & Social Equality. This Note is dedicated to one of my fiercest supporters, my 
grandmother, Joyce Luanne Logan. 
1  JOHN LEWIS, ANDREW AYDIN & NATE POWELL, MARCH: BOOK ONE (2013); JOHN LEWIS, ANDREW AYDIN & 
NATE POWELL, MARCH: BOOK TWO (2015); JOHN LEWIS, ANDREW AYDIN & NATE POWELL, MARCH: BOOK 
THREE (2016). 
2  See generally, JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT 
(1998). 
3  See generally, John Lewis, CONGRESSMAN JOHN LEWIS, https://johnlewis.house.gov/john-lewis (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
4  The Power of Words with Jon Lewis, Andrew Aydin, & Nate Powell, COMMUNITY ACCESS TELEVISION 
SERVICES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://catstv.net/m.php?q=2661, at 1:27:05.  
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The vote is precious. While we often speak of a right to vote, the ability to vote 
may not be a right at all. On paper, every American citizen is entitled to vote without 
being discriminated against because of his or her race, native language, or socio-
economic status.5 Nevertheless, a right without a remedy is not a right; a right must 
be enforced in order for the right to be legitimate. For the last fifty years, the Voting 
Rights Act of 19656 (VRA) has been the prophylactic guarantor of the right to vote. 
However, the coverage provision of VRA that allowed the Department of Justice to 
enforce the Act was invalidated in 2013.7 Now, voting is arguably a mere privilege 
that American citizens may exercise, but disenfranchisement of “others” prevents this 
privilege from becoming an absolute right guaranteed to all. The struggle to extend 
the franchise to groups beyond White male landowners has taken centuries. While 
some argue that the ills of voter discrimination and unequal access to the polls is 
over, as evidenced by the Shelby County decision,8 it would be a mistake to assume 
the problem of disenfranchisement is a relic of the past.  
During the past two presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, as well as the 
current 2016 election, Democrats and Republicans have warred over voter 
suppression and its racial impact.9 Yet in a culture that feels less and less comfortable 
explicitly confronting race and racism, it is unlikely that the problem of Black 
disenfranchisement, or the disenfranchisement of other minority groups,10 can be 
addressed directly in a race-conscious manner. Still, the connection between race and 
the struggle to achieve an unencumbered right to vote is undeniable.  
The current wave of voter-suppressive legislation is not an anomaly. Rather, it 
is an episode in the ebb and flow of systematic oppression, at the well-known 
intersection of racial and voting discrimination that pre-dates Reconstruction. It is 
another reincarnation of Jim Crow. Today, concerted efforts to disenfranchise Black 
Americans continue and have expanded to impact other minority voters as well.11 
This Note will first trace the history of voting rights and tools of suppression 
used to disenfranchise Black voters. Part I.A will analyze the period beginning at the 
founding and through Reconstruction. Part I.B focuses on the voter suppression 
trends following Reconstruction until the 1950s. Part I.C looks at the “Second 
Reconstruction” and the shift toward protecting the vote during the latter part of the 
                                                          
5  52 U.S.C. §§ 10301(a), 10303(f)(2), 10306(a). (2012). 
6  The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).  
7  Shelby Cnty., Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see infra at Part III.A, section ii for a 
discussion of Shelby County. 
8  Id. at 2618 (“There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these measures 
no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 
One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226 (2009) (Thomas. J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously uphold § 5 as enforcing the 
Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.”) 
9  See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, No One in America Should Have to Wait 7 Hours to Vote, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 
5, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/no-one-in-america-should-have-to-wait-7-
hours-to-vote/264506/; Halimah Abdullah, As Election Day nears, voter ID laws still worry some, 
encourage others, CNN (Oct. 12, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/12/politics/voter-laws-
update/.   
10   See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, The New Attack on Hispanic Voting Rights, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Dec. 
17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/magazine/block-the-vote.html. 
11  See, e.g., id. 
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twentieth century. Part II compares the recent waves of voter suppression and how 
they connect to efforts and vote suppression of the past, arguing that the voter 
restrictive legislation being proposed and passed across the nation is not a new form 
of vote suppression. Rather, it is another incident in the ebbs and flows of voter 
suppression and voter mobilization. Finally, this Note argues that the federal 
government must intervene to ensure equality in voting. Part II.B. proposes that a 
race neutral proposal is the best way to combat voter suppression. This note suggests 
that the federal government set voter registration, identification, and procedural 
standards for all federal elections under the Election Clause.  
I. HISTORICAL EBBS AND FLOWS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION AND 
DEMOBILIZATION 
In the United States, voting has never been an inclusive right. The access to 
the franchise has been restricted by race, gender, socio-economic status, and age. 
Voters are still required to prove their eligibility through administrative hurdles that 
impede some would-be voters from participating in elections. In order to create 
effective solutions for the future, we must look back at our country’s voting history.  
A. Founding through Reconstruction  
At the founding of the United States of America, only free adult male property 
owners, twenty-one years of age and older, could vote.12 Some states also gave free 
Black men the right to vote prior to the Civil War, although this ability was largely 
eliminated before the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment.13 Ratified in 1870, the 
Fifteenth Amendment was the last of the Reconstruction Amendments. The 
Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”14 It also gives Congress the power to “enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.”15 Federal power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment was extended by the Enforcement Act of 1870.16 This Act provided that 
it was the duty of all election officers: 
to give to all citizens of the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform 
such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote without distinction of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude; and if any such person or officer shall refuse or 
knowingly omit to give full effect to this section, he shall, for every such offence, forfeit 
and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be 
recovered by an action on the case, with full costs, and such allowance for counsel fees 
as the court shall deem just, and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined not less than five hundred 
                                                          
12  See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (2000). 
13  See id. at 54–55. 
14  U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.  
15  Id. § 2. 
16  Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 § 2. 
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dollars, or be imprisoned not less than one month and not more than one year, or both, 
at the discretion of the court.17   
The Reconstruction Amendments were a radical attempt to realize racial equality 
after the destabilizing Civil War. The aims of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments were bold. However, the Radical Republicans who drafted the 
Reconstruction Amendments were ahead of their time, because the country was not 
ready for political and social equality for Black Americans. It would be almost a 
century before the words in the Reconstruction Amendments were given any effect or 
practical meaning through the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.18 
The Radical Republicans wanted to give Congress broad power, because the 
legislature did not trust the Supreme Court to guarantee the rights promised in the 
Reconstruction Amendments.19 Their fears proved to be true soon after the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. When faced with challenges to the 
Reconstruction Amendments, the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the 
legislation, essentially thwarting any attempt to achieve the equality pledged by the 
recently amended Constitution.20  
The Fifteenth Amendment was effectively reduced to meaningless words by 
the Supreme Court in 1876.21 Kentucky election inspectors were indicted for refusing 
to count the vote of William Garner because of his race, thereby violating the 
Fifteenth Amendment.22 In United States v. Reese, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the suit, narrowly construing the power of the Amendment: “The 
Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents 
the States, or the United States, from giving preference, in this particular, to one 
citizen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”23 The Court further reasoned that the Fifteenth Amendment 
did not provide a punishment;  accordingly, it could not “substitute the judicial for 
the legislative department of the government” to create a punishment or set a limit 
on who could be convicted of the general prohibition against abridging an individual’s 
right to vote on account of race.24 After Reese, the Fifteenth Amendment afforded no 
remedies for a Black person who was unconstitutionally prevented from voting 
because of his or her race.  
In United States v. Cruikshank,25 the federal government’s powers under the 
Enforcement Act were also gutted by the Supreme Court. The Cruikshank defendants 
were charged with conspiracy under the Enforcement Act after a gruesome murder 
of a Black family in Louisiana, which came to be known as the Colfax Massacre.26 In 
                                                          
17  Id. § 2. 
18  P.L. 89-110. 
19  See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (2010). 
20  See e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  
21  United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 
22  Id. at 215.  
23  Id. at 217. 
24  Id. at 221. 
25  92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
26  Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1071 (2009). 
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his majority opinion, Chief Justice Waite never explicitly detailed the horror of Easter 
Sunday 1874, when an estimated 100 Blacks were killed by the White League, a 
paramilitary group intent on securing white rule in Louisiana, in a clash with 
Louisiana’s almost entirely Black state militia.27 The Court found the rights or 
privileges at which the conspiracy was aimed were “rights or privileges which were 
derived from the state and which the federal government had no power to protect.”28 
The Court did not seem to think that the Reconstruction legislation affected the 
balance of power created between the state and national government by the Tenth 
Amendment; some even argued it misinterpreted the Framers’ theory.29 Cruikshank 
“signaled open season on blacks and other racial minorities.”30 These decisions 
effectively transferred the responsibility to protect civil rights back to the states, the 
exact circumstance the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments were trying to 
avert. 
B. Post-Reconstruction to the Second Reconstruction 
Southern Black Americans were not completely disenfranchised. Some were 
able to successfully vote and some were elected to public office.31 In fact, two Black 
men, Hiram Revels and Blanche K. Bruce, were elected to represent Mississippi in 
the United States Senate in 1870 and 1875, respectively.32 Nevertheless, the overall 
outlook was grim. 
Formal enfranchisement of Blacks during Reconstruction “ended with 
Supreme Court decisions gutting both the [F]ourteenth and [F]ifteenth 
[A]mendments on the same day followed soon by a political decision to terminate 
already dwindling enforcement efforts.”33  By 1877, Reconstruction was officially dead 
with the presidential election of Rutherford B. Hayes and the removal of the 
remaining troops in the South.34 The Southern states continued to implement 
strategies to disenfranchise Black voters; some strategies included both formal 
disenfranchisement by preventing them from registering and informal 
disenfranchisement by allowing their names to be on the rolls without the ability to 
actually exercise the franchise. The attempts to eliminate or control the Black vote 
“through bribery or coercion [ ] created a general atmosphere of corruption 
                                                          
27  See generally The Colfax Massacre, PBS, http:/www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general- 
article/grant-colfax/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).  
28  Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 523, 528 (1973). 
29  See Huhn, supra note 26, at 1075 (“The Court’s ruling on state action in Cruikshank certainly did not 
accord with the understanding of the Framers. The Republican members of Congress articulated this 
principal theory: ‘Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.’ They believed that citizens owe 
allegiance to their government because (and to the extent that) the government affords them 
protection.”).  
30  Huhn, supra note 26, at 1077. 
31  See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, Legal Disenfranchisement of the Negro, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE 207 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992). 
32  See generally Breaking New Ground -- African American Senators, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/Photo_Exhibit_African_Americ
an_Senators.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). 
33  Derfner, supra note 28, at 523. 
34  See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (1991).  
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surrounding southern elections, causing many whites to feel that eliminating the 
possibility of [B]lack voting would reduce the fraud, corruption and violence that had 
been necessary to maintain [W]hite control.”35 Somehow, the corruption that 
developed to keep Black Americans from voting converted into the cause of 
disenfranchisement. 
 Still, at the turn of the century, Black voters continued to look to the courts to 
realize their rights, which, although unenforced, were still the letter of the law.  
Jackson W. Giles, a citizen of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a suit in equity “on 
behalf of himself and on behalf of more than five thousand [N]egroes, citizens of the 
county of Montgomery, Alabama, similarly situated and circumstanced as himself, 
against the board of registrars of that county.”36 Giles sought to compel the county 
voting officials to register him, and thousands of other eligible Black voters, who had 
been illegitimately precluded from registering after the state constitution had been 
amended.37  
 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver W. Holmes Jr., put Black voters in a 
catch-22: the Court acknowledged the probability that the challenged provisions to 
the Alabama constitution were void but found no way to remedy the situation.38 It 
could not add Giles’ name to an unconstitutional voting list but also did not strike the 
grandfather provisions down as unconstitutional: 
The difficulties which we cannot overcome are two, and the first is this: The plaintiff 
alleges that the whole registration scheme of the Alabama Constitution is a fraud upon 
the Constitution of the United States, and asks us to declare it void. But of course he 
could not maintain a bill for a mere declaration in the air. He does not try to do so, but 
asks to be registered as a party qualified under the void instrument. If then we accept 
the conclusion which it is the chief purpose of the bill to maintain, how can we make 
the court a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and adding another voter to 
its fraudulent lists?39 
 
The Court saw political rights as unenforceable, concluding that “[u]nless we are 
prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it seems to us 
that all the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.”40 The non-
interventionist approach established in Giles became the blueprint for Southern 
resistance to the civil rights movement, “serv[ing] as notice that the Court would not 
stand as a barrier to the mass disfranchisement of African-Americans in the Deep 
South.”41  
Weary of Black enfranchisement, Southern legislatures looked for legal ways 
to prevent Southern Blacks from voting while still complying with the Reconstruction 
Amendments. The states and their political leaders, both Northern and Southern, 
concocted various schemes to maintain an all-, or overwhelming majority-, White 
                                                          
35  Derfner, supra note 28, at 535. 
36  Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482 (1903). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 486. 
39  Id.  
40  Id. at 488.  
41  Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA L. REV. 903, 910 (2008).  
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electorate “merely to eliminate the Negro voter.”42  The disenfranchisement schemes 
were effective. For example, the amount of Black registered voters in Louisiana 
dropped from 130,334 in 1896 to 5,320 by 1900; by 1910, only 730 Black voters 
remained registered, a mere 0.5% of eligible Black men.43 From the late 1800s until 
the eventual passing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, tools to suppress the Black vote 
included grandfather clauses, violence and intimidation, white primaries, purging 
voting lists of Black registered voters, poll taxes, and literacy tests.44  
i. Poll Taxes  
 
The poll tax was one of the first disenfranchisement devices used to circumvent 
the requirements of the Fifteenth Amendment. In 1889, Florida was the first state to 
institute a two-dollar poll tax.45 The Mississippi Constitution was amended in 1890 
to also require voters to pay a poll tax of two dollars per year.46 Some states instituted 
cumulative poll taxes, which demanded that past and current taxes be paid, thereby 
increasing the amount a potential voter owed.47 In other states, poll taxes had to be 
paid years in advance of an election—another barrier that kept Blacks away from the 
polls.48 During this time period, the meaning of the poll tax evolved, “where it once 
had referred to a head tax that every man had to pay and that sometimes could be 
used to satisfy a taxpaying requirement for voting, it came to be understood as a tax 
that one had to pay in order to vote.”49 This shift allowed for poll taxes to be used in 
a discriminating fashion as local officials often made it difficult for only Black men to 
pay their taxes in order to vote.50  
The practice spread throughout the South. By 1904, every ex-Confederate state 
adopted the poll tax.51 Most states charged between one and two dollars, which 
“represented a significant charge to many inhabitants of the nation’s economic 
backwater region.”52 The amount was especially harsh in the South, particularly for 
recently-freed slaves who overwhelmingly worked as tenant farmers or 
sharecroppers.53 The consequences of the poll tax were devastating. At a Mississippi 
constitutional convention, a state legislator called the poll tax “the most effective 
instrumentality of Negro disenfranchisement”; another Mississippi Congressman 
                                                          
42  Franklin, supra note 31, at 210.  
43  Derfner, supra note 28, at 542; Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 303 (2000). 
44  See generally, FRANCES FOX PIVEN, LORRAINE C. MINNITE & MARGARET GROAKE, KEEPING DOWN THE 
BLACK VOTE: RACE AND THE DEMOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN VOTERS (2009). 
45  FRANKLIN, supra note 31, at 210. 
46  Id. at 210. 
47  KEYSSAR, supra note 12, at 111.  
48  Derfner, supra note 28, at 535. 
49  KEYSSAR, supra note 12, at 112. 
50  Id. at 105. 
51  Id. at 63.  
52  J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910 64 (1974). 
53  Id. at 65. 
112  Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [5:1 
 
stated that ninety percent of Black Mississippians were disenfranchised by the 
device.54  
The poll tax, however, was not limited to Black disenfranchisement. The device 
also had class consequences, preventing poorer Whites from exercising their right to 
vote.55 In 1937, the practice was upheld by the Supreme Court in Breedlove v. 
Suttles.56  Breedlove involved a challenge by a White male voter who was not allowed 
to become a registered voter in Georgia because he had not paid poll taxes.57 
Breedlove argued that because the Georgia poll tax only applied to persons between 
the ages of twenty-one and sixty, and only applied to women if they registered to vote, 
the poll tax was repugnant to the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments.58 The Court reasoned that requiring a payment as a 
condition of voting did not deny a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship 
because the“[p]rivilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is 
conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may 
condition suffrage as it deems appropriate.”59  
Poll taxes in federal elections were outlawed in 1964 with the ratification of 
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,60 which states: 
the right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election or President 
or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or 
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.61  
 
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended this proscription to local elections in 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.62 The Court found “a State violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the 
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”63  
ii. Literacy Tests  
 
Another voter qualification that seemingly complied with the Fifteenth 
Amendment was the requirement that a person be literate to vote. Literacy tests were 
pervasive throughout the entire country. In fact, between 1889 and 1913, nine 
Northern states required all voters to be able to read English.64 The provisions 
generally required the applicant to read a section of the state or federal constitution 
                                                          
54  Id. at 66. 
55  See id. at 71–72. 
56  302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
57  Id. at 280. 
58  Id. at 280–81. 
59  Id. at 283. 
60  U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. 
61  Id. § 2. 
62  383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
63  Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. 
64  KOUSSER, supra note 52, at 57. 
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to qualify.65 Like the poll tax, the potential reach of literacy tests was crushing. An 
estimated fifty percent of Black men were illiterate during this time.66 In 1900, the 
literacy test estopped a majority of Black voters in that year, and would have 
disenfranchised as many as thirty to forty percent of Whites in some states if it were 
applied fairly.67 The mere existence of the measure prevented Black voters from even 
attempting to register because Negroes “believe[d] that they [would] have a hostile 
examination put upon them by the white man, and they believ[ed] that that [would] 
be a preventive to their exercising the right of suffrage, and they [would] not apply 
for registration.”68 
The practice was deemed constitutional in Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, 
which indirectly targeted the practice by challenging the composition of a jury that 
could only include registered voters.69 The Supreme Court found that the 
Constitutional amendments that prescribed qualifications for electors, including a 
literacy provision, were constitutional both facially—because there was no outward 
discrimination between the races—and as-applied, because “it has not been shown 
that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.”70 
In fact, the Supreme Court has never found literacy tests to violate the 
Reconstruction Amendments. As recently as 1959, the Court declared literacy 
requirements were constitutional on their face where the literacy requirements were 
neutral on race, creed, color, and sex.71 Despite their potential constitutionality, 
literacy tests were suspended under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).72 The 
section suspending such tests was upheld by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. 
Morgan.73 Nevertheless, it is possible that literacy tests could be implemented in such 
a way that does not violate the Reconstruction Amendments or the VRA.74  
iii. Grandfather Clauses  
 
Poll taxes and literacy tests not only disenfranchised a majority of Black 
eligible voters but also had a disparate impact on poor Whites.75 To remedy the 
consequence for White voters, states implemented Grandfather clauses that 
exempted from literacy tests any person who could vote prior 1867, or anyone who 
                                                          
65  Id. at 58. 
66  KEYSSAR, supra note 12, at 112. 
67  KOUSSER, supra note 52, at 580. 
68  Id. at 59. 
69 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
70  Williams, 170 U.S. at 225.  
71  Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1959). 
72  52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1). 
73  384 U.S. 641 (1966).  
74  Any literacy test imposed, however, must comply with the requirements of § 4(e), which prohibits 
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who studied in “American-flag” schools where the predominant language of instruction was not 
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75  Alan Greenblatt, The Racial History of the ‘Grandfather Clause’, NPR, (Oct. 22, 2013, 9:44 AM) 
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was a direct descendant of a registered voter prior to 1867.76 In other words, if your 
grandfather could vote before the Reconstruction Amendments, so could you. While 
this practice was race-neutral on paper, the obvious consequence was to prevent any 
Black person from being able to vote, as the Fifteenth Amendment was not passed 
until 1870.77  Enacting grandfather clauses was a political decision that was more 
about enfranchising poor Whites than it was about disenfranchising Blacks.78 
Drafters of grandfather clauses knew such legislation was “grossly 
unconstitutional.”79 Accordingly, nearly every state included a sunset provision that 
would allow enough White voters to become registered before the laws could be 
challenged in court.80 The strategy proved effective as the clauses were not challenged 
until 1910, and the Supreme Court did not issue a ruling on grandfather clauses until 
1915.81 The gap in time between the 1890s, when the majority of grandfather clauses 
were instituted, and the Supreme Court decision twenty-five years later allowed 
White voters to be added to the voting rolls and Black voters to be removed. 
The Court heard a challenge, in Guinn v. United States, to a grandfather clause 
in an Oklahoma state constitutional amendment in October 1913, but the decision 
was not released until June 1915, after a year and eight months elapsed.82 A 
unanimous Court concluded that the Oklahoma constitutional amendment was 
invalid and that the Amendment was void because it attempted to deny citizens the 
right to vote using pre-Fifteenth Amendment standards.83 Despite a public 
understanding of the unconstitutionality of the clause and the Supreme Court’s clear 
decision, the Oklahoma legislature was able to avoid compliance by drafting a new 
law that automatically registered voters who were registered in 1914, an exclusively 
White electorate; anyone not grandfathered in under the new standard could only 
register between April 30 and May 11, 1916, or forfeit their right to vote.84 This 
practice continued for over two decades until it, too, was invalidated by the Court in 
1939.85 
iv. Lynch Mob Terror and Intimidation  
 
Another powerful tool to prevent Blacks from exercising their right to vote, 
even if they were registered, was to make Blacks so fearful of violent consequences of 
voting that they would simply choose to stay home on Election Day. The Ku Klux 
Klan, formed in 1865 by a group of Confederate Army veterans in Pulaski, 
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Tennessee,86 aimed to “destroy Congressional Reconstruction by murdering 
[B]lacks—and some [W]hites—who were either active in Republican politics or 
educating [B]lack children.”87 KKK night riders threatened violence, and often 
followed through with their promise, against Black voters.88 Lynch mob terror, a 
traumatizing terrorism tolerated by state and federal officials, peaked in the period 
between 1890 and 1940, claiming the lives of thousands of Black Americans.89 Racial 
terror lynching was a tool used to enforce Jim Crow laws and racial segregation—a 
tactic for maintaining racial control by victimizing the entire African-American 
community, not merely punishment of an alleged perpetrator for a crime.”90  
Black citizens were publicly and extrajudicially executed for various reasons, 
including fear of interracial sex, minor social transgressions, allegations of crime, and 
to send a message to the entire Black community that they were not welcome, 
resulting in mass exodus from the area.91 In the early twentieth century, lynching 
was also used to silence Black leaders demanding economic and civil rights.92 
Lynching was an effective type of terror, with the public spectacle and press coverage 
for the death of fellow Black citizens: 
[S]outhern [B]lacks lived with the knowledge that any one of them could be a victim 
at any time. They also knew those unlucky enough to be chosen as targets could not 
expect protection from the law, for law enforcement officers often acquiesced or even 
joined in the mob violence. To avoid provoking a violent response, many [B]lacks 
adopted deferential patterns of conduct towards [W]hites . . .93  
 
After seeing a Black person lynched for attempting to vote, many would-be Black 
voters likely decided that attempting to vote was not worth their life and opted not to 
vote.  
White officials used less violent forms of intimidation to informally keep Blacks 
from voting. For example, Governor Eugene Talmadge publically warned: “Wise 
Negroes will stay away from the white folks’ ballot boxes on July 17. . . . We are the 
true friends of the Negroes, always have been and always will be as long as they stay 
in the definite place we have provided for them.”94  
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v. White Primaries 
 
Future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall called White primaries the 
“most effective, and on the surface the most legal” device to check Black participation 
in Southern politics.95 At their onset, primaries were local, informal affairs that were 
unregulated by law and therefore prone to unlawful, discriminatory acts. 96 As 
primary elections became formalized and regulated by political parties, formal rules 
still limited the ability to participate to White voters only.97 This practice was initially 
upheld by the Court because primaries were not understood to be within the meaning 
of an election under the Constitution.98 Marshall observed: 
It is one of those little ironies of which Southern politics is full, that the primary 
movement which was motivated, at least in part, by democratic motives and a desire 
for wider participation in the representative process was turned into a device for 
eliminating millions of Negroes from participation in government.99 
 
The White primary system was challenged on numerous occasions, with the four most 
prominent cases arising out of Texas. In Nixon v. Herndon, the Supreme Court found 
the practice violated the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore did not reach the 
validity of the statute under the Fifteenth Amendment.100 Five years later, the Court 
was again confronted with the validity of White primaries and, for a second time, 
invalidated the practice under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.101 Three years later, the Court in Grovey v. Townsend, rejected 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims, deferring to the Texas Supreme Court, 
which found that the Democratic party’s exclusion of Black voters did not constitute 
state action. 102 
In 1944, the White primary was ruled unconstitutional under the Fifteenth 
Amendment in Smith v. Allwright.103 Writing for the eight-to-one majority, Justice 
Stanley F. Reed held: 
 
It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the 
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote 
in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. By the terms of the 
Fifteenth Amendment that right may not be abridged by any State on account of 
race. Under our Constitution the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a 
man by the State because of his color.104 
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The decision in Smith was surely a step forward for the safeguarding of voting rights. 
In fact, Professor Michael J. Klarman claims Smith “inaugurated a political 
revolution in the urban South” and led to monumental increases in Black voter 
participation.105 Despite its significance, the demise of the White primaries was not 
the final cure for voter discrimination. Writing in 1957, Thurgood Marshall 
accurately noted “[t]he collapse of the white Democratic primary, despite fond hopes, 
has not resulted in full participation by all in the political life of the south.”106  
vi. Purging Voter Rolls 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century, many important steps were 
taken in extending the franchise to all, including the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment that expanded the right to vote to women, at least in theory.107 However, 
these lawful protections could not guarantee that all eligible voters could actually 
register and vote in practice. In Georgia, there were 135,000 registered Black voters; 
in an effort to disenfranchise them, the Democratic Party launched a campaign to 
challenge the registration of thousands of Black voters.108  
The motivation for this massive disenfranchisement was to ensure the election 
of Democrat Eugene Talmadge for governor of Georgia by preventing Blacks from 
voting for his primary rival, James V. Carmichael, who the majority of Black voters 
supported.109 Talmadge’s campaign implemented a white supremacy drive “to 
organize groups indoctrinated with the ‘white supremacy’ viewpoint, but also sought 
to provide local supporters with specific means of reducing the number of black 
votes.”110 The plan involved using a provision of Georgia law that allowed any citizen 
to “challenge the voting right of a registrant thought to be improperly qualified.” 111 
The purging of voting lists was challenged in federal courts. However, when federal 
courts issued injunctions ordering that the disqualified registrants be reinstated, the 
local officials could not comply because the names had been lost or destroyed.112 White 
voters, mainly of low socio-economic status, were also purged. Nevertheless, “the 
exclusive thrust of the action in most counties, and the major thrust of it in the 
remaining counties, was its use as a racial device against blacks.”113  
On Election Day in Savannah, Georgia, Chatham County officials halted 
voting for several hours until the Chatham County Democratic Executive Committee 
chairman could arrive to handle the numerous challenges brought against Black 
voters, challenges that were made by Talmadge supporters.114 When polls closed for 
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the evening, thousands of Black voters were left waiting in the street.115 Because of 
the long wait, newspapers estimated that more than 5,000 Black voters were unable 
to participate in the election.116 Talmadge won the county by a margin of 3,629.117 
Thus, the disenfranchisement of Black voters had a significant effect on the outcome 
of the primary election.  
The 1946 Georgia gubernatorial election is but one example of the effectiveness 
of purging voter lists. Even if litigation had been successful in ruling the practice 
unlawful, the ability to enforce such a ruling was rendered impossible by corrupt local 
officials and the postviolation litigation process.  
 
C. A Shift Toward Civil Rights Protection and the “Second 
Reconstruction” 
Despite the long history of voter suppression, many fundamental changes to 
constitutional law during the twentieth century expanded the franchise. Grassroots 
efforts were key in creating the momentum that led to a shift in doctrine by Congress 
and the Supreme Court. 
 
i. Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 
 
Many view Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka—118 the landmark case 
which ended segregation in public schools and led to the dismantling of Jim Crow—
as a turning point in the fight for racial equality. Ironically, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Brown decision, its opponents led the charge to strengthen civil 
rights protections at the federal level. In an effort to distance his administration from 
the decision,119 President Dwight D. Eisenhower drafted proposed legislation, which 
served as the basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first civil rights legislation 
since Reconstruction.120 The 1957 Act was passed “to provide means of further 
securing and protecting the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States” and created the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice as well as 
the Commission on Civil Rights, and authorized the appointment of the Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights.121 This legislation signaled the growing federal 
interest in enforcing civil rights laws by combating voter suppression efforts in 
federal elections. 
 In 1959, the Civil Rights Commission’s report recognized the system was 
broken, concluding, “qualified Americans, are, because of their race or color, being 
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denied their right to vote.”122 One year later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1960,123 in response to Southern resistance to court orders regarding school 
desegregation and established the federal courts as “voting referees.”124 As he signed 
the Act into law, President Eisenhower commented he believed it held “great promise 
of making the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution fully meaningful.”125 
While the 1957 and 1960 Acts focused on voting rights, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 focused on equal access to public accommodations.126 Although the 1964 Act 
would ostensibly be “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
right to Equal Protection, unfavorable precedent127 made the Court hesitant to rely 
on any of the Reconstruction Amendments to uphold the law.128 Therefore, instead of 
relying on the race-conscious amendments, the Court avoided the racial issue and 
found the 1964 Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause.129  
ii. The Voting Rights Act of 1965  
 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) is arguably the most radical civil rights 
legislation passed to date. The VRA, “an act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,” 
gave unprecedented power to the federal government to oversee elections, both state 
and federal.130  Section 2 states, “[n]o voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote on account of race or color.”131 Section 2 is violated when a law or practice 
intends to discriminate based on race or has a disparate impact on a certain race.132 
The most controversial sections, 4 and 5, singled out states and local jurisdictions 
with a history of racial discrimination in voting for federal intervention known as pre-
clearance.133 Section 4(b) outlined the coverage formula.134 Originally, covered 
jurisdictions were those who used a test or device as a prerequisite to voting on 
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November 1, 1964, and had less than fifty percent voter registration or a 
comparatively low turnout in the 1964 election.135 The section was reformulated in 
1970; the most recent formula applied to states or counties that had a voting test and 
less than fifty percent voter registration or turnout.136  Section 5 requires that any of 
the § 4(b) covered jurisdictions had to get approval from the Department of Justice 
before any voting-related changes could be implemented.137  
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of covered jurisdictions were in the Deep 
South.138 These jurisdictions, however, were not ordained for perpetual intervention. 
Any covered jurisdiction could seek a § 4(a) bailout upon proving in the past ten years 
that a number of factors were met: full compliance with the VRA; no further violation 
of § 4(b); no objection from the Attorney General or denial of a § 5 declaratory 
judgment by the District Court of the District of Columbia; there were no adverse 
judgments in any voting discrimination lawsuits nor any pending lawsuits alleging 
discrimination; and no violations of the Constitution or federal, state, or local laws 
with respect to voting rights unless the jurisdiction could establish that any such 
violations were trivial, were promptly corrected, and were not repeated. 
Still, some say the VRA was not strong enough. “Although the Voting Rights 
Act outlaws discriminatory election administration procedures, it is the actions and 
inactions of federal officials, not the existence of the law, which protects and 
undermines the right to vote.”139 Despite any perceived flaws, the VRA had been 
fundamental in undoing, or at least neutralizing, the discriminatory practices of 
decades past. The electorate became even larger in 1971 when the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution lowered the voting age from twenty-one to 
eighteen.140 The electorate was finally more inclusive of all Americans. 
iii. The Important Role of Social Movements in Obtaining Civil Rights 
Legislation  
 
This shift toward civil rights protection was not done entirely out of the 
goodness of politicians’ hearts; rather, politicians were also motivated by the Great 
Migration and the civil rights movement.141 Between 1910 and 1960, almost five 
million Blacks left the South for large cities in the North and West.142 By leaving the 
rural South, more Blacks became enfranchised and now constituted an important 
electorate for both parties.143 Eighty-five percent of these Black migrants resettled in 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California, seven 
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states that controlled almost eighty percent of the presidential electoral votes.144 
Black voters had historically voted with the Republican Party but now found 
themselves in the heart of the Democratic base in the North.145 The electoral leverage, 
coupled with the civil rights movement, transformed American politics.  
Black-led social movements for political and social equality were also pivotal 
in the passage of the civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 1960s. After returning 
from fighting for democracy in World War II, Black soldiers returned home only to be 
reminded that the promise of democracy was still yet to be fulfilled in their own 
country. The Second World War's most significant ramification for racial change may 
have been its impact on Black attitudes and the ability of the Black community to 
mobilize.146  
American Blacks had almost universally supported the preceding generation's 
war to make the world safe for democracy, only to be disappointed when neither the 
ideological underpinnings of the war nor their own contributions to the war effort 
yielded substantial changes in American racial practices.147 This hypocrisy would not 
be lost on the Supreme Court Justices either: “the Justices cannot have failed to 
observe the tension between a purportedly democratic war fought against the Nazis, 
with their theories of Aryan supremacy, and the pervasive disfranchisement of 
Southern blacks.”148 The civil rights movement brought the problems in the South to 
the rest of the country. Had the violent atrocities of Bloody Sunday in Selma, 
Alabama,149 not been televised, the VRA would likely not have been passed so quickly. 
The political success of the midcentury civil rights legislation must be understood 
within the context of the struggle for civil rights and racial equality.   
Collective action in the Black community concerning voting, especially, has 
continued into the twenty-first century. During the 2004 presidential election, 
prominent Black figures such as Sean “Diddy” Combs and Russell Simmons urged 
young voters to participate with the famous “Vote or Die” campaign150 and “Rock the 
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Vote.” The campaign proved to be successful; twenty-one million voters under thirty 
years of age went to the polls, the biggest turnout of the youth vote since 1972.151 
By the latter part of the twentieth century, the promise of the Fifteenth 
Amendment was more than mere words in the Constitution. Real change was 
implemented, and access to polls was possible. Still, challenges remain to fulfilling 
the Fifteenth Amendment to this day. 
 
II. THE RACIAL DISPARITY IN VOTING RIGHTS, WHILE IMPROVED, HAS YET 
TO BE SOLVED. 
In 2015, we celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act. 
Nevertheless, the fight to ensure the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right 
to vote regardless of the color of one’s skin, is far from over in the twenty-first century. 
In fact, research suggests that recent proposed and passed voting regulations 
“indicate that proposal and passage are highly partisan, strategic, and radicalized 
affairs. These findings are consistent with a scenario in which the targeted 
demobilization of minority voters and African-Americans is a central driver of recent 
legislative developments.”152 In other words, some of the methods and tools might 
have changed but the United States is facing “Jim Crow 2.0”—another wave of 
systematic voter disenfranchisement, often because of racial and political 
motivations. Sadly, when comparing current voting regulations to those of the past, 
a shocking trend appears: none of this disenfranchisement is new. 
A. Progress Made to Ensure Universal Suffrage Continues to Be 
Undermined by State Action. 
States continue to control access to the ballot, leaving the federal government 
with few options to combat voting rights violations.153 Despite the improvements and 
efforts made to improve access to voting, restrictive state legislation still makes 
voting harder than it ought to be.154 In 2013, Keith G. Bentele and Erin E. O’Brien 
analyzed what causes or motivates a state’s decision to enact restrictive voting 
laws.155 The pair found that the continued exclusionary practice, a tradition dating 
back to the nineteenth century, is “a tendency bolstered, yet again, by the power and 
flexibility federalism grants to the states.”156  
As was done to maintain one-party rule in the South during the first half of 
the twentieth century, current practices are politically motivated. “[R]ecent 
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legislative efforts to restrict voter access are usefully conceptualized as yet another 
wave of election reforms in a long history for such reforms, pursued in order to 
demobilize and suppress particular categories for partisan gain.”157 In fact, political 
leaders in areas with large Black populations and increased minority turnout in a 
previous presidential election are more likely to propose restrictive legislation; this 
association makes it clear that “the racial composition of a state is strongly related to 
the proposal of changes that would restrict voter access.”158 Today’s voter suppression 
efforts overwhelmingly favor Republicans because people of color are more likely to 
vote Democrat.159 Bentele and O’Brien note, “[w]hile we can only infer motivation, 
these results strongly suggest that the proposal of these policies has been driven by 
electoral concerns differentially attuned to demobilizing African-American and lower-
income Americans.”160 
State actors, motivated by partisan politics, have few incentives to guarantee 
the right to vote. States have implemented new laws, or resurrected old practices, in 
the name of preventing voter fraud, which, while race-neutral on their face, have had 
a devastating racial impact on the ability to vote in state and federal elections.161 
Recent efforts at voter demobilization and vote dilution are today’s Jim Crow 
practices. 
Today’s disenfranchisement may look different than that of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. We do not have voting officials that discriminatorily impose 
literacy tests or poll taxes to overtly prevent Black people from voting. Most state 
officials, unlike their nineteenth- and twentieth-century predecessors, would not go 
on record to say that their voting regulation is implemented to discriminate.162 While 
some old practices may have died, many of the old practices have resurfaced and 
continue to affect access to the polls today.  
As discussed previously,163 one effective practice in demobilizing voters is to 
purge the voting lists and remove would-be voters from the list of eligible voters or 
challenge the registration of a voter on Election Day. Sadly, this trend still continues 
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justified as necessary to promote the integrity of the electoral process, a formulation that makes dirty 
politics looks clean.”).  
162   Unfortunately, some state officials have no problem admitting the political and racial consequences for 
voting regulations. See Brett LoGiurato, Here's The Racist 'Daily Show' Interview That Cost A Local 
GOP Chair His Job, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/daily-
show-interview-don-yelton-racist-resign-2013-10.  
163  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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today.164  Even with court intervention, the damage may already be done as purged 
voters are often forced to vote provisionally.165 
Ahead of a close 2004 Presidential election, Republicans implemented a 
multipronged “antifraud” strategy including poll-watcher campaigns and the use of 
challengers at the polls in key states. No Republican has won the White House 
without winning the state of Ohio, making the state, which was never subject to the 
VRA’s preclearance requirements, a prime place for restrictive voting practices. 
Cuyahoga County, which is home to Cleveland, is the most consistently Democratic 
county in the state.166 Between 2000 and 2004, 168,000 voters in the county were 
purged in an overly aggressive interpretation of the National Voter Registration 
Act.167 During the 2004 election, Ohio republicans also purged Democratic-leaning 
voters in Cincinnati.168 In Hamilton County, twelve percent of registered voters were 
moved from active to inactive status; voters whose registration records were inactive 
had to show identification to vote at a time before providing identification to vote was 
a requirement.169 If the polling official did not believe the voter’s identification was 
satisfactory, the voter was forced to cast a provisional ballot.170 After the election, 
Republican Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell ordered all provisional ballots be 
set aside and not be counted in the election.171 All provisional ballots cast in Hamilton 
County came from Cincinnati, a city with a large Black population that tended to vote 
Democrat.172 President George W. Bush won Ohio and was reelected, but many 
questioned the validity of the Ohio outcome because of voter suppression.173 
In 2015, a tiny county in Georgia experienced “the worst voter suppression . . . 
ever seen” according to a former Department of Justice attorney, John Powers.174 
Hancock County, Georgia, is a small county of less than 1,000 people; the county is 
overwhelmingly Black with only 96 White residents.175 The eligibility of hundreds of 
voters was challenged without notice.176 One hundred and seventy-six voters were 
prevented from voting in the local elections; of those voters, all but two were Black.177 
                                                          
164  See generally Myrna Pérez, Voter Purges, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 2008), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voter.Purges.f.pdf (detailing 
comprehensive study of twenty-first century voter purges in twelve states). 
165  Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Voters Improperly Removed from Rolls Can Vote in November Election, Court 
Rules, CLEVELAND.COM, (Oct. 19, 2016, 8:45 PM) (last updated (Oct. 20, 2016, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/10/ohio_voters_removed_from_rolls.html. 
166  Rich Exner, Democratic Presidential Candidates Do Best in Cuyahoga County; Putnam Leads for 
Republicans: Statistical Snapshot, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.ssf/2012/10/democratic_presidential_candid.html.  
167  PIVEN, supra note 44, at 173. 
168  Id. 
169  Id.  
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. 
173  See e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Was the 2004 Election Stolen?, ROLLING STONE (June 1, 2006), 
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0601-34.htm.  
174  John Fisher, The Worst Case of Voter Suppression That I Have Ever Seen, THOSE PEOPLE (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://thsppl.com/the-worst-case-of-voter-suppression-that-i-have-ever-seen-e8e4b99bbb03#.hl9xxxe3e.  
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
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 Challenging the registration of voters and purging names from the lists of 
eligible voters is a practice in which the victims often do not know until it is too late 
and they are unable to vote. Remedial lawsuits can do nothing to prevent the practice 
nor change the outcome of an election affected by the violation. 
i. Voter Identification Laws  
 
The past decade has seen the rise of voter identification laws, regulations that 
require a voter to present a photographic identification in order to vote.178 In 2006, 
Indiana was the first state to enact a strict photo identification law.179 The Court 
upheld the law in 2008, finding that the state’s interests in deterring and detecting 
voter fraud, modernizing election procedures, and safeguarding voter confidence 
justified the “limited burden on voter rights.”180 The record presented to the Court 
was a limited one;181 in 2008, few truly understood the impact these laws would have 
on low-income and minority voters.182 Judge Richard Posner, who authored the 
preceding Seventh Circuit opinion upholding the law,183 later recanted his previous 
stance in a fiery dissent from an order denying a petition to rehear a challenge to 
Wisconsin’s voter identification law.184 Judge Posner concluded, “[t]here is only one 
motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly designed to discourage 
voter-impersonation fraud . . . and that is to discourage voting by persons likely to 
vote against the party responsible for imposing the burdens.”185 He cited Bentele and 
O’Brien’s research, noting that photo identification laws are “highly correlated with 
a state’s having a Republican governor and Republican control of the legislature and 
appear to be aimed at limiting voting by minorities, particularly [B]lacks.”186  
In fact, many argue that voter identification laws should be invalidated as poll 
taxes, which were found to violate the 24th Amendment. Congressman Lewis called 
the legislation “a poll tax by another name.”187 The congressman lamented “[n]ew 
restraints on the right to vote do not merely slow us down. They turn us backward, 
setting us in the wrong direction on a course where we have already traveled too far 
and sacrificed too much.”188 With documented evidence that voter identification laws 
                                                          
178  Suevon Lee, & Sarah Smith Everything You’ve Ever Wanted to Know About Voter ID Laws, PROPUBLICA 
(March 9, 2016 7:33 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-youve-ever-wanted-to-know-
about-voter-id-laws. 
179  Id.  
180  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008).  
181  Id. at 201–02. 
182  See Ezra Klein, Voter ID Laws Fix a Fake Problem by Creating a Real One, VOX (Dec. 21, 2014, 10:11 
AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/7/5979377/voter-id-laws-fix-a-fake-problem-by-creating-a-real-one. 
183  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 375 F. Supp. 2d 788 (7th Cir. 2007) (reh’g en banc denied). 
184  Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 783, 784 (Posner, J., dissenting); see also Michael Hiltzik, A Conservative 
Judge's Devastating Take on Why Voter ID Laws Are Evil, LA TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-why-voter-id-laws-are-evil-20141013-column.html. 
185  Frank, 768 F.3d at 796 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
186  Id. at 30.  
187  John Lewis, A Poll Tax by Another Name, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/opinion/a-poll-tax-by-another-name.html. 
188  Id.  
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impact citizens’ ability to exercise their right on Election Day, voter identification 
laws are currently being litigated across the country.189   
 
ii. Northwest Austin, Shelby County, and the Evisceration of the 
Voting Rights Act  
 
In July 2006, Congress overwhelmingly passed a twenty-five year extension of 
the VRA.190 Nevertheless, the Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
coverage formula a mere three years later in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District Number One v. Holder.191 The Court disposed of the case by allowing the 
utility district to bail out of the preclearance requirement, thereby avoiding the 
constitutional question of the validity of the Act.192 Nevertheless, the Court expressed 
doubt about the VRA’s continuing viability by commenting that the VRA was justified 
by “exceptional conditions” decades before, but “we are now a very different 
Nation.”193 Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Court would not answer the “difficult 
constitutional question” of whether current conditions justified “the extraordinary 
legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.”194 In a concurrence in part 
and dissent in part, Justice Thomas took the Chief Justice’s doubts one step forward, 
concluding, “[t]he extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to previously 
uphold § 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.”195 
Four years later, the Court heard another challenge to the VRA. In this suit, 
an Alabama county challenged §§ 4(b) and 5 of the VRA as facially 
unconstitutional.196 Unlike Northwest Austin, Shelby County was ineligible for a 
bailout because the Attorney General recently objected to proposed voting changes.197 
The Court cited Northwest Austin, finding that the VRA “imposes current burdens 
and must be justified by current needs.”198 The Court invoked federalism principles, 
without any real consideration of how the Reconstruction Amendments may have 
affected or influenced the federalism designed by the founders in 1787.199 Chief 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion gave new meaning to the doctrine of equal 
sovereignty, citing only his opinion in Northwest Austin.200 The Chief Justice noted 
                                                          
189  Michael Wines, Critics See Efforts by Counties and Towns to Purge Minority Voters from Rolls, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/us/critics-see-efforts-to-purge-minorities-
from-voter-rolls-in-new-elections-rules.html. 
190  Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 
21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/washington/21vote.html.  
191  557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
192  Id. at 211.  
193  Id. 
194 Id. 
195  Id. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
196  Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621–22. 
197  Id.  
198  Id. at 2622 (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203). 
199  Id. at 2623–24.  
200  See Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 122, at 520 (“[N]ote how equal sovereignty begins as an 
‘historic tradition’ at the start of the paragraph, morphs into a ‘doctrine’ in the middle of the paragraph, 
and comes to life as a ‘fundamental principle’ by the end of the paragraph. . . . Northwest Austin not 
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that improvements in Black turnout were “in large part because of the Voting Rights 
Act,”201 but found that because Congress did not update the coverage formula, the 
Court was left “with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”202 Section 5 
remained intact and the Court invited Congress to “draft another formula based on 
current conditions.”203 However, without the coverage formula, the VRA is essentially 
lifeless, allowing previously covered jurisdictions free reign to implement voting 
changes without any supervision or intervention to prevent discriminatory laws from 
being implemented. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg penned a passionate dissent maintaining, “the 
VRA provided a fit solution for minority voters as well as for States.”204 Justice 
Ginsburg pointed to the Reconstruction Amendments finding, “[i]t cannot tenably be 
maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted to shield the right to vote from 
racial discrimination, is inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, or any provision of the Constitution read in light of the Civil War 
Amendments.”205 She also noted that the challenges being faced by today’s minority 
voters were not direct attempts but rather “subtler second-generation barriers” for 
which Congress believed preclearance was necessary so as not to risk loss of the gains 
that had been made.206 Again, like in Giles v. Harris, the Court’s majority opinion put 
voting rights in an impossible catch-22: “If the statute was working, there would be 
less evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that Congress should not 
be allowed to renew the statute. In contrast, if the statute was not working, there 
would be plenty of evidence of discrimination, but scant reason to renew a failed 
regulatory regime.”207 Justice Ginsburg elaborated that “[t]hrowing out preclearance 
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like 
throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”208 
Shelby County is a rare, exceptional case in which an act of Congress that was 
once constitutional is no longer, not because of new understanding of the Constitution 
but rather an assumption that the underlying need for the legislation was no longer 
viable. Essentially, the Court found that racism and discriminatory voting practices 
were historical phenomena of the twentieth century because of improvements in the 
last fifty years, despite the wealth of research that contradicts that conclusion. 
States that wanted to implement new voting changes, but were blocked by the 
Department of Justice thanks to the § 4(b) coverage requirement, wasted no time in 
taking advantage of the impotent legislation. In fact, as soon as Shelby County was 
decided, Greg Abbott, Attorney General for the state of Texas, announced that the 
                                                          
only distorted the meaning of what the Court said in South Carolina v. Katzenbach but also revived the 
equal dignity of the states that Katzenbach buried.”). 
201  Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (emphasis in original). 
202  Id. at 2631. 
203  Id.  More than three years after the Shelby County decision, Congress has made no legitimate effort at 
updating the coverage formula, leaving the VRA toothless.  
204  Id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
205  Id. at 2637.  
206  Id. at 2642 (citing 2006 Reauthorization §§ 2(b)(2), (9)).  
207  Id. at 2638. 
208  Id. at 2650.  
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state would be immediately initiating new voter identification laws that had 
previously been blocked by the Obama administration.209 On the very same day it 
was decided, Shelby County began to have devastating consequences for minority 
voters.  
iii. The Present: Voting Rights in 2016 
 
Many lament that the 2016 Presidential election will be the first national 
election without the full protections of the Voting Rights Act since its inception.210 
Voting rights advocates worry over the restrictive voting laws and over voter 
suppression that might affect the outcome of the election.211 In fact, voters have been 
purged from voting lists during the primary and general seasons of the 2016 
presidential election.212 The next president will likely nominate several Supreme 
Court Justices,213 making the 2016 election a key moment for the future of voting 
rights.  
Still, there are positive signs. In 2015, two states, Oregon214 and California,215 
passed automatic registration bills, removing one of the biggest barriers to voting and 
making access to the polls easier.  
During the summer months of 2016, district and federal courts in key 
battleground states struck down numerous voter identification laws, citing racial 
animus as a motivating factor for these laws.216 In examining North Carolina’s voter 
                                                          
209  Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Decision, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jun. 25, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-supreme-court-
decision.  
210  See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, For Government’s Top Lawyer on Voting Rights, Presidential Election Has 
Begun, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-
governments-top-lawyer-on-voting-rights-presidential-election-has-already-
begun/2016/01/13/b9942d36-b953-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html; NPR, Block the Vote: A 
Journalist Discusses Voting Rights and Restrictions, (Aug. 10, 2015,  2:21 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/08/10/431238980/block-the-vote-a-journalist-discusses-voting-rights-and-
restrictions; @NAACP. TWITTER (JAN. 12, 2016, 12:15 PM), 
https://twitter.com/NAACP/status/687004928779366400. 
211  Dale Ho, Will the 2016 Presidential Election Be Decided by Voter Suppression Laws?, ACLU (Jan. 14, 
2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/will-2016-presidential-election-be-decided-
voter-suppression-laws. 
212  Gregory Krieg, Sanders Campaign, New York Officials Cry Foul After New York Voters Report Issues, 
CNN (Apr. 20, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/19/politics/new-york-primary-voter-
problem-polls-sanders-de-blasio/; Dan Horn, Ohio Election Roll Purge Challenged by Voting Rights 
Advocates, WKYC (July 28, 2016, 8:32 PM), http://www.wkyc.com/news/politics/ohio-election-roll-purge-
challenged-by-voting-rights-advocates/283644184. 
213   Rebecca Shabad, How Could the Next President Reshape the Supreme Court?, CBS NEWS, (Jan. 5, 2016 
6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-next-president-could-reshape-the-supreme-court/; see also 
Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 70, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
214   Andrew Prokop, Oregon will be the first state to automatically register voters, VOX (March 17, 2015 
12:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/3/17/8231387/oregon-voter-registration-automatic. 
215  Andrew Prokop, California governor signs bill to automatically register people to vote, VOX (Oct. 10, 
2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/14/9319889/california-automatic-voter-registration.  
216  Camila Domonoske, As November Approaches, Courts Deal Series Of Blows To Voter ID Laws, NPR 
(Aug. 2, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/02/488392765/as-november-
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identification laws, the Fourth Circuit considered the actions of North Carolina 
legislators in the aftermath of the Shelby County decision.217 While acknowledging 
that the lawmakers were partly motivated by partisan politics, the Fourth Circuit 
found that “discriminatory racial intent motivated the enactment of the challenged 
provisions in [the legislation].”218 Similarly, the United States District Court for the 
District of North Dakota enjoined a voter identification law in because of its disparate 
impact on Native American voters.219 
 The decisions in the recent cases concerning VRA and voter suppression give 
hope that courts might be able to stop voter suppression before a national election, 
even without the full protection of the VRA. However, that possibility alone is not 
enough. Voting must be protected during primaries, local, and state elections, not just 
for federal elections during a presidential election year. Because it seems unlikely 
that Congress will be able to come up with a new coverage formula and because of 
the Supreme Court’s skepticism towards race-conscious solutions in Shelby County, 
it is likely that a race-neutral approach to increasing voter access is the best option 
to combat voter discrimination.   
B. Looking Forward: Fixing a Racial Issue Through a Race-Neutral 
Approach 
From analyzing the history of the franchise, it is clear that access to the ballot 
box has, and continues to be, a racial issue in the United States. However, in order 
truly to achieve the promises of the Fifteenth Amendment, the most practical 
approach might be one that, at least on paper, does not acknowledge the racial 
problem. 220 
A new preclearance coverage formula under § 4(b) of the VRA is the obvious 
possibility. With the celebration of the fifty-first anniversary of the Act on August 8, 
2016, there were renewed calls to return the VRA to its full power.221 However, recent 
history shows us that voter suppression is a nationwide problem. It seems improbable 
that Congress would agree to allow the Justice Department to oversee the election 
                                                          
217  N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 821 F.3d 204, 227–29 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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injunction enjoining North Dakota Secretary of State from enforcing the North Dakota’s voter ID laws 
during the pendency of litigation). 
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AFL-CIO (August 5, 2016), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-Legislation/On-the-51st-
Anniversary-of-the-Voting-Rights-Act-Now-Is-the-Time-to-Restore-It-to-Its-Full-Power. 
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laws of every state in the Union; yet, such supervision would be the only way to ensure 
that every eligible voter has the ability to vote free of discrimination. In a different 
vein, both President Barack Obama and Senator Bernie Sanders have raised the idea 
of making Election Day a national holiday.222 While this solution would address 
access to the ballot during presidential elections, it would do nothing to help voters 
in primaries or during local elections.  
The best solution might be for the federal government to mandate the 
regulations for federal elections. The government can establish how citizenship must 
be proved, allow absentee ballots to be requested online, regulate the timetable for 
early voting and weekend hours, and permit same-day registration. In other words, 
Congress should establish procedures that make it easier to vote and protect the 
practices that many states have been attempting to eradicate.  
The power of the federal government to regulate the time, place, and manner 
of its own elections under the Election Clause was upheld in Arizona v. Inter Tribal 
Council of Arizona, Inc.223 The Court blocked Arizona’s attempt to require additional 
proof of citizenship because federal law preempted the state action, holding that when 
the federal government acts under its Election Clause power, federal regulations 
necessarily displace any conflicting state law.224 Thus, the federal government could 
effectively preempt a state’s attempts at voter suppression. In fact, a state judge in 
Kansas recently ruled that a two-tiered system of voter registration was unlawful.225 
While the basis for this decision was based on the National Voter Registration Act, 
this rationale can easily be extended to the federal government’s power under the 
Election Clause.  
The Election Clause method is not a perfect approach. It would still require 
Congress to approve such a method, and it would not stop a future suppression tool 
that has yet to be implemented or proposed. Nevertheless, it would be an effective 
corrective measure that would allow the federal government to regain control over 
voting rights without a full-functioning Voting Rights Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the founding, the United States has struggled with unequal and 
discriminatory voting practices. The Radical Republicans laid a foundation for 
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political equality in the Reconstruction Amendments. Those values, after lying 
dormant for about a hundred years, were given practical meaning during the civil 
rights movement of the twentieth century. Despite the progress made over the last 
half-century, the Reconstruction Amendments have yet to be fully realized. Political 
parties still have incentives to introduce restrictive voting regulations, which far too 
often have negative racial consequences. Voter suppression practices that 
characterized the post-Reconstruction period have evolved into modern forms that 
allow discrimination against Black and minority voters.  
The United States has a damning history of voter suppression. This legacy 
continues today in new forms of modern disenfranchisement that target Black and 
other minority voters. The states should no longer be trusted to regulate voting 
without federal supervision or intervention. The vote is precious—far too precious a 
right to be delegated to the state laboratories of democracy. In order to truly protect 
equal access to the ballot, the federal government must take a more active, 
prophylactic role in protecting the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right to 
vote without discrimination based on race. 
 The Process of Power: 
A Process-Oriented Approach to Dissecting a Group’s Political Power 
 
Pat Andriola 
 
ABSTRACT 
Minority groups receiving protection under the Fourteenth Amendment must typically 
show that they have little "political power," the idea being that the judiciary ought not step in 
on their behalf if there are legislative outlets available to them. But how should a court 
determine whether a group is politically powerful (or powerless)? This article argues that the 
typical indicia of political power relied on by the courts are unwisely based on political 
outputs, or what minority groups strive for (such as laws in their favor), rather than political 
inputs, or the things that determine whether groups can get political outputs in the first place 
(such as money). 
INTRODUCTION 
 The gist behind the “politically powerless” criterion of Carolene Products’ 
Footnote Four is that the judiciary should pay special attention to certain groups who, 
due to institutional failures of the democratic system, are particularly vulnerable to 
public action that discriminates against them.1 Determining whether a group is 
politically powerless is more of an art than a science, given that there is no visible 
bright line a court can look to for guidance (or even anything resembling a test 
articulated by the Supreme Court).2 During the trial on Proposition 8 in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, the testimony of Stanford political science professor Gary 
Segura (and the questions he was asked by both counsel) seemed to indicate that the 
components of a group’s political power were the number of members it has,3 its 
financial resources,4 and its societal clout (as a byproduct of the public’s attitude 
toward the group).5 There was also an indication from the testimony that these inputs 
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does or does not maintain political power or conceptualizing the issue on a continuum.  
3  Transcript of Direct-examination of Gary Segura at 1538, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW) http://kenjiyoshino.com/KY/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Perry_Volume_7_1480-1741.pdf. (stating that gays don’t have the “numbers” 
to be effective advocates). 
4  Id. at 1818 (“[W]hen there is money to be given, there are politicians to come accept it.”).  
5  Id. at 1564. A group’s clout is also intimately tied to the activities of other organizations that coalesce to 
oppose the group. See id. at 1594.  
134      Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality           [5:1 
would typically produce outputs of legislation beneficial to the group and elected 
representatives who are members of the group themselves and/or allies of it.6  
My argument is that although outputs are without question more practically 
important to disadvantaged groups in the long run, courts should focus more on the 
inputs, or process, rather than the results in determining whether a group actually 
has sufficient political power. Part and parcel of being a minority group with a history 
of discrimination against you is vulnerability, or an anxious unease that the political 
tides can shift in your disfavor as they have before. Since the Court in Carolene 
Products was interested in specifying which groups were at risk of majoritarian 
attack (such that it was the task of the judiciary to curb the kinds of factionalism 
Madison once warned about)7, looking to inputs is a good method to determine how 
stable a group’s present political power is; whereas looking at outputs, complimentary 
data is most likely to tell us more about past inputs than they do about current ones.8 
Importantly, this Article also serves to undercut three myths that have accompanied 
the respective inputs when it comes to the political power of gays: (1) that gays make 
up ten percent of the population and thus by themselves constitute a significant 
voting bloc; (2) that gays are mostly affluent and well-connected and thus can attract 
the political capital of lawmakers; and (3) that America has done a complete 180 and 
is currently very accepting of homosexuality.  
 POKER, POLITICAL POWER, AND OUTPUTS 
In the game of poker, a player who is a ninety-nine percent favorite with one 
card remaining will still lose one out of a hundred times. The player is definitely more 
concerned with the result of the hand than her favorable odds before the last card is 
turned, since the odds are only valuable instrumentally in that they give her a greater 
chance of winning the hand itself. However, if we were trying to gauge the player’s 
chances of winning before the last card is turned, looking to the result of the hand 
would do nothing but muddle the analysis. Similarly, if we conceptualize a group’s 
political power by looking to its inputs, valuable instrumentally insofar as they allow 
for greater political results (which is the ultimate goal), I believe we have a better 
chance of rebuffing the counter-majoritarian difficulty the Court was concerned with 
in Carolene Products. 
 
 
                                                        
6  Id. at 1539 (“[W]e would want to take into account the process whereby the outcome was achieved, and 
the subject matter of the outcome, before we concluded that the outcome by itself was sufficient 
evidence”).  
7  Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403 (1982). 
8  Current inputs might actually be a better correlative indicator of future outputs than current outputs 
are. This idea was actually taken from the world of advanced baseball statistics, which the author has a 
background in. It has been demonstrated that input-based pitching statistics, such as FIP, are actually 
better predictors of future ERA, an output-based statistic, than current ERA is. See Colin Wyers, How 
well can we predict ERA?, THE HARDBALL TIMES (June 18, 2009), http://www.hardballtimes.com/how-
well-can-we-predict-era/.  
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 Allies 
 Professor Segura highlighted some of the main analytical problems with 
looking to outputs as an indication of a group’s intrinsic political power. Political 
allies, which Segura defines as “an individual or group who are willing to expend 
political capital on behalf of that position, not merely embrace it,” are a good example 
of a particularly poor metric for political power analysis.9 Because politicians will 
almost always support a group when there are no political costs to doing so, pointing 
to a bunch of politicians across the state and federal levels who claim to be allies is 
futile because the real issue comes when the politician has to make a zero-sum 
calculation (i.e., support the group at the expense of possible votes).10 A politician’s 
favorite approach when it comes to policy and constituents is being able to have her 
cake and eat it too: if a politician can somehow claim to support gay rights while at 
the same time not offending more traditional voters, she may be characterized as an 
ally when really he or she has done nothing but garden-variety opportunism. Since 
the factors that go into a politician’s political capital are fragile and dynamic, it’s 
tough to decipher how long she will be willing to actually spend effort on a group if 
the return on investment (for reelection or legacy-building purposes) is no longer 
positive.11  
A prominent example of someone who only came to be an ally once the cards 
were stacked in his favor is President Obama, who steadfastly believed in limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples in 2008 when the issue was more controversial and 
his election chances were exceedingly unclear, but he changed his mind during the 
2012 campaign when public sentiment had shifted and he was a considerable favorite 
for reelection.12 Since the point of Footnote Four’s inclusion of political power is to 
figure out when the judiciary should step in because the political process has failed 
to protect vulnerable groups, the benefits of looking to allies is limited since they 
could easily abandon the group if either public opinion shifts or they need to use their 
political capital for more personally pressing concerns.  
 
                                                        
9   Transcript of Cross-examination of Gary Segura, supra note 3, at 1686. 
10  Id. at 1581 (commenting that many allies will “retreat and retreat quickly” when “faced with difficult 
decisions that might be electorally risky”).  
11  Id. at 1696 (citing Congressperson Pelosi as an example of someone who waned support for gay rights 
in 2009 because of diminished political capital). 
12  See Nate Silver, Support for Gay Marriage Outweighs Opposition in Polls, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 9, 
2012, 4:52 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/support-for-gay-marriage-
outweighs-opposition-in-polls. Ironically, Obama was a supporter of same sex marriage as early as 
1996, so his position “evolved” not once, but twice. See Jesse Singal, Obama’s Incoherent Stance on Gay 
Marriage, THE DAILY BEAST (May 8, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/08/ 
obama-s-incoherent-stance-on-gay-marriage.html. President Obama was not the only presidential 
candidate to flip flop on issues relating to gays. Mitt Romney said during his campaign run that, as 
President, he would not interfere with a state’s decision regarding adoption or marriage. He then 
switched gears and openly supported a Constitutional amendment to limit marriage to opposite sex 
couples. See Zack Ford, Romney Campaign Flops Twice on Marriage Amendment and Same-Sex 
‘Benefits,’ THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 22, 2012, 9:03 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/10/22/1057711/romney-campaign-flops-twice-on-marriage-
amendment-and-same-sex-benefits/.   
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 Legislation 
 
Looking to pro-gay legislation for indicia of political power is rife with similar 
problems. First, as Professor Segura notes, antidiscrimination legislation is clear 
evidence of a group’s vulnerability, as it addresses the fact that the group suffers from 
systematic discrimination in the first place.13 This is a phenomenon that mirrors 
Professor Yoshino’s point in The Paradox of Political Power: just as it takes a certain 
amount of political power for the judiciary to even notice a certain group, it takes a 
similar amount of political power for the legislature to notice a group as well.14 
Second, it’s easy to simply count up laws that are ostensibly pro-gay but in 
actuality do nothing more than codify judicial mandates or grant only some benefits 
while leaving others out of reach.15 There is a troubling irony to these laws: they are 
examples of the legislature reacting to decrees from the courts, but they are often 
used as examples for why the courts need not step in because the legislature has 
acted. If anything, these laws help to demonstrate that the only way for a minority 
group to get the legislature’s attention is by asking the judiciary to twist the 
legislature’s arm. 
Third, legislation is not stagnant; it can be overturned either by the same 
legislature (if opinion changes) or by ballot initiatives (for example, Proposition 8). 
The reason input analysis is applicable here is that it looks at what conditions need 
to be present in order for laws favorable to minority groups to be overturned, whereas 
output analysis asks a relatively superficial question of, “Is there a law benefitting 
this group on the books?” Again, while favorable legislation is obviously a significant 
goal in advancing a group’s interests, courts should consider this evidence with a 
strong grain of salt because of its tenuousness.  
 
 Elected Representatives 
Electing representatives who themselves are members of the group is also an 
important end, but how that relates to political power can be deceiving. First, because 
sexual orientation is a complicated concept and less conspicuous than gender or race, 
and because gay politicians are often forced into the closet, it is hard to judge both 
the percentage of gays in the overall population and the percentage of gays in 
representative bodies (in order to see if there is a substantial difference between the 
two).16 Second, these politicians are usually elected from locales that are much more 
comfortable with homosexuality than the nation as a whole, so there is a local-versus-
national divide at play. Third, while having elected representatives from your group 
is a good proxy for group representation, those representatives may not always have 
                                                        
13  Transcript of Direct-examination of Gary Segura, supra note 3, at 1549 (analogizing an 
antidiscrimination statute to a medical prescription, saying the prescription doesn’t mean you’re 
healthy, but that there’s actually a problem).  
14  Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F.Supp. at 437 n.17. 
15  Transcript of Direct-examination of Gary Segura, supra note 3, at 1549 (noting that some 
antidiscrimination ordinances is California “were passed in the wake of court decisions ordering that 
policies be adopted”).  
16  See id. at 1574–75.  
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the interests of the group at the forefront of their agenda. Finally, like legislation, 
politicians can be removed from their public positions with a change in the political 
atmosphere.   
 
 INPUTS 
 Strength in Numbers 
 
Inherent in the idea of “insular” and “minority” groups is that the groups are 
literally outnumbered by the majority. While a strict numerical advantage cannot 
guarantee that a group will be properly represented, or even avoid oppression (for 
example, South African apartheid or nineteenth century women’s suffrage), it is 
certainly a correlative indicator of potential group success. Below is a comparison of 
the demographics of the population of the United States compared to that of the 
Congress whose session ended in 2015:17  
Group Percentage of 
Population 
Percentage of 113th 
Congress 
Male ~49.2 ~81.5 
Female ~50.8 ~18.5 
White ~74.8 ~82.5 
Black ~13.1  ~8.3 
Latino ~16.7 ~7.0 
Asian ~5.0  ~2.4 
LGBTQIA ~3.4 ~1.3 
White Males ~36.8 ~68.0 
 
The numbers show that a group’s federal representation will somewhat mirror 
its countrywide population; a basic linear regression of the two for the groups above 
(not including White males so as not to double count) shows an r2 value of .73, which 
means there is a very solid correlation between them.18 However, every group except 
Whites and males (and the cross section of the two) exhibit lower representation in 
Congress than their overall demographics would suggest. This should not be 
surprising given the history of socioeconomic domination of Whites and males in 
America and the zero-sum nature of demographic statistics (for example, if a white 
or male is elected to a seat, necessarily a non-white or non-male is not).  
                                                        
17  See generally JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42964, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 113TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42964.pdf; see also UNITED STATES 
CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.  
18  For more on r2 value, also known as the “coefficient of determination,” see generally PENN STATE 
EBERLY C. OF SCI., The Coefficient of Determination, r-squared, 
https://onlinecourses.science.psu.edu/stat501/node/255 (stating that “Social scientists who are often 
trying to learn something about the huge variation in human behavior will tend to find it very hard to 
get r-squared values much above, say 25% or 30%. Engineers, on the other hand, who tend to study 
more exact systems would likely find an r-squared value of just 30% merely unacceptable”).  
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Strict population percentages for a group are not as valuable for quality 
political power analysis independent of the other inputs; indeed, inputs simply have 
to be looked at holistically. For example, in order to understand the discrepancy for 
most minority groups between their population percentage and their congressional 
percentage, we need to better understand the group’s financial position and how the 
public views the group, which are both incredibly important to winning seats on the 
Hill.  
It is also important to note just how small of a percentage of the population 
LGBT members are compared to popular misconceptions. Gay activists used an 
obscure passage from an Alfred Kinsey book in the 1970’s to argue that the LGBT 
population hovered somewhere around ten percent in an attempt to choose a number 
that was significant but not threatening.19 Unfortunately, that number has still stuck 
around and is used as an informal statistic by many, overestimating the political 
might of gays. In reality, a Gallup poll, which used the largest representative sample 
of LGBT men and women ever, found the number to be roughly 3.4%.20 That number 
also includes bisexuals, whom the Supreme Court does not seem to consider as being 
independently constitutionally implicated.21 Since the Court is focusing on 
homosexuals, the number it should focus on is probably maxed somewhere around 
1.7% considering that recent studies have shown that self-identified bisexuals 
outnumber self-identified gays.22 
The presence of the closet also complicates demographic statistics of the LGBT 
community. There seems to be a consensus that self-identification for race is not the 
same as for sexual orientation, and that there are many more gays in the population 
than studies show.23 For political power analysis, however, the potential presence of 
these “silent members” seems to do us little good. Aside from some sort of closeted 
political action, such as voting for or supporting gay politicians or allies, closeted 
members will have an extremely limited impact on the group’s overall progress. In 
fact, some studies have supported the age-old notion of the “closeted homophobe,” 
meaning that closeted gays actually are not silent and are instead 
counterproductively vocal in a way that cannibalizes group resources.24 
 
 
 
                                                        
19  See LGBTs Are 10% of US Population? Wrong. Says Demographer, NPR (June 8, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/08/137057974/-institute-of-medicine-finds-lgbt-health-research-gaps-in-us.  
20  See Gary J. Gates & Frank Newport, Gallup Special Report: The U.S. Adult LGBT Population, THE 
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Oct. 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-
demographics-studies/gallup-special-report-18oct-2012/. 
21  Or, at the least, the Court has not articulated, in regard to suspect class analysis, if bisexuals are a 
subsection of hetero or homosexuals, a separate group, or something else altogether.  
22  See Simone Wilson, How Gay Is America? UCLA Study Shows Only 3.5 Percent of U.S. Claims Rainbow 
– But 11 Percent Are Tempted, LA WEEKLY BLOGS: THE INFORMER (April 8, 2011, 11:30 AM), 
http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2011/04/how_many_gays_in_america_ucla_study_9_million.php.   
23  Id. (quoting activist Cathy Renna as saying, “of course [9 million] is an undercount”).   
24  See Jeanna Bryner, Homophobes Might Be Hidden Homosexuals, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (April 10, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=homophobes-might-be-hidden-homosexuals. 
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 Wealth 
In a post-Citizens United capitalist democracy, the connection between wealth 
and political power cannot be understated. High-income citizens are more likely to 
vote than low-income citizens.25 US senators are more responsive to constituents who 
are affluent, and statistical evidence shows the bottom third of income distribution 
have zero effect on their senators’ roll call votes.26 The wealthy help to shape ideology 
and social norms that eventually permeate into more tangible policy.27 Corporations 
spent almost one billion dollars on political lobbying in 2010 alone.28 Not only is 
money important in order to get your voice heard in Washington, it is also important 
in order to get the opportunity to legislate. Fifty-seven members of the Congress in 
2011 were in the top one percent of wealth; 250 of them were millionaires and their 
median net worth was $891,506, nine times that of the average household.29  
But just as the population of gay Americans has been mythically overstated, 
so has their economic success.30 A report by the Williams Institute at UCLA finds 
that poverty is a major problem in the gay community.31 The study found that “gay 
and lesbian couple families are significantly more likely to be poor than heterosexual 
married couple families”; that “children in gay and lesbian couple households have 
poverty rates twice those of children in heterosexual married couple households”; and 
that lesbian couples are economically worse off than both heterosexual couple 
households and gay male couple households.32 Below is the median income for certain 
groups compared to their congressional representation:33 
                                                        
25  See Annalyn Censky, Why the rich vote more, CNN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2012, 5:46 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/24/news/economy/rich-vote-more/index.html.  
26  See Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/economic.pdf. 
27  See generally Arthur MacEwan, The Wealth-Power Connection (Pol. Econ. Research Inst., Univ. of 
Mass. Amherst, Working Paper No. 299, 2012), 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP299.pdf. 
28  See Scott Hirst, Corporations and Political Spending: A New Lobbying Focus in the 2012 Proxy Season, 
THE HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (March 10, 2012, 10:17 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/10/corporations-and-political-spending-a-new-lobbying-
focus-in-the-2012-proxy-season/.   
29  See Gregory Korte & Fredreka Schouten, 57 members of Congress among wealthy 1%, USA TODAY (Nov. 
11, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-15/congress-
wealthy-1/51216626/1. 
30  See Jonathan Capehart, Myth: ‘Gays make more money than non-gays,’ WP OPINIONS: POSTPARTISAN 
(Feb. 8, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/myth-gays-make-
more-money-than-non-gays/2011/03/04/gIQA26CexQ_blog.html. 
31  See Randy Albelda, M.V. Lee Badgett, Alyssa Schneebaum & Gary J. Gates, Poverty in the Lesbian, 
Gay, and Bisexual Community, THE WILLIAMS INST. (March 2009), 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Albelda-Badgett-Schneebaum-Gates-LGB-
Poverty-Report-March-2009.pdf.  
32  Id. 
33  See Carmen DeNavas et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2010, CURRENT POPULATION REPS.: CONSUMER INCOME (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf; see also Associated Press, Report: Gay couples 
similar to straight spouses in age, income, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:09 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-02-census-gay-couples_N.htm?csp=34. 
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Group Median Annual Salary Percentage of 113th 
Congress 
Male  $47,715 ~81.5 
Female  $36,931 ~18.5 
White $54,620 ~82.5 
Black $32,068 ~8.3 
Latino $37,759 ~7.0 
Asian $64,308 ~2.4 
LGBT (household) $91,558 ~1.3 
Heterosexual 
(household) 
$95,075 ~98.7 
 
Gay families seem to be in strong financial competition with their heterosexual 
counterparts on average, but as the study above showed they are also much more 
likely to fall under the poverty line.34 Moreover, although there is less data available 
in this area than is true of that for gay couples, studies have shown that non-
partnered gay individuals also make less than both partnered gays and non-
partnered heterosexuals.35  
Personal finances are also significantly different from successful group 
lobbying. The Human Rights Campaign, the largest LGBT equal rights advocate in 
America, came in 359th place of the top spenders in lobbying for 2012.36 While that 
number is not terrible considering the advocate is going against the likes of the US 
Chamber of Commerce and Google, it also is pretty far down for the largest advocacy 
group of its kind. Gay lobbying is far less powerful than the conservative myth of the 
omnipotent, megalithic “gay agenda” that the late Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence 
dissent, said had deeply influenced the law-profession culture.37 
 Societal Clout 
Quakers seem as vulnerable as any group based on the inputs above: there are 
only 130,000 of them in the country and they do not seem to have amassed any 
                                                        
34  This most likely means that more gays reside at the ends of the income distribution gradient than is 
the case for heterosexuals (for example, if you are gay and poor you are more likely to be very poor than 
if you are straight and poor, and the same goes for being gay and rich). See Albelde et al., supra n. 31, 
at iii (finding that “After controlling for other factors, same-sex couples are significantly more likely to 
be poor than heterosexual couples”). 
35  See Joe Clark, Full Findings: Singles as opposed to couples, GAY MONEY, 
http://joeclark.org/gaymoney/findings/#singles. 
36  Human Rights Campaign Organization Profile, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000158.  
37  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Conservatives also argued that the 
gay agenda was using biased pollsters prior to the 2012 election in order to drum up support for Barack 
Obama by lying about polling data to show him as the favorite. Of course, not only was this homophobic 
conspiracy theory laughably wrong, but gay statistician and blogger Nate Silver ended up predicting all 
50 states correctly. See Jordan Sargent, Don’t Listen to Nate Silver’s Gay Polls, Says Superstar 
Conservative Pollster, GAWKER (Oct. 27, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://gawker.com/5955480/dont-listen-to-nate-
silvers-gay-polls-says-superstar-conservative-poster. 
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spectacular amount of wealth.38 But Quakers are not in a poor position because there 
is no apparent animosity toward them. If there were any reason for the majority to 
make the lives of Quakers miserable, it would not be easy for the group to defend 
itself, but at this point nobody is proposing anti-Quaker referenda. Societal clout, 
which is a group’s social standing based on the public’s attitude towards it, is 
important because it can serve as a weathervane for potential animosity-inspired 
legislation. Although the history of the discrimination prong takes into account prior 
feelings of societal ill will, current public views are just as important. 
 Despite a recent media and political narrative of societal acceptance of gays, 
they are still one of the most targeted, discriminated against, and distrusted groups 
in society.39 For example, thirty-one percent of the country still thinks that not only 
should same sex marriage not be allowed, but that gay relationships should be 
illegal.40 This number was as high as 40% in 2009, but also as low as 35% in 2003, 
36% in 1989, and 39% in 1982. However, it also hit 57% in 1988 and 49% in 2004, 
demonstrating just how non-linear public opinion can be (despite the media’s 
insistence that the trend in the status quo is somewhat permanent).41 A 2006 study 
found that 22.6% of respondents to a poll did not think gays shared their vision of 
American society, slightly better than the rate for Muslims and five times as high as 
that of African-Americans.42 Thirty-six percent of the nation still opposes allowing 
gays to adopt.43 Thirty-nine percent of the country thinks gay marriage will make 
things worse, while forty percent thinks there will be no effect and only nineteen 
percent thinks it will make things better.44 
 A significant hurdle in looking at these polls is the perception that homophobia 
and similar biases are fading away as society progresses, thus making it less 
necessary for the judiciary to step in.45 Professor Richard Epstein specifically warned 
                                                        
38  Table 75. Self-Described Religious Identification of Adult Population: 1990, 2001, and 2008, U.S. 
CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0075.pdf.  
39  See generally DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS BASED ON THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND GENDER IDENTITY, REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Documents/A_HRC_29_23_en.doc 
(documenting the “continuing, serious and widespread human rights violations perpetrated, too often 
with impunity, against individuals based on their sexual orientation”). 
40  Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (also finding 
that less than half the country thinks someone is born gay and that thirty-eight percent of the country 
still finds homosexuality to be “morally wrong”).  
41  Id.  
42  See John Allen Paulos, Who’s Counting: Distrusting Atheists, ABC NEWS (April 2, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=1786422&page=1#.UZpZSLuBIq4. 
43  See Susan Page, Poll: Attitudes toward gays changing fast, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:02 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/12/05/poll-from-gay-marriage-to-adoption-attitudes-
changing-fast/1748873/.   
44  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in U.S., GALLUP (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-above.aspx. 
45  See Gary Langer, Poll Tracks Dramatic Rise in Support for Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS (March 18, 2013, 
2:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/poll-tracks-dramatic-rise-in-support-for-gay-
marriage/.   
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against the Court creating backlash to gay rights by jumping ahead of the 
majoritarian opinion. He wrote: 
We can and should make an immense advance in this particular area, but the only way 
we are going to be able to do it is to pull the reins back a little bit and let the horse go 
at a slower pace. Whip the horse forward and you may collapse the entire carriage.46 
Epstein is using a statistical narrative (that public opinion is rapidly shifting more 
pro-gay) in order to argue for temperate judicial restraint. However, one should not 
take marginal progress and drape a “Mission Accomplished” banner over it. The only 
reason people are shocked by how quickly homosexuality is being accepted is because 
of how far the movement has had to come to even get to this mediocre position. In 
other words, it was once so bad to be a gay American that a poll saying only a third 
of the country wants to illegalize gay relations is somehow seen as an incredibly 
positive development in societal tolerance. 
 That is not to say that the progress the gay rights movement has fought for so 
strongly is really some sort of illusion; the gains are completely real and show the 
fortitude of the movement’s organizational and strategic abilities. But that does not 
mean the war has been won whatsoever, and the numbers are still awful in many 
places. Seventy-five percent of Arkansas residents opposed same sex marriage in 
2004, with a political consultant saying, “You can’t be for gay marriage and be a 
statewide elected official in Arkansas.”47 Public attitude toward same sex marriage 
has been basically unchanged in over a decade in most southern states.48 Even though 
overall hate crimes are down thirty percent since 1996 (with those against Blacks 
down forty-three percent), anti-gay hate crimes increased from 1,206 in 1996 to 1,256 
in 2011.49 Sixty-five percent of Americans do not approve of teaching children that 
homosexuality is a normal alternative lifestyle.50 Meanwhile, self-reported 
discriminatory opinions against other groups with suspect classification are much 
lower than that against gays.51 When a last place sports team wins a few games in a 
row, it does not mean the team is in the playoffs; it just means the team is doing 
better than its earlier poor performance. It is dangerous to conflate marginal 
increases in societal tolerance with the end of homophobia. 
 
                                                        
46  Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutionality of Proposition 8, 34 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 879, 888 
(2011).   
47  See Alex Roarty, Why This Democratic Senator Won’t Support Same-Sex Marriage, THE ATLANTIC (April 
4, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/why-this-democratic-senator-wont-
support-same-sex-marriage/436356/ . 
48  Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gap Persists, PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gay-marriage-momentum-regional-gaps-
persist/.   
49  See Aleksi Tzatzev, There’s A Disturbing Trend Involving Anti-Gay Hate Crime In The US, BUS. 
INSIDER: LAW & ORDER (Dec. 12, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/anti-gay-hate-crime-
stats-dont-budge-2012-12. 
50  See Rebecca Millette, 65% of Americans reject gay-affirmative lessons in elementary school: poll, 
LIFESITE NEWS (May 5, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/65-of-americans-reject-gay-
affirmative-lessons-in-elementary-school-poll/.  
51  Page, supra note 43. 
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CONCLUSION  
 The concept of political power seems, at least for those who argue the issue in 
court, more apt for vague and grandiose evidence. The motion for summary judgment 
for the Proposition 8 proponents mostly included quotes from politicians and pieces 
of legislation, as compared to any hard data or high-level analysis.52 Still, if the 
concept is to be taken seriously as doctrine, which in the light of Windsor and 
Obergefell is all the more unclear, a more rigorous approach is absolutely necessary. 
The judiciary’s role is to step in where the political process has failed, but it is difficult 
to decipher just when a group is vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority. While 
outputs are what every group is aiming for, the courts should look to inputs to see 
whether or not they are likely to get them.  
 
                                                        
52  See Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of Proponents, Perry v. Schwarzenegger at 45–46, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW)  (referencing President Obama, the Democratic 
Party platform, and scorecards given out to politicians on behalf of the Human Rights Campaign).  
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ABSTRACT 
This Note illustrates how the current US labor scheme acts as an impediment to union organization of 
undocumented day laborers. While the market for these contingent workers grows, so too does the need 
for worker protection from abuses. However, unions face legal and structural barriers that prevent them 
from effectively organizing day laborers. Ultimately, these legal and structural barriers show that the US 
labor scheme as a whole is incapable of effectively responding to the needs of day laborers, and by 
extension, to the needs of a globalized, migrant workforce. My Note argues that by failing to adapt to 
changes brought on by globalization, our labor law cannot be harnessed to protect vulnerable day 
laborers. As they stand, our labor laws secure the place of day laborers in the shadows of our working 
society. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 “They thought we Latinos were disposable workers.”1  
Josue was recruited from a street corner in New Orleans by an employer 
offering promising work for wages.2 He was one of several jornaleros—day laborers, 
or temporary workers—hired to clean up portions of a Texas town that was destroyed 
by Hurricane Ike in 2008.3 Josue accepted the employer’s offer, relying on the promise 
of good work, payment, and decent working conditions.4 However, when Josue arrived 
for his first day of work, he was placed in an isolated labor camp, forced to perform 
dangerous work in toxic conditions with no protective equipment, and had no one to 
turn to for help.5 Josue and his fellow day laborers not only risked their health by 
performing dangerous construction work, but also faced discrimination and wage 
                                                 
* Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, Volume 5; 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, May 2017; Centre College B.A. 2014. I would like to thank 
Professor Fred Aman for his guidance and for his constant reminders that we, as law students, can 
effectuate change. Thanks as well to Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt for sparking my interest in labor 
law, and to the Peggy Browning Fund for inspiring me and countless other students to fight for 
workplace justice. This note is dedicated to my mother, Lou Anne Coomer, the hardest worker and 
fiercest union supporter I know.  
1  Josue’s Story, Day Laborers, UNITED WORKERS’ CONGRESS, http://www.unitedworkerscongress.org/day-
laborers.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
2  Id.  
3  Id.  
4  Id.  
5  Id.  
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theft from their employers.6 When Josue protested against his employer for stealing 
wages, his employer called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).7 Josue, 
an undocumented worker, spent 78 days in jail for demanding $250 in unpaid wages.8 
Day laborers stand on sidewalks, street corners, and parking lots, waiting to 
be picked up by employers who offer temporary work.9 Often invisible to mainstream 
America, day laborers build our houses, farm our land, and cook our meals—moving 
our day-to-day lives ever-forward through their work in the low-wage labor market. 
Of these “men on the corner,”10 three-quarters are undocumented.11 And, as the above 
narrative demonstrates, many undocumented day laborers face rampant abuse from 
employers.12 
Josue’s situation is not uncommon. In any given day, approximately 117,600 
undocumented day laborers search for work.13 Employers in industries such as 
construction and agriculture often take advantage of the undocumented labor market 
because such labor is cheap and flexible.14 Further, undocumented workers 
themselves often seek day labor jobs because of their informal, “no questions asked” 
nature.15 The jobs are quick and temporary, and employers often do not require the 
verification documents and English language skills required by more formal 
employment opportunities.16 However, such informality puts day laborers in a 
tenuous position: employers can withhold wages and place workers in unsafe 
                                                 
6  Id.  
7  Id.  
8  Id.   
9  Abel Valenzuela Jr., Nik Theodore, Edwin Meléndez & Ana Luz Gonzalez, On the Corner: Day Labor in 
the United States, UCLA CTR. URBAN POV., at i, 
http://www.coshnetwork.org/sites/default/files/Day%20Labor%20study%202006.pdf   (2006).  
10  Throughout this paper, I will refer to day laborers using the pronoun “he” because the majority of 
undocumented day laborers are male, with women comprising roughly two percent of the day labor 
population. Id. at 18. For an article discussing the unique problems women day laborers face, see 
Elizabeth J. Kennedy, The Invisible Corner: Expanding Workplace Rights for Female Day Laborers, 31 
BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 126 (2010).  
11 Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at iii. 
12  Though day laborers come in many forms and work across various industries, this paper focuses on 
undocumented day laborers who migrate to the United States from the global south, namely Latin 
American countries. Typically, these laborers work in the construction or agricultural industries. See 
Rebecca Smith, An Honest Day’s Work: Day Labor Advocacy in the United States, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 355, 358 (2004). 
13  Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at i.  
14  A report written by the Government Accountability Office found that contingent workers (day laborers) 
are paid less and have less job security than standard workers. This is because day laborers only 
receive work—and thus, only receive wages—when work is available. Because employers can hire day 
laborers at-will when work arises, they are in a more flexible position than the laborer. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, 
AND BENEFITS, 30–31, 45–46, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf (2015).  
15  Amy Pritchard, Note, “We Are Your Neighbors”: How Communities Can Best Address a Growing Day 
Labor Workforce, SEATTLE. J. SOC. JUSTICE 371, 375 (2008).  
16  Id. at 375.  
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conditions.17 If undocumented workers complain, the employers simply threaten 
them with ICE and therefore avoid consequences for breaking the law.18  
As the tide of undocumented workers continues to flow into the United States, 
day labor is often the first place vulnerable immigrants turn to for work 
opportunities.19 But while the market for contingent workers grows, so too does the 
need for worker protection from abuses like those experienced by Josue. In light of 
this increase of day laborers and need for protection, it is essential to view day 
laborers within the broader labor landscape in the United States. When doing so, an 
interesting paradox crystalizes: the low-wage workforce continues to increase in size, 
but the bodies initially created to protect powerless workers—labor unions—are 
faltering.20 Traditionally, low-wage, unskilled labor in the United States was 
concentrated in the industrial sector.21 When these laborers faced workplace abuses, 
they unionized. Through collective action, industrial unions negotiated fair collective 
bargaining agreements to set wage and hour floors and promote fair workplace 
practices.22 After WWII, roughly forty percent of the working population was 
unionized.23 But as industrial workplaces have moved overseas to take advantage of 
cheap labor markets, union membership in the United States has steadily declined.24 
Labor’s industrial stronghold, affected and changed by “a new epoch of global 
production and finance,” no longer exists to the extent it once did.25 Today in the 
United States, only twelve percent of the workforce is unionized.26  
Ultimately, both the growth of the undocumented, contingent workforce and 
the steady disappearance of labor unions as a viable source of collective action 
illustrate changes in domestic labor brought on by globalization. While unions once 
organized the industrial laborer of the past, the face of the worker has, in many ways, 
                                                 
17  See Fact Sheet for Workers, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 1–2 (2002), 
http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NELP-FactSheetForWorkers.pdf. 
18  See Luna M. Yasui, Written Statement of the National Employment Law Project on the Subject of 
Employment and Labor Protections for Day Laborers, See Fact Sheet for Workers (2002), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Employment-and-Labor-Protections-for-Day-Laborers.pdf. 
19  Valenzuela et al , supra note 3, at 2 (writing that “[f]or 60 percent of day laborers, this work was the 
first occupation they had held in the United States.”) 
20  See Jake Blumgart, Bonds of Steel, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (NOV. 5, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/article/bonds-steel (noting the fragmented nature of U.S. labor unions and that 
present-day unions have not “figured out how to defend their members”).  
21  See id. (writing that organized labor has shifted from industrial unions to service and public sector 
unions because jobs in these areas are not so easily outsourced).   
22  The establishment of the Wagner Act, or National Labor Relations Act, gave workers the right to 
“organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” FRANK W. 
MCCULLOCH & TIM BORENSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1510 (1974). In doing so, 
workers could create greater economic stability for themselves, as collective bargaining would “promote 
both a higher level of real wages and a better distribution of the national income.” JAMES B. ATELSON, 
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 42 (1983).  
23  Louise Uchitelle, Globalization, Union Style, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, NOV. 5, 2010, 
http://prospect.org/article/globalization-union-style. 
24  NPR, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, In One Map (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-membership-in-
one-map.  
25  Blumgart, supra note 20.  
26  Uchitelle, supra note 23.  
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evolved.27 Undocumented workers—and more specifically, day laborers—provide a 
vivid illustration of this change.28 With roughly 11.1 million undocumented 
immigrants in the United States,29 undocumented workers occupy a key position in 
the US economy.30 The work that day laborers like Josue perform is vital, but the 
undocumented workers that perform day labor are some of the most vulnerable 
members of our society.31 This “vulnerability” comes not only from their status as 
undocumented workers, but from the fact that our labor laws and institutions—labor 
unions, specifically—that are meant to protect workers are incapable of reaching day 
laborers. 
If we assume that the purpose of unions in the United States is to protect 
workers’ rights and set a baseline for fair workplace practices through collective 
bargaining, then unions are a logical place to turn when trying to determine how day 
laborers might be protected from abuse. A large population of workers desperately 
need the benefits of collective organization,32 but as they stand, unions face 
significant barriers to organizing these laborers. As a result, day laborers are 
excluded from national labor protections.  
The purpose of this Note is to explore the barriers that prevent unions from 
reaching day laborers. In doing so, this Note first places the plight of day laborers in 
a global context by exploring why such barriers exist. Ultimately, these barriers arise 
as labor laws and labor institutions fail to adapt to a new globalized workforce. Next, 
this Note discusses in detail both the legal and structural barriers that prevent 
unions from organizing day laborers. Legal barriers involve both definitional 
restrictions that prevent day laborers from falling within the National Labor 
Relations Act’s grasp and the tension between upholding workers’ rights while, at the 
same time, enforcing strict immigration policies. Structural barriers involve the 
nature of a globalized, day labor workforce, and how traditional union organization 
does not comport to the characteristics of such workers.  
Further, this Note explores alternative labor solutions that try to give day 
laborers the same workplace protections that unions have traditionally sought to 
achieve. Specifically, these alternatives are the transnational labor citizenship 
                                                 
27  The changing face of the American low-wage worker is largely a result of changes in our domestic 
economy. Today, service sector jobs are more prominent than they once were, while the number of 
industrial jobs has decreased as manufacturing work moves overseas. See Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, 
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), http://prospect.org/article /alt-labor. 
28  See id.; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Graham Rehrig, The Domestic Face of Globalization: Law’s Role 
in the Integration of Immigrants in the United States, 2 OMNES J. MULTICULTURAL SOC’Y 43, 44 (2011) 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1281 (noting the role that immigrants play in the U.S. as 
the “domestic face of globalization”). 
29  Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (July 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-
population-stable-for-half-a-decade.  
30  María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States Legal System After 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison With Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 301 (2005). 
31  See Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at 20.  
32  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14. 
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model33 and the worker center model.34 Both of these models respond to the legal and 
structural obstacles presented by the barrier analysis. As such, my analysis of both 
the barriers and the proposed solutions demonstrates what happens to 
organizations—here, unions—when they fail to adapt to globalizing forces: the result 
of failure to adapt is exclusion, and day laborers suffer from such exclusion.  
I. DAY LABOR IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION  
Before exploring the barriers that prevent the organization of day laborers, we 
must first discuss the forces that led to the rise of an undocumented contingent 
workforce. Ultimately, globalization changed both the face of the domestic worker 
and the domestic workforce.35 By failing to adapt to these changes, domestic labor 
laws and unions are unable to protect day laborers.  
 Returning to Josue’s story, what led workers like Josue to come to the United 
States, and how can his tenuous position as an undocumented day laborer be 
explained? Essentially, day laborers are part of a broader pool of migrant workers 
who fled poverty and economic stagnation in search of opportunity in the United 
States.36 But more than that, migrant workers reflect the “internationalization of 
production.”37 In her work The Mobility of Labor and Capital, Saskia Sassen explains 
that the expansion of export-oriented manufacturing in foreign countries led to the 
mobilization of migrant workers.38  
When our economy internationalized, “transitional space” was formed, in 
which workers flowed, following trade patterns in reverse by following investment 
back to its source.39 This pattern, and the close economic integration between the 
United States and countries like Mexico,40 accounts for the number of immigrants in 
the United States from Latin American countries. Further, it should be noted that 
                                                 
33  Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 504 (2006). 
34  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 355–56; Justin McDevitt, Note, Compromise is Complicity: Why There 
is No Middle Road in the Struggle to Protect Day Laborers in the United States, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 101, 118–19 (2011); Eidelson, supra note 27.  
35  Eidelson, supra note 27.  
36  Immigration comes in diverse forms. See Aman & Rehrig, supra note 28, at 48 (writing that 
“immigration is not a monolithic or single phenomenon, but one that is extremely diverse even within a 
single country’s experience.”). For this Note, the focus is on immigrants from Latin American 
countries—particularly Mexico—because Latinos make up the largest percentage of day laborers. See 
Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at iii (finding that most day laborers are Latino, with fifty-nine percent 
from Mexico). 
37  SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL 9 (1988).  
38  Id. at 3.  
39  Id. at 15.  
40  Douglas S. Massey, Seeing Mexican Immigration Clearly, MEXICANS IN AMERICA, CATO UNBOUND (Aug. 
20, 2006), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/08/20/douglas-s-massey/seeing-mexican-immigration-
clearly (writing that “[r]ates of migration between Mexico and the United States are entirely normal for 
two countries so closely integrated economically.”); see also Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About 
Immigration: Common Misconceptions Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN 
FOCUS 1, 4, 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/IPC%20five%20myths.pdf 
(Aug. 2005).  
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when migrant workers come to the United States, they are not necessarily fleeing 
poverty, but are more likely seeking economic freedom and mobility.41 Workers have 
complex reasons for migrating to the United States, but many do not intend to stay.42 
Rather, an increasing number of migrant workers hope to find work in the United 
States so they can finance economic goals back home.43 These complex factors 
perhaps explain why workers like Josue come to the United States in the first place. 
The analysis above helps explain why migrant workers are here, but the next 
step in our analysis is determining why workers like Josue are in such vulnerable 
positions: Why is day labor needed, and why is it rife with abuses? Ultimately, the 
demand for day labor is the result of economic pressure for greater labor market 
flexibility in the United States.44 Today, low-skilled work is characterized by short-
term contracts, temporary placements, and employers’ ongoing demand for cheap 
labor.45 This reality is especially present in the construction industry, where many 
day laborers are concentrated.46 Additionally, because industrialized jobs have 
largely moved overseas, where labor is cheaper, day laborers need contingent work 
just as much as employers need day laborers.47 The low-skilled, factory jobs of the 
past are no longer present in the United States as they once were. This ever-growing 
need for cheap labor, combined with the supply of a migrant-labor workforce in the 
United States, allows the day labor sector to prosper.  
 However, it is the contingent and informal nature of day labor, combined with 
the fact that many day laborers are undocumented, that allows such work to be rife 
with abuses.48 Historically, when workers felt oppressed by their employers, they 
organized.49 Such collective organization was protected under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA)50 as a necessary way to prevent industrial strife.51 However, 
the NLRA, and unions by extension, were developed during a time when both workers 
and the work they performed were intrinsically different than day laborers and the 
work they perform today. But because of the globalizing forces mentioned above, that 
reality has shifted.52 Industries have largely moved overseas, and the service sector 
jobs that day laborers frequent are both common and essential for the maintenance 
of our economy.53 The exploited worker is no longer the industrial laborer of the past; 
rather, it is the undocumented worker, and by extension, the day laborer.  
                                                 
41  Massey, Seeing Mexican Immigration Clearly, supra note 40.  
42  Id.  
43  Id.  
44  Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at 1.  
45  Id. at 6.   
46  Id. at 1.  
47  See id.  
48  Id. at 2.  
49  See MCCULLOCH & BORENSTEIN, supra note 22, at 15.  
50  See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012) (granting employees the right to collectively organize).  
51  ATLESON, supra note 22, at 42.  
52  See Eidelson, supra note 27, at 2–3; see also Zohal Hessami & Thushyanthan Baskaran, The Demise of 
Labor Unions in the Era of Globalization 2–3 (Univ. of Konstanz Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 2, 
2013), http://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/workingpaperseries/WP_02-Hessami-Baskaran_2013.pdf. 
53  See Eidelson, supra note 27.  
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If labor law was created to protect workers, and if day laborers are a population 
of workers that need protection, then it is clear that the current labor scheme fails to 
effectuate its protective purpose because that scheme has not adapted to changes in 
the US workforce brought on by globalization. In analyzing this failure, this Note 
next discusses some of the most prominent legal and structural barriers to organizing 
day laborers. Further, by looking at scholars and organizations that have actively 
sought to protect day laborers, this Note highlights how the effective organization of 
the contingent workforce requires activists to go outside of the traditional US labor 
scheme. Woven through this analysis is recognition of the stark reality before us: that 
when our protective laws and institutions do not adapt to the changes that 
globalization brings, then vulnerable sects of our population are excluded from 
receiving protection. With that in mind, our labor laws, and unions as an institution, 
must shift to incorporate a global perspective if groups like day laborers are to receive 
workplace protections.  
 
II. BARRIERS: LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL LIMITS ON UNIONS THAT PREVENT 
DAY LABOR ORGANIZING  
 
Domestic labor laws, which were created in light of a different economic reality 
than we have today, do not adequately protect the new, globalized workforce that day 
laborers represent. This is because there are certain legal and structural barriers that 
prevent our laws and institutions from providing undocumented migrant workers 
with labor protections. Legal barriers include the exclusionary way that our labor law 
characterizes day laborers and the tension between effectuating immigration controls 
while promoting workers’ rights—a tension that has been answered by favoring tough 
immigration policies. Structural barriers refer to traditional exclusionary perceptions 
of immigrants held by labor unions, and how the nature of day labor work does not 
readily lend itself to the union model. These barriers show that the traditional union 
model—and the US labor scheme as a whole—is incapable of effectively responding 
to the needs of day laborers, and by extension, to the needs of a globalized, migrant 
workforce.  
 
A. Legal Limitations to Organizing Day Laborers Under the NLRA  
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) governs the relationship 
between employers and unions.54 The NLRA was created to facilitate collective 
bargaining between employers and employees.55 In the Preamble to the NLRA, 
Congress noted that the “inequality of bargaining power” between managers and 
laborers “affects the flow of commerce,” thereby impeding the success of the national 
                                                 
54  See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); see also NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1 
(1997).  
55  Atelson, supra note 22, at 42.  
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economy altogether.56 It was thought that protecting the rights of workers to organize 
and bargain with employers was a way to eliminate economic warfare.57  
There are limits to organizing day laborers under the NLRA, and these limits 
demonstrate how the NLRA fails to accommodate for a globalized workforce.58 First, 
NLRA protection only extends to those who are considered “employees” under the 
Act.59 Because day laborers are often excluded from the definition of “employee,” such 
workers cannot organize under the NLRA.60 Second, the rise of undocumented 
workers in the United States has led to a tightening of immigration policy.61 Such 
policy tends to conflict with workers’ rights, because undocumented workers are not 
legally allowed to maintain employment in the States.62 Ultimately, stricter 
immigration policy has blocked unions from reaching groups like undocumented day 
laborers. Thus, under current US labor law, day laborers are widely excluded from 
union representation. Due to these legal barriers, US labor law, created for an 
industrial workplace that no longer exists, does not adequately protect the 
undocumented worker and does not reflect changes in the American workforce 
spurred by globalization.  
 
i. Employee/Independent Contractor Distinction 
Though the NLRA protects the rights of employees, under Section 2(3), the Act 
excludes certain workers from its protections. Specifically, it excludes domestic 
workers, agricultural laborers, and independent contractors.63 Historically, 
undocumented workers have occupied these areas.64 Though the NLRA’s protections 
generally apply to undocumented workers,65 such protections do not extend to the 
undocumented worker who is classified under one of the three exceptions listed 
above.66 
Day laborers are often classified as independent contractors.67 Whether one is 
an independent contractor is determined by the common law “right to direct and 
control” test, which looks at various factors regarding the extent of control the 
employer has over the employee to determine whether the employee is an 
                                                 
56  29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935); see also Atelson, supra note 22, at 42.   
57  Id.  
58  See generally 29 U.S.C. § 152. 
59  29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
60  McDevitt, supra note 34, at 102.  
61  Id. at 120.  
62  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it unlawful for employers to hire 
undocumented workers. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond 
the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 741 (2003).  
63  Id. at 102.  
64  McDevitt, supra note 34, at 102.   
65  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).  
66   29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
67  Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and 
Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 142 (2009).  
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independent contractor.68 When enough of these factors are met, courts will classify 
the worker as an independent contractor, and thus not afford the worker NLRA 
protections.69 
 Because the nature of day labor is often temporary and informal, many 
employers of day laborers classify them as independent contractors.70 For instance, 
day laborers are often hired by private homeowners to perform discrete, short-term 
construction work. Employers will argue that these workers are independent 
contractors based on the informality and short length of the project.71 In his work The 
Rise of the Contingent Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, Richard 
Belous lists factors that distinguish contingent workers, including day laborers and 
independent contractors, from “core” employees.72 Specifically, contingent workers 
are distinguishable because of their (1) weak affiliations with the employer; (2) lack 
of an implicit long-term contract; (3) insignificant stakes in the company; and (4) lack 
of relationship with corporate family.73 This independent contractor classification is 
favorable to the employer—and to an extent, the laborer—because it is not required 
that the immigration status of independent contractors be ascertained.74  
Additionally, the classification is beneficial to employers of day laborers 
because it means they do not have to engage in official, NLRA-controlled collective 
bargaining.75 Thus, an employer can exercise more control over his workers without 
the fear of violating the NLRA’s workplace and union protections.76 But ultimately, 
classifying a day laborer as an independent contractor is harmful to the worker 
precisely because it puts the day laborer outside the scope of the NLRA. Excluded 
laborers are denied the legally protected right to organize, and while these laborers 
can certainly still organize in an informal fashion, they cannot join or form a legally 
recognized union, nor can they create a legally-binding collective bargaining 
agreement with their employer.77 The NLRA does not contain a private right of 
action, so without an official union that can allege employer violations to the National 
                                                 
68  See, e.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998); NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of Am., 
390 U.S. 254 (1968). Factors considered in determining whether one is an independent contractor 
include: 1) the extent of control by which an employer may exert over the worker; 2) whether or not the 
worker is “engaged in a distinct occupation or business”; 3) the type of occupation, and whether such 
work is usually done under the direction of an employer or without supervision; 4) the skill required in 
the occupation; 5) whether the worker supplies his own tools; 6) the length of time for which the person 
is employed; 7) the method of payment; whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business; 8) 
whether or not the parties believe they are creating a master servant relationship; 9) and whether the 
principal is or is not in business. Rest. (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958). 
69 Id.; see also Roadways, 326 N.L.R.B. at 849.   
70  McDevitt, supra note 34, at 102.  
71  Id.  
72  Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 865 (1995). 
73  Id.   
74  McDevitt, supra note 34, at 102 (Note, however, that federal regulations like the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act make it illegal for employers to hire workers who the employer is certain are 
undocumented). 
75  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(3).  
76  See Griffith, supra note 67, at 139.   
77  See id.  
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Labor Relations Board, day laborers who are deemed independent contractors are 
entirely left out of the sphere of the NLRA’s protections.78  
Just as it is problematic for day laborers, the independent contractor 
classification is also problematic for unions who wish to organize these workers. In 
fact, many labor advocates believe such workers are often misclassified as 
independent contractors, when in reality they are “employees” under the NLRA.79 In 
its written statement on “Employment and Labor Protections” for day laborers, the 
National Employment Law Project wrote that labor legislation like the NLRA should 
be read to “broadly protect day laborers and other contingent workers.”80 Further, 
scholars have noted the difficulty of applying the traditional “right to direct and 
control” test to day laborers.81 Because the test is “unwieldy” and relies on a variety 
of distinct factors, day laborers who might be classified as independent contractors 
by courts in one region might not be considered independent contractors for 
performing the same work in another location.82 The result is that unions could 
organize some day laborers under the NLRA, but not others.83 The Department of 
Labor has highlighted the dangers of misclassifying workers as independent 
contractors: beyond being exempt from the NLRA, day laborers who are classified as 
independent contractors are denied access to minimum wage, overtime 
compensation, medical leave, employment benefits, and workplace safety.84  
Essentially, the classification of day laborers as “independent contractors” 
under the NLRA—and the NLRA’s broader exemptions of domestic laborers and 
agricultural workers, who often happen to be undocumented immigrants—does not 
reflect workplace changes catalyzed by globalizing forces. Day labor is an ever-
growing sector of our service economy.85 As such, when these workers are considered 
independent contractors, a significant majority of undocumented workers then fall 
outside the scope of the NLRA.86 Thus, the independent contractor exception creates 
a “gap” in workplace protections. The NLRA’s exceptions to the “employee” definition 
certainly might have worked in our past manufacturing, industrial economy, but it 
does not conform to today’s service economy, where work is often temporary and 
informal in the sectors most widely populated by day laborers. Because unions are 
formed under the NLRA, and the NLRA’s exceptions to coverage often block day 
laborers from union organization, the NLRA acts as a legal barrier to union 
organization of day laborers. 
                                                 
78  Id. at 142–43.  
79  See Dep’t of Labor, Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/#stateDetails. 
80  NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, Written Statement of the National Employment Law Project on the Subject of 
Employment and Labor Protections for Day Laborers 3 (2002).  
81  E.g., Griffith, supra note 67, at 142–43.   
82  Id.  
83  Id.  
84  Dep’t of Labor, supra note 79.  
85  NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, supra note 80, at 2.  
86  See id. at 3. 
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ii. Policy Conflicts Between Labor Law and Immigration Law   
Even if a day laborer is considered an “employee” so as to fall under the 
auspices of the NLRA, other legal limits of organizing day laborers under the NLRA 
exist in the contention between workers’ rights and enforcement of immigration 
policies. Legal scholar María Pabón López noted that the undocumented workers’ 
current place in the US legal system is one of “hostile inconsistency.”87 The 
“inconsistency” comes from the tension between the NLRA, which operates with the 
goal of protecting workers’ rights, and immigration policy like IRCA, which tightens 
and controls the undocumented workers’ role in US workplaces.88 The “hostility” 
appears in court precedent that considers the place of the undocumented immigrant 
in the world of workers’ rights.89 By analyzing the policy goals of the NLRA and 
immigration legislation like the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and by 
looking at Supreme Court decisions that limit undocumented workers’ rights, this 
section illustrates how hostile immigration policy acts as a barrier to organizing day 
laborers under the NLRA and the US legal system as a whole. As was the case with 
the independent contractor distinction, the failure of the legal system to extend 
protections to undocumented day laborers again represents the failure of our legal 
bodies to adapt a sufficiently global perspective when regarding the rights of such 
workers. 
The tension between labor and immigration policy is most vividly depicted in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB.90 In 
Hoffman, the Supreme Court grappled with whether undocumented workers, who 
are considered “employees” under the NLRA,91 are entitled to the same remedies for 
unfair labor practice as “legal” workers.92 The Court found that while some remedies 
are still available to undocumented workers, such workers are not entitled to either 
back pay or reinstatement when subjected to unfair labor practices.93 In Hoffman, 
this meant that an undocumented worker who was fired due to his union 
participation was not entitled to receive pay for three years of work he lost due to his 
employer’s retaliation for union participation, nor was he allowed to return to his lost 
job.94 
In making its decision, the Supreme Court discussed the tension between 
immigration policy and workers’ rights. As noted, undocumented workers are broadly 
considered “employees” under the NLRA (as long as they do not fall under one of the 
three exceptions mentioned above), meaning they receive the Act’s labor 
                                                 
87  Pabón López, supra note 30, at 303.   
88  Id.  
89  See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
90  Id.  
91  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).  
92  See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. 137, 142 (noting that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have 
divided on the question whether the Board may award backpay to undocumented workers.”). 
93  Id. at 146.  
94  Id. at 146–47.  
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protections.95 However, under IRCA, undocumented workers are not legally entitled 
to work, and it is illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented immigrants.96 
Thus, the Supreme Court analyzed two opposing policies: the need for powerful 
remedies to restore a worker back to the position he was in before unlawful 
retaliation, or the need to keep undocumented workers out of the workplace.97 The 
Court found that between the two legislative schemes, the policy behind IRCA—to 
prohibit undocumented immigrants from working—was violated by effectuating the 
remedies envisioned under the NLRA.98 
In finding that immigration law supersedes the policies behind the NLRA in 
the undocumented worker context, the Supreme Court in Hoffman effectively 
“modified the . . . remedial scheme” of the Act.99 Thus, in a post-Hoffman world, two 
of the Act’s most powerful remedies are no longer available to undocumented workers. 
The question becomes: How does this affect unions’ abilities to organize the 
undocumented workers that now represent a significant portion of our globalized 
workforce?  
First, scholars have noted that the decision in Hoffman essentially makes it 
economical for employers to violate the NLRA when undocumented workers are 
involved.100 Specifically, because undocumented workers are not entitled to the 
NLRA’s most powerful remedies, employers who hire undocumented workers might 
find the costs of violating the NLRA less than the costs of workers’ union 
protections.101 This greatly diminishes the power of union organization in 
undocumented worker-heavy workplaces. 
 Additionally, scholars like Christopher David Ruiz Cameron have speculated 
that Hoffman essentially created a new Bracero Program.102 The Bracero Program, 
which gave Mexican nationals temporary citizenship status based on their affiliation 
with an agricultural labor force, ultimately resulted in the creation of an “underclass 
of low-wage Latino immigrants.”103 In theory, the Bracero Program was intended to 
provide some workplace protections to workers; in actuality, the laborers were kept 
outside the scope of our national labor law protections. The decision in Hoffman 
similarly pushes undocumented workers to the periphery of the US labor scheme. If 
the Act’s most powerful remedies are no longer available to undocumented workers, 
it seems less likely that these workers will have an incentive to unionize. Thus, 
undocumented workers are more likely to remain in the shadows after the decision 
in Hoffman.  
                                                 
95  Sure-Tan, Inc.  467 U.S. at 891 (“The Board has consistently held that undocumented aliens are 
“employees" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act.”).  
96  Pabón López, supra note 30, at 30203.  
97 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141–45, 160.  
98  Id. at 146–47.  
99  Pabón López, supra note 30, at 315.  
100  E.g., Garcia, supra note 62, at 742.   
101  Id.   
102  Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero 
Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 24 (2003).  
103  Id. at 4.  
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Overall, Hoffman illustrates the Court’s failure to adopt a sufficiently global 
perspective.104 In other words, even though the purpose of the Act is to protect 
workers, the Court placed a significant portion of our labor market outside of the Act’s 
protections based solely on their legal status, without recognizing the prevalence of 
undocumented workers, their significance to the US economy, and their vulnerability 
to abuse. Undocumented laborers are an economic reality of our times, and this is 
demonstrated by the fact that undocumented workers, as a class, are considered 
employees under the NLRA. By not granting undocumented workers the right to back 
pay and reinstatement, the Supreme Court placed the interests of such workers at 
the periphery of labor law. And ultimately, because the Supreme Court established a 
broad rule that the policy goals of strict immigration regulation are favored over 
policy that secures workers’ rights, undocumented workers are blocked from 
achieving the workplace protections that labor unions and the NLRA provide. By 
significantly decreasing the cost of unfair labor practices to employers and by making 
undocumented workers outsiders to US labor protections, the decision in Hoffman 
creates another barrier to organizing undocumented day laborers.    
 
B. Structural Limitations  
Beyond the legal barriers found in the language of the Act and the tension 
between labor and immigration policy, certain structural barriers also prohibit the 
organization of undocumented day laborers under the traditional US labor scheme. 
Structural barriers refer to the inner-workings of union organization that block 
unions from reaching day laborers. To explore structural barriers, this section first 
looks toward the anti-immigration stance traditionally upheld by unions as 
representing a potential barrier to organization of day laborers. But ultimately, while 
the traditional protectionist stance taken by unions is significant, the most prominent 
structural barrier involves the question of whether legally recognized unions 
organized under the traditional union model can even reach day laborers to organize 
them. Again, these barriers demonstrate how our labor institutions fail to adapt to a 
current, globalized reality.  
First, the anti-immigration stance historically adopted by most labor unions 
creates a sort of “moral” barrier (meaning, many union organizers would prohibit 
such organization as going against the union cause) to organizing undocumented day 
laborers. Traditionally, union organizers opposed immigration and the free flow of 
labor across borders.105 This protectionist stance was a result of labor organizers 
viewing immigrants as a threat to native US workers because immigrants created a 
cheap labor pool for employers to draw from.106  The idea was that more immigrants 
                                                 
104  See Garcia, supra note 62, at 744 (writing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman “illustrates 
the failure of labor laws originally enacted in the 1930s to respond to a changed global economic 
landscape”).  
105  See Gordon, supra note 33, at 531–32.   
106  See id. at 517, 550.  
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meant less jobs for US-born workers, and in turn, less union membership.107 Because 
immigration trends ultimately led to changes in the scale, skill-level, and 
geographical distribution of the national workforce, labor unions have consistently 
bound themselves to the goal of tightening immigration laws.108 In fact, until the 
1980s, unions repeatedly supported legislative initiatives that curbed immigration 
and created stricter immigration enforcement policies.109 Unions maintained an anti-
immigrant, or at least an anti-undocumented immigrant, stance through the 
1990s.110 The advent of immigration, which lessened the power of unions for the 
reasons noted above, was viewed as antithetical to the labor movement’s call for 
solidarity among US workers.111 
Notably, unions have become less restrictive with regard to immigration in 
recent years. In 2000, the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO) called for 
“blanket amnesty for undocumented immigrants.”112 This policy shift, along with the 
recognition that undocumented immigrants are especially vulnerable to workplace 
abuses, led to organization campaigns like Change to Win—a coalition of unions 
representing workers in migrant-heavy agricultural and service sectors.113  Today, 
the AFL-CIO and its affiliates recognize the need for immigration reform to protect 
US workers, noting that the most effective way to afford undocumented workers 
protections is through giving “all workers—immigrant and native-born— . . . [access] 
to the protection of labor, health and safety and other laws.”114 But despite this shift 
in perception, unions still face a glaring barrier that they, ironically, promoted in the 
past: strict regulation of undocumented workers in the workplace. Thus, while the 
widespread anti-immigrant stance among unions is virtually a thing of the past, 
unions who wish to incorporate undocumented workers into their protective schemes 
are still blocked from doing so because of unions’ past legislative lobbying efforts that 
ultimately led to tighter immigration laws.115 Again, the legal barriers mentioned 
earlier come into play, and unions cannot effectively sidestep the fact that 
                                                 
107  This perception was not totally invalid. Scholars at the Industrial and Labor Relations School at 
Cornell University have documented the relationship between immigration and union membership. 
When immigration is high, union membership flounders. In turn, in periods where immigration was 
low, union membership flourished. See the chart below for more information. Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., 
American Unionism and U.S. Immigration Policy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 1–2 (2001).  
108  Id. at 1.  
109  Id.  
110  Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Labor Unions Move to Protect Immigrants, Regardless of Legal Status, THINK 
PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2015/03/26/3638255/ unions-
increasingly-bargaining-protect-undocumented-immigrants/. 
111  Gordon, supra note 33, at 524.  
112  Lee, supra note 110.  
113  See About Us, CHANGE TO WIN, http://www.changetowin.org/about (last accessed Nov. 15, 2016) 
(showing Change to Win is affiliated with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), United 
Farm Workers of America (UFW), United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), 
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)).  
114  AFL-CIO & CHANGE TO WIN, The Labor Movement’s Principles for Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
1 (Aug. 2009), http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/60511/854621 
/version/1/file/UnityFrameworkAug2009.pdf.  
115  See Briggs, supra note 107, at 1.  
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immigration law does create a place for the undocumented worker in the US 
workforce.  
Additionally, unions face practical barriers to organizing undocumented day 
laborers. The nature of day labor, as noted earlier, is transitory and temporary.116 
Undocumented day laborers stay on the job for short periods of time, and work—
especially in the construction and agricultural industries—is often seasonal, so day 
laborers do not have a steady source of income, nor a steady employer.117 The informal 
nature of day labor does not fit easily within the union model. The power of a union 
is in its ability to set the stage for workers to sit down with employers and negotiate 
a collective bargaining agreement.118 This negotiation process—a union’s primary 
tool for securing workplace rights and protections—is difficult, if not impossible, to 
perform considering the informal nature of day labor work. How can unions sit down 
with employers to negotiate agreements on wages, benefits, and safety when the 
employers change daily, and the laborers are out of work shortly after receiving it?  
Moreover, many undocumented workers might oppose joining the union in the 
first place based on fears of employer retaliation.119 In many instances, employers 
have deterred undocumented day laborers from contesting violations of labor law by 
threatening to turn them over to immigration authorities.120 Thus, undocumented 
workers who are victims of workplace exploitation face a catch-22: if they remain 
silent, they face continued exploitation; but if they speak up, they face deportation.121 
Threats of deportation, coupled with widespread lack of understanding among 
undocumented workers about their legal rights, often curtail efforts to organize 
undocumented workers.122  
The above structural barriers, combined with the legal barriers mentioned 
earlier, work to exclude a significant population of vulnerable workers from labor 
protections. As noted, these “barriers” can be seen as a result of a legal and structural 
scheme that failed to adapt to a changing workforce. The most vulnerable and 
unprotected laborers are no longer the industrial workers of the past: they are the 
undocumented workers, like day laborers, performing service sector jobs. The failure 
of legislation and unions to adapt to this change leaves a gap in labor policy, and it is 
within this gap that day laborers are situated.  
                                                 
116  See Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at 6.  
117  See id. at 4.  
118  Id.  
119  Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY 
LA RAZA L. J. 103, 110–11 (2003). 
120  Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at 22; see also Velasquez-Tabir v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 127 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997) (denying relief to undocumented workers who were arrested and 
deported pursuant to employer’s complaint to legacy INS shortly after certification of a labor union had 
taken place); Impressive Textiles, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 8 (1995) (preventing employer from beginning to 
ask for documentation from workers after a successful union election, implying to workers that they 
would be reported to INS as a result of choosing the union to represent them); Accent Maint. Corp., 303 
N.L.R.B. 294 (1991) (preventing employer from discharging undocumented workers who joined the 
union, threatening to report undocumented worker to legacy INS if he did not withdraw from labor 
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: HOW ALT-LABOR TRIES TO FILL THE GAPS 
 Legal and structural barriers prevent unions, in their traditional form, from 
organizing day laborers. Thus, groups who advocate for day laborers have had to go 
outside the traditional US labor scheme to find creative ways to protect the rights of 
undocumented contingent workers. Importantly, these solutions highlight the “gaps” 
identified above: that both the legal scheme and structural scheme of unionization, 
as they stand, exclude undocumented day laborers from accessing key labor rights. 
These solutions demonstrate how groups and policy-makers have learned to adapt to 
the globalized undocumented workforce in order to afford workers basic labor rights 
in creative ways that circumvent traditional labor law. For legal solutions, Jennifer 
Gordon has proposed transnational labor citizenship, explored in Part A below. 
Additionally, structural solutions have been found in the worker center model, as 
discussed in Part B. In analyzing these solutions, it becomes clear that the path to 
organization is not through our current labor laws. Rather, we must look outside our 
traditional legal structures and find ways to adapt to the new, globalized worker 
encapsulated by the day laborer.  
 
A. Filling the Legal Gaps Through Transnational Labor Citizenship 
Transnational labor citizenship, a concept developed by Jennifer Gordon, 
attempts to knock down the legal barriers for day laborers in one sweeping reform: 
by giving migrant workers legal status.123 In doing so, it becomes less likely that 
workers will be blocked from receiving workplace protections due to a technicality, 
such as characterization of day laborers as independent contractors, or due to the 
tension between enforcing both labor and immigration laws. Transnational labor 
citizenship is a way of organizing workers as they cross borders, and a method of re-
conceptualizing the relationships between nations, institutions, and private actors so 
as to accommodate the needs of migrant workers.124 Transnational labor citizenship 
gives migrant workers legal status through their participation in transnational labor 
organizations.125 Through labor citizenship, migrant workers act in solidarity “to 
achieve recognition of and compensation for their economic contributions to 
society.”126 The goal of Gordon’s proposal is to facilitate the free movement of labor 
while simultaneously setting baseline protections for workers.127  
In order to work, Gordon’s model requires nations, migrants, and transnational 
labor organizations to each play unique roles. First, nations—Gordon uses the United 
States and Mexico as an example—must negotiate a bi-national framework for 
facilitating transnational labor citizenship.128 These negotiations would involve input 
                                                 
123  See generally Gordon, supra note 33 (creating the concept of transnational labor citizenship).  
124  Id. at 504.  
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from nongovernmental organizations and labor unions with experience working with 
migrant laborers.129 According to Gordon, the resulting framework would address 
recruitment of workers, compliance with the program, and sustainable methods of 
sending and receiving workers between countries.130 Second, migrant workers must 
participate in transnational labor organizations to obtain citizenship.131 Their 
participation requires compliance with certain standards. For instance, migrant 
workers would be required to take a “solidarity oath” with the labor organization, 
where they would promise not to accept work below set labor standards and agree to 
report employers who violate labor codes established by the organization.132 Last—
and most essential to Gordon’s proposal—networks of transnational unions must 
develop to organize workers and establish baseline workplace standards.133 These 
grassroots groups would not only set rules for the workplace, but would also facilitate 
the sending and receiving of migrant workers by orienting them to their new 
workplaces and educating them on their rights.134 The purpose of these organizations 
is to organize workers despite divisions among nationality, race, and immigration 
status. Through workers’ participation in these transnational union networks, they 
maintain labor citizenship status, and can legally work in the United States.135  
Initially, it is clear that Gordon’s proposal knocks down some of the barriers 
to organizing day laborers mentioned earlier. Most noticeably, her proposal finds a 
way out of the legal obstacles by giving migrant workers legal status. This status 
perhaps allows workers to avoid the NLRA exclusions for independent contractors 
mentioned above, but more notably, giving workers legal status helps eradicate the 
tension between immigration policy and labor policy that provides a significant 
barrier to organizing under the NLRA. First, as mentioned above, day laborers do 
not fall under the NLRA if they are considered independent contractors. But under 
Gordon’s proposal, the entire notion that temporary, informal labor does not require 
the same protections as more stable work flies out the window. Gordon emphasizes 
that her proposal applies to all workers and all employers who are members of the 
network of transnational labor organizations.136 Thus, for those involved in the 
network, the distinction between “independent contractors” and full-fledged 
“employees” would not matter—every worker would be entitled to the same 
workplace protections.  
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, Gordon’s proposal seems to work 
around the tension between immigration laws, like IRCA, and labor law by giving 
undocumented workers legal status. Thus, if the tension between IRCA and the 
NLRA is that undocumented workers are not legally entitled to work—and thus, not 
legally entitled to certain workplace protections—because of their undocumented 
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132  See id.  
133  Id. at 568.  
134  Id.  
135  See id. at 568–70.  
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status, then transnational labor citizenship solves that problem by giving workers 
legal status. Under Gordon’s model, it is because of workers’ migrant status and 
participation in labor organizations—not in spite of their undocumented status—that 
workers are afforded protections. However, it is unclear whether her proposal is an 
effective work-around laws like IRCA, or if her policy cannot be implemented without 
changing strict immigration laws. But overall, her policy would essentially eviscerate 
the idea that migrant workers are not entitled protection because of their 
undocumented status, simply because her proposal gives workers legal status.  
Of course, there are limits to organizing undocumented day laborers under 
Gordon’s proposal. For instance, transnational labor citizenship proposes widespread 
reform for workers who have not yet migrated to the United States, but it is difficult 
to see how her proposal could help those day laborers already in the United States 
who are facing continuous abuse from their employers. A retroactive application of 
her proposal to workers already in the United States is difficult for some of the 
structural reasons mentioned earlier: day laborers are often transient, living in the 
shadows of our communities. Further, Gordon’s proposal requires cooperation from 
major bodies, all with different interests. First, nations must make massive policy 
overhauls and agree to give legal status to workers who normally would not be 
afforded any sort of legal recognition at all.137 Second, traditionally hard-bordered 
labor unions would have to reconfigure themselves to accept large swaths of workers 
who might normally be seen as a threat to the domestic workforce. And last, migrant 
workers would have to buy into the idea. Normative to union effectiveness is the idea 
of solidarity—that unions are only successful if every worker buys into the cause. But 
in light of past failed guest worker programs—like the Bracero Program, which 
effectively created an underclass of migrant citizens—migrant workers might be 
wary of such a proposal.  
However, even with these limits in mind, the purpose of this section is not to 
analyze the effectiveness of Gordon’s proposal, but rather to note how her proposal 
emphasizes the barriers to organizing day laborers that exist in our traditional legal 
scheme. Gordon’s proposal introduces creative ways of navigating exclusionary 
immigration and labor laws in the United States. Gordon creates a method of 
establishing legal status for migrant workers, and in doing so Gordon does not violate, 
but goes around laws like the NLRA and IRCA.138 By making baseline workplace 
rights the norm for workers who are members of the transnational union network, 
Gordon’s proposal ensures that each migrant worker receives protections despite the 
nature of the work performed and despite the lack of documentation that the worker 
holds.139 Additionally, by recognizing the importance of undocumented workers in the 
US workforce, and by recognizing the globalized nature of this work, Gordon’s model 
provides a sweeping solution to organizing day laborers.  
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B. Filling the Structural Gaps Through Worker Centers  
With the decline of union participation and the limits of organizing under the 
NLRA, a strong “alt-labor” movement has developed in the United States, and its 
prominence is rising.140 This movement is significant for our analysis because alt-
labor arose as an alternative to the traditional US labor scheme that failed to provide 
adequate protections to undocumented workers.141 Within this movement, worker 
centers—small organizations working outside the NLRA to organize day laborers—
are considered the “new face” of labor organizing.142 These centers are day labor 
hiring sites run by non-profits and community organizations.143 Lawyers and 
community advocates work with day laborers and their employers to negotiate 
contracts and ensure workplace protections.144 The purpose of these centers is to 
provide a “safe place” for employers and day laborers to negotiate baseline work 
standards.145 As of 2013, there were 214 known worker centers in the United 
States.146  
Notably, worker centers are located directly in the communities where day 
laborers work to facilitate the bargaining process.147 Not only do these centers protect 
laborers’ workplace rights, but they also attempt to integrate day laborers into the 
broader community.148 CASA de Maryland, located just outside of D.C., has been 
especially successful on this front.149 The worker center’s organizing model extends 
beyond merely facilitating negotiations with employers to providing workers with 
English language classes and lessons on industry-specific skills.150 By providing 
educational, social, and cultural services, in addition to advocating for workplace 
rights, worker centers shed a light on laborers who most often work in the shadows 
of our communities.  
 In many ways, worker centers have been quite successful in providing 
protections for day laborers. By acting in a similar manner to union “hiring halls,” 
employers who want to hire day laborers will go to worker centers, where advocates 
bargain for fair wages and safety standards.151 By setting workplace baselines, 
worker centers ensure that day laborers receive some basic protections.152 Further, 
many worker centers provide legal services to laborers. In 2006, CASA de Maryland 
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149  Lydia DePillis, It’s Easy to Make Day Laborers’ Lives Better. Why Isn’t it Happening in Washington 
D.C.?, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014) (calling Casa de Maryland the “best example of a worker center”).  
150  Services, CASA DE MARYLAND, http://wearecasa.org/what-we-do/services/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).  
151  DePillis, supra note 149.  
152  Id.  
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recovered over $200,000 in back wages for day laborers.153  In light of the successes 
of groups such as CASA de Maryland, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
(“NDLON”) was established in 2001 as an umbrella group for worker centers and day 
laborer allies.154 Today, NDLON-member organizations undertake local and regional 
campaigns and promote legislative changes on behalf of day laborers.155 
 Despite the widespread success of worker centers and NDLON, these 
organizations face significant challenges. While the NLRA certainly provides 
obstacles to organizing day laborers, it also provides legitimacy. Once a union 
recognizes a group of workers, those workers are party to a collective bargaining 
agreement that employers and workers alike are required to negotiate periodically.156 
Alt-labor groups are potentially limited by this lack of collective bargaining rights.157 
Additionally, while unions are financially supported by their members, worker 
centers are supported by outside donors. They thus lack the same financial stability 
that comes with being in a union. And last, these centers face widespread backlash 
from communities and politicians. Communities often think that day labor, and 
worker centers by extension, brings crime into cities.158 Additionally, politicians and 
anti-labor groups have criticized worker centers as end-runs around the NLRA.159 
Groups like Worker Center Watch view worker centers as a tactic by “Big Labor” to 
circumvent legal restrictions placed on unions.160  
Despite these limitations, worker centers have been able to do what unions did 
with a traditional workforce, but have thus far been unable to do with day laborers. 
In other words, worker centers have protected workers by sitting down with 
employers and laborers and negotiating workplace terms. In this way, the worker 
center model, as a development outside the traditional union sphere, knocks down 
some of the structural barriers mentioned earlier. As noted, unions face structural 
barriers to organizing day laborers because of past anti-immigration perspectives, 
but more significantly, because of the temporary, informal nature of day labor work, 
                                                 
153  Wage Theft: How Maryland Fails to Protect the Rights of Low-Wage Workers, CASA DE MARYLAND 8 
(Jan. 2007), http://cdm.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/wagetheft.pdf.  
154  Our History, NAT’L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.org/en/about-us/our-history (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2016).  
155  See id.  
156  See Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations (last accessed Aug. 18, 2016).  
157  See Eidelson, supra note 27. However, it should also be noted that falling outside the NLRA is precisely 
one reason why worker centers have been so successful. See also Rosenfeld, supra note 148, at 509 
(noting that “no worker center wants to be labeled a labor organization under the NLRA, considering 
all the restrictions and obligations that would apply.”). 
158  Arturo Gonzalez, Day Labor in the Golden State, 3 CAL. ECON. Pol. 1, 12 (2007).   
159  See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, What You Should Know About Job Killing “Worker Centers,” REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS (2013), 
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/07/30/what_you_should_know_about_job_killing_worker
_centers_100510.html. 
160  These restrictions refer to financial reporting requirements under the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and picketing limitations under the NLRA (for instance, unions cannot 
picket “secondary”—those not directly responsible for alleged unfairness—employers, while non-union 
organizations can). See id.  
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and because undocumented workers might not join a union in the first place because 
doing so opens the door to employer retaliation and potential deportation.  
Worker centers have found ways around each of these barriers. First, because 
these centers were created with the needs of the most vulnerable workers in mind—
undocumented day laborers—past animus is not an obstacle to organizing. 
Additionally, because worker centers are typically located in the center of day labor-
heavy communities, they are not out of reach for transient, temporary workers. Often, 
these centers are located at informal sites, like strip malls.161 Thus, worker centers, 
which are small and localized, are visible to day laborers. Finally, worker centers 
promote solidarity among undocumented workers, giving them security despite their 
undocumented status. By providing not only workplace advocacy and direct legal 
services, but also other social services like language classes and job skills training,162 
worker centers create a supportive community for undocumented workers to find 
protection and assistance.  
Analyzing the worker center model illustrates how, in order to effectively 
organize day laborers, advocates have had to go outside of the traditional union model 
and labor law scheme, as did Gordon’s proposal for transnational labor citizenship. 
Worker centers work around barriers by providing an alternative to labor unions. 
This alternative takes the form of small groups of advocates who situate themselves 
among day laborers in order to provide them with representation. Ultimately, worker 
centers—despite their limits—found a way to knock down some of the most 
significant structural barriers that keep unions from reaching day laborers. The 
success of the worker center movement emphasizes the failures of our current labor 
system. Our current system, as it stands, cannot reach day laborers, because its rules 
and regulations do not comport to a globalized workforce and a changed workplace. 
The worker center movement, and the alt-labor movement as a whole, recognizes 
these limitations. By providing on-the-ground services to day laborers, alt-labor not 
only protects some of our nation’s most vulnerable workers, but also demonstrates 
the need for mainstream labor to adapt to changes spurred by globalization in order 
to effectively protect day laborers, and undocumented workers as a whole. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Under our existing labor scheme, the organization of day laborers by unions 
and under the NLRA is impossible because of the legal and structural barriers that 
stand in the way. First, legal barriers like definitional restrictions under the NLRA 
and the enforcement of strict immigration policy over workers’ rights prevent day 
laborers from receiving the labor protections the NLRA was created to provide. 
Further, structural barriers like the traditional hard-bordered union model and the 
nature of day labor itself make it unlikely that unions would be able to reach day 
laborers to organize them. Thankfully, proposals like transnational labor citizenship 
                                                 
161  See Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, ECON. POL. INST. 
(Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp159/ (noting the informal nature of worker centers).  
162  See CASA DE MARYLAND, supra note 150.  
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and worker centers exist to overcome the most significant of these barriers. But by 
analyzing these potential solutions, the gaps in our current labor policy are further 
illuminated, and it becomes clear that in order to organize day laborers, one must go 
outside the traditional US labor scheme. Perhaps the best and only solution is to 
revamp this labor scheme entirely.  
In order for our current labor scheme to protect day laborers, our governing 
laws and institutions must adapt to changes brought on by globalization. The current, 
global reality of our time involves a growing rise in the number of undocumented 
workers, coupled with the continued depletion of union membership. Despite these 
significant changes, the laws on the books for labor protections have not changed, 
even though these laws were created in the 1930s for an entirely different type of 
worker.163 However, the face of the domestic worker has evolved, and undocumented 
workers—including day laborers—now make up a significant portion of our 
workforce.164 Based on the analysis engaged in above, which attempts to identify the 
most significant barriers to organizing undocumented day laborers, it is clear that 
outmoded labor laws like the NLRA are not readily adaptable to this new, globalized 
workforce.  
Now that we know that barriers exist, and that groups have recognized these 
barriers and tried to work around them, the question becomes: What does the 
existence of these barriers say about our legal structures? Most notably, these 
barriers demonstrate that the result of not adapting to change is exclusion. Our laws 
and institutions do not effectively reach a workforce that did not exist at the time 
those laws and institutions were created. By failing to adapt to changes brought on 
by globalization, our labor law cannot be harnessed to protect vulnerable day 
laborers. Thus, those day laborers are excluded from the protections that labor laws 
provide. Moving forward, lawyers and policymakers will have to determine how 
legislation can be reformed to conform to the realities of a global workforce. For 
instance, scholars like Kati Griffith have argued that the first step toward securing 
workplace protections for undocumented workers is through immigration reform.165 
By incorporating undocumented workers into our legal system, as opposed to seeing 
them as illegal “outsiders,” perhaps such workers will become entitled to essential 
labor protections. If such policy changes can be made, unions could incorporate 
undocumented day laborers into their reaches and hold true to the battle cry that 
encapsulates the union experience: “solidarity forever.”166  
  
 
                                                 
163  Garcia, supra note 62, at 744. 
164  See Valenzuela et al., supra note 9, at i.  
165  Kati Griffith, Immigration Advocacy as Labor Advocacy, 33 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. 73, 77–78 (2012).  
166  RALPH CHAPLIN, SOLIDARITY FOREVER (The Little Red Songbook 1915).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While America’s dark history of institutionalized racism might seem like an 
ancient skeleton in a red, white, and blue painted closet, “extra-judicial killings by 
the police . . . now number more than . . . four times the number of people lynched or 
executed by capital punishment in the worst of years.”1 “No justice, no peace,”2 
reverberated throughout America in recent years as Trayvon Martin, Michael 
Brown, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, Samuel DuBose, Laquan 
McDonald, Alton Sterling, and Philando Castille were killed by the police, 
seemingly one after the next. But it’s not just an issue with police. There’s more to 
the story. The first thing Lesley McSpadden, Michael Brown’s mother, said to the 
media as she stood next to where her deceased son’s body laid for hours was, “You 
took my son away from me. Do you know how hard it was for me to get him to stay 
in school and graduate? You know how many black men graduate? Not many!”3 
According to the Shriver Center, “The killing of racial minorities by police is but one 
violent example of racial injustice. But there are thousands of other examples of 
racial injustice that slowly and systemically deprive racial minorities of their rights, 
their opportunity, and of their belief in a free and just society.”4 The systemic 
deprivation of minority opportunity and rights begins with America’s school system. 
Much of the nation was outraged when police arrested Texas ninth grader 
Ahmed Mohamed in September 2015 for bringing a homemade clock to school that 
                                                        
* Symposium Editor, Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, Volume 5; Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law, May 2017; University of Miami M.S.Ed. 2013; Purdue University B.A. 2011. I would like 
to thank Professor Deborah Widiss for her guidance, thoughtful comments, and, most importantly, for 
inspiring women at Maurer to use their voices for social change. This Note is dedicated to my former 
first grade students. You taught me so much, and it was a privilege to be your teacher. 
1  Jerome Karabel, Police Killings Surpass the Worst Years of Lynching, Capital Punishment, and a 
Movement Responds, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2015, 8:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-
karabel/police-killings-lynchings-capital-punishment_b_8462778.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2016). 
2  Steve Mazie, What does “No Justice, No Peace” Really Mean?, THINKBIG.COM, 
http://bigthink.com/praxis/what-does-no-justice-no-peace-really-mean (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
3  This American Life: The Problem We All Live With, CHI. PUB. RADIO (July 31, 2015), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/transcript.  
4  John Bouman, To End Poverty, We Must Address Racial Justice, SHRIVER CTR, (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@shrivercenter/3681a2e8603d#.7sbra4qnz.  
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was mistaken for a bomb.5 “#IStandWithAhmed” was mentioned on Twitter 209,000 
times, and Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Mark Zuckerberg, and Shonda Rhimes 
were just a few of the high-status individuals who joined the Twitter crusade in 
expressing their support for the innovative teen.6 More recently, a White school 
resource officer, Ben Fields, was captured on video grabbing a Black student by the 
neck and throwing her across a classroom after she refused to leave class for having 
her cell phone out.7 The footage of the incident was viewed well over one million 
times.8 While headline spectacles such as Mohamed’s arrest and the South Carolina 
teen’s school confrontation raise questions of overt discrimination and often rally 
national attention, there is a more subtle form of racial discrimination in school 
discipline that is steadily building traction: the disproportionate discipline of 
minority students.  
The disproportionate discipline of minority students, in particular black 
students, is a real problem that plays out for millions of kids and families each year. 
Tunette Powell’s four-year-old son, J.J., was suspended from preschool three times.9 
While J.J. was suspended for acts such as “pushing a chair,”10 the White students at 
the school experienced less serious punishments for more serious offenses.11 Stories 
like that of Tunette Powell are beginning to make their way into the headlines, and 
as a result, disproportionate discipline is amassing attention.  
School districts, legislators, education scholars, and the Obama 
Administration are plunging headfirst into the fight against disproportionate 
discipline within K-12 schools, making disproportionate discipline a hot topic in the 
education and school law world today. Numerous school districts across the county 
are modifying their discipline policies to curtail the use of suspensions and 
                                                        
5  Editorial, Ahmed Mohamed and the Absurdities of Zero Tolerance, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/09/21/ahmed-mohamed-and-absurdities-zero-
tolerance/f5fKSCpxSYWTwKAkKUMOtL/story.html. 
6  Jessica Durando, #IStandWithAhmed Takes Twitter by Storm, USA TODAY, (Sept. 16, 2015, 3:08 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/09/16/hillary-clinton-tweets-support-ahmed-
mohamed/32497949/.  
7  Richard Fausset & Ashley Southall, Video Shows Officer Flipping Student in South Carolina, 
Prompting Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/us/officers-
classroom-fight-with-student-is-caught-on-video.html.  
8  See results for search of “South Carolina School Police Officer,” YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=south+carolina+school+police+officerhttps://www.youtu
be.com/results?search_query=south+carolina+school+police+officer+ (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).  
9  Tunette Powell, My Son Has Been Suspended Five Times. He’s 3., WASH. POST (July 24, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/24/my-son-has-been-suspended-five-times-
hes-3/.  
10  This American Life: Is This Working?, CHI. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/538/transcript.  
11  See id. (“And they said, they suspend kids? They were shocked. And I said, absolutely. I said, he's been 
suspended, and I started telling them all the things that he had done. And then one parent's like, I 
wonder why my kid hasn't been suspended. And I'm like, hm? What? So then she says, well, my son, he 
hit this kid on purpose, and they had to rush that kid to the hospital, and all I got was a phone call. 
And I was like, hm. And one after another, they kept telling me different stuff—my kid did this, my kid 
did that, my kid bit somebody, my kid—all these things. And my kids, they're all the same age, all the 
same class. And only JJ had been sent home. So I was like, what is going on? That's when I thought to 
myself, something is not right.”). 
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expulsions in their arsenal of student discipline tools,12 often in conjunction with 
new legislation.13 Some school administrations and an overwhelming number of 
advocacy groups are calling for suspension and expulsion freezes altogether, no 
matter how serious the infraction.14 The discussion on disproportionate discipline is 
not limited to the K-12 education community. Today, psychology and sociology 
scholars frequently write about the unintended sociological and psychological effects 
of disproportionate suspension and expulsion rates for minority students, as well as 
the ineffectiveness of suspensions as a deterrent in general. 15  Legal scholars 
examine potential legal protections—or lack thereof—through disparate impact 
analysis.16 A Department of Education “Dear Colleague” letter pinpoints the legal 
ramifications for disproportionate discipline within schools.17 President Obama even 
directed the Department of Justice Office of Civil Rights to put greater resources 
into investigating “education-related civil rights issues,” which has resulted in the 
                                                        
12  Schools are adopting updates to their codes of conduct to “reduce over-reliance on suspensions.” See 
Bethany Bump, Capital Region Schools Evolve Thinking on Suspensions, TIMES UNION (Oct. 25, 2015, 
10:35 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/Capital-Region-schools-evolve-thinking-on-
6589917.php. The Department of Justice has even played a part in the re-vamping of school discipline 
codes; it worked with Baltimore schools to modify Baltimore Public Schools’ discipline code in 2008. 
Nadra Kareem Nittle, U.S. Department of Education Investigating Record Number of Civil Rights 
Complaints, AMERICA’S WIRE, http://americaswire.org/drupal7/?q=content/us-department-education-
investigating-record-number-civil-rights-complaints (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). Additionally, over 
18,000 k-12 schools are attempting to curtail suspension and expulsion rates by implementing positive 
behavior intervention supports (PBIS), and many are developing elaborate restorative justice 
programs. Jeffrey Sprague & C. Michael Nelson, School-Wide Positive Behavior Interventions and 
Supports and Restorative Discipline in Schools, U. OF OR. 3–4 (2012), 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/ivdb/documents/ RJ and PBIS Monograph for OSEP 10.11.12.pdf. 
13  In 2015, Chicago passed SB 100—a state law that, among other things, prohibits schools in Illinois 
from using zero tolerance policies and only allows suspensions over three days in certain contexts. See 
Pub. Act. No. 099-0456 (2015) (codified as amended at 105 ILCS §§ 5/10-20.14, 5/10-22.6 (2015)); see 
also Bump, supra note 12. In 2015, New York assemblywoman Catherine Nolan proposed the Safe and 
Supportive School Bill in front the New York General Assembly. The Bill would “put an end to 
indiscriminate suspensions at public schools across the state” by prohibiting teachers from making a 
student leave the classroom for behaviors such as “tardiness, inappropriate language or dress code 
violations.” Id. 
14  See John O’Connor, Miami-Dade Schools Eliminating Out-of-School Suspensions, STATEIMPACT (July 
29, 2015), https://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2015/07/29/miami-dade-schools-eliminating-out-of-school-
suspensions/ (noting that Miami-Dade County Public Schools included $3.2 million in their 2015-2016 
school budget to eliminate out of school suspensions entirely). See also Dylan Thomas, Superintendent 
Aims to Eliminate Suspension Disparities by 2018, SW. J. (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.southwestjournal.com/news/schools/superintendent-aims-to-eliminate-suspensions-
disparities-by-2018 (noting that Minneapolis Public Schools implemented a “moratorium on all 
suspensions of the district’s youngest students, those in grades Pre-K–1.”).  
15  See generally Brea L. Perry & Edward M. Morris, Suspending Progress: Collateral Consequences of 
Exclusionary Punishment in Public Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1067 (2014) (discussing the negative 
impact of suspensions on students’ reading and math improvement.).  
16 See Zachary W. Best, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track: Title VI and a New Approach to 
Disparate Impact Analysis in Public Education, 99 GEO. L.J. 1671, 1672–74 (2011). See generally 
Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes & Kevin Brown, African American Disproportionality in School 
Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071 (2009) 
(discussing potential legal avenues for disproportionate discipline claims). 
17  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON THE NONDISCRIMINATORY 
ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 6–13 (2014).  
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investigation of a record number of disproportionate discipline claims in the past 
few years.18 The conversation surrounding disproportionate discipline is flourishing. 
However, there is a gaping hole in the literature and an invaluable 
perspective left out of an important narrative that renders the disproportionate 
discipline conversation incomplete. It is true that the disproportionate suspensions 
and expulsions of minority students can have the unintended consequences of 
depleting a student’s sense of school belonging, causing underperformance in 
academics, and increasing likelihood of juvenile delinquency. 19  Nevertheless, 
disproportionate discipline also has grave unintended consequences on the family,20 
which have not yet been fully explored.   
When a student is suspended for fewer than ten days, constitutional due 
process merely entitles a student to informal notice and an opportunity to explain 
oneself prior to being suspended.21 The Supreme Court came to this conclusion in 
Goss v. Lopez22 by weighing the school’s interest in efficiency against the child’s loss 
of fewer than ten days of education.23 As a result of the Court’s 1975 ruling, a 
standard narrative generally unfolds when a student is issued a short-term 
suspension.24 Typically, a child is first sent to the principal’s office for disrupting 
the class, in some form or another. The principal next explains to the child what he 
or she is in trouble for (notice) and asks whether the child has anything to say about 
the matter (opportunity to explain oneself). Ultimately, the principal calls the 
child’s parent to inform her that she must come pick the child up for the resulting 
suspension. Clearly, this practice has profound implications for not just the child, 
but also for the child’s family.  
Families headed by low-income minority single mothers, by the nature of 
disproportionate discipline, are the families who are most greatly affected by the 
unequal distribution of suspensions and expulsions of minority students. Because 
low-wage minority single mothers experience inflexibility in the work place, 
overwork due to the necessity to hold multiple jobs, lack of child-care options, 
limited resources, and single-motherhood, these women are arguably the least 
                                                        
18  Nadra Kareem Nittle, U.S. Department of Education Investigating Record Number of Civil Rights 
Complaints, AMERICA’S WIRE, http://americaswire.org/drupal7/?q=content/us-department-education-
investigating-record-number-civil-rights-complaints (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).  
19  See Anne Gregory, et al., The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 
39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 59, 60–61 (2010), http://www.indiana.edu/~equity/docs/Gregory%20et%20al% 
202010.pdf.  
20  It is important to note that other scholars have acknowledged that disproportionate discipline has the 
unintended consequence of affecting families; however, scholars have not explored the full effects of 
disproportionate discipline, demographics of what families it most greatly affects, and possible 
solutions. See Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1079 (citing Am. Psychol. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, 
Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 852, 860 (2008)). Although Skiba’s article pertains to zero-tolerance policies, the authors refer 
to zero-tolerance policies in the context of suspensions. 
21  See infra Part I.B.  
22  419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
23  See infra Part I.B.  
24  See infra Part I.B. 
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equipped to deal with their children being suspended on a whim;25 however, the 
nature of disproportionate discipline tells us that low-wage minority single mothers 
are the parents who are most greatly affected. Existing protections that provide 
limited workplace flexibility, such as the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), are 
only applicable in medical-related emergencies.26 Low-wage workers who leave their 
jobs last minute are at an extremely high risk of losing their jobs.27 Due to higher 
suspension rates for minority students, minority students are not only losing out on 
education time, but their families might possibly be losing their livelihoods.28  
This Note argues that disproportionate discipline’s effect on families, 
particularly low-income single minority mothers, is an additional consideration that 
deserves more weight in thinking about suspension policies within schools. This 
argument does not seek to minimize the importance of the effect of suspensions on 
students themselves. Rather, it proposes that considering the additional effect of 
disproportionate discipline on families might bolster support for legislative 
proposals that seek to constrain suspensions. Part I of this Note lays the factual 
background for disproportionate discipline and addresses current due process 
requirements for short-term suspensions. Part II explains how current notions of 
due process for short-term suspensions are inconsistent with current workplace 
norms and policies, especially for families headed by minority low-income single 
mothers. Part III addresses possible non-solutions and solutions. This Note 
ultimately proposes that considering the disproportionate effect of suspensions on 
low-income families could provide additional support for lobbyists and advocacy 
groups to push legislation that centers on the reduction of out of school suspensions 
as a discipline norm within the education realm. 
 
I. LAYING THE LANDSCAPE FOR DISPROPORTIONATE DISCIPLINE  
 
A. What is Disproportionate Discipline? 
The disproportionate discipline of minority students is not a new 
phenomenon;29 however, the disproportionate use of exclusionary practices such as 
suspensions for minority students is relatively recent. Historically, corporal 
punishment was the dominant form of discipline within schools until the late 
1960s.30 Today, the era of corporal punishment has nearly come to an end.31 As 
                                                        
25  See infra Part II. 
26  See infra Part II.A.i. 
27  See infra Part II. 
28  Id. 
29  SEE RUSSELL J. SKIBA, ROBERT S. MICHAEL, ABRA CARROLL NARDO & REECE PETERSON., POLICY RESEARCH 
REPORT #SRS1: THE COLOR OF DISCIPLINE: SOURCES OF RACIAL AND GENDER DISPROPORTIONALITY IN 
SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 3–4 (2000) (highlighting early studies done on minority disproportionality in office 
referral, suspensions, and expulsions).  
30  Skiba et. al., supra note 16, at 1073. 
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physical force as a means of a bad behavior deterrent amasses more and more 
negative stigma,32 out of school suspensions are the most prevalently used student 
discipline tool.33 It is estimated that during the 2009–10 school year, over two 
million students were suspended in middle and high school alone; a majority of 
these suspensions were for minor infractions of school rules.34  
Today, the term “disproportionate discipline,” also referred to as the 
“discipline gap,”35 generally refers to the overrepresentation of minority students 
receiving “differential administration of exclusionary and punitive discipline.”36 The 
differential administration of punitive discipline can take place at either the 
classroom level or the administrative level. Research shows that, at the classroom 
level, educators make more frequent initial referrals for minority students for less 
serious disciplinary infractions, which commonly result in suspensions. 37  Once 
referred to the administrative level, Black students are three times more likely to 
be suspended than White students, as 16.4% of Black students are suspended 
compared to 4.6% of White students.38  It is also noteworthy that over seventy 
percent of resulting school-related law enforcement referrals and arrests involved 
Black and Hispanic students. 39  Some geographic-specific figures are even more 
                                                        
31  See ELIZABETH T. GERSHOFF ET AL., CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2015) 
(pointing out that the most recent OCR data shows .5% of students received corporal punishment in the 
2009-2010 school year). 
32  Public instances such as that of Vikings running back Adrian Peterson and surrounding debates clearly 
err on the side of eliminating or not utilizing existing corporal punishment statutes in the existing 
nineteen states that still legally allow corporal punishment. Valerie Strauss, 19 States Still Allow 
Corporal Punishment in School, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/18/19-states-still-allow-corporal-
punishment-in-school; See also DeNeen L. Brown, A Good Whuppin’? Adrian Peterson Child Abuse Case 
Revives Debate, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-
people/wp/2014/09/13/a-good-whuppin-adrian-peterson-child-abuse-case-raises-old-debate/. The arrest 
of a Floridian pastor for spanking a child for refusal to eat a strawberry further contributes to the 
revival of the age-old debate of whether or not spanking is an effective method for punishing a child or 
constitutes child abuse. Numerous groups, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, came out 
earlier this year to declare their stance against corporal punishment because of its proven link to 
mental illness. Id.  
33  Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1073.  
34  DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE 
OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS 1 (2013), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED541735.pdf.  
35  See Anne Gregory et al., The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 39 
EDUC. RESEARCHER 59 (2010) (discussing how disproportionate discipline of minority student 
contributes to the academic achievement gap and thus becomes a “discipline gap”). 
36  Brenda L. Townsend, The Disproportionate Discipline of African American Learners: Reducing School 
Suspensions and Expulsions, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 381, 381 (2000).  
37  SKIBA ET AL., supra note 29, at 16. 
38  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION ISSUE BRIEF #1, at 3 (Mar. 
2014), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rulesforengagement/CRDC%20School%20Discipline%20Snapshot.pdf.  
39  Tom Rudd, Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline: Implicit Bias is Heavily Implicated, KIRWAN 
INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2014, at 1 http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/racial-
disproportionality-schools-02.pdf. It is important to note that schools’ over-referral of black students to 
law enforcement is a whole separate issue that deserves equal attention and is commonly referred to as 
the “school-to-prison pipeline.” MADELEINE COUSINEAU, INSTITITIONAL RACISM AND THE SCHOOL-TO-
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alarming. For example, Black students make up thirty-seven percent of the K-12 
student body in Georgia but sixty-seven percent of all suspensions40 and are five 
times more likely to be suspended than White students in the South. 41  The 
overrepresentation of minority students in exclusionary discipline practices is not 
limited to the sphere of K-12 education. Even the nation’s Black preschoolers—a 
group of children who are arguably not even developmentally capable of 
comprehending exclusionary discipline practices42—experience discipline at a rate 
greater than their white-peer counterparts. Black children comprise eighteen 
percent of preschool enrollment yet make up nearly half of all preschoolers receiving 
more than one out of school suspension.43 Given these statistics, it makes logical 
sense to wonder, are black students disproportionately disciplined because their 
behavior actually is more suspension-worthy? If this were the case, higher 
suspension rates for minority students would not reflect racial bias—whether overt 
or implicit. Instead, disproportionate suspension rates would be “a relatively 
appropriate response to disproportionate behavior.” 44  Studies show that actual 
misbehaviors of minority students do not account for racial disparities in school 
discipline. 45  To the contrary, most suspensions result from small instances of 
misbehavior, such as failure to wear a school uniform or refusal to take off a hat.46 
Regardless of the underlying causes of the disproportionate discipline of 
minority students—as there are numerous interconnected ideas that attempt to 
explain the “why” of disproportionate discipline— 47  the uneven distribution of 
suspension amongst racial groups in schools around the country has severe costs for 
minority students and society as a whole. In a study of one million students in 
                                                        
PRISON PIPELINE,(Paper Submitted for the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Ass’n) 
(2010), http://www.suspensionstories.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/racism-and-stpp.pdf. However, 
the focus of this paper is on preventing short-term suspensions, which is only one component of three 
needing reform in order to fully address the school to prison pipeline. Id. at 4. 
40  Edward J. Smith & Shaun R. Harper, Table on Disproportionate Impact of K-12 School Suspension and 
Expulsion on Black Students in Southern States, PENN GSE, 
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/GSE_HarprSspnsnInfo_R5.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2014). 
41  EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, 
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN 
SOUTHERN STATES 1 (2015), 
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.pd
f.  
42  See Donna St. George, Suspended from School in Early Grades, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/suspended-from-school-in-early-
grades/2012/02/02/gIQA3H0X9Q_story.html. (“[S]uspension is at odds with teaching the social and 
behavioral skills many young students lack. ‘We would never send a child home because that child was 
struggling at reading,’ he said. ‘We would never send a child home if that child was struggling with 
math. Why would we send a child home for struggling with social-emotional skills?’”).  
43  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 1.  
44  SKIBA, supra note 29, at 5.  
45  Id. at 6.  
46  Of the 710,000 suspensions in California schools during the 2011–12 school year, 48% of suspensions 
were for “willful defiance,” which included instances such as failing to wear a school uniform and 
refusal to take off a hat. Rudd, supra note 39, at 4. 
47  See Townsend, supra note 36, at 383–84.  
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Texas, thirty-one percent of students who were suspended or expelled were held 
back a grade at least once, ten percent of students who were suspended between 
seventh and twelfth grade dropped out of school altogether, and half of the students 
who were disciplined over eleven times entered the juvenile justice system the 
following year.48 Pedro Noguera, a leading scholar in the field of disproportionate 
discipline, sums up the concern of the affects of suspensions: “There’s this 
assumption that, if we get rid of the bad people, that the good people will be able to 
learn, the good people will be safe. What we continue to ignore is that we are 
producing the bad people. We’re producing in school the bad behavior.”49 
 
B. Current Due Process Requirements for Short-Term Suspensions 
There is no denying the fact that the disparate disciplining of Black students 
occurs every day in schools around the country, but it is important to consider what 
series of actions lead up to the issuance of a suspension. Even in a short chain of 
events, there is an important stage in the suspension process that is often 
overlooked: the period between the initial discipline referral of a student and the 
resulting suspension. Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, an 
individual has a substantive right to certain constitutionally protected liberties that 
cannot be abridged without substantial justification.50 In addition to substantive 
rights, an individual also has the procedural right to not be deprived “of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”51 It is well established under the theory of 
in loco parentis and related case law that schools generally have blanket authority 
to discipline students.52 This includes the authority to use suspension and expulsion 
as discipline tools.53 Thus, a student’s substantive rights in the realm of school 
discipline are, at most, extremely minimal and, at minimum, nonexistent. 
Procedural due process rights, on the other hand, are guaranteed to all students 
prior to being subject to certain disciplinary measures in order to ensure fairness 
and impartial treatment for students.54  
                                                        
48  TONY FABELO,  MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE CARMICHAEL, MINER P. MARCHBANKS III 
& ERIC A. BOOTH,  COUNCIL  OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER & PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO 
STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT xi-xii (2011), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Final.pdf. This was a groundbreaking, 
statewide study done in Texas, whereby all Texas seventh grade students’ school records were tracked 
for six years and then compared to their matching juvenile records. Id. at 6. 
49  This American Life: Is This Working?, CHI. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/538/transcript.  
50  Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Suspension and Expulsion in America’s Public Schools: Has 
Unfairness Resulted from a Narrowing of Due Process?, 13 HAMLINE J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1992).  
51  U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.  
52  Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1072–73. See also Daniel & Bond Coriell, supra note 50, at 6 (discussing 
the court’s general deference to school authority based on the school’s legitimate state interest in 
maintaining order and discipline).  
53  Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1072–73. 
54  Daniel & Bond Coriell, supra note 50, at 7. 
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There are generally two different procedural due process standards; both 
were concurrently established by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1975 case, 
Goss v. Lopez.55  This Note focuses on due process for “short-term” suspensions 
because an overwhelming majority of suspensions in schools today are less than ten 
days.56 In the Goss analysis, which is still applicable today, the Court first asked 
whether a student’s liberty or property interest were at stake.57 Because suspension 
implicated the student’s statutorily created property interest in an education58 and 
liberty interest in sustaining “a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity,”59  the students were entitled to constitutional due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.60 More importantly for the purpose of this Note’s analysis: 
once the Goss court decided that suspension did indeed trigger procedural due 
process protection, it set forth how much due process students are entitled to.61  
Because “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands,” 62  the amount of process afforded to each 
claimant can range from formal to informal procedural rights. Courts traditionally 
use the factors-based test established in Mathews v. Eldridge63 to determine the 
exact “amount” of due process an individual is entitled to.64 Under this test, all 
courts consider: (1) the private interests that will be affected by the government 
action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest and probable value of 
additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the 
administrative burden and the suitability of the case for trial-like procedures.65 
“Amount” of due process means more than meets the eye. The right to an 
evidentiary hearing, right to notice, right to have an attorney present, and right to 
cross-examine witnesses, among others, are what typically come to mind when 
thinking of procedural due process protections.  
Importantly, however, courts also have discretion in regard to the timing of 
when a claimant can access procedural due process rights under the Mathews test.66 
                                                        
55  419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
56  The Goss standard for suspensions has been codified by most states today. A majority of states consider 
any suspensions over ten days to be expulsions. See IND. CODE § 20-33-8-3(a)(1) (2015) (In Indiana, 
“‘expulsion’ means a disciplinary or other action whereby a student: (1) is separated from school 
attendance for a period exceeding ten (10) school days.”). 
57  See also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (establishing that the first step in 
the legal analysis in determining whether due process is triggered after adverse state action is to 
determine whether an individual has a protected liberty or property interest, and further shifted away 
from the rights/privilege distinction previously used to trigger due process).  
58  Goss, 419 U.S. at 573.  
59  Id. at 574 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).  
60  Id. at 576. 
61  Id. at  577–79  (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
62  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481(1972)).   
63  Id. at 334–35. 
64  See Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test: Time for a New Due 
Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 287 (2008).  
65  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
66  For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court determined that a welfare recipient’s interest in continued 
benefits entitled him to a pre-termination hearing before the benefits (a property right) could be taken 
away, because the recipient’s interest of uninterrupted financial assistance needed to survive 
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In the context of suspensions, the Goss v. Lopez Court weighed the nature of the 
competing interests involved and found that a school’s interest in efficiency67 and 
maintaining order 68  outweighed the child’s interest in avoiding the “unfair or 
mistaken exclusion from the educational process” for less than ten days of school.69 
As a result, the Court found that suspensions for less than ten days merely required 
oral or written notice and “some kind of hearing” prior to a suspension.70 This is still 
the due process standard for suspensions today. No time must pass between when 
“oral notice” is given and the time of the “hearing,”71 and the situation typically 
plays out in the following way: an administrator tells the student what he or she 
has done wrong, and the student is “given an opportunity to explain his version of 
the facts.”72 The Goss Court acknowledged that “in unusual situations, although 
involving only a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary 
procedures will be required;”73 however, courts today rarely, if ever, allow for more 
formal due process procedures under this exception.74 The Court also recognized 
that the due process requirements it imposed for suspensions are “less than a fair-
minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair 
suspensions.”75 Still, most school suspension policies are modeled after the minimal 
requirements laid forth in Goss v. Lopez. After the student is given oral notice and 
an opportunity to explain his or herself, the parent is called to come pick the child 
up from school before the end of the school day. Rarely, if ever, does a child’s 
explanation change an administrator’s decision to suspend.  
                                                        
outweighed the government burden of efficiency. 397 U.S. 254, 264–66 (1970). Conversely, the Mathews 
v. Eldridge Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not procedurally required before a person’s 
disability benefits can be terminated. 424 U.S. at 349 (holding no pre-termination hearing was required 
because the significance of the financial burden of a trial outweighed the claimant’s interest of 
continued benefits a pre-termination hearing). It is important to note that at the time of Goss v. Lopez, 
the Court was still relying on a similar, yet less formal, balancing test set forth in Cafeteria Workers v. 
McElroy. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of 
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.”). 
67  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (emphasizing that the formalization of due process rights for suspensions 
“[M]ight well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more 
than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process 
and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular 
disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”). 
68  Id. at 580 (“Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to be 
performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, 
effective action. Suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a 
valuable educational device.”). 
69  Id. at 579.  
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 582. 
72  Id.  
73  Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. 
74  See Paredes v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that drug charges resulting in a ten-day 
suspension did not constitute an “unusual situation”); see also Lamb v. Panhandle Cmty. Unit Sch. 
Dist., 826 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a suspension at the end of the school year that 
prohibited the student from taking final exams and graduating was not an “unusual situation” that 
necessitated additional due process rights than laid out in Goss v. Lopez.).  
75  Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. 
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Because some school districts are sanctioned for issuing over a certain 
number of suspensions, schools, in practice, also issue “undocumented 
suspensions.”76 Undocumented suspensions informally require parents to come pick 
their children up from school early without classifying the incident as a 
“suspension.” In those instances, no procedural due process rights attach.77 Whether 
short-term or undocumented, all forms of suspension have profound implications for 
families because of the non-existent notice required under current due process 
standards.  
 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUSPENSIONS AND THE CURRENT JOB-PLACE REALITY  
 
A. The Families Most Affected by Disproportionate Discipline 
Although there are other family populations whom disproportionate 
discipline also affects, the focus of this Note is the effect of suspensions as a 
discipline tool on low-income, single, Black mothers. Based on the nature of 
disproportionate discipline and the student population it affects, the large 
percentage of single, Black mothers in the United States and statistics that show 
more mothers are working today than ever before, this Note makes the assumption 
that single Black mothers are most greatly affected by disproportionate discipline.  
Non-Black minority students, and as a result, their families, are not as 
greatly affected by disproportionate discipline as Black students. Black students 
represent sixteen percent of the school-age population but thirty-three percent of 
out of school suspensions. 78  They also represent forty-two percent of students 
receiving more than one out of school suspension.79 Conversely, Hispanic/Latino 
students make up twenty-four percent of school-age population but only twenty-
three percent of out of school suspensions;80 they also represent only twenty-one 
percent of students receiving more than one out of school suspension.81 Similarly, 
Asian students make up five percent of the school-age population but represent only 
two percent of all out of school suspensions.82 
                                                        
76  Discipline, MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR FAMILIES, 
http://www.michiganallianceforfamilies.org/education/discipline/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
77  See Parents and Students Applaud San Francisco School Plan to Eliminate Suspension Gap for 
Students of Color, Press Release, PUBLIC COUNSEL, (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.publiccounsel.org/press_releases?id=0076. It is noteworthy that some school districts, such 
as San Francisco, are taking active steps to eliminate “undocumented suspensions” by acknowledging 
their unlawfulness and requiring data collection and reporting for all “permits to leave.” S.F. UNIFIED 
SCH. DIST. BD. OF ED., RESOL. NO. 1312-10A4, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SAFE AND SUPPORTIVE SCHOOLS 
POLICY IN THE SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 6 (Feb. 25, 2014).  
 
78  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 2. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id.  
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It is clear that Black students, and therefore Black families, more frequently 
experience suspensions, but a closer look at the average composition of the Black 
family today reveals why higher suspension rates are so devastating. Statistics 
show that an overwhelming majority of children born to black mothers are born out 
of wedlock.83 In 2010, seventy-three percent of all non-Hispanic Black births were to 
unmarried women.84  In comparison, the out of wedlock birth rate is fifty-three 
percent for Hispanic and twenty-nine percent for non-Hispanic White births.85 It is 
important to acknowledge that fifty-eight percent of the non-Hispanic Black women 
who gave birth outside marriage were in cohabitating relationships;86 however, one 
study showed that these relationships typically do not last until the child reaches 
school-age.87 Even though 63.27% of unwed Black mothers believed “there [was] a 
pretty good or almost certain chance” that they would eventually marry their 
cohabitating partner, 88  only 16% of women in cohabitating relationships were 
married to the father of their child five years after the baby’s birth; only 26% of 
couples were still cohabitating. 89  Given that most school-aged children begin 
kindergarten around the age of five, seventy-four percent of the Black mothers 
giving birth out of wedlock are truly “single mothers” when their children enter the 
education system.90 Even those women that are married might be raising their 
children alone. In 2007, U.S. prisons held 744,200 fathers of 1,559,200 children, 
nearly half of whom were Black children.91   
The idea that Black, low-income single mothers are more greatly affected by 
suspensions only stands true if these mothers are active participants in the 
workforce. While some scholars are quick to point out that twenty-seven percent of 
poor single mothers do not work,92 seventy-three percent of poor, single mothers are 
in the labor force. Women are also the “sole or primary breadwinners in forty 
percent of households with children.”93 Images of the stereotypical “welfare queen,” 
regardless of whether this typecast was ever accurate, is certainly inaccurate today. 
The 1996 welfare reform requires most women to work to receive Temporary Aid to 
                                                        
83  See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., Births: Final Data for 2010, in 61 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 1, 8 
(2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_01.pdf.  
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id.  
87  CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING, FRAGILE FAMILIES RESEARCH BRIEF: PARENTS’ 
RELATIONSHIP STATUS FIVE YEARS AFTER A NON-MARITAL BIRTH 1 (Princeton Univ. 2007), 
http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/briefs/ResearchBrief39.pdf.  
88  SOMA ROY ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY DATASET 3510 (Accessed Nov. 10, 
2015),10, 2015), https://www.amstat.org/sections/srms/proceedings/y2005/Files/JSM2005-000701.pdf.  
89  CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING, supra note 87. 
90  See id.  
91  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR 
MINOR CHILDREN 2 (2008).  
92  JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT 6 (Ctr. for Am. 
Progress 2010). 
93  Claire Caine Miller, The Motherhood Penalty vs. the Fatherhood Bonus: A Child Helps Your Career, if 
Your’re a Man, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/a-child-helps-
your-career-if-youre-a-man.html?_r=0.  
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Needy Families (TANF) benefits, 94  as well as limits the number of years an 
individual can receive TANF benefits to five years.95 The full-time employment of 
mothers with children under age eighteen increased from nineteen percent to fifty-
seven percent between 1965 and 2000,96 arguably, in part, as a result of the need for 
low-income women to work to receive TANF benefits and support their families at 
the end of the five-year period. 
B. The danger of suspensions for low-income workers 
Given that 1.2 million Black students were suspended in 2014,97 there is a 
constant possibility that a school administrator could call a working mother and 
inform her that her child was suspended and in need of being picked up from school. 
A majority of Black mothers of school-aged children are raising their children 
without a partner, immersed in the workforce, and still low-income;98 this trifecta 
makes current suspension practices particularly dangerous to low-income single 
Black mothers. Current procedural due process requirements for short-term 
suspensions are misaligned with the job-place reality for low-income parents 
generally, but particularly for single, Black mothers.99 Job inflexibility, high costs of 
childcare, gender expectations, and extremely limited workplace policy protections 
make leaving a job in the middle of the day to pick up a suspended child a risk to 
the wellbeing of the entire family. To illustrate: Rajuawn Thompkins’ four-year-old 
son was suspended from Imagine Hope Community Charter School in Washington 
D.C. for “kicking off his shoes and crying in frustration.”100 As a result of her son’s 
frequent formal suspensions, coupled with additional “undocumented suspensions,” 
Thompkins lost her job.101    
There are a multitude of workplace-related factors that make the way 
current suspension practices operate highly problematic for mothers such as 
Thompkins.  
 
 
                                                        
94  TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) benefits are also known more generally as welfare 
and were part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA); 
PRWORA “ended entitlement to welfare benefits” under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Act. Hope Corman et al., Effects of welfare reform on women’s crime, 40 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 1 (2014).   
95  Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 Berkeley J. of Emp. & Lab. L. 
1, 54 (2007).  
96  Suzanne M. Bianchi, Family Change and Time Allocation in American Families, in CONTEMPORARY 
FAMILY LAW 207 (Thomas Reuters 3rd ed. 2012) (2006). 
97  SMITH & HARPER, supra note 41. This figure does not even take into account the number of preschoolers 
suspended. See id.  
98  See discussion supra, Part II.A. 
99  See also STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, POOR, PREGNANT, AND FIRED: CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LOW-
WAGE WORKERS 17 (U.C. Hastings Center for WorkLife Law, 2011) (“[T]he daily responsibilities of 
caring for young children, aging parents, or ill spouses continue to conflict with the way in which low-
wage jobs in the United States are currently structured.”).  
100  St. George, supra note 42.  
101  Id.  
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i. Job Inflexibility 
 
 Low-wage workers experience a “lack of even minimal [job] flexibility”102 and 
have extremely limited workplace protections. Low-wage workers are less likely to 
have employer-provided benefits, more likely to be subject to mandatory overtime, 
and rarely have access to paid time off.103 Only thirty-nine percent of low-wage 
workers report that their employers allow for some type of paid time off (“PTO”) for 
personal illness; in comparison, over seventy-nine percent of mid and high-wage 
employees report access to sick-leave related PTO.104 As a result, over fifty-nine 
million workers in the U.S. have no sick leave coverage, and over eighty-six million 
workers do not have paid sick leave to care for sick children.105 Even if a worker did 
have access to sick leave, it might not be usable. Most employers require employees 
give advanced notice to take time off, and existing laws that require employers to 
provide sick leave only apply to limited groups of employees.106 Additionally, many 
low-wage jobs require workers to abide by strictly enforced attendance policies and 
unyielding schedules that “penalize workers for justifiable absences, for being 
minutes late, or even for assumption of future absences—for example, the 
stereotype that a single mother will be ‘unreliable.’”107 Low-wage workers are also 
punished for not fulfilling mandatory overtime requirements, even if such 
assignments are given without notice.108 Under no-fault attendance policies, women 
who are late or miss work, regardless of the reason, are subject to a strike system. 
Strikes for late arrival often collectively add up and result in termination. The U.C. 
Hastings Center for Worklife Progress recounts the story of Tameeka, a single low-
income mother who was demoted from her training supervisor job in spite of twelve 
out of thirteen positive evaluations during her six-month probationary period.109 
Tameeka was working the midnight shift when her babysitter suddenly quit. 
Initially, she requested to change shifts but was denied. Thereafter, Tameeka left 
work early three days per week to meet the needs of her children. Altogether, she 
only accrued one day and one hour of unpaid, authorized sick leave. 110  While 
Tameeka’s demotion did not result from missing work for repeated suspensions, her 
                                                        
102  BORNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 18. 
103  Betsy Gwin, Lessons for Anti-Poverty Advocates from the Workplace Flexibility Movement: Improving 
Flexibility in Low-Wage Work and Access to Work Supports, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 265, 271–
72 (2011).  
104  Id. at 272. 
105  VICKY LOVELL, NO TIME TO BE SICK: WHY EVERYONE SUFFERS WHEN WORKERS DON’T HAVE PAID SICK 
LEAVE 1, 3 (Inst. Women’s Policy Research, 2004), (explaining this is even more problematic for low-
wage workers because “[w]orkers in lower-income families miss more days than those in higher-income 
families; this is consistent with well-established disparities in health that are correlated with income.”). 
106  For example, the New York Paid Sick Leave Act requires employees to have worked for an employer for 
at least 120 days in order for an employee to be entitled to the paid sick leave mandated by the act. 
Furthermore, the law does not apply to federal, state, or municipal workers, or independent 
contractors. N.Y.C., N.Y,, Local Law 46 (Jun. 26, 2013). 
107  BORNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 19. 
108  See also Gwin, supra note 103, at 272. 
109  BORNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 20. 
110  Id. 
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story still portrays the imminent risk that low-wage working mothers face when 
faced with a childcare emergency outside of their control.  
The problem of low-wage worker turnover from inflexible attendance policies 
can “wreak havoc” for employers, as well.111 High turnover rates within the low-
wage labor force are detrimental to businesses: costs to train a new employee 
making under $30,000 per year averages 16.1% of the employee’s yearly salary.112 It 
is without a doubt that the issue of sick children and consequential looming risk of 
parental job loss escalated to the national spotlight in recent years;113 however, the 
right to time off for student discipline remains under-considered. If “being female 
doubles the odds of experiencing job termination related to family illness,” 114 
suspensions certainly have a similarly detrimental effect on women and low-wage 
workers. 
 
ii. Limited Job-Protected Leave 
 
There are limited workplace policies in place for protecting low-wage, 
working parents in general; even state and federal policies specifically created to 
address the tightrope walk of balancing parent and work responsibility fall woefully 
short. A lack of job-protected leave exacerbates the problem of suspensions not only 
for low-income, single, black mothers but also for parents working at inflexible jobs, 
in general. Congress passed the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993115 (FMLA), in 
part,116 “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to 
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national 
interests in preserving family integrity.”117 The implementing regulations further 
recognize the purpose of the FMLA: they state that “workers need reassurance that 
they will not be asked to choose between continuing their employment, and meeting 
their personal and family obligations or tending to vital needs at home.”118 Under 
                                                        
111  Id. at 18. 
112  See HEATHER BOUSHEY & SARAH JANE GLYNN, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT BUSINESS COSTS TO REPLACING 
EMPLOYEES (Center for American Progress, 2012), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/11/16/44464/there-are-significant-business-
costs-to-replacing-employees/.  
113  See generally Susan Perry, A Third of Working Parents Risk Pay or Job Loss When Child Gets Sick, 
Survey Finds, MINNPOST (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com/second-opinion/2012/10/third-
working-parents-risk-pay-or-job-loss-when-child-gets-sick-survey-finds (discussing a survey done by 
C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital that revealed 33% of parents reported taking time off of work to care for 
their sick children put their job at risk or resulted in loss of pay); Danielle Shapiro, For Working Moms, 
One Sick Kid Can Spell Disaster, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 26, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/26/for-working-moms-one-sick-kid-can-spell-
disaster.html (telling the story of various low-income women who are “one sick child away from being 
fired”).  
114  LOVELL, supra note 105, at 5.  
115  29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–54 (2014). 
116  See O’Leary, supra note 95, at 38 (noting that the FMLA was also passed out of “recognition of the 
limits of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act”). 
117  29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(1) (West 2014). 
118  29 C.F.R. § 825.101(b) (2011). 
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the FMLA, an employee is entitled to up to twelve weeks of leave from work119 to 
tend to one of five circumstances surrounding birth, adoption, and family illness-
related needs120 without fear of losing her job; however, the FMLA has extreme 
limitations. Implementing regulations define “vital needs” and “family obligations” 
extremely narrowly. “Vital home needs,” for the purpose of this Note, 121  only 
encompasses “serious health condition[s],”122 and “family” is limited to “a spouse, 
son, daughter, or parent.”123 In its current state, the FMLA does nothing to protect 
low-wage parents—or any parents for that matter—who are forced to leave work for 
a suspension. Even if the FMLA is amended to allow for absences from work for a 
wider range of circumstances, such as school suspensions, the FMLA does not 
protect all private employees and does not allow for any paid time off124—a luxury 
that many low-wage workers cannot afford.125  
Rightfully acknowledging the vital importance of parental involvement in a 
child’s education, 126  some states have attempted to address the challenge of 
balancing a parent’s responsibility to support her child academically and 
financially.127 Because of the proven effects of parental involvement in a child’s 
academic success,128 a majority of states have some form of family engagement 
provisions within state education laws. Additionally, under the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB),129 schools receiving Title I assistance were required to create 
                                                        
119  29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1) (“Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible employee shall be entitled to a 
total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . .”). 
120  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(E) (An individual is entitled to twelve workweeks of leave for (1) the 
birth of a son or daughter of the employee to care for the son or daughter; (2) if an employee adopts or 
fosters a child; (3) to care for an ill spouse, son, daughter, or parent who has a serious health condition; 
(4) because of an employee’s own serious health condition; or (4) because of “qualifying exigency arising 
out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on covered active duty in 
the Armed forces.”). 
121  The FMLA also allows up to twelve weeks of leave for “the birth of a son or daughter or placement of a 
son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care,” for the employees own serious health 
condition that impairs his or her ability to work, and for “any qualifying exigency arising out of the fact 
that [a family member] is a military member on covered active duty or call to covered active duty 
status.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #28: THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (2012), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28.pdf.  
122  Id.   
123  Id.  
124  The FMLA only protects private employees who work for private employers that have 50 or more 
employees and have been employed full-time (1,250 hours) by the employer for the past 12 months. Id.  
125  This is not to suggest that the legislature should amend the FMLA to require paid leave to pick up a 
suspended child. It is merely to illustrate the mutli-dimensional challenges that low-income parents 
face when it comes to taking time off from work. 
126  The Harvard Family Research Project found that family engagement can help close the education gap 
and “is one of the strongest predictors of children’s school success.” SHAKTI BELWAY , MISHAELA DURÁN, 
LELA SPIELBERG, STATE LAWS ON FAMILY ENGAGEMENT IN EDUCATION REFERENCE GUIDE 5 (National 
Parent Teacher Association), https://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcms-
pta/files/production/public/State_Laws_Report.pdf.  
127  See generally id. (detailing the current national landscape for family engagement and labor laws by 
state).  
128  See id. at 3. 
129  The NCLB was repealed in December, 2015, and replaced with the Every Student 
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family and parent engagement policies in an effort to bolster academic 
achievement.130 Generally, these laws attempted to “create policies, strategies, and 
practices that build on the strengths and wisdom of families to support their child’s 
learning and improve student achievement.”131 Forty states have education laws 
requiring school districts to implement family engagement policies, and five states 
mandate pilot family engagement projects.132 A select number of states also have 
labor laws that aim to “facilitate family engagement by protecting employees with 
school-age children from being terminated or otherwise penalized for attending 
parent-teacher conferences or other important school meetings.” 133  These laws 
recognize that taking time off of work for a school-related activity can endanger the 
family’s livelihood.  
Family engagement and labor laws are a step in the right direction, but most 
labor and family engagement laws fail to fully rectify the inconsistency of harsh 
workplace policies and the unpredictable nature of parenthood. There are only 
sixteen states with labor laws that allow employees with school-aged children to 
take leave from work for school-related purposes;134 two of those states’ labor laws 
only apply to public sector employees,135 four states only “encourage” workplaces to 
grant employees with children time off for school conferences only,136 and some 
states allow time off for school-related activities but require advanced notice—a 
requirement far from helpful for parents dealing with unpredictable suspensions.137 
Even those states that do offer general protections for school-related activities other 
than conferences only allow for minimal time off.138 Alarmingly, California and 
                                                        
Succeeds Act. See Lyndsey Layton, Obama Signs New K-12 Education Law that Ends No Child Left 
Behind, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/obama-
signs-new-k-12-education-law-that-ends-no-child-left-behind/2015/12/10/c9e58d7c-9f51-11e5-a3c5-
c77f2cc5a43c_story.html. 
130  See Every Student Succeeds Act Title I Part A § 1010 (2002), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
114s1177enr/pdf/BILLS-114s1177enr.pdf. The family engagement provisions of NCLB are also in the 
new Every Student Succeeds Act. Similarly, every Title I school is required to reserve at least one 
percent of Title I funding to implement and sustain parent and family engagement policies. See The 
Leadership Conference Education Fund, Parent and Family Engagement Provisions in the Every 
Student Succeeds Act 1 (2016), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/education/ESSA-Parent-Family-
Engagement.pdf. 
131  See BELWAY ET AL., supra note 126, at 15. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 147. 
134  BELWAY ET AL., supra note 126, at 147.  
135  Hawaii and Texas both have a labor law that allows limited leave for school functions, but the laws 
only protect public-sector employees. Both states also only allow a maximum of two hours of paid leave, 
two times per year for each child. Id. 
136  Alabama, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Utah encourage, rather than mandate, time off for employees with 
children to attend limited school functions. Id.  
137  Id. at 148 (“Illinois law sets forth highly specific guidelines regarding the circumstances under which 
employees may exercise their right to leave time. The specifics include the amount of time an employee 
may use both during the school year and on any given day. The law further stipulates the amount of 
notice required from employees, which must be done in writing seven days in advance, among other 
requirements.”). 
138  North Carolina grants four hours of leave per year to “attend or otherwise be involved in the child’s 
school.” Id. at 157 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-28.3(a) (West 2016).  
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Nevada 139  are the only states that explicitly prohibit employers from firing 
employees who choose to make use of policies granting parental leave for school 
activities.140 Even though thirty-five of the states that lack labor laws have laws 
that support family engagement, most family engagement statutes mandate schools 
provide opportunities for things such as more parent teacher conferences, contracts 
between parents and schools, and parent education classes.141 Engagement policies 
could even potentially exacerbate the difficulty for a working parent by requiring 
her to attend more school-related functions without having analogous labor 
protections for education-related activities.  
Although not exemplar, California and Nevada are two states worth turning 
to as strong models for labor laws that better protect single working mothers. Both 
states have labor laws that explicitly forbid employers from taking any sort of 
adverse action against employees who take time off to participate in school 
activities.142 California allows employees to take off up to forty hours every year for 
school-related activities,143 and Nevada forbids an employer from “terminat[ing], 
demot[ing], suspend[ing] or otherwise discriminate[ing] against the employment of 
a person who . . . is notified during his work by a school employee of an emergency 
regarding the child.”144  
It is worth pointing out that even states such as California and Nevada that 
have the most liberal labor law protections lack adequate enough laws to account 
for the disproportionate suspension of black students. California, one of the states 
that allows for the most leave time (forty hours per year), allows an employee a 
maximum of eight hours off per month to “participate in their children’s 
education.”145 The eight hours would be sufficient for a single mother to leave from 
work to pick up the child if suspended, but what then? The child could possibly be 
suspended for up to ten days, which would well surpass the eight-hour allotted 
monthly limit. Even in California a single mother is forced to choose between 
staying home and possibly losing her job or paying for childcare. That said, 
California and Nevada are still the states with the most comprehensive labor laws, 
which is better than the alternative prevalent in most states—no labor protections 
at all. 
 
iii. Other Factors  
 
                                                        
139  Id. at 148 (“Nevada’s law renders it unlawful for employers to either terminate or threaten to terminate 
parents for attending meetings requested by school administrators.”). 
140  See id. 
141  For example, the family engagement statute in Illinois permits school districts to conduct “parental 
institutes” to generally increase parental engagement levels. Id. at 17. 
142  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(2)(d) (West 1989). 
143  BELWAY ET AL., supra note 126, at 151. 
144  NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.920 (1989).  
145  BELWAY ET AL., supra note 126, at 148–49. A further point of inquiry would be examining whether or 
not staying home with a suspended child qualifies as “participating in children’s education.” 
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A low-income woman’s financial insecurity further makes her more at-risk if 
her child is suspended. Once a low-income single mother loses her job, it is much 
more difficult for her to find a new one. This challenge makes the risk of losing her 
job all the more dangerous for her family. All mothers, regardless of socioeconomic 
status, are less likely to be hired for jobs, to be perceived as competent at work, or to 
be paid as much as their male colleagues with the same qualifications.146 Low-
income mothers with children under six, however, “[pay] a wage penalty five times 
as great as that of higher-paid women with young children” and lose six percent in 
wages per child. 147 Not only do these women lack job protections, they also do not 
have financial protections to fall back on. Prior to the 1996 welfare reforms, welfare 
“served as a form of paid leave between jobs . . . . [and] many women were working 
while on welfare.” 148  Now, when a woman loses her job, she has very limited 
assistance to support her family. Additionally, her family’s situation is likely to be 
exacerbated by a lack of child support payments. 149  Twenty-six percent of 
noncustodial fathers earn an average of $5,627 per year, and eighty-eight percent of 
those fathers do not pay court-ordered child support.150 This means that low-income 
single mothers, in addition to making the lowest wages, likely do not have access to 
child support payments to support their children in case of job-loss. If a single 
mother doesn’t have access to affordable childcare, as many low-income individuals 
do not,151 a suspension could also cause a parent to either go into financial debt or 
stay home with her child. Not only could a suspension cause a child to lose out on 
educational learning opportunities, it could also cost the child’s entire family its 
livelihood.  
 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS  
 
 There is no one single fix that addresses the numerous competing interests 
that school suspensions evoke: the school district has an interest in efficient 
administration;152 the students have an interest in remaining in the classroom;153 
                                                        
146  Caine Miller, supra note 93. 
147  Id.   
148  O’Leary, supra note 95, at 53. 
149  See Tonya Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income 
Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617 (2012). One study found that 
“sixty percent of poor fathers who do not pay child support are racial and ethnic minorities, and twenty-
nine percent were institutionalized (mostly in prison) at the time of interview. Only forty- three percent 
of men not in prison were working, and those employed in 1996 worked an average of just twenty-nine 
weeks and earned $5,627 that year. Their barriers to employment were also considerable: forty-three 
percent were high-school dropouts, thirty-nine percent had health problems, and thirty-two percent had 
not worked in three years.” Id. at 647.  
150  Id. 
151  See Sarah Jane Glynn et al., The Importance of Preschool and Childcare for Working Mothers, Center 
for American Progress (2013), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2013/05/08/62519/the-importance-of-
preschool-and-child-care-for-working-mothers/. A low-income family, on average, pays 39.5% of its 
income towards childcare costs. Id. 
152  See supra discussion Part II.A. 
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teachers have an interest in maintaining effective learning environments for all 
students without disruptions; 154  other students have an interest in an 
uninterrupted education;155 and parents have an interest in not being forced to 
leave work for small student infractions.156 Therefore, coming up with a “solution” 
to the problem school suspensions raise involves striking a delicate balance with 
various conflicting interests. “Solving” the problem also involves considering a 
variety of possible avenues, including legal avenues, legislative avenues, and policy 
implementation at the school level. 
 
A. Non-Solutions: Available Remedies That Do Not “Solve” the Problem 
i. Legal Remedies 
 
Ensuring evenly distributed suspensions and expulsions of all students using 
the law as a tool for leveling the playing field would not eliminate the problem 
suspensions pose for all low-income families, but it could help.157 Under current 
legal standards, students or parents disproportionately affected by suspension 
policies are unlikely to avail themselves using legal remedies. Although legal 
remedies might be technically available, gathering evidence to make a showing of 
disparate treatment under Title IV; Title VI; or the Equal Protection Clause, or 
disparate impact under Title VI and Title IV can be extremely cumbersome. 
A parent could potentially bring two legal claims to seek redress for school 
discipline that is perceived as discriminatory: disparate treatment or disparate 
impact. First, a parent could argue that the school’s suspension of a minority 
student was motivated by racial animus, which is a form of disparate treatment. 
Under a disparate treatment claim, a parent would have to be able to show that 
teachers or administrators administered a facially neutral discipline policy in a 
discriminatory way.158 A parent could bring a disparate treatment claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause,159 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
                                                        
153  See supra Part I.B. 
154  See infra Part III.A.ii.2. 
155  See Adrienne Green, When Schools are Forced to Practice Race-Based Discipline, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 
26, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/08/teachers-say-no-disparate-impact-
discipline/402144/. (Some argue that “guidelines [eliminating exclusionary discipline] “will encourage 
schools to tolerate disruptive and dangerous behavior lest they have too many students of one race 
being punished,” wrote the education-law expert Joshua Dunn in a Fordham Institute blog post last 
year. “The effect will be to punish students who behave and want to learn since their education will be 
sabotaged by troublemakers. And the disruptive will certainly learn, and learn quickly, that their 
schools are now tolerating even more disruptive behavior.”). Id.  
156  See supra Part II. 
157  The problem of suspension for low-income families would not be alleviated if suspension rates for white 
students increased and suspension rates for minority students stayed the same; however, it would be 
more probable to assume that suspension rates for minority students would go down if laws ensured 
evenly distributed suspensions among races.  
158  See U.S. DEP’T  JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 7. 
159  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
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of 1964 (Title VI),160 or Title IV.161 Courts typically allow schools the authority to 
discipline a student under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause if 
the school’s actions are reasonably related to a legitimate educational interest; 
however, a court will apply strict scrutiny if the school was motivated to discipline a 
student out of racial animus.162 Because most teachers and administrators do not 
disproportionately refer or suspend students based on overt racial animus, but 
rather might do so because of implicit bias, 163  Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VI and IV disparate treatment claims are near 
impossible to prove absent a showing of intentional discrimination.164 
There are instances where circumstantial evidence can be used to show 
discriminatory intent necessary to bring a successful disparate treatment claim 
(either under Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause). 165  A court might infer 
discriminatory intent if a parent is able to show: (1) a Black student was more 
harshly punished than a white student for the same offense; or (2) the parent could 
use circumstantial evidence that “allows the Departments to infer discriminatory 
intent from the facts of the investigation as a whole, or from the totality of the 
circumstances;”166 however, student privacy laws limit the amount of information a 
parent has access to, including the consequences different students received for 
similar punishments.167 New discipline reporting mechanisms under ESSA report 
                                                        
160  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006). Title VI prohibits discrimination based on 
“race, color, or national origin” in any institutions or activities that receive federal financial assistance. 
Id. 
161  42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (2006). Title IV prohibits discrimination in public elementary and secondary schools 
based on race, color, or national origin.  
162  Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1090. 
163  See JOHANNA WALD, SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER II: CAN “DE-BIASING” STRATEGIES HELP TO REDUCE RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE? 1-2 (Harvard Law School Institute for Race & Justice, 2014) (“As 
our knowledge about how implicit racial bias is triggered, and how its impact on our decisions and 
actions has grown, a strong hypothetical case can be made for its contribution to the stark racial 
disparities that figure so prominently in school discipline data. We underline the term hypothetical 
because there is not yet, to our knowledge, any direct evidence that the implicit racial bias held by 
decision-makers in the disciplinary chain contributes to the disproportionate numbers of children of 
color who are severely punished in schools. That said, there is clear evidence that children of color are 
punished more severely than White children for relatively minor, subjective offenses in schools”). 
164  See generally Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1099.  
165  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 17. 
166  Id. (list of questions the Department of Education typically asks after an allegation of intentional 
discrimination in school discipline to figure out whether the discipline was intentionally discriminatory. 
It is important to note that the Harvard Civil Rights Project points out that “Title VI has been 
“ineffective and [is] rarely enforced” in discipline cases.” Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1091 (citing the 
Civil Rights Project); However, the Department of Justice and Department of Education Joint “Dear 
Colleague” letter explicitly allows for more circumstantial evidence to be used to show discriminatory 
intent. More research is needed to decipher whether recent DOE guidance, in actuality, allows for more 
successful Title VI disparate treatment claims.). 
167  The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act prohibits schools from disclosing “student records” 
without written parental consent. “Student records” include student discipline records. Although there 
are limited exceptions where parental consent is not required to release student discipline information, 
the exceptions only allow for disclosure of final outcomes of a disciplinary proceeding for violent crimes 
or non-forcible sex offenses. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(13)–(14); see also, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BALANCING 
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card requirements may allow parents to use broad, district-wide statistics to more 
easily make these comparisons.168 
Second, a claimant could bring a disparate impact claim if he or she believes 
a neutral discipline policy’s administration was not motivated by racial animus, yet 
still had a discriminatory effect.169 Because the Supreme Court held in Washington 
v. Davis that disparate impact alone is not enough to show racial animus under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 170  a parent must bring a 
disparate impact claim under Title VI or Title IV. 171  Even though Title VI’s 
accompany regulations allow for a parent to bring a disparate impact claim absent 
evidence of intentional discrimination, Alexander v. Sandoval ended private rights 
of action under Title VI in 2001.172 As a result, enforcement of Title VI claims is left 
to the federal government.173 
Additionally, low-income parents still face the structural barrier that they 
are not entitled to a civil attorney absent a showing of effect on physical liberty.174 
Some might contend that parents can still file complaints through the Department 
of Education Office of Civil Rights; however, the complaint form contains procedural 
complexities, numerous time-sensitive deadlines, and encourages parents to file 
internal grievances prior to filing a complaint.175 Most disproportionate discipline 
claims today are brought by large advocacy groups,176 many of which do not take on 
individual clients.177  
                                                        
STUDENT PRIVACY AND SCHOOL SAFETY (2007), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/brochures/postsec.pdf.  
168  PROFESSIONAL LEARNING EXCHANGE, THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: STATE AND LOCAL EDUCATION 
AGENCY REPORT CARD REQUIREMENTS 3 (2016), 
https://www.psea.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Professional_Publications/Advisories/Advisory-ESSA-
StateAndLocalReportcardRequirements.pdf.  
169  Amy Howe, Disparate Impact-Claims Survive Challenge: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jun. 25, 
2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/disparate-impact-claims-survive-challenge-in-plain-english/.  
170  426 U.S. 229 (holding that a police admissions exam did not violate the 14th Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause in spite of a showing that it had a disparate impact on the admission of black police 
officers.). 
171  Title VI, supra note 160. 
172  Skiba et al., supra note 16, at 1091 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). 
173  Id. at 1099. 
174  COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE & NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
PROGRAM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL), EQUAL ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 1 (2007).  
175  See U.S. Department of Education, OCR Complaint Forms (last updated Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaintintro.html (detailing the procedures necessary to file 
a discrimination complaint through the Office of Civil Rights). 
176  See generally American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, South Orange-Maplewood School District 
Office of Civil Rights Complaint, ACLU (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/south-
orange-maplewood-school-district-office-civil-rights-complaint (example of an OCR complaint filed by 
the New Jersey ACLU, demonstrating the complexity of filing a claim as compared to a parent filling 
out the form). 
177  See also COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, supra note 174, at 3. Because “the majority [of a survey of trial judges 
from 37 states] reported that pro se litigants were ineffective in their self‐advocacy because they failed 
to present necessary evidence [and] committed procedural errors . . . “ it seems likely that the same 
pitfalls in pro se court would manifest in the filing of a disproportionate discipline complaint with the 
DOE Office Of Civil Rights, as well, although more research is needed to back this contention. 
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ii. Elimination of Exclusionary Discipline Altogether 
 
Some school districts and policy makers are moving towards precluding 
suspensions entirely,178 but this is not a realistic solution. One might well say, 
“What? Eliminating exclusionary discipline altogether is a non-solution? Isn’t that 
contrary to the entire premise of this Note?” Yes and no. It might be true that school 
exclusionary discipline practices have little or no value as a discipline tool to the 
student, but teachers still need a way to remove a student from the classroom if the 
student’s behavior is disrupting the classroom culture and learning environment of 
other students. There is space for better teaching strategies to minimize the need 
for suspensions, but a student’s interest in a disruption-free classroom, the school’s 
interest in “promot[ing] safe and orderly school environments,”179 and the teacher’s 
interest in maintaining class order dictate that exclusionary practices should not 
entirely disappear.180 Even with preventative measures such as Positive Behavior 
Supports181 in place, there will still be, on occasion, a student who needs to be 
physically taken out of the general education classroom.182  
Elimination of all exclusionary practices might sound great in theory, but it 
simply is not a practical solution for teachers, especially when the teaching 
profession is suffering in numbers as greatly as it is.183 Discipline-related problems 
                                                        
178  See supra note 12 discussion. 
179  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 17.  
180  See supra discussion Part III.A.i.. 
181  See infra note 191. 
182  My own teaching experience confirms this. In my third year of teaching at one of the highest 
performing charter schools in Washington, D.C., my school did attempt to keep one student in 
particular in the classroom at all costs. Among other problematic patterns of behavior, his everyday 
mission in life seemed to be to unplug my projector while I was teaching a whole-class guided reading 
lesson, which might seem comical now, but it wasted nearly twenty to thirty minutes of class time 
every day. This amount of time might seem trivial, but thirty minutes of instruction for students 
already behind their higher-socioeconomic peers across the city can add up to a large amount of time 
over the course of the school year. After countless behavior intervention plans (at a school that already 
had a character education program and PBIS) extensive parental involvement, attempts at 
strengthening my personal relationships with him, and numerous personal aides (whereas this would 
not even be possible in most traditional public schools without a special education diagnosis under 
IDEA), this student continuously disrupted an entire classroom of twenty-eight first graders. It was 
definitely not to this student’s benefit to be excluded from class, but keeping him in class at all costs 
was also not fair to the other twenty-something students in class who were losing precious learning 
time. 
183  See Eric Westervelt, Where Have All the Teachers Gone?, NPR (Mar. 3, 2015, 2:03 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/03/03/389282733/where-have-all-the-teachers-gone (Enrollment is 
drastically declining at some of the leading teacher training programs. Enrollment is down fifty-three 
percent over the past five years in California and twenty percent over the last three years in North 
Carolina due to the “erosion of teaching's image as a stable career.”); see also Dan Carden, Interest in 
Indiana Teaching Careers Declines Sharply, NWITIMES.COM (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/interest-in-indiana-teaching-careers-declines-
sharply/article_dc856843-53d4-5248-9b72-76a829136925.html (The issuance Indiana teaching licenses 
dropped thirty-three percent in the 2014–15 school year, and between 2009–13 the number of college 
students in Indiana taking teacher education courses dropped fifty percent). 
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are the “prime stress-producing factor in teaching.”184 It is no surprise that over 
three quarters of teachers disagree with policies that prevent minorities from being 
expelled at greater rates (likely also in part because of teachers’ preference for 
classroom autonomy).185 Prospective educators do not need another reason not to go 
into the teaching profession. 
a. Possible (Though Admittedly Far-Fetched) Solution: Change Procedural 
Due Process Requirements for Suspensions 
 
There are certainly a multitude of details to be worked through, but changing 
the way courts conceptualize the amount of due process a student is entitled to for 
suspensions under Goss v. Lopez186 may affect positive change for families and 
students. Under the Mathews v. Eldridge test,187 courts currently weigh (1) the 
child’s interest in ten or fewer days of education against (2) the school’s interest in 
efficiency. 188  If courts instead weighed: (1) the amount of educational harm 
resulting from losing less than ten days of school plus the interest of a parent in 
keeping her job for the benefit of the family against (2) the school’s interest in 
efficiency, the scales would likely tip in favor of necessitating more formal due 
process procedures. By recognizing these additional harms, schools might be less 
likely to use out of school suspensions for non-suspension worthy behaviors because 
courts could necessitate more procedural requirements. For example, a court could 
shift the burden onto the school to prove that the behaviors resulting in suspension 
actually occurred and were truly suspension-worthy. 189  Requiring the school to 
affirmatively justify how the suspension was fair and consistent would make school 
administrators less likely to engage in unnecessary suspensions as a behavior 
control mechanism, as well as make it more difficult to disprove. Additionally, the 
court could also require more formal notice and opportunity to present the student’s 
side prior to calling the parent for a midday pick-up. Perhaps having this additional 
safeguard would also prevent teachers and administrators from using out-of-school 
suspensions, as they would have to devote more time and resources to utilize 
suspension as a discipline tool. Although this is not the traditional way of thinking 
about due process analysis—nor would it likely be adopted given the immense 
                                                        
184  Barbara F. Zimmerman, The Nature and Consequences of Classroom Disruption (1995) (unpublished 
PhD dissertation, State University of New York), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.139.4113 &rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
185  Green, supra note 155. 
186 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
187  See supra discussion Part III.A.i. 
188  419 U.S. 565. 
189  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (using the Mathews v. Eldridge test to find that a U.S. 
citizen-detainee had a due process right to notice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy-
combatant, but the circumstances demanded that the burden could be shifted to a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the government’s evidence). Although the circumstances in Hamdi were more 
extreme (post-September 11th detention of an alleged enemy combatant), this case still shows that the 
amount of due process given under the Mathews Test can include a court’s ability to burden-shift based 
on the weight of the three factors. Id.  
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complexity in reconfiguring current due process notions190—it is worth thinking 
through for important policy reasons.  
 
b. Feasible Solutions 
With so many competing interests at stake, there is no easy or single “fix” for 
exclusionary discipline practices that would eliminate all costs for all parties 
involved. Rather, a patchwork of strategies can reduce the current costs of 
suspension. No one cost can entirely be eliminated, but competing interests can be 
more adequately balanced so no one party—such as the families of suspended 
students—bear the brunt of school discipline policies. Teachers and students share 
a common interest (albeit for different reasons): the interest in having a positive 
classroom culture void of significant learning disruptions. There are numerous 
preventative strategies that schools can implement in order to alleviate student 
discipline problems before they begin. Having a strong classroom culture that 
rewards students’ positive behavior, rather than punishes students for disruptive 
behavior, is one way to go about this.  
Positive Behavior Supports (PBS) and the Safe and Responsive Schools 
Project aim to help schools develop preventative strategies for addressing student 
behaviors.191 Not only is it proven that these preventative programs can improve 
student behavior, they also increase teacher perceptions of student misbehaviors.192 
Teachers felt more aware of strategies to change student behaviors and “increased 
options for keeping students in school.” 193  It is important to note that the 
implementation of preventative programs should be a school-wide, not a top-down, 
effort in order to create community buy-in.194 Standing alone, PBS is not enough.195  
It would also benefit low-income students if schools recognized trauma as a 
factor that impacts student behavior.196 Given that one out of four children have 
                                                        
190  Re-configuring due process still raises numerous valid questions: would schools instead use in school 
suspensions to avoid lengthy due process requirements? Would working parents be the only parents go 
get these additional due process safeguards? If so, is that fair? 
191  See Russell J. Skiba, Shana Ritter, Adam Simmons, Reece Peterson & Courtney Miller, The Safe and 
Responsive Schools Project, Safe and Responsive Schools 631 (2005), 
http://www.indiana.edu/~equity/docs/A_School_Reform_Model.pdf.  
192  See id. at 645. 
193  Id.  
194  Id. at 646. 
195  PBS is already implemented in sixteen thousand schools around the country, yet disproportionate 
discipline is still a pervasive problem. See Jane Ellen Stevens, Masachusetts, Washington State Lead 
U.S. Trauma-Sensitive School Movement, ACES TO HIGH (2012), 
http://acestoohigh.com/2012/05/31/massachusetts-washington-state-lead-u-s-trauma-sensitive-school-
movement/.  
196  A growing body of research suggests that children’s brains respond to trauma (defined as “multiple 
traumas including physical or sexual abuse, abandonment, and domestic and neighborhood violence”) 
in ways that dramatically affect their behaviors. See Jane Meredith Adams, Schools Promoting 
Trauma-Informed Teaching to Reach Troubled Students, EDSOURCE (Dec. 2, 2013) (“In the brains of 
traumatized youth, neural pathways associated with fear and survival responses are strongly 
developed, leaving some children in a state of hyperarousal that causes them to overreact to incidents 
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witnessed a violent act, programs such as the ARC Framework can significantly 
prevent student misbehaviors and alleviate the need for suspensions.197 The limited 
number of schools that have already implemented trauma-informed improvement 
plans have shown up to forty percent reduction in suspension since their 
implementation.198 Newly emerging strategies such as meditation within schools 
has also had profound effects on students. For example, a “Quiet Time” meditation 
program in San Francisco schools reduced the suspension rate by as much as forty-
five percent in one school during the program’s first year, and a similar study in 
Connecticut showed significantly lower stress-hormone levels in high school 
students. 199  Lastly, the implementation of restorative justice models to teach 
students improved conflict-resolution skills can also contribute to alleviating 
discipline problems within the classroom. These preventative measures are all 
necessary, long-term solutions to preventing behavior issues from arising in the 
first place. Preventative approaches aimed at improving classroom management 
and student behaviors address students’ interests in maintaining disruption-free 
classrooms, the disciplined student’s need to remain in the classroom, and the 
teacher’s need to maintain order. 
Prevention of misbehavior will not always be enough for two reasons: (1) if a 
teacher can’t recognize behavior that is truly “disruptive,” preventative efforts are 
useless, and (2) misbehaviors are inherently bound to occur sometime. Because 
White teachers can perceive different cultural behaviors as “misbehaviors,” 200 
teachers can mislabel minority student behavior as discipline-worthy; this practice 
undermines any preventative efforts the school might have in place. In order to 
prevent this phenomenon, culturally responsive teaching, implicit bias trainings, 
and law in education courses need to be taught in teacher training programs and 
reinforced through professional development sessions throughout a teacher’s career. 
Additionally, schools should turn to suspension policies such as California’s and 
Illinois’ which eliminated suspensions for minor misbehaviors 201  and require 
exhaustion of preventative strategies before schools may issue suspensions.202  
                                                        
other children would find nonthreatening, the research shows. Consumed by fear, they find it difficult 
to achieve a state of calmness that would allow them to process verbal instructions and learn”). 
197  Trauma Center, Attachment, Regulation, and Competency, JUSTICE RESOURCE INSTITUTE, 
http://www.traumacenter.org/research/ascot.php (accessed Dec. 15, 2015).  
198  Stevens, supra note 195.  
199  Amanda Mochado, Should Schools Teach Kids to Meditate? THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/01/should-schools-teach-kids-to-meditate/283229/. 
200  See TOWNSEND, supra note 36, at 383 (“Cultural conflicts may exist between African American students’ 
culture and schools’ mainstream culture. For example, many African American students are 
accustomed to engaging in multiple activities simultaneously in their homes and communities. They 
can be involved in multiple conversations while eating, studying, watching television, or participating 
in other recreational activities. Thus, those students may prefer activities that allow them to socialize 
with others while completing tasks. At school, teachers usually expect and reward students’ individual 
engagement in one activity at a time, as opposed to managing multiple tasks and working with 
others”). 
201  Press Release: California Enacts First-in-the-Nation Law to Eliminate Suspensions for Minor 
Misbehaviors, ACLU of Northern California (2014), https://www.aclunc.org/news/california-enacts-first-
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Even after refining what constitutes a suspension-worthy “misbehavior” 
through policy reform and implementing preventative strategies at the school-level, 
misbehaviors are still bound to occur. Therefore, suspensions should not be 
altogether eliminated. In order to address parents’ interest in continued 
employment and the teacher’s need to maintain a disruption-free environment, 
schools should turn to in-school-suspensions (ISS) (termed something different so as 
to eliminate the negative stigma) as an alternative to out-of-school suspensions; 
however, “schools need more than a room and a teacher for in-school suspension to 
change behavior.”203 According to the Education Pipeline Project at Boston College, 
ISS can offer a “teachable moment” to connect with students and show them that 
they belong in school. Certain characteristics of ISS programs, such as term limits, 
problem-solving/mediation focus, professional staffing, and structured programs can 
lead to reductions in school discipline rates, overall.204  
Schools should continue to implement preventative strategies and still 
allowing for in-school suspensions while these measures take effect. Parents would 
not have to risk losing their jobs, students could still get some sort of educational 
benefit—an issue that is beyond the scope of this Note—and teachers would still 
have the necessary relief for a student who really did need to be removed from the 
classroom. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With 1.2 million black children suspended annually, a majority of whom are 
children of low-income single mother households, the use of suspensions as a 
discipline tool is clearly misaligned with the needs of vulnerable families. When a 
low-income single mother is called to pick up her child from school—or any parent 
with inflexible job schedule for that matter—inflexible schedules and lack of policy 
protections for education-related emergencies create a strong likelihood that she 
will suffer some sort of penalty. If she does not lose her job the first time, given a 
black child’s statistical likelihood of frequent suspensions, it is likely that she will 
eventually. Clearly, suspensions have far more grave implications than currently 
given credit for. Taking into account the supplementary consideration of the 
                                                        
nation-law-eliminate-student-suspensions-minor-misbehavior. (After the enactment of AB420, 
“California bec[ame] the first state in the nation to eliminate suspensions for its youngest children, and 
all expulsions for all students for minor misbehavior such as talking back, failing to have school 
materials and dress code violations).  
202  See Evie Blad, Illinois Governor Signs Sweeping School Discipline Bill Championed by Students, 
EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 25, 2015, 4:14 PM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rulesforengagement/2015/08/illinois_governor_signs_school_discipline_b
ill_championed_by_students.html.  
203  In School Suspension: A Learning Tool, EDUCATION WORLD, 
http://www.educationworld.com/a_admin/admin/admin329.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).  
204  See id. (“At Falcon Middle School in Peyton, Colorado, safety and discipline incidents dropped 
dramatically after the school introduced an in-school suspension program in 2001-2002. ‘We had 437 
safety and disciplinary incidents in 2000-2001 [before in-school suspension],’ principal Bill Noxon told 
Education World. ‘In 2001-2002, we had 74.’”).  
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disproportionate affect of suspensions on low-income families could provide 
additional support for lobbyists and advocacy groups to push legislation that centers 
on the reduction of out of school suspensions as a discipline norm within the 
education realm. 
 
 
Fair Representation in Local Government 
Ruth Greenwood* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on my work in Illinois to use the Voting Rights Act1 (VRA) to 
improve minority representation at the local level, but the themes and findings are 
applicable across the country because many states have growing minority populations in the 
suburbs just outside of large city centers.2 These minority populations tend to be much less 
segregated than the minority communities in the cities,3 and so it is more difficult to use 
Section 2 of the VRA4  (“Section 2”) to ensure both descriptive and substantive 
representation. I recommend the use of fair representation systems like ranked choice and 
cumulative voting (with multi-member districts) to improve minority representation in these 
decreasingly segregated areas. I introduce three case studies from Illinois to highlight the 
numerous burdens facing those that seek to reform their local government redistricting 
systems. I finish with some thoughts on how litigation and legislative advocacy may be used 
to promote fair representation systems in local government. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be . . . represented. 
No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”5 
John Stuart, Mill 1862  
 
Representation in a democracy is “a substitute for the meeting of citizens in 
person.”6 Federal, state, and local governments could not function if all of the millions 
of citizens with a stake in the decisions of government were involved in every decision. 
Americans long ago decided that they did not want a single leader to determine issues 
                                                 
*  Ruth Greenwood is the Deputy Director of Redistricting for the Campaign Legal Center and an Adjunct 
Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This Article adapts and expands the research I 
did for a report while at the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, The Color of 
Representation, CHICAGO LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, INC. (Apr. 2015)  
http://www.votingrightsillinois.org/color-of-representation. I would like to thank Annabelle Harless, 
Devin Race, J. Cunyon Gordon, George Cheung, Jorge Sanchez, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Maria Aracelia 
Rosas Urbano, Mark and Kathy Kuehner, and Willie Scott for their inspiration and assistance in this 
important work. 
1  52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10301–14 (West 2016). 
2  William H. Frey, Melting Pot Cities and Suburbs: Racial and Ethnic Change in Metro America in the 
2000s, METROPOLITAN POL’Y PROGRAMS AT BROOKINGS, 9–11 (May 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/0504_census_ethnicity_frey.pdf. 
3  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 
1343–48 (2016).  
4  52 U.S.C.A. § 10301. 
5  John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, in THREE ESSAYS BY JOHN STUART MILL 143, 252 (Oxford 
1960). 
6  HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 191 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, THE FEDERALIST NO.52, in THE FEDERALIST 269, 
270 (Max Beloff ed. 1948)). 
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of the commonwealth. Thus, governmental systems were chosen whereby some people 
represent others to determine the rules by which we live. 
To be represented has four relevant meanings in the context of voting rights.7 
One can be said to be represented if:8 
1. she can register, vote, and have that vote count; 
2. she can join with her community to elect candidates of their choice; 
3. people with the same demographic or social characteristics are part of a 
governmental decision making body (I will refer to this as descriptive 
representation); and 
4. there is a congruence between the actions and behavior of a representative 
and one’s policy preferences (I will refer to this as substantive 
representation).   
The first form of representation is not a focus of this Article but has been a focus of 
recent successful litigation efforts across the country.9 It is the latter three types of 
representation that this Article discusses. 
Recognizing that representation is required in a democracy is only the first 
step. A community must then decide how it will choose its representatives. What 
mechanism is chosen will depend on a community’s conception of democracy and of 
representation. Is democracy served by a purely majoritarian representative body 
whereby representatives do only what those they represent want and the decision 
made in each case is by majority rule (majoritarianism)?10 Is it served by a 
representative body where the most talented members of society are trusted to 
deliberate and act in favor of the national interest, even if it involves unpopular 
choices (trusteeship)?11 Is it served by a representative body that is a vibrant 
marketplace of ideas, where every demographic and interest group is represented, 
and decision makers form different coalitions come to different compromises 
depending on the issue (pluralism)?12 Perhaps a little of each of these drove the 
decisions of the Founders to establish the decision-making structures of federal 
government. 
The federal government structure is laid out in our almost-unamendable 
Constitution,13 but the structure of a local government is, in many states, relatively 
                                                 
7  For a full discussion of definitions of representation, see PITKIN, supra note 6, at 1–11. 
8  Adapted from PITKIN, supra note 6, at 38–59. 
9  Successful litigation on this form of representation has occurred in Wisconsin, One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. 
v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jpd, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wis. July 29, 2016), Texas, Veasey v. Abbott, 
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), North Carolina, North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. 
McCroy, No. 1:13CV861, 2016 WL 1650774 (M.D.N.C. April 25, 2016), and Kansas, Fish v. Kobach, No. 
16-2105-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 2866195, May 17, 2016 (D.C. Kan).. 
10  See PITKIN, supra note 6, at 30. 
11  Id. at 181. 
12  Id. at 191. 
13  Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible to Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_constitution
_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html. 
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easily amended. For example, in Illinois, home rule jurisdictions14 can change their 
system of government (that is, their county, town, or school board) by majority vote 
at a general election after collecting a relatively small number of signatures to place 
the question on the ballot.15  
At the local level then, we are all potential founders. 
In a world of relatively infinite choice, what system of democracy suits local 
government? And, therefore, what system of representation is preferable? Some 
guidance can be drawn from Hanna Pitkin’s seminal 1967 book, The Concept of 
Representation. Pitkin found that political decisions are “questions about action, 
about what should be done; consequently they involve both facts and value 
commitments.”16 While decisions based on facts may be delegated to experts, 
decisions based on value commitments—like the decisions of what rules a community 
wants to live by—require diverse representation.  
Not every type of diversity will be relevant for representation. For example, it 
is hard to think of a reason why blue-eyed people need specific representation that 
they could not get from brown-or green-eyed people. Additionally, in some 
communities, different religions or ages need not be represented, but in others, 
religion or age may be a key cleavage in a community, and so establishing a system 
that ensures diverse representation with respect to religion or age will be necessary. 
In every community in America one thing is for certain: race and ethnicity will be an 
issue that requires diverse representation.17 
This Article proceeds as follows: It starts by defining minority representation 
and outlining the normative and practical case for promoting minority 
representation, highlights the importance of focusing on local government 
representation, discusses the legal routes currently available to improve minority 
representation, goes through two case studies of work I have done at the local level 
to try to improve minority representation (in Joliet and Blue Island), and concludes 
with thoughts for the strategies that can be used going forward to advocate and 
litigate for local government structures that will better protect and promote minority 
representation. 
I. MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
If the goal of democracy is majority rule, why is pluralism or an explicit 
protection of racial justice needed? This question strikes at the basic paradox of 
                                                 
14  See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. 
15  See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-7 (2016) (the number of signatures required is equal to 8% of total vote of 
that jurisdiction in most recent gubernatorial election). 
16  PITKIN, supra note 6, at 212. 
17  See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Race Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age 
of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Mario L. Barnes, Reflections on a Dream World: Race, Post-
Race and the Question of Making It Over, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 6 (2009); Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2006); see also JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY 
REPORT 196 (2008) (citing Kinder and Sanders 1996, and Sniderman and Carmines 1997 as examples of 
how race continues to divide American society and politics). 
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democracy—can a society be equally committed to majority rule and minority 
protection?18  Because it conflicts with government by the majority, the commitment 
to minority protection must be grounded in some other value. A commitment to 
minority representation can be grounded in pluralism and/or a commitment to racial 
justice. Failing to focus on minority representation is not a choice in favor of race 
neutrality, but instead a de facto vote against racial justice.  
For minority representation to exist, all four types of representation outlined 
above should be present. That is, minority communities must be able to register and 
vote, to elect candidates of their choice, and to be both descriptively and substantively 
represented in federal, state, and local government. These types of representation 
stand in contrast to various kinds of disenfranchisement and political 
disempowerment minorities have experienced in America’s history. 
A. The Voting Rights Act  
It wasn’t until the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 that part of the promise of 
the Fifteenth Amendment was codified by Congress.19 Though passed in direct 
response to the violence in Selma, Alabama, on Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965, the 
aims of the VRA were broader than simply allowing Black people to register to vote 
without fear of losing their lives. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s views on the topic were 
summarized by Lani Guinier in 1991: “King advocated full political participation by 
an enlightened electorate to elect blacks to key political positions, to liberalize the 
political climate in the United States and to influence the allocation of resources.”20 
Guinier also notes that Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP and Chairman 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR), advocated for the VRA before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, on the grounds that eliminating voting restrictions 
would mean that elected officials “will become responsive to the will of all the 
people.”21 
Provisions protecting language minority communities (Latinos, Asian 
Americans, American Indians, and Native Alaskans and Hawaiians) were not 
                                                 
18  See Alexis de Tocqueville, Tyranny of the Majority, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 306 (Schocken Books 
1961); see also JAQUES DERRIDA, ROGUES: TWO ESSAYS ON REASON 31–36 (Pascale-Anne Brault & 
Michael Naas trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005). 
19  There are other statutes that indirectly protect minority voting rights by protecting voting rights of 
particular communities that include people of color, e.g., the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–10 (1993); the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C. § 
1973ff-7 (1998); the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–545 (2002); and the Military 
and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-7 (2009). 
20  Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and The Theory of Black Electoral 
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1084 n.26 (1991) (citing MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 
166 (1963)). 
21  Id. at 1077 n.26 (citing Voting Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 377–80 (1965) (statement of Roy Wilkins). 
2017] Fair Representation in Local Government 201 
included in the VRA until 1975.22 These were added to help non-English-speaking 
voters to “cast an effective ballot . . . .”23  
The definition of minority political participation used during the 1975 debates 
included registering, voting, running for office, and holding office as civic 
participation goals.24 The 1975 Act’s added protections were written to apply to 
“language minority groups,” defined as “persons who are American Indian, Asian 
American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage.”25 
B. Promoting Minority Representation 
i.  Registering, Voting, and Having that Vote Count Today 
The removal of practices that directly prevented minority voters from 
registering and voting (for example, literacy tests, and some of the practices 
prevented through Section 5 preclearance, such as not opening voter registration 
opportunities when Black citizens appeared at the relevant office to register) 
supported the most basic type of minority representation: allowing people of color to 
register, vote, and have that vote count. 
There are still laws that disproportionately disenfranchise voters of color, such 
as felon disenfranchisement laws, photo ID laws, citizenship requirements, and 
restrictions on early voting that are either currently on the books or are being 
advanced in legislatures or through ballot initiatives.26 Advocates for minority 
representation are using Section 2 of the VRA somewhat effectively27 where previous 
litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment has not been successful.28 
ii. Electing Candidates of the Minority Community’s Choice 
The VRA, though originally interpreted by the Supreme Court to protect 
against only intentional discrimination with respect to the right to vote, was clarified 
by Congress in 1982 such that today it prohibits systems of election that prevent 
minority communities from electing candidates of their choice.29 The classic example 
of such a system is a town council that elects all of its representatives at large, 
meaning that every voter chooses someone for each of, say, seven positions. The result 
                                                 
22  The expansion was both through the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973aa-6 (1965), and the addition of Section 203 that required election materials to be printed 
in multiple languages in areas where there was a significant community with a common language that 
also spoke English less than well. 
23  Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1, 117 (1975). 
24  Id. at 39–58. 
25  Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-
rights-act (last updated August 8, 2015). 
26  For a full list of restrictive voting laws introduced and passed in 2015, see Voting Laws Roundup 2015, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 3, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-
2015#Restrictive. 
27  See supra text accompanying note 9.  
28  See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
29  52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(b). 
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of at-large systems is that the majority white population, if there is racial polarization 
in voting, will elect all seven members, and the minority community will never be 
able to elect a candidate to the local office. In places where it is possible to divide the 
jurisdiction into single-member districts (SMDs) such that one or more will have a 
majority of minority citizens, Section 2 of the VRA has been interpreted to require 
that SMDs (or another remedy) be implemented.30  
iii. Descriptive Representation 
The VRA says nothing explicitly about descriptive representation, but the 
Senate, in passing the amendments to Section 2 in 1982, added in a list of factors that 
a court must consider as part of the “totality of the circumstances” test. 31 Factor 
seven, in particular, is concerned with descriptive representation: “the extent to 
which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction.”  
In many cases, the VRA’s protection of communities electing candidates of 
their choice has resulted in a protection of descriptive representation because people 
of color have largely been the choice of the minority community and white people have 
largely been the choice of the white community. For example, at the congressional 
level in elections from 1966–96 (the thirty years after the VRA was passed) only 35 
of the 6,667 elections in white majority districts provided Black winners (that is 
0.005%).32 There are more white winners in majority Black or Latino districts than 
this low rate, but not a sufficient amount to threaten the ability of representatives of 
color to be elected at the local, state, and national level. 
iv. Substantive Representation 
Substantive representation can have both an individual representative 
component and a whole legislature/policy outcomes component. With respect to 
individual representatives, the VRA protection of communities of color’s ability to 
elect candidates of their choice should protect substantive representation (if the 
community votes in its self-interest and is able to hold the legislator to account). In 
addition, the Senate factors in the Section 2 amendments to the VRA outline the 
issues that a court should consider as part of the “totality of the circumstances” test 
required by the section. One of the Senate factors requires a court to look at whether 
the relevant minority group bears the effects of discrimination in areas such as 
education, employment, and health.  
Additionally, political scientists have found strong evidence that substantive 
representation follows directly from descriptive representation. For example, Kerry 
L. Haynie finds, in analyzing agenda-setting behavior, that “a legislator’s race tends 
                                                 
30  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
31  See S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 28–29 (1982). 
32  DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 12 (1999). 
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to have a stronger effect on substantive representation than does a legislator’s party 
membership.” 33 
With respect to whole legislature/policy outcomes, the story is somewhat 
different due to the nature of winner-take-all district elections. Whether substantive 
policy outcomes are promoted by the VRA depends on the size and distribution of the 
minority communities and the level of racially polarized voting. 
The need to divide minority representation into a substantive and descriptive 
component reveals how differently the political world is experienced by whites and 
people of color (and hence why it is important to approach the political world with an 
appreciation of racial difference). Since ninety percent of elected officials are white 
(and sixty-five percent are white men),34 a white person will almost never need to 
worry about whether the candidate who will substantively represent him will also 
descriptively represent him.  
C. The Benefits of Minority Representation 
Q: Now why would you come from Crittenden County to participate in a fundraiser for a county 
race that was basically a local race to Philips County? 
 
A: Well, the reason I would come, first of all, there are no blacks elected to a county position in 
eastern Arkansas and no blacks serving in the House of Representatives in eastern Arkansas 
and no blacks elected to anything other than school boards in districts that are predominantly 
black. And I feel like blacks should be elected to public office because they should have a chance 
to serve. 
 
And I want to help get blacks elected so little black children can see them serving and I want 
to dispell (sic) the myth that some white kids might have that blacks can’t serve or shouldn’t 
be serving at the courthouse. And when my little girl goes to the courthouse or when other 
little girls go to the courthouse, I want them to be able to see black people working up there. 
 
And if we can get some blacks elected at the local level, eventually we can—blacks will have 
the expertise and we can groom them to the point where they can run for the state legislature 
and other positions . . . . 
Ben McGee, 198835 
i. Black Americans 
Though the Black community is not homogenous, and Black community groups 
will differ in their support for various policies and laws, it is possible to find a large 
                                                 
33  KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 25, 30 (2001). Haynie 
justifies assessing agenda-setting behavior as a method of assessing substantive representation by 
relying on R. Douglas Arnold’s finding that “analyzing legislator’s bill introductions is often superior to 
a reliance on roll-call votes for attempting to establish a linkage between constituency interests or 
preferences and the legislative behavior of representatives.” Id. at 25. 
34  Do America’s Elected Officials Reflect Our Population?, WHO LEADS US, 
http://wholeads.us/electedofficials/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).  
35  LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 54 (1994) (citing Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F.Supp. 
1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided court, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (trial 
transcript at 654–55)). 
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body of common ground between black citizens on questions of public policy, ideology, 
and candidate choice, and therefore to define “Black interests,” for the purpose of 
studying whether these interests are furthered by an increased presence of black 
legislators, by greater seniority of black legislators, or other practices aimed at 
promoting minority representation. Kerry L. Haynie finds that Black citizens “have 
been the most cohesive and consistent political subgroup in U.S. politics.”36  
This coherence has made it easier for researchers to draw conclusions as to 
whether white or Black representatives are better able to represent the views of the 
Black community. Canon researched thousands of Congressional representatives 
over a thirty-year period and found that  
white representatives from districts that are 30–40 percent Black can largely ignore 
their Black constituents, and many do. Black representatives from districts that are 
30–40 percent white cannot ignore their white constituents because they are operating 
in an institution that is about 86 percent white and a nation that is 82.5 percent white.37  
He concludes that there is “very little support” for the claim that “whites are just as 
able to represent black interests as blacks.”38  
Additionally, Haynie, in analyzing state legislatures, found that Black 
members did not need to be in positions of power (for example, on legislative 
committees) to exert an influence over substantive outcomes, instead “the mere 
presence of African Americans in state legislatures . . . was sufficient to yield 
significant institutional and governmental responsiveness to black interests.”39 
Haynie also examined the introduction of bills by state legislatures and found that 
“the race of the representative has a powerful and statistically significant effect on 
the introduction of traditional civil rights legislation.”40   
A corollary of the Canon and Haynie findings is that “districts with a majority 
black population had no significant impact on whether legislators representing such 
districts introduced black interest legislation.”41 That means that majority-Black 
districts without a Black elected official are not likely to see Black-interest legislation 
introduced on their behalf, even though the minority community voted that 
representative into office. Thus, the candidate of choice of a minority community will 
best represent them substantively if—and only if—that candidate also descriptively 
represents them. There are of course exceptions to this statistical finding: there have 
been and are a small number of majority Black communities that elect white 
candidates to represent them, and those candidates provide substantive 
representation for their communities. Those exceptions do not undercut the link 
between descriptive and substantive representation, but rather should give us hope 
                                                 
36  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 19. 
37  CANON, supra note 32, at 13. 
38  Id. at 12. 
39  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 90.  
40  Id. at 30. 
41  Id.  
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that in a future time it will be possible for all white candidates to represent all of 
their constituents, not just the white ones.  
ii. Latinos 
The Latino community is not as politically cohesive as the Black community, 
largely because of group differences by country of origin, e.g., Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
and Cuba.42 This makes it difficult to assess whether on the whole, the Latino 
community is able to get “what it wants” because there is no “it.”  
However, it is possible to assess whether Latinos are more likely to get the 
outcomes they desire than white Americans. It has been shown that, in Congress, 
Latinos, like Black Americans, are less likely to have policies implemented that they 
care about when their representatives are white, with the exception of districts that 
are over fifty percent Latino and represented by white members.43 In the latter case, 
Latinos are as likely to have their policies represented by their congressional 
members as the whites in that district.44 Thus, having a Latino representative 
generally leads to substantive representation for Latinos. 
For Latinos (as well as Blacks), the substantive representation that results 
from descriptive representation also goes beyond just being more generally liberal. 
An analysis of voting patterns in several Congresses shows that “rather than simply 
greater intensity on a liberal-conservative spectrum, which generally emphasizes 
economic/class cleavages, minority representatives see a second, racial dimension of 
policies as highly salient.”45 This finding also tends to discredit those who say that 
substantive representation for minorities can be achieved by simply increasing the 
number of liberal representatives in office. White representatives—even liberal 
ones—do not have the “sense of racially ‘linked fate’” or “personal experience with 
discrimination” to draw upon, which shows up in how they vote.46 
iii. Asian Americans 
Though the Asian American community does not share a common history, 
language, or country of origin, political scientists conclude that an “Asian American 
identity does exist and frequently works as a collective group.”47 Unlike Black 
                                                 
42  See JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT 51 (2008). 
43  See id. at 197. 
44  See id. 
45  Robert R. Preuhs & Rodney E. Hero, A Different Kind of Representation: Black and Latino Descriptive 
Representation and the Role of Ideological Cuing, 64 POL. RES. Q. 157, 157–71 (2011). 
46  See id. at 158, 160. Preuhs and Hero used a measure of how liberal a representative was (the DW 
NOMINATE score) along with scores on race issues from the NAACP (for Blacks) and NHLA (National 
Hispanic Leadership Council) to analyze voting patterns. They found that for white liberals, the DW 
NOMINATE score was highly explanatory of voting patterns whereas for Black and Latino 
representatives, the scores from NAACP and NHLA indicating how sensitive a candidate is to minority 
issues were far more predictive of representatives votes on certain issues. Id. 
47  Neilan Chaturvedi, Responding to Silence: Asian American Representation through Bill Sponsorship 
and Co-Sponsorship (2011 Annual Meeting Paper), AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 5–6 (last revised Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902228. 
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Americans and Latinos, Asian Americans, though exhibiting a reasonable level of 
political cohesion, largely do not exhibit party loyalty.48 
An example of Asian political cohesion is the fight to keep an Asian 
neighborhood together during a redistricting process in New York in the 1990s. 
Latinos challenged the Twelfth Congressional District in New York, and a group of 
Asian Americans intervened to argue that the redrawn district should not split up 
their community.49 The community was defined by common neighborhoods, language, 
level of education, employment in similar industries, use of public transport, and 
immigration status.50 The Court found this argument compelling, and the first 
constitutionally permissible Asian-influence district was formed. The district 
remains a multi-racial opportunity district (with 40% Latino and 20% Asian 
American population).51  
When there are common interests amongst Asian American groups,52 it is 
possible to study whether Asian American legislators effectively represent those 
interests, and it has been found that they do, indeed, further such interests. 53 
iv. Minority Representatives as Role Models 
Guinier explains role model theory as Black representatives “who convey the 
message ‘We Have Overcome’ and inspire those not yet overcoming. Thus, in general, 
Black role models are powerful symbolic reference points for those worried about the 
continued legacy of past discrimination.”54  
The most prominent example of a candidate of color inspiring others is, of 
course, President Obama. The ability of a Black man to be elected to the highest office 
in the land conveys the message to Black children everywhere that they too can do 
great things even though they may experience racism along the way. Similarly, 
Senator Daniel Inouye served as a role model to a generation of Japanese 
Americans,55 as did Mayor Villaraigosa, Senator Rubio, and Congressman Castro for 
Latinos. 
 
 
                                                 
48  See Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspective from the 
Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 739, 764 n.163 (2001) (“Political cohesion around candidates can be 
discerned, but party loyalty is largely absent.”). 
49  Id. at 766–67. 
50  See id. at 766–67. 
51  New York’s 12th Congressional District in the 1990s is now the 7th District, and is still represented by 
Nydia Vela ́squez. The District is 43% Latino and 19% Asian according to the 2013 American 
Community Survey estimates. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2013 American Community Survey (2013), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml. 
52  See Magpantay, supra note 48, at 768 (explaining that communities of interest can be identified within 
the Asian American community). 
53  See Chaturvedi, supra note 47, at 20 (“Asian American legislators represent Asian Americans well.”). 
54  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 57. 
55  See Paul Watanabe, Remembrance: Daniel Inouye Was My Role Model, COGNOSCENTI (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2012/12/20/daniel-inouye-paul-watanabe. 
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v. Improved Civic Participation by People of Color 
In 1965, Black voter registration rates were as low as 6.7% in some states.56 
This was the intended outcome of the white power structure in place. Following the 
adoption of the VRA, voter registration rates increased. Voter turnout also largely 
followed a similar trajectory. Guinier theorized in 1994 that this is because there is a 
key role that “group identity plays in mobilizing political participation and 
influencing legislative policy.”57 She noted also that: “blacks can be encouraged to 
participate in the political process, the possibility of electing a ‘first’ Black tends to 
increase election day turnout. Indeed, the courts and commentators have recognized 
that the inability to elect Black candidates depresses black political participation.”58  
Studies of each of the minority groups under consideration bear out this 
hypothesis. For Blacks, this effect was dramatically illustrated in the 2008 election 
where black turnout eclipsed that of white turnout for the first time,59 likely because 
Black voters wanted to elect the first black President. Additionally, political scientists 
have found a link between the election of black mayors and greater Black political 
participation.60 
For Latinos, a study of Southern California over five years shows that Latino 
voter turnout increases when Latino voters have a chance to elect their candidate of 
choice out of a majority-minority district.61 That boost to turnout increases with each 
additional overlapping district where electing a Latino is possible: the highest 
turnout came from Latino voters who lived in overlapping majority-minority districts 
for State Assembly, State Senate, and U.S. House of Representatives.62 
For Asian Americans, Taofang Huang finds that Asian Americans are more 
likely to vote when an Asian American is a candidate, particularly when the 
candidate’s ties to a specific Asian country are a prominent part of his or her 
presentation during a campaign.63 
It seems likely that, beyond mayoral races, increased minority representation 
at the local level will drive minority civic participation. For example, each additional 
Latino majority-minority district increases turnout by the Latino community. Thus, 
descriptive representation should increase substantive representation on both ends; 
the elected official is more likely to take the interests of the minority community 
                                                 
56  Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/intro_c.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
57  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 57. 
58  Id. at 58. 
59  See Thom File, The Diversifying Electorate—Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2012 (and 
Other Recent Elections), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2013), 
http://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/demo/p20-568.pdf. 
60  See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, CHANGING WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 1 (2007). 
61  Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of Majority—Minority 
Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004). 
62  Id. 
63  See Taofang Huang, Electing One of Our Own: Descriptive Representation of Asian Americans (2010 
Annual Meeting Paper), W. POL. SCI. ASS’N 2, 21, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580953 (last revised Mar. 31, 2010).  
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seriously and the community will become more engaged, mobilized, and better able 
to hold that representative accountable.  
vi. Confidence in Government 
Jane Mansbridge explains the connection between increased descriptive 
representation, legitimacy, and confidence in government: 
Seeing proportional numbers of members of their group exercising the responsibility 
of ruling with full status in the legislature can enhance de facto legitimacy by making 
citizens, and particularly members of historically underrepresented groups, feel as if 
they themselves were present in the deliberations.64 
Haynie and Guinier accept this argument, but they clarify that they believe 
descriptive representatives will only contribute a basic level of trust in political 
institutions if the minority members actually speak for the communities from which 
they come.65  
The benefit of an increased confidence in government will not necessarily only 
be felt by members of the relevant minority community but may also increase the 
confidence of elected officials that they have made decisions based on the views of the 
entire community, rather than just the white majority. There is also a possibility that 
this confidence could flow over to white voters themselves if they believe that all 
community members are having their voices heard on local decision-making bodies. 
 
vii. Changing Attitudes to Minority Legislators and Minority 
Community Members 
There is some evidence that Black political leadership can help to break down 
the “myth that some white kids might have that Blacks [and other minority 
candidates] can’t serve or shouldn’t be serving.”66 For example, Zoltan Hajnal shows 
that “the transition from white to Black leadership frequently leads to notable shifts 
in white attitudes and behavior.”67 Hajnal argues that this shift in behavior occurs 
where information about the Black political leadership is credible and widely 
disseminated such that the white community perceive their black leader to have real 
                                                 
64  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 114 (citing Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women 
Represent Women? A Contingent Yes, 61 J. POL. 628, 650 (1999)). 
65  HAYNIE, supra note 33, at 114. 
66  Id. at 63. 
67  HAJNAL, supra note 60, at 7. Unfortunately, Hajanal finds exceptions to his rule, and Chicago is one of 
the notable exceptions: “Although Black representation in most cases leads to decreased racial tension 
and greater acceptance of Black incumbents, there are a select number of cities where racial tension 
remains high, voting continues to be highly racially polarized, and few new white voters begin to 
support Black leaders despite years under Black leadership . . . . Chicago represents perhaps the most 
famous case of ongoing white resistance.” Id. at 123 (though Hajnal can explain the unique 
circumstances that set Chicago out from other cities). 
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control over outcomes and policies, and white community members are therefore 
more likely to reduce their negative attitudes to black leadership.  
At the congressional level, some studies on white voting behavior following 
Black leadership support Hajnal’s findings,68 but some find the opposite result, with 
whites being eight to ten percent less likely to support Black incumbents than white 
incumbents.69 Despite this finding, the number of Black congressional 
representatives that represent majority white districts has increased from zero in 
1960 to six in 2000, representing sixteen percent of all Black representatives.70  
Though change in the level of racially polarized voting is slow, it seems change has 
indeed followed from increased examples of Black leadership (in both majority white 
and majority Black communities). 
The number of Latino and Asian American representatives has only started to 
grow in the past three decades, but the data so far suggest that white voters respond 
to Latino and Asian American leadership positively. Hajnal finds “there does appear 
to be a pattern of changing white behavior in response to experience with Latino 
elected officials. The evidence is clearer for whites who experience Latino leadership 
than it is for whites who live under Asian American incumbents but in both cases 
there are signs that white Americans are learning.”71  
The effect of minority political leadership on white racial attitudes is therefore 
one of caution and hope. Though minority representation “cannot solve all or even 
most of America’s racial ills . . . if it can begin to reduce racial divisions in the political 
arena, then it is a goal well worth pursuing.”72 
viii. Minority Representation and the Representation of Women 
Focusing on minority representation gives us a chance to explore “the 
interaction and coalition formation that may occur between women and 
minority groups with corresponding interests” and to find ways to advance 
representation for both of these underrepresented groups of people.73  
A finding that reveals corresponding interests is that the improvement in 
minority representation over the past few years has largely been driven by 
women of color. This is particularly true for black elected officials. For example, 
in 2001, the increase in Black elected officials in office was entirely due to the 
increase in Black women in office. Since 1998, the number of Black men has 
actually decreased, and overall (from 1970–2005) black female elected officials 
                                                 
68  Id. at 145. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 146. 
71  ZOLTAN HAJNAL, AMERICA’S UNVEVEN DEMOCRACY 153 (2010). 
72  Id. at 161. 
73  Michael D. Minta, Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Political Representation in the United States, 8 POL.& 
GENDER 541, 544 (2012). 
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increased twenty-fold while black male elected officials increased only four-
fold.74  
The fights for gender and racial/ethnic equality should be seen as 
connected because achieving minority representation is not just about 
narrowly satisfying the interests of some racial groups. Rather, it is grounded 
in a view of democracy that says that all of those who are historically or 
currently disempowered still deserve respect and recognition. This connection 
has been important in the advances of racial and gender justice: the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s was dominated by discussions of race, but coalition 
building allowed protections for gender to be included in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.75 
II. MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Now that we have set the boundaries for our discussion of what constitutes 
minority representation and why we may desire to increase it, let us turn our 
attention to local government representation in particular. The starkest recent 
example of the importance of local government in the fight for racial equality comes 
from Ferguson, Missouri. 
Many will remember Ferguson only for the shooting and killing of an unarmed, 
Black teenager, Michael Brown, by a white police officer in 2014.76 A large part of the 
blame for this terrible event was rightly attributed to the racially discriminatory 
culture within the Ferguson Police Department. 77 But there are deeper issues. 
Ferguson, along with St. Louis, is highly segregated not only in housing patterns, but 
also in the distribution of local power.78 Although Ferguson’s population is majority 
Black, it is run by a white mayor and a white police chief, with a police department 
known for brutality against Black79 youth and racist conduct by police officers.  
While Ferguson is over sixty-seven percent Black, its city council included only 
one Black member out of six seats.80 In addition, seventy-seven percent of students 
                                                 
74  Carol Hardy-Fanta et al., Race, Gender, and Descriptive Representation: An Exploratory View of 
Multicultural Elected Leadership in the United States 6 (Sep. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the American Political Science Association). 
75  See Minta, supra note 73, at 544–45. 
76  See, e.g., Editorial, The Death of Michael Brown: Racial History Behind the Ferguson Protests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racial-history-behind-the-ferguson-
protests.html (last visited Aug. 2016). 
77  See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. CIVIL RTS. DIV., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
78  See The Death of Michael Brown, supra note 76. 
79  This report uses “Black” rather than African American to ensure that people without slave ancestry but 
who still hail from Africa are included in the analysis.  The Census Bureau uses both terms in its work. 
This report capitalizes “Black” because the terms Latino and Asian are also usually capitalized. 
80  Karen Shanton, The Problem of African American Underrepresentation on Local Councils, DEMOS.ORG, 
http://www.demos.org/publication/problem-african-american-underrepresentation-city-councils (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
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in the Ferguson-Florissant School District are Black,81 yet only one school board 
member out of seven total was Black.82 City councils, school boards, and other local 
government systems can influence city agencies and the allocation of resources in 
many important ways. For example, if Ferguson’s city council looked like Ferguson 
itself, it could choose to ensure that the police force is racially diverse, better trained 
to understand racial justice issues, and held accountable for racially disparate 
treatment and racially discriminatory conduct. 
The situation on the ground in Ferguson serves to highlight a truth about local 
governments across our country: they control many aspects of our daily lives, not just 
criminal law but also many other policy areas that are crucial for the civil rights 
agenda. Local government decisions can affect whether a community is integrated,83 
whether public employees include people of color,84 whether police target people 
based on race,85 whether schools disproportionately suspend and expel Black 
students,86 whether food deserts exist,87 whether minority-owned businesses can 
thrive,88 whether people of color’s right to vote is disproportionately burdened,89 
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(reporting on Fresno’s disparate expulsion referrals for people of color). 
87  Governor Pat Quinn appropriated $10 million to go to cities, towns, and villages across Illinois to 
address the problem of food deserts. City council members had to apply to receive that money, and 
some used the media in that lobbying effort. Landon Cassaman, Rockford ‘“Food Desert” Seeks State 
Funding, WIFR.COM (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.wifr.com/home/headlines/Rockford-Food-
Desert-Seeks-State-Funding-164970226.html. 
88  For example, Chicago has a Minority and Women-Owned Business (e.g., (M/WBE)) Certification 
Program that provides contracting opportunities to M/WBE certified companies. Businesses & 
Professionals, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/ofinterest/bus/mwdbe.html (last 
visited March 12, 2015). 
89  For example, the Department of Justice was asked to investigate the placement of voting machines in 
Franklin County.  The DOJ found that more registered voters were allocated to a single machine in 
predominantly Black precincts, and less registered voters per machine in predominantly white 
precincts (the amount of actual voters for each machine did not show a discriminatory impact).  Dan 
Tokaji, DOJ: No Discrimination in Ohio Election, MORTIZ COLLEGE OF LAW: ELECTION LAW @ MORTIZ 
BLOG (July 5, 2005), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2005/07/doj-no-discrimination-in-ohio-
election.html. In addition, decisions on the allocation of voting machines and election judges can affect 
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whether first-time offenders are prosecuted for felonies under the criminal justice 
system,90 and where for-profit detention centers will be located,91 to name a few 
examples.  
Local governments are often overlooked and understudied compared with 
federal or state governments when it comes to civil rights protections. Local 
governments contribute to whether we make our society a place where people can 
thrive economically, politically, and socially, regardless of their race or ethnicity, or 
whether people of color will face an uphill battle just to live, work, and be educated. 
Local governments are at the forefront of civil rights issues, and so it is at that level 
that we should be trying to ensure that minority communities are fairly represented. 
Unlike Congress and state legislatures, which can contain many hundreds of 
legislators, local school boards and city councils are usually comprised of five to fifteen 
members. Adding even a single minority voice to the deliberations of a small body can 
help the rest of the members better understand issues from the perspective of the 
minority community, and that member can raise issues or introduce motions for a 
vote, without needing to have the support in a legislative committee. Thus, the 
introduction of one or more people of color to a local council has the potential to make 
a larger difference at the local level than at the state or congressional level. 
 
A. Descriptive Representation at the Local Level May Increase Descriptive 
Representation at the National Level 
Even if one’s ultimate goal is to improve state or federal minority 
representation, local minority representation is still fundamentally important to that 
end. Local government representation by minority candidates can “build the bench” 
of candidates for higher office. Minority representatives at the federal level are more 
likely than their White peers to ascend through the political ranks by first serving as 
local elected officials.  
An analysis of the background of the House members in the 114th Congress 
found that while twenty-two percent of White representatives started their political 
careers as elected representatives in local government, representatives of color were 
                                                 
the length of lines in predominantly Black and white communities. In the 2012 election, Black and 
Latino voters waited in lines 2 and 1.5 times as long as white voters. Charles Stewart III & Stephen 
Ansolabehere, Waiting in Line to Vote, SUPPORT THE VOTER 11 (July 28, 2013), 
https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Waiting-in-Line-to-Vote-White-Paper-Stewart-
Ansolabehere.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2016). 
90  The Cook County State’s Attorney is an elected position in local government.  In March 2011, the Cook 
County State’s Attorney implemented a Deferred Prosecution Program to attempt to divert first time 
offenders from the justice system. Deferred Prosecution Program, TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SAFE 
COMMUNITIES, http://www2.tasc.org/program/deferred-prosecution-program (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
91  The Corrections Corporation of America sought to build a for-profit immigration prison in Joliet in 
2013.  In order for that to go ahead, the Joliet City Council had to approve a special use permit. Ashlee 
Rezin, Pressure Against Joliet’s Proposed For-Profit Immigrant Detention Center Escalates, PROGRESS 
ILL. (May 16, 2013, 7:11 PM), http://www.progressillinois.com/quick-hits/content/2013/05/16/pressure-
against-joliets-proposed-profit-immigrant-detention-center-es. 
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much more likely to have started in local government: 29% percent of Asian American 
representatives, 38% of Black representatives (over 1.5 times as many as white 
representatives), and 44% of Latino representatives (double the number of white 
representatives) started their political careers as local government representatives.92 
This disparity holds specifically for people of color: there is little difference by 
gender (twenty-five percent of male and female representatives started in local 
elected office) and party (twenty-one percent of white Republicans and twenty-four 
percent of white Democrats started in local elected office). 
Therefore, improving local minority representation could create a cadre of 
trained representatives of color that are ready to go on to state and national office to 
represent the interests of their communities. In addition, the reluctance of white 
voters to vote for Black candidates breaks down (even if only to some extent) after 
experiencing Black leadership.93  Thus, the opportunities for local Black candidates 
to get elected to higher office, even if the higher offices are not majority-minority 
communities, improves.  
B. Descriptive Representation Improves Substantive Representation at the 
Local Level 
Descriptive representation for people of color at the local level has the potential 
to significantly improve the lives of communities of color.  
At the county level, a minority commissioner can influence whether services 
and administrative positions will be distributed equitably. For example, in Chilton 
County, Alabama, during the late 1980s, the county decided which roads got paved 
and re-paved (as many county boards do). Their system was ad-hoc and resulted in 
the all-white board of commissioners prioritizing white neighborhoods. Once Bobby 
Agee, the county’s first Black commissioner, was elected in 1988, he was able to 
implement a systematic and objective way to determine which roads got paved.94 As 
a result, Black communities had their roads paved (and the overall process was more 
responsive to community needs). The county board also has the power to suggest and 
appoint administrative personnel. After Bobby Agee was elected, Black 
representatives were appointed by the county board to administrative board 
positions.95 
At the municipal level, descriptive representation for Black Americans has led 
to an improvement in police and social welfare policies for the Black community. 
Having a Black mayor is consistently associated with an increase in the number of 
Black officers on the police force.96 A Black mayor also makes it more likely that there 
                                                 
92  All research for this small study was conducted by the author. 
93  See HAJNAL, supra note 60, at 160–63. (“[B]lack mayoral leadership [can] . . .  change white voting 
behavior, [and] also [] alter white racial attitudes.”). 
94  LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE, 259–60 (1998). 
95  Id. 
96  See Daniel J. Hopkins & Katherine T. McCabe, After It’s Too Late: Estimating the Policy Impacts of Black 
Mayoralties in U.S. Cities, 40 AM. POL. RES. 665, 665–700 (2012); see also Jihong Zhao, Ni He & Nicholas 
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are police department policies that aim to improve the relationship between police 
and the over-policed Black communities, such as citizen accountability boards.97 
Black descriptive representation also leads to better responsiveness of social service 
agencies to the needs of the Black community, particularly when the program 
managers and the representatives engage in community networking and learning.98  
And, at the school board level, school boards that include Latino 
representatives are more likely to hire Latino school administrators, such as 
principals and superintendents, who, in turn, hire more Latino teachers. 
Qualitative99 and quantitative100 studies, including randomized experiments,101 find 
that the academic achievement of Latinos, as well as non-Latinos, increases when a 
school has Latino teachers. In addition, a majority of Latinos would prefer for their 
children to have more Latino teachers.102  
III. IMPROVING LOCAL MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
If we accept that improving minority representation at the local level is a valid 
goal, then how are we to achieve this improvement? Perhaps everything appears to 
be able to be changed by litigation or legislative change if one is a lawyer (much like 
a hammer sees everything as a nail), but I believe that there are great strides to be 
made through these two methods. The third, complementary, and in many ways a 
sine qua non of legal change, method is to engage in community organizing. That is 
beyond the scope of my expertise though, so I will leave it to others to comment on 
the best ways to integrate community organizing into a fully-fledged litigation and 
legislative advocacy campaign.  
A. Litigating over minority vote dilution 
The difficulty with using litigation to develop solutions to a complex problem 
like minority representation is that an impact case will set a precedent based on a 
unique factual scenario and with a single or limited set of remedies. In the case of 
minority representation, Thornburg v. Gingles was a watershed for minority 
representation because it set the floor—a base level of representation of people of 
color in the halls of power—below which the country would not return.103 
                                                 
Lovrich, Predicting the Employment of Minority Officers in U.S. Cities: OLS Fixed- Effect Panel Model 
Results for African American and Latino Officers for 1993, 1996, and 2000, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 377, 377–
79 (2005), http://nuweb.neu.edu/nhe/race and police emp.pdf. 
97  See Grace Hall Saltzstein, Black Mayors and Police Policies, 51 J. POL. 525, 525–44 (1989).  
98  See Belinda Creel Davis, Michelle Livermore & Younghee Lim, The Extended Reach of Minority 
Political Power: The Interaction of Descriptive Representation, Managerial Networking, and Race, 73 J. 
POL. 494, 497 (2011). 
99  David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Latino Education: The 
Biases of At-Large Elections, 66 J. POL. 1224, 1229–30 (2004). 
100  Id. at 1230–31. 
101  Id. at 1230. 
102  Id. at 1224. 
103  478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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Unfortunately, Gingles has also come to represent a ceiling. That ceiling prevents the 
adoption of an election system that would allow for fairer representation for people of 
color. 
The concept of vote dilution was recognized as a constitutional harm in the 
“one person, one vote” (OPOV) Supreme Court cases of the 1960s.104 The Court found 
that an individual’s vote could be diluted if she was in an election district that had a 
huge disparity in population to another district for election to the same legislature. 
For example, in Baker v. Carr, districts for the state legislature in the urban centers 
of Tennessee had ten times the number of people as districts in rural areas.105 This 
meant that a voter in an urban district had one-tenth the voting power of a voter in a 
rural area. The court labeled the requirement of rough population equality106 a OPOV 
requirement:  
[A]ll who participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, 
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever 
their home may be . . . . The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes 
no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic 
qualifications.107 
The OPOV requirement recognizes that an individual’s vote can be diluted by the size 
of election districts. Minority vote dilution operates in a similar, but more complex 
way than individual vote dilution, and it describes a group rather than an individual 
harm.108 As Pamela S. Karlan explains, “[u]nlike the white suburban plaintiffs in 
Reynolds whose voting strength was diluted because of where they lived, the political 
power of Black citizens is diluted because of who they are.”109 
Thus, in 1971, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, a group of Black voters in Indiana 
argued that vote dilution could also occur based on race, rather than geography. 110 
The plaintiffs argued that by electing multiple legislators in the Marion County area 
using at-large elections, the Black community was left with “almost no political force 
                                                 
104  See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
105  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 253–267 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
106  The OPOV started as a rough population equality measure, but later was changed to require a 
population deviation of no more than one person for each congressional district (and at the state 
legislative and local level, the population requirement only allowed that the largest and smallest 
districts deviated by no more than 10%). See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–41 (1983) 
(regarding congressional districts); Larios v. Cox, 305 F. Supp. 2d. 1335, 1337 (2004), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 
2806 (2004) (citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (regarding state legislative 
districts)). 
107  Gray, 372 U.S. at 379–80. 
108  The concept of minority vote dilution was first hinted at in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), but 
not relied upon by the appellees, and so it was only briefly addressed by Justice Brennan writing for 
the Court. Id. at 439 (“It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency 
apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or 
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”). 
109  Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 174 (1989). 
110  403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
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or control over legislators because the effect of their vote [was] cancelled out by other 
contrary interest groups.”111 The problem with winner-take-all, at-large elections 
(those where fifty-one percent of the community can elect one hundred percent of the 
representatives) is that “a slim majority of voters has the power to deny 
representation to all others.”112 The Court declined to find that there was in fact a 
constitutional violation caused by the use of at-large districts in Indiana, but it left 
open the question of whether, in the right factual scenario, the rights of minority 
voters might be diluted. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs from Texas, in White v. Regester, convinced the 
Supreme Court that there was invidious discrimination in the drawing of the Texas 
legislative redistricting plan in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 113 The plaintiffs showed that “the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the 
group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in 
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their 
choice.”114 The court analyzed a number of practices that prevent political 
participation by Black voters in Dallas County and Latino voters in Bexar County. 
These included party slating, poll taxes, cultural barriers, and the use of multi-
member districts (MMDs) with at-large, winner-take-all plurality voting. 
Another set of plaintiffs tried to build on the theory of minority vote dilution 
as caused by at-large voting in MMDs from Regester to argue that such dilution was 
occurring in the city of Mobile, Alabama. In Mobile v. Bolden, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and Section 2 of the VRA, were 
violated by the City Commission’s election system that elected the three-person 
Commission at-large, thereby denying the Black population (that constituted 35.4% 
of the total population) the ability to elect a single candidate. 115 The Court held that 
there was no difference between the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, 
and found that both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not violated 
because a showing of purposeful discrimination was required for each, and such a 
purpose was not shown.116  
The holding in Bolden appeared to make it all but impossible for plaintiffs to 
overturn redistricting plans or election systems that diluted the minority vote. As 
Chandler Davidson describes, in the context of an attempted minority vote dilution 
case in the town of Taylor, Texas (where, despite high Latino turnouts in elections 
                                                 
111  Id. at 129. 
112  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/assets/Racial-Minority-Representation-Booklet.pdf (last visited Mar. 
14, 2015). 
113  412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973). 
114  Id. at 766. 
115  446 U.S. 55, 58–59 (1980). 
116  Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66–68 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
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and Latino candidates running regularly for office between 1967 and 1974, no 
candidate that was the choice of the minority community was elected): 
The decision presented serious problems to the plaintiffs in Taylor, whose at-large 
system had been established in 1914. The files of the local newspaper only went back 
to the 1930s, and official city documents relating to the charter revision shed no light 
on the motives for the change. After much soul searching, the plaintiffs withdrew the 
suit, at the cost of three years of trial preparation, dashing the minorities lingering 
hopes that the U.S. Constitution might provide them relief.117 
The difficulties Bolden created were foremost on the minds of legislators when 
they amended Section 2 of the VRA in 1982. Congress added paragraph (b) to Section 
2 that explained that Section 2(a) could be violated if a “totality of circumstances” test 
was met, rather than the more stringent purposeful discrimination test of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The totality of the circumstances test means 
that plaintiffs can present evidence that an election system in effect dilutes the 
minority vote, along with examples of other types of racial discrimination that occur 
in the jurisdiction, rather than having to show that the particular election system 
was adopted with a racially discriminatory purpose. 
The amended Section 2 was used effectively in litigation immediately after 
1982, with the seminal case of Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986 establishing a three-part 
test that plaintiffs could meet in order to prove a Section 2 violation even if they could 
not prove that an election system was instituted for the purpose of discriminating 
with respect to voting on the basis of race. The Gingles test requires the racial, ethnic, 
or language minority group to prove that it is: 
(1) sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district; 
(2) politically cohesive; and 
(3) in the absence of special circumstances, that bloc voting by the white 
majority usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidate.118 
The Court will also look at factors identified by the Senate in the 1982 
amendment of Section 2. These factors clarify the “totality of circumstances” 
requirement in Section 2.119 Modern legal strategies to overcome minority vote 
dilution must still operate within the Gingles framework. However, this does not 
mean that the remedy imposed in Gingles (majority-minority SMDs with winner-
take-all plurality voting) must be applied wherever a Section 2 violation occurs. In 
addition, Section 2 litigation is not the only strategy that can be used to remove 
                                                 
117  Chandler Davison, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1, 2 (Chandler 
Davidson ed., 1984). 
118  Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 49–51. 
119  The list of Senate factors and a brief discussion of how they are used in litigation is available here: 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
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minority vote dilution. The remainder of this section compares the Gingles remedy to 
other election systems used in the United States to prevent minority vote dilution.  
B. Remedying Minority Vote Dilution: The Problem of Majority-Minority 
SMDs 
The benefits of the Gingles remedy are most clear where the fact scenario is 
similar to that in Gingles. That is, where an “at-large scheme consistently, 
systematically dilutes the voting strength of a geographically isolated racial or ethnic 
minority.”120 There are multiple reasons why this particular scenario is becoming less 
common, and therefore why systems other than majority-minority SMDs are more 
likely to protect the voting rights of racial and ethnic minorities. These reasons are 
discussed below. 
i. Decreasing Residential Segregation 
America is becoming less residentially segregated.121 
The movement of people of color into relatively white suburban areas causes 
those suburbs to become more diverse (in that they include people of multiple races 
and ethnicities) but not necessarily residentially integrated.  
Many of the areas that have new populations of color still have almost entirely 
white representation at the school board or local government level. In many cases 
this is because at-large districts are used to elect the local board. For example, the 
Hanover Park, Illinois, town council is all white, yet forty-four percent of the 
population is Black, Latino, or Asian American. 
The consequence of reduced segregation is that majority-minority SMDs 
cannot be drawn to protect the voting rights of people of color. The Gingles remedy 
only protects geographically compact minority communities. As long as people of color 
do not make up a majority of new neighborhoods and racially polarized voting 
persists,122 there will be no minority representation on local representative bodies. 
ii. Irregular Town Boundaries 
Unlike county boundaries, which are mostly square in Illinois, and school 
board boundaries, which are also fairly smooth, town boundaries are often uneven, 
winding in and out of communities, along some roads and not others, and very often 
including unincorporated areas within the town boundary. In order to keep SMDs as 
contiguous as possible (it may not be possible if the town itself is non-contiguous), 
                                                 
120  Jim Blacksher & Larry Menefee, At-Large Elections and One Person, One Vote: The Search for the 
Meaning of Racial Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 203, 233 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). 
121  Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 1343–48.  
122  Racially polarized voting occurs when one racial or ethnic minority group prefers one candidate or set of 
candidates and a different racial or ethnic minority group prefers different candidates.  For example in 
Alabama in 2012, white voters voted for President Obama at a rate of about eight percent, while Black 
voters voted for the President at a rate of around ninety-eight percent.  This represents a huge polarity 
in voting preferences by race. 
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district boundaries can only be drawn in certain ways, which can prevent the drawing 
of majority-minority districts. 
iii. Lack of Minority Voting Cohesion 
There are a number of cities or school boards that have a combined minority 
population over fifty percent and yet, in at-large elections, all of the elected officials 
are white. It may be that minority voter turnout is lower than that of white voters. 
However, it could also be that the minority communities do not vote together to elect 
candidates of choice, so if the plurality of voters are white and vote cohesively, they 
will be able to elect all of the candidates for the local board. 
iv. Low Turnout or Lack of Candidates 
There are some city councils and school boards that are majority-minority or 
even plurality Black or Latino, and yet they continue to elect an all-white council or 
board. An explanation for this is lower voter turnout by the minority community. The 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies notes that minority turnout in local 
elections is worse than white turnout (this does not always hold for federal general 
elections).123 As long as this situation continues, even with cumulative or ranked 
choice voting, it will be hard to improve minority representation. 
v. The Problem of Prison-Based Gerrymandering 
Prison-based gerrymandering occurs because prisoners are counted at their 
prison addresses by the U.S. Census Bureau, but they cannot actually vote. Thus, if 
a district is drawn to include a nearby prison, it will consist of far fewer actual eligible 
voters than a neighboring district (though they have the same total population). The 
most egregious example in the country is in the city of Anamosa, Iowa, where each 
City Council ward has around 1,370 people, but one ward has 1,321 prisoners and 58 
non-prisoners. This means that 58 people have the voting power of 1,370 for the city 
council.124  
In Illinois, the biggest distortion of prison gerrymandering occurs because sixty 
percent of the prison population comes from Cook County, yet ninety-nine percent of 
the population is housed and counted in districts outside of Cook County.125 This 
leads to less comparative urban representation and greater rural representation.  
vi. Growing Minority Populations 
                                                 
123  KHALILAH BROWN-DEAN, ZOLTAN HAJNAL, CHRISTINA RIVERS & ISMAIL WHITE, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. & 
ECON. STUD., 50 YEARS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: THE STATE OF RACE IN POLITICS 12–14, 
http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/VRA%20report%2C%208.5.15%20%28540%20pm%29%28update
d%29.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
124  See Prison Gerrymandering Project, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001). 
125  Id. 
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The Census only occurs every ten years and it is usually accompanied by 
redistricting (except where at-large elections with winner-take-all voting is used), but 
throughout the decade people move, citizens turn eighteen, and residents are 
naturalized. If fair representation systems are used, then the election system can 
ensure that as soon as a minority community is large enough to elect a candidate of 
their choice, they can do so. If at-large systems are used, then the jurisdiction does 
not need to change to SMDs or move district boundaries until it is sued under Section 
2 of the VRA or until the next census is released.  
vii. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Black Population 
Many researchers have found that district-based elections increase Black 
representation when they replace winner-take-all at-large systems.126 Despite this, 
there are three main criticisms leveled at majority-minority districts for the Black 
community. First, as a matter of substantive representation, packing Black voters, 
who are predominantly Democratic, into single districts can create districts in the 
surrounding areas that are more Republican, resulting in the election of more 
Republicans to the legislature, which may be less likely to support the interests of 
the Black community.127 Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran found in 1996 that the 
1990 round of congressional redistricting’s focus on using majority-minority districts 
to ensure that communities of color could elect candidates of choice diluted the 
minority influence in surrounding areas and led to “an overall decrease in support for 
minority sponsored legislation.”128  
Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran believe that if SMDS are used, there is a 
tradeoff between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting 
legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community.  Their finding held 
true in the South, where they determined the optimal minority population in any 
district to be forty-seven percent (rather than over fifty percent as has been imposed 
                                                 
126   See Richard Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the 
Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344, 
344–54 (1981); Richard Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Underrepresentation of Blacks on City 
Councils, 44 J. POL. 1088, 1089 (1982). See also Theodore Robinson & Thomas Dye, Reformism and 
Black Representation on City Councils, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 133, 136–37 (1978); Joseph Stewart, Robert 
England & Kenneth Meier, Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to 
Office Classroom, 42 W. POL. Q. 287, 291(1989); ALBERT KARNIG & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK 
REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY 134–49 (1980); see generally Richard Engstrom & Michael 
McDonald, The Effect of At-Large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. 
Municipalities, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 203, 203–25 (G. Bernard & A 
Lijphart eds., 1986).  
127  See, e.g., Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts 
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 795 (1996) (finding 
a tradeoff “between maximizing the number of Black representatives in Congress and maximizing the 
number of votes in favor of minority-sponsored legislation”); David Epstein et al., Estimating the Effect 
of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation, 23 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 499, 505–06 (2007); 
Christine L. Sharpe & James C. Garand, Race, Roll Calls, and Redistricting: The Impact of Race-Based 
Redistricting on Congressional Roll-Call, 54 POL. RES. Q. 31, 44 (2001). 
128  Cameron et al., supra note 127, at 794.  
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by the Courts in Section 2 cases).129 Outside of the South, they found that 
“substantive minority representation is best served by distributing Black voters 
equally among all districts.”130 
A second criticism of majority-minority districts, articulated, by Professor 
Abigail Thernstrom, is that a preoccupation with creating majority Black districts 
entrenches the racial segregation of minority voters. Thernstrom argues that 
“minority representation might actually be increased not by raising the number of 
black officeholders [elected from Black districts] but by increasing the number of 
officeholders, black or white, who have to appeal to blacks to win.”131 
A version of this argument has been made by Professor Lani Guinier, who 
argues that “single-member districts may aggravate the isolation of the black 
representative”132 and possibly even lead to Black representatives being viewed as 
tokens that let the white majority feel that their role in the winning coalition has 
greater value.133 
In addition to opposing the tokenism of minority representation, Guinier 
highlights that the purpose of the VRA was—and the purpose of civil rights activists 
should be—minority empowerment, not just minority legislative presence.134 She has 
argued that the current interpretation of the VRA (to protect majority-minority 
districts seemingly at the expense of all other protections) has “‘inescapably closed 
the door’ on the real goal of the civil rights movement, which was to alter the material 
condition of the lives of America’s subjugated minorities.”135 Whether the door is 
closed is debatable, but the research in The Color of Representation shows that 
remedies other than SMDs will need to be used with more frequency if we are to 
improve the substantive representation of communities of color. 
A third criticism is leveled by the national organization FairVote, which has 
long argued that one of the main problems with majority-minority districts is that 
they “require the continuation of some degree of housing segregation that 
concentrates minority populations within easily drawn boundaries.”136 They 
elaborate: 
                                                 
129  Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17 (2009) (“We find support for the majority-minority requirement in 
the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration. The rule draws 
clear lines for courts and legislatures alike. The same cannot be said of a less exacting standard that 
would mandate crossover districts under § 2.”). 
130  Cameron et al., supra note 127, at 809. 
131  ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 21 
(1987); Voting Rights Trap: The Resegregation of the Political Process, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1985.  
132  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 81. 
133  Id. at 64. 
134  Id. at 55. 
135  Id. at 54. 
136  Robert Richie, Douglas Amy & Frederick McBride, New Means for Political Empowerment: 
Proportional Voting, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 1, 10, as reprinted in 
How Proportional Representation Can Empower Minorities and the Poor, PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION LIBR.,  https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/empower.htm (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2015). 
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[A SMD system] has been effective for racial minorities and has remedied thousands 
of minority vote dilution lawsuits and dramatically increased racial minority 
representation where it has been applied. However, the effectiveness of majority-
minority districts as voting rights remedy is dependent upon the geographic 
concentration of racial minorities. Geographic dispersion can limit majority-minority 
districts to fewer seats than a given racial minority’s share of population. Even where 
districts provide an effective remedy in the short-term, they may not adequately 
represent the jurisdiction’s diversity after its demography changes. Finally, many 
racial minority voters will be unable to elect preferred candidates when not living in 
majority-minority districts.137 
viii. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Latino Population 
SMDs do not increase descriptive representation for Latinos as much as they 
do for blacks and may actually decrease Latino descriptive representation. 
Latinos are not as segregated from whites or from other minority groups as are 
Blacks.138 This means that there are fewer places where it is even possible to draw a 
Latino majority-minority district. This is one of the major reasons why Latinos are 
more underrepresented than Blacks. Since the 1980s, Latinos have moved from more-
segregated to less-segregated areas, becoming more integrated with both white and 
Black Americans.139  
In addition, any attempt to enfranchise minority communities must take into 
account varying levels of citizenship and political incorporation.140 Even in 
communities where there are a significant number of Latinos who are American 
citizens, they may be still new enough to the country that they lack the social 
networks and community knowledge to run a successful campaign141 (and the 
community may be more resistant, especially in local races where candidates often 
run on a platform of how long they and their families have been in the community). 
In a city with low levels of citizenship and political incorporation, there may be one 
viable candidate and just enough Latino citizens across the city to elect that person, 
with a fair representation electoral system rather than SMDs with winner-take-all 
plurality voting system providing the only likelihood of that happening.  
The scenario of the city with a high number of Latino noncitizens represents a 
particularly important case for minority representation. In a single-member-district 
system, each candidate may not have enough Latino citizens to ever be concerned 
with the interests of Latinos because they do not influence his or her chances for re-
election. A system that allowed at least one Latino representative to be elected would 
then give that population some chance of having a voice.  
                                                 
137  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
supra note 112. 
138  Paru Shah, Racing Toward Representation: A Hurdle Model of Latino Incorporation, 38 AM. POL. RES. 
84, 87. (2010). 
139  See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3. 
140  Id. at 88–89.  
141  Id. at 90.  
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ix. Problems with Majority-Minority Districts for the Asian American 
Population 
SMDs with winner-take-all plurality voting are even more problematic for the 
Asian American population, because their population is comparatively low 
throughout the country, making it hard to draw majority Asian American districts in 
most places.142 New York City elections provide the clearest example of how SMDs 
have failed the Asian American population. The use of ranked choice voting in New 
York City school board elections from 1970 to 1999 led to descriptive representation 
of Asian Americans, “many with almost exclusive support from Asian American 
voters.”143 This result provided a “stark contrast” with the experiences of Asian 
American candidates in elections for other legislative bodies representing New York 
(that do not use ranked choice voting): in the late 1990s, “[e]ven with 800,000 Asian 
Americans, though there [we]re fifteen Asian American elected officials in the school 
boards, no Asian ha[d] been elected to the city council, state legislature, or 
Congress.”144 
C. Remedying Minority Vote Dilution: Fair Representation Systems 
Given the myriad of potential problems with using SMDs to improve minority 
representation, I recommend the use of “fair representation systems” to overcome 
these boundaries. Fair representation systems used in the United States include 
cumulative and ranked choice voting (where used with MMDs). Overall, fair 
representation systems ensure that “a majority cannot control the outcome of every 
seat up for election. Instead, they ensure that the majority wins the most seats, but 
guarantee[s] access to representation for those in the minority.”145 
Cumulative voting was used to elect the Illinois House of Representatives for 
more than a century (1870–1980)146 and was initially enacted to ensure that the 
minority party would have representation in a politically polarized state.147 
Cumulative voting is currently used in local elections in Alabama, California, Illinois, 
                                                 
142  California’s 49th state legislative district is the first majority Asian American state legislative district 
outside of Hawaii. See Daniela Gerson, California’s First Asian Majority Legislative District, ALHAMBRA 
SOURCE (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.alhambrasource.org/stories/californias-first-asian-majority-
legislative-district. 
143  Magpantay, supra note 48, at 739, 773. This history led to the Department of Justice, in 1999, denying 
preclearance to a state law seeking to replace ranked choice voting for the school boards. Ultimately, 
school boards were shifted to not being elected at all, which is why ranked choice voting is not used in 
the city today. 
144  Id. 
145  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
supra note 112.   
146  Black Representation Under Cumulative Voting in IL, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=419 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
147  Effectiveness of Fair Representation Voting Systems for Racial Minority Voters, FAIRVOTE (Jan. 2015), 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/fairvote/pages/127/attachments/original/1449690096/Fair-
Representation-Systems-Voting-Rights.pdf?1449690096. 
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New York, South Dakota, and Texas,148 and ranked choice voting was previously used 
at the local level in Ohio and New York and is currently used in California, Maine, 
Minnesota, and Massachusetts.149 Overall, more than 100 jurisdictions in the United 
States currently use fair representation voting to elect their representatives.150  
Fair representation systems not only improve many measures of minority 
representation, but they also lead to improved democratic outcomes generally.  
i. Improved Minority Representation 
First and foremost, for my purposes, the benefit of fair representation systems 
is that they allow people of color to elect candidates of their choice, where winner-
take-all, at-large systems would, and SMD systems may, prevent them from doing so. 
As FairVote found, “in a study of 96 elections in 62 jurisdictions with cumulative 
voting or the single vote, black candidates were elected 96 percent of the time and 
Latino candidates 70 percent of the time when a black or Latino candidate ran.”151 
In New York:  
African Americans, [Latinos], and Asian Americans made up 37 to 47 percent of [the] 
City’s population during the three decades in which it used [ranked choice] voting for 
its school board elections. The minority groups won 35 percent to 57 percent of these 
positions, compared to only 5 percent to 25 percent of seats on the city council, which 
were elected using single-member districts.152 
During a period when the South elected zero Black representatives to Congress and 
State legislatures, Illinois’s cumulative voting system meant that at all times from 
1894 to 1980 there was at least one Black legislator in the Illinois House (and in most 
years there were many more than that) despite the Black population in the state 
averaging roughly fourteen percent throughout that period.153  
                                                 
148  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 835 (2013); 
Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting, FAIRVOTE, 
http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=2101 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
149  Id. at 835. 
149  Fair Representation and the Voting Rights Act: Remedies for Racial Minority Vote Dilution Claims, 
supra note 112. In addition, many corporations in the US (about ten percent of the S&P 500) use 
cumulative voting to elect their boards, including AON, Toys ‘R’ Us, Walgreen’s, and Hewlett-Packard. 
See also Cumulative Voting—A Commonly Used Proportional Representation Method, FAIRVOTE, 
http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=226. 
151  Effectiveness of Fair Representation Voting Systems for Racial Minority Voters, supra note 147. See also 
David Brockington et al., Minority Representation Under Cumulative and Limited Voting, 60 J. OF POL. 
1108, 1115 (1998); Steven Hill & Rob Richie, New Means for Political Empowerment in the Asian 
Pacific American Community, 11 HARV. J. ASIAN AM. POL’Y REV. 335, 340 (2001) (citing election of Bobby 
Agee in Chilton County, AL despite being outspent twenty to one by the highest spending candidate).  
152  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 849 (citations omitted). 
153  See, e.g., Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 
to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United 
States 50–51 tbl. 14 (U.S. Census Bureau Population Div., Working Paper No. 76, 2005) (listing 
statistical population information by demographic for large cities in Illinois from 1840 to 1990); 
Kathryn M. Harris, Generations of Pride: African American Timeline, A Selected Chronology, ILL. HIST. 
PRESERVATION AGENCY, https://www.illinois.gov/ihpa/Research/Pages/GenPrideAfAm.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2016) (detailing the chronology of African American presence in Illinois). 
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Where fair representation systems have been implemented to remedy a Section 
2 violation, the system has resulted in communities of color being able to elect their 
candidates of choice and has improved descriptive representation. This has been 
shown for the Black, Latino, and Native American communities.154 
Ranked choice voting (RCV)) provides additional value for racial and ethnic 
minorities. Because it creates incentives for candidates to reach out to more voters, 
it tends to result in less racially polarized campaign tactics and more inclusion for 
racial minority voters. Even in single-winner, winner-take-all elections, ranked 
choice voting appears to have an impact. For example, the imposition of ranked choice 
voting in San Francisco and Oakland led to the first Asian American mayor being 
elected in San Francisco and to the first Asian American—and first female—mayor 
being elected in Oakland.155 In San Francisco, of eighteen offices elected by RCV, 
sixteen are held by people of color—up from nine when RCV was first used in 2004.156 
The ability of communities of color to elect candidates of their choice in fair 
representation systems is not limited to groups that are residentially segregated, 
which, as Nicholas Stephanopoulos has argued, is more equitable because “[s]patially 
dispersed groups are just as deserving of representation” as segregated ones.157 This 
ability also means that all members of a community of color in a jurisdiction can have 
a say in who is elected to represent that community of color, rather than just those 
people of color that happen to live in the majority-minority district.  
ii. Cross-Racial Coalition Building 
As well as improving descriptive representation and allowing communities of 
color to elect candidates of their choice, fair representation systems have also been 
shown to foster the construction of cross-racial coalitions among both voters and 
legislators.158 This is particularly true for RCV, given that voters have every incentive 
                                                 
154  FairVote’s Amicus Curiae Brief Regarding Proposed Remedial Plans at 17–18, Montes v. City of 
Yakima, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1377 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (No. 12-3108) (citing Richard Engstrom, Cumulative 
and Limited Voting: Minority Electoral Opportunities and More, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 97, 125 
(2010) (describing the first Latino representative)) (citing Robert R. Brischetto & Richard L. Engstrom, 
Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas Communities, 78 SOC. SCI. 
Q. 973, 975 (1997) (describing the first Latino and Native American representatives)) (citing Richard H. 
Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 272–
73 (describing the first Black representative)). 
155  About the Mayor, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., http://sfmayor.org/about-mayor (last visited Nov. 18, 2016); 
Tina Trenkner, Oakland, Calif. Elects First Female, Asian-American Mayor, GOVERNING (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/oakland-california-elects-first-female-asian-american-
mayor.html. But see Troy M. Yoshino, Still Keeping the Faith: Asian Pacific Americans, Ballot 
Initiatives, and the Lessons of Negotiated Rulemaking, 6 ASIAN AM. L. J. 1, 19–20, 22 (1999). Yoshino 
discussing the fact that in many places the Asian American community will be too small to reach the 
threshold of exclusion. This is less relevant in Illinois because there are local jurisdictions with an 
Asian American population much greater than the three percent he writes of. 
156  Richard DeLeon & Arend Lijphart, In Defense of Ranked Choice Voting, SFGATE (Jan. 22, 2013, 6:49 
PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/In-defense-of-ranked-choice-voting-4215299.php. 
157  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 847, n.3. 
158  FairVote’s Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 154, at 16 (citing Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A 
Remedial Map for the Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. 
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to rank candidates outside their own racial group (in addition to selecting their 
preferred candidate in the number one position). Even when voters in a racial 
minority are below the threshold of exclusion necessary to elect their most preferred 
candidate, their second choice vote will be sought after by multiple candidates, 
possibly from a variety of racial, ethnic, and political backgrounds.  
iii. Increased Representation for All Political Minorities 
Fair representation systems show huge benefits to racial minorities, but they 
may also “open up the political process for politically cohesive minorities, not just 
racial minorities.”159 In addition to the minority political party being able to gain 
representation, other demographic minorities can also have a better chance at being 
elected.  For example, alternative election systems can lead to greater diversity by 
gender, age, religion, sexuality, or country of origin, depending on the communities 
of interest in the jurisdiction. 
iv. Reduced Partisan Polarization 
Cumulative voting in Illinois historically increased “the variance of the policy 
views held by both Democratic and Republican members of the state house.”160 This 
holds not just historically for Illinois but has also been suggested as a way to reduce 
polarization across the board in modern America: “[i]f one’s greatest concern in a . . . 
legislature is partisan gridlock, multi-member districts could potentially ease the 
partisan feuding by making each party more ideologically diverse.”161 
v. Improved civic engagement 
Fair representation systems can lead to improved civic engagement by 
communities of color. For example, a study of cumulative voting “found that their 
elections feature higher turnout, more active campaigning by candidates, greater 
mobilization by outside groups, and more contested races than either single-member 
districts or at-large regimes” and “voters worldwide in preferential systems [for 
example, ranked choice voting] exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy and are 
more likely to believe their elections are conducted fairly.”162 
 
                                                 
REV. 1867, 1903 (1999)) (citing Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the 
United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 297 (1995)). 
159  GUINIER, supra note 35, at 71. 
160  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 855. 
161  Id. (quoting Greg D. Adams, Legislative Effects of Single-Member Vs. Multi-Member Districts, 40 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 129, 141–42 (1996); see also Gary W. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral 
Systems, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 903, 927 (1990) (“In multimember districts, cumulation promotes a 
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162  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 851–52. 
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vi. Removal of Race Conscious Districting 
While many racial justice advocates do not accept that redistricting should 
avoid being race conscious, there are skeptics in the community and on the Supreme 
Court163 of an over-zealous focus on race in redistricting164 and in remedying past 
discrimination generally.165 For these critics, fair representation systems may be 
more acceptable than SMD systems because they “do not compel any consideration of 
race in their design or operation. They promise levels of minority representation 
comparable to those produced by Section 2, but without any of the ‘dividing’ and 
‘segregating’ that are sometimes linked to the provision.”166  
IV. APPLYING THE THEORY: THREE CASE STUDIES 
Armed with the knowledge that I could help my community by improving 
minority representation, in particular through the use of fair representation systems, 
I set out to find communities to work with on these important issues.  
The overwhelming lesson from these efforts was that creating change at the 
local level is tough but possible. Some of the constraints include that there are limited 
resources to support local organizing efforts; the central authorities are powerful and 
able to control, or even manipulate, the ballot initiative process, and litigation is 
costly and time consuming. In this section, I present three stories from communities 
that I have worked with on minority representation issues. None can be considered a 
complete success, but all show that there is some hope for positive change if attorneys 
and community members work hard together toward common goals. 
A. Joliet…The Dice Were Loaded from the Start 
Joliet is the fourth largest city in Illinois, with a population of almost one 
hundred and fifty thousand people.167 The heart of Joliet is about an hour’s train ride 
southwest of downtown Chicago. Joliet has seen a large increase in its minority 
population from 1990 to 2010. As of the 2010 Census, Joliet was approximately fifty-
three percent white, twenty-eight percent Latino, sixteen percent Black, and two 
percent Asian American.168 It had eight council members, of which two were Black, 
                                                 
163  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Schs. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
164  See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993). 
165  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
166  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 908–12 (1994); Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 849.  
  
167  Quick Facts: Joliet City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/1738570 (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).  
168  Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html (last 
updated Feb. 10, 2016) (All numbers reported in this section are calculated using the following Census 
demographics: “white:” non-Hispanic white; “Latino:” Hispanic or Latino origin; “Black:” non-Hispanic 
Black plus non-Hispanic Black+White; “Asian American:” non-Hispanic Asian plus non-Hispanic 
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and six were non-Hispanic white. The city council was chosen from five single-
member districts (of which two were majority-minority) and three council members 
were elected at-large. I have been privileged to work with the Concerned Citizens of 
Joliet (CCJ) and Jorge Sanchez of the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund. Jorge and I have attended multiple local meetings, discussions, 
education sessions, church events, and fairs to discuss redistricting with the local 
community. By 2014, Joliet was ready for change. 
The CCJ is a multi-generational, multi-ethnic, multi-religious organization 
that focuses on helping all the people of Joliet—not just the wealthy elites. CCJ 
worked effectively as a diverse coalition to prevent a for-profit immigration detention 
prison from being erected in Joliet. High from their victory on this important issue, 
the group set out to tackle a new issue. The CCJ decided that they could not 
sufficiently hold their city council accountable for its policy positions and suspected 
that the redistricting system was to blame. 
CCJ sensed that the redistricting system was unfair, with almost all of the city 
council members living in the tiny (and comparatively wealthy) “Cathedral District”, 
leaving the south, east, and west sides all without a council member close to them. 
This resulted, they believed, in an unequal distribution of resources (trash and snow 
are quickly cleaned up in the center of town, but left for days on the outskirts; the 
center of town has its parks upgraded while the edge of town has chain link fences 
and broken playground equipment); and there was a lack of awareness of the concerns 
of the outlying areas, in particular those that pertain to the Black and Latino 
communities.  
The CCJ developed a campaign “Joliet for 8 districts,” seeking to place an 
initiative on the ballot asking the city to vote to have eight single-member districts. 
In 2016, the CCJ submitted their signatures for this proposition for the third time, 
and for a third time were blocked from the ballot. There have been a series of 
roadblocks to their community action, well beyond the usual struggles of a meagerly 
funded volunteer group seeking to create change. 
One initial challenge I faced as a practitioner was that the CCJ had already 
decided that they wanted eight SMDs. I had wanted to articulate the benefits of 
ranked choice voting and MMDs (at least for the three already at-large seats), but the 
community found that option to be foreign to its experiences, and the community had 
already decided that having council members be geographically spread across the 
town was of prime importance to them. This experience led me to refine the ways I 
present ranked choice voting discussions to community groups and helped me to 
understand that there is more to representation than just descriptive and substantive 
issues—spatial patterns (of communities and candidates) are intertwined with our 
beliefs about effective representation. 
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i. The Ballot Initiative Strategy 
To place an initiative on the ballot in Illinois, a home rule county,169 a group 
must gather the number of signatures equal to eight percent of the vote in that 
jurisdiction for governor in the most recent election. In 2014, when the CCJ first 
gathered signatures, the local authorities were not able to determine how many 
signatures they actually required because the gubernatorial vote is collected at the 
precinct and county level, and the city crosses two counties and splits some twenty 
precincts.  
A local citizen—with connections to the incumbent council members—
challenged the signatures gathered by the CCJ in 2014, resulting in the challenger, 
the CCJ (and Jorge and I with them), and the authorities holding a week of hearings 
and signature review sessions to determine whether the CCJ had met the statutory 
signature requirement. The most farcical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, aspect 
of the whole week was that the local review board (staffed, by Illinois statute, by the 
mayor, a current city council member, and the city attorney)170 was informed that we 
would not be told how many signatures needed to be gathered until the number of 
signatures had been counted. Somewhat unsurprisingly, it turned out, a week later, 
that the number of signatures needed was just a few hundred more than those that 
had been validated. In addition to this, another questionable legal decision was made 
by the city council member on the local review board: he refused to recuse himself 
despite the fact he was elected from one of the three at-large positions and therefore 
subject to be removed if the ballot initiative went ahead and was approved.  
Aside from the review board process, the room where signatures were validated 
quickly degenerated into a power play, as the county staff members claimed that 
people who had moved away from the address where they signed the petition could 
not be counted as a valid signature. The Illinois statutes are unclear on this point, so 
it was left to the local review board to decide how to interpret the law, resulting—
again unsurprisingly—with those signatures being considered invalid. 
One of the volunteer signature gatherers with the CCJ had toured a local short-
term housing facility, Evergreen Terrace, to gather hundreds of signatures. Another 
CCJ member was a pastor to this community, and the residents there represent 
exactly the people that CCJ was trying to enfranchise (poor, predominantly minority, 
often sick and/or struggling with homelessness). Many of these residents of Evergreen 
Terrace had moved since signing the petition (the signature gathering had been going 
for around nine months by the time the signatures were reviewed). The review board 
decision meant that hundreds of signatures from these eligible voters were 
invalidated.  
At the lowest ebb in the signature review week, I sat with one of the Latino 
leaders of the CCJ as she listened to the staff laugh at the “hard to pronounce names” 
of her neighbors, get confused as to whether someone was a duplicate signatory 
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170  10 ILCS § 10–9(3). 
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because the Latino “names were so similar,” and joke about how they had not 
bothered to learn Spanish in school.  
After this unfair and, frankly, humiliating process, the CCJ pulled themselves 
back together to try to put the issue on the next ballot, in the local elections for 2015, 
but with the bulk of signature gathering occurring during the freezing winter months, 
they were unable to reach the target number of signatures. 
In August 2016, the CCJ again submitted nearly four thousand signatures. 
They still did not know exactly how many signatures were needed because one of the 
two counties that Joliet sits in refused to respond to multiple letters requesting the 
target number. The estimate in the previous hearing was around 2,800. 
The current mayor of Joliet was previously a council member and he had 
signed the 2014 petition to place the question on the ballot—he believed the people 
should get to vote on the question. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the petition was 
challenged (this time by the county clerk herself), and despite excellent pro bono 
representation from a large Chicago firm, the CCJ again lost their bid to place the 
question on the ballot. 
In response to the outcry over the third petition being rejected, the Mayor 
appointed a Latina to the City Council.  The person has no connection to CCJ or the 
communities they represent, and so it remains to be seen whether this will be a step 
forward or backward for minority representation in Joliet. 
ii. Litigation 
The demographics have changed in Joliet since 2010. In particular, many of 
the Latino community has turned 18 or gained citizenship, such that even in 2015, 
there was a large enough Latino and Black citizen voting age population that if they 
continued to vote together to elect candidates of their choice, three majority-minority 
districts could be drawn. There is no doubt that with updated census data, this figure 
will rise. 
It is likely that the CCJ will have a viable Section 2 case if the Latina that was 
appointed to the Council is not elected to her position (and in particular if she is not 
elected with evidence of racially polarized voting), but with VRA litigation being so 
complex, expensive, and time intensive, it is unlikely that the VRA will provide a 
change for the CCJ members before the next census is taken. The CCJ will need to 
get the resources for political science experts, discovery, and court fees to show that 
if the city were divided into eight districts, three would be majority-minority (without 
race predominating in the drawing of the districts).  
It is quite possible that by the time the next full census results are released in 
2021, Joliet will be majority-minority—perhaps even using the Citizen Voting Age 
Population (CVAP). This could result in a bizarre reversal of incentives by the 
majority white council members. For white voters to be represented at close to 
proportional level in a majority-minority town, the city council would favor removing 
the at-large seats. If it came to this, at least the CCJ would have their preference for 
council members who live closer to their constituents realized, even if it takes 
nefarious reasoning to get there. 
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B. An Accidental Win in Blue Island 
Blue Island is a small city immediately south of the border of Chicago. It has a 
population of just over twenty-three thousand, of which twenty-one percent are white, 
forty-seven percent are Latino, and thirty percent are Black.171 When CVAP is used, 
the white population grows to twenty-nine percent, the Black population grows to 
thirty-eight percent, while the Latino population drops to just thirty percent. Blue 
Island, like Chicago to its north, is still fairly segregated, particularly for the Black 
community. 
i. Pushing for Public Hearings 
In 2015, when we172 met with the Citizens in Action Serving All (CASA) group 
in Blue Island, there were seven two-member districts constituting their council. Of 
the fourteen members, two were Latino and two Black. There was no majority Latino 
district and only two majority Black districts.  
We spent a few weekends sitting down with local community members, 
showing them the mapping capabilities of Maptitude for Redistricting and discussing 
where they would prefer the district lines to be drawn. We had to consciously remind 
the excited rooms that it was not likely that we would be able to get the Council to 
adopt the plan we wanted, but that knowing what the districts are and could be would 
be helpful in itself. 
As we suspected, we were able to draw a plan using the most recent CVAP 
data, with three majority Black districts and one majority Latino district. We then 
needed a way to convince the council (or a court) to adopt a new plan. Blue Island 
does not have home rule, so it was not possible to use a ballot initiative to create 
change. Strangely, Blue Island had not redrawn its city council districts since 1996, 
and as two census counts had come and gone, the districts were in violation of the one 
person, one vote (OPOV) requirement of the federal Constitution.173 We were able to 
use this as leverage to ask the council to hold public hearings to redraw the seven 
districts, and the CASA group advocated for the plan with four majority-minority 
districts. 
After two months of Council hearings and public hearings of the Council’s 
Redistricting Subcommittee to discuss possible district plans, the City Council 
surprised no one by voting to adopt its own district plan. The major difference 
between the CASA plan and the city council plan was that the latter protected 
incumbents, while the former was drawn without regard for current council members. 
CASA opposed the protection of incumbents at the public hearings, but the council 
opted to protect its self-interest in its vote. 
                                                 
171  Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), supra note 168. All numbers are reported for 
non-Hispanic white, Latino, non-Hispanic Black plus non-Hispanic Black+White. Other races and 
ethnicities make up the remainder of the population, but are not reported here. American Community 
Survey 2010–2014 
https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html. 
172  My colleague Annabelle Harless and I worked with CASA together throughout the work in Blue Island. 
173  Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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By good fortune (and the not-unexpected increase in the proportion of Blue 
Island that is Black or Latino), the new CVAP data (the 2011–15 estimates) was 
released by the Census Bureau a few days before the council’s final vote. CASA was 
able to tell the council before their vote that even though they disliked that the plan 
protected incumbents, they were pleased that it too had three majority Black and one 
majority Latino district. The next election in Blue Island will now include four of 
seven districts with a majority of people of color. Hopefully the communities of color 
can respond to this good news by electing their preferred candidates across the city. 
ii. Online Public Redistricting 
Another notable aspect of our work in Blue Island was that we decided to use 
a free trial of a service called iRedistrict,174 to make map drawing available to the 
community online. iRedistrict’s main power as a piece of software is its ability to draw 
random simulations of districts. We were using it for a slightly different purpose: to 
allow the public to make changes to the old redistricting plan, or the CASA plan, or 
to create their own new plan, and to see the demographic effects of such changes in 
real time.  
In addition to using iRedistrict, we placed Keyhole Markup Language (KMZ) 
files and descriptions of data onto the Google Maps Engine, and thereby made the 
statistics (and boundaries) of current, and various proposed plans, available to 
anyone with a network connection (we also displayed these tools at the Redistricting 
Committee Public Hearings). 
The community was reluctant to embrace iRedistrict, likely because the editing 
aspect of the software had sufficient bugs as to make the map drawing process quite 
frustrating for the casual user. In total, we only had seven users sign up to use the 
online map drawing software.  
To our surprise though, the Google Maps Engine districts and statistics were 
viewed over one thousand times and used by local media in their reporting of the case. 
Each public hearing had around thirty, and at times more than fifty, people in 
attendance (largely thanks to letter box pamphlets distributed by Mark and Kathy 
Kuehner of CASA). I believe we showed that there is an interest, even in a small 
community considering very local issues, in using online tools to better understand 
local government, and it is likely that this interest can be harnessed and enlarged 
through online organizing tools. 
Overall, Blue Island was a success to the extent that CASA and the community 
will now have districts that are constitutional and will have the possibility of electing 
candidates of choice of the minority community to a majority of the council seats. Blue 
Island also showed the utility of online redistricting tools in community organizing 
                                                 
174  See iRedistric®: Smart Redistricting Software for Territory Mapping with Powerful Optimization, 
ZILLION INFO, http://zillioninfo.com/product/iRedistrict (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (iRedistrict® is an 
award-winning redistricting software with powerful optimization algorithms, intuitive user controls, 
easy editing interface, and customizable reporting. It received two National Science Foundation (NSF) 
SBIR Awards in 2013 and 2014.). 
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around this issue. We were not able to prevent council members from focusing on 
their own self-interest in their vote for new districts, but very few jurisdictions are 
ever able to achieve such a feat. 
C. Crete-Monee School Board Ten Years On 
In our research into local redistricting in Illinois, we tried to find success 
stories—places where minority representation had increased and the community was 
in a better place because of it. We reviewed all the prior Section 2 cases from Illinois 
and thought that the Crete-Monee School District case looked particularly promising.  
Crete-Monee School District had been sued in the late 1980s175 over a possible 
Section 2 violation. By the mid-1990s, the case eventually resulted in a consent 
decree, and as a result the board started electing Black representatives to the school 
board.176 As of March 2017, the school board has three Black and four white members, 
and the president is an African American.177 
We set up a meeting with Dr. Hall, the president of the school board, to find 
out all the ways that the diverse board was helping the community. Dr. Hall agreed 
that the diverse board was better able to ensure racial equity in the school policies 
and procedures, and the district report card suggests the district is at or just below 
average on most statewide metrics,178 but Dr. Hall lamented that the diverse board 
had not resulted in better racial relations in the community. In 2015, the district 
successfully defended against a challenge to part of the consent decree, and not-at-all 
subtle racial overtones were used in local school board election campaigns (one 
campaign sought to “change the face” of the school board). 
V. THE ROAD AHEAD 
As long as there are communities willing to push for change to local 
redistricting practices, we practitioners must make ourselves aware of the best 
possible strategies and tactics we can use to help communities seek better outcomes. 
A. Federal Litigation 
Federal Section 2 litigation can be pursued to remedy the most egregious cases 
of minority vote dilution, where the minority population in question is geographically 
concentrated. 
 
                                                 
175  Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 1995). 
176  Consent Decree – Agreed Order 08/13/1998, CRETE-MONEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 201-U, 
http://www.cm201u.org/index.aspx?nid=4146.  
177  See Crete-Monee School District 201-U Board of Education, CRETE-MONEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 201-U, 
http://www.cm201u.org/index.aspx?NID=139 (last visited March 6, 2017). 
178  See, e.g., Crete-Monee CUSD 201 U. ILL. REPORT CARD (2015–2016), 
http://illinoisreportcard.com/District.aspx?districtId=56099201U26. 
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B. Section 2 Remedies 
A jurisdiction found to violate Section 2 is able to choose how it will remedy the 
violation179 and, with the approval of the court, can then implement the new system. 
In many cases, jurisdictions choose to adopt SMDs, but not in every case. Recently, a 
defendant in Port Chester, New York, was able to implement cumulative voting to 
remedy a Section 2 violation, over the objection of the plaintiff.180 Many jurisdictions 
in Alabama that were forced to change from at-large elections after the long running 
Dillard litigation chose to adopt cumulative or single voting in the 1980s and 
1990s.181 
Thus far, no jurisdiction has chosen to adopt ranked choice voting in response 
to a Section 2 violation. However, it was requested (and approved by the court) as a 
remedy to a potential Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act) 
violation in Alabama in 2013,182 and it was used for overseas voters in a similar way 
in four additional states in 2014 (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina).183 
Pam Karlan has argued since 1989 that Section 2 remedies can be innovative 
and non-traditional.184 She explains: 
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable 
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies . . . . Congress squarely stated that a court faced with a violation 
of Section 2 must ‘exercise its traditional equitable powers so that it completely 
remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal 
opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their 
choice.’ A court faced with a violation ‘cannot authorize a remedy . . . that will not 
with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation.’185 
 
Courts have rejected remedies that have been proposed by defendants and explained 
how options provided by the plaintiff will remedy the section violation better,186 but 
ultimately the defendant is able to determine the remedy for a Section 2 violation. 
The remedies in Alabama included not only cumulative voting but also an increase 
in the number of commissioners from four to seven and the institution of a system 
whereby the commission chairmanship would rotate between commissioners, 
                                                 
179  Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2000). 
180  United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
181  Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 241, 263–66 (1995).  
182  United States v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2015). 
183  Dania N. Korkor, Overseas Voters from 5 States to Use Ranked Choice Voting Ballots in 2014 
Congressional Election, FAIRVOTE BLOG (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/blog/overseas-voters-from-5-states-to-use-ranked-choice-voting-ballots-in-2014-congressional-
election/. 
184  Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution 
Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 173, 218–19 (1989). 
185  Id. at 219. 
186  See Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 831 F.2d 246, 250–253 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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allowing a Black commissioner to occasionally be chairman, if one had been elected.187 
These provisions were implemented upon the recommendation of a “special master,” 
a magistrate with the federal court. The Supreme Court’s finding in Holder v. Hall 
has now limited the ability of a court to impose a remedy requiring an increase in the 
number of districts in an election jurisdiction in response to a Section 2 violation,188 
but there has been no limitation on the type of election system that can be used to 
remedy a Section 2 violation. 
The most promising avenue to use to argue for fair representation systems 
comes from the myriad of cases that have dealt with the question of imposing a 
remedy to a statewide redistricting violation. In these cases, defendants have argued 
that particular proposed remedial plans do not fully remedy the constitutional or 
statutory error. The remedial phase of redistricting cases is within the court’s 
equitable jurisdiction, and since 1972 the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
“scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”189 Though broad, “[t]he 
remedial powers of an equity court . . . are not unlimited.”190 It is the court’s duty to 
navigate between seeking a remedy to an unconstitutional redistricting plan and 
minimizing the disturbance of legitimate state policies.191  
There are cases where courts have explicitly overruled the imposition of 
remedies by the legislature, and these cases should be used to push for fair 
representation remedies. In one case, the reason the Court chose to draw its own plan 
was because the Court found that “[i]n its record of doggedly clinging to an obviously 
unconstitutional plan, the Legislature has left us no basis for believing that, given 
yet another chance, it would produce a constitutional plan.”192 In that case, the Court 
explained that it could not “turn a blind eye on the record of the Legislature.”193  
In addition to the difficulties at the remedies phase, additional difficulties of 
federal Section 2 litigation include:194 
 “[v]oting rights suits are actually among the most time- and labor-intensive 
of all actions brought before the federal courts;”195 
 attorneys’ fees do not necessarily follow from a victory and the cost of 
litigating a Section 2 case is extremely high; and 
                                                 
187  Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007). 
188  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
189  Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 191 (1972) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).  
190  Id. (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 199 (1971)). 
191  Id. at 202. 
192  Hays v. State of La., 936 F. Supp. 360, 372 (W.D. La. 1996). 
193  Id. 
194  See Paige Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through State Voting Rights Acts (U. Chi. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 474, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422915; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The 
South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55 (2013). 
195  Stephanopoulos, supra note 148, at 850. 
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 the defendant is allowed to choose how to remedy a violation and so can 
implement a new election system that meets a bare minimum requirement of 
representation of the minority population. 
C. State Voting Rights Acts 
Given the potential difficulties associated with federal Section 2 litigation, 
implementing a state voting rights act (and then suing in state courts) may be a better 
alternative in some states. 
California has instituted a remedy to alleviate some of the problems of Section 
2 litigation by enacting a California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) that makes it cheaper 
and easier to prove that a local government’s election system impermissibly dilutes 
the votes of the minority community. The CVRA does not require fair representation 
remedies, but such systems could be imposed as a remedy in future state acts.196 
An additional benefit of developing a state level jurisprudence on minority vote 
dilution is that it can fill the gaps left in the current Section 2 jurisprudence. For 
example, the Gingles criteria for Section 2 liability are based on the assumption that 
SMDs are the appropriate benchmark for minority vote dilution when, in fact, the 
SMD requirement effectively overlooks the dilution of non-compact minority 
populations. As a result, a place where a crossover district can be drawn (districts 
where a racial minority votes as a bloc with a small amount of support from the white 
majority, resulting in the candidate of choice of the racial minority being elected) will 
not establish liability under Section 2 and so cannot be required by federal law.  
State Voting Rights Acts can be tailored to local needs, but in all cases if they 
include provisions that explicitly allow for fair representation systems to be imposed 
in response to a violation, and if they make the proving of a violation less burdensome 
than the federal VRA, then they will be a useful tool in the fight for improved minority 
representation in local government. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Striving for fair representation systems in local government is an important 
way to promote minority representation, and thereby fulfill the promise of our 
democracy. I encourage all practitioners to use the ideas and arguments in this paper 
to improve local government across the country.  
 
                                                 
196  For example, Santa Clarita chose to adopt cumulative voting as a settlement to a CVRA lawsuit. Drew 
Spencer, “California City of 180,000 to Provide Cumulative Voting Rights” FairVote Press Release 
(March 12, 2014), http://www.fairvote.org/newsletters-media/e-newsletters/california-city-of-180000-to-
provide-cumulative-voting-rights-/ (last visited March 15, 2015). Note, though, that jurisdictions found 
liable under Section 2 VRA can also choose to adopt cumulative voting, but they cannot be required to 
do so. 

